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SUMMARY 
 
The fear and pain of medical procedures are a source of great distress to 
children.  Techniques such as distraction, relaxation and guided imagery help children 
to cope, and in some cases, have a marked influence on the experience of fear and pain 
during painful medical procedures.  However, the effects, embedded in the 
relationships between consciousness, imagery, fear and pain, are unclear, particularly 
with regard to the clinical (as opposed to the laboratory) reality of procedural pain.  The 
aim of this thesis was to empirically account for the therapeutic effects of distraction, 
relaxation, and imagery on procedural fear and pain in children and to offer a model 
based on a constructive view of experience allied to recent advances in 
neurophysiology that could account for the effects. Two studies were undertaken to 
address this aim.  The first study investigated the effects of cartoon distraction on fear 
and pain in children undergoing venepuncture.  The second study investigated the 
independent and combined effects of relaxation and imagery on fear and pain in 
children also undergoing venepuncture.  The studies indicated that relaxation, 
distraction and imagery reduced procedural fear.  Procedural pain was not affected by 
relaxation but distraction showed positive effects as did imagery, particularly if 
procedural pain was defined in terms of its sensory and emotional components. These 
effects are explained using a model based on a top-down constructivist view of the 
psychology and neurophysiology of fear, pain, imagery and consciousness.  The 
neurophysiological components of the model comprised the amygdala, anterior 
cingulate cortex and association areas within a working memory view of 
consciousness.  The constructivist perspective held that during relaxation the child’s 
cognitive, emotional and sensorial quality were largely based on the ‘reality’ of the 
procedure room, but that during imagery and perhaps distraction, the qualia were 
located elsewhere.  The thesis concludes with the relevance of the model for clinical 
practice and implications for further psychological and neurophysiological research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION 
 
This thesis is about the psychology of fear and pain in children who are 
subjected to painful medical procedures.  It is also an investigation of 
the therapeutic effects of distraction, relaxation and mental imagery in 
the form of guided imagery on procedural fear and pain in children.  
This, the first of 12 chapters, introduces the topic, the theoretical 
framework, the research approach and outlines the structure of the 
thesis. 
 
Significance and Background to the Present Study 
The spectrum of medical treatment of children from a perceived ‘simple immunization’ 
injection to the complexities of chemotherapy frequently involves pain and fear.  Best 
intentions and an improved outcome are no longer sufficient justification for ignoring 
the fear and pain of medical treatment in children.  The term ignore implies denial or 
an intentional lack of concern and describes the attitude of a minority of health 
professionals towards the pain and fear that they inflict on children.  A more apt term, 
stemming from the inadequate education and entrenched practice that reflects the 
majority, is perhaps ignorance.  Many health professionals simply do not know, beyond 
pharmacological interventions, how to manage fear and pain in children.  The problem 
of procedural pain and fear, therefore, traverses education and practice and has an 
added complexity because the recipient of treatment has very little say or choice in the 
matter.  An adult may exercise his or her choice and refuse treatment but children have 
no choice.  The onus is on the health professional to develop ways of delivering 
treatment that reduces harm to the child.  Within the context of this argument, harm 
includes psychological and physical damage.  Best practice demands treatment that 
carries the least risk, is effective and ethically sound.  The challenge and, indeed, 
responsibility for researchers and clinicians treating children is to meet a duty of care 
that includes minimal impact on the child.  In many respects, this represents a change 
in practice.  Any change in practice should be justified and grounded in research.  The 
following scenario illustrates the fear and pain of a medical procedure from the 
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viewpoint of a child; it is commonplace and reflects the need for change.  The purpose 
of this thesis is to investigate the psychology of procedural fear and pain and related 
strategies as vehicles for change. 
 
Imagine for a moment that you are six years old.  You are sitting in a waiting 
room with Mum somewhere in a hospital.  The reason you are there is that 
your doctor has said that you have to have an operation.  You are waiting to 
have a blood test.  Suddenly the nurse calls your name and Mum says, “Come 
on we are next."  You stand up and walk to the window and say,  “Mummy I 
don’t want to have a needle, I’m scared.”  The nurse seems friendly she says, 
“Come on, you’re brave aren’t you?”  As you walk through the door, you feel a 
shiver across your shoulders, you try to swallow but your mouth is dry.  You 
can hear a baby screaming behind a closed door and your hand feels sweaty in 
Mum’s.  The nurse says, “OK, you sit here on Mum’s knee and let’s pull up 
that sleeve.”  The nurse puts a tight stretchy thing high up on your arm and 
then tells Mum to hold your arm out straight.  She says to you, “Now you have 
to hold very still; you will just feel a little pinch.”  Mum is holding you tight; 
you cannot move; tears well in your eyes as a huge wave of fear comes up 
from deep inside.  The nurse wipes your arm with something that smells like 
the hospital.  It is right there in front of you now: the needle.  “Oh No!  Mum I 
don’t want the needle, Please don’t,” you plead.  However, Mum does not say 
anything; she is holding you tight.  The nurse says, “Just a little prick... One, 
Two, Three."  You scream out OWWW as you feel the needle pierce your 
skin.  You look down and say to yourself, “Oh No, she stuck it in me, I’m 
bleeding.”  The nurse is putting the blood in a plastic thing; she then pulls the 
needle out and there is more hurt.  Then she puts a Bandaid® on your arm and 
says, “There you are; all finished, that wasn’t so bad was it."  You turn around 
to cuddle Mum, and see the tears in her eyes.  As you walk out the door the 
nurse says, “2 pm tomorrow OK then?”  You ask, “What does she mean 
tomorrow?”  Mum replies “We have to come back for another test tomorrow." 
 
The foregoing story is intended to illustrate the complexity of thoughts and 
emotions that a young child (and parent) may experience even when undergoing what 
many health professionals would see as a routine or minor procedure.  Anticipation, 
concern, pain, helplessness, fear and anxiety are represented, while for another child, 
the predominant emotion could be anger. 
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There is more to understanding and managing procedural pain than simply 
focussing on the physical sensation.  Pain is, in fact, defined in lay and specialist 
settings in terms that extend beyond the physical sensation.  The Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary (Little, Fowler, Coulson, Onions, & Friedrichsen, 1991) for 
example defines pain as “The opposite of pleasure; the sensation which one feels when 
hurt (in body or mind); suffering, distress” (p. 1494, italics original).  The International 
Association for the Study of Pain (IASP, 1979, pp. 249-252) defines pain as “An 
unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue 
damage or described in terms of such damage”. 
 
The pain felt by children undergoing medical procedures is consistent with both 
of these definitions.  Children certainly suffer and become distressed and their pain has 
sensory and emotional components.  However, the pain of a medical procedure is not 
the same as post-operative pain or the pain of a sporting injury because, generally, the 
child is subjected to procedural pain, in the here and now, at the hands of another, 
indeed, an adult who is socially and legally sanctioned to inflict pain on a child.  In 
many settings, the focus of the health professionals who inflict the pain is only on the 
sensory component because the child’s pain is considered the same as any other pain.  
Even if the sensory component is managed well, then, at best the health professionals 
have managed only part of the problem.  Accompanying the physical sensations are the 
social, cognitive and attendant emotional complexities that make up the experience of 
procedural pain.  These not only serve to amplify the sensation, in some cases they may 
represent the bulk of the child’s pain experience.  The following exemplar, an actual 
case (Whitaker, 1994), illustrates this point. 
 
A ten-year-old boy had presented to the emergency department with a large laceration 
to the inner aspect of his thigh.  He had sustained this injury by sliding down a pole 
that had a nail or something sharp protruding from it.  The laceration was surgical; it 
was clean and deep enough to expose the underlying fatty tissue.  The wound was 
covered with gauze soaked in adrenaline and cocaine to anaesthetize the area. He was 
fairly settled as he waited to go to the procedure room to have his leg sutured.  At the 
time, I was in the emergency department using relaxation therapy with guided imagery 
with children undergoing medical procedures for my masters research.  I accompanied 
the child to the procedure room after an explanation of my intentions and consent from 
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the parents.  I started the process with progressive relaxation, and then we talked about 
his chosen imagery.  He was very apprehensive but started to describe his imagery.  At 
this point, the attending doctor started to inject the lignocaine (local anaesthetic) into 
the wound.  The boy lost his focus on the imagery, opened his eyes and started to 
scream.  He continued screaming as a total of 20ml of lignocaine was infiltrated into 
the tissues in and around the wound.  After a couple of minutes, the doctor began 
suturing.  The boy became very distressed, screamed, and literally cried until the last 
suture was tied.  It is extremely unlikely that he felt much in the way of sensory pain 
with the adrenaline and cocaine and lignocaine.  What he was experiencing though was 
an enormous amount of fear.  The local anaesthetic did nothing for his fear and because 
he lost his focus on his imagery, neither did the imagery.  
 
Such an extremely negative reaction to pain is not inevitable.  The following 
examples (Whitaker, 1994) suggest that imagery may radically alter a child’s 
experience of pain in a range of procedures. 
 
A boy with a large pre-tibial laceration that required six deep and 13 superficial 
sutures entered into his imagery and happily chatted away describing playing at school 
and at home for 45 minutes while the wound was injected with local anaesthetic and 
sutured.  He showed no signs of pain, distress or even concern and actually laughed and 
smiled at times.  Another child imagined that she was in a swimming pool during a 
local anaesthetic, manipulation and plaster (LAMP) to repair a fractured right radius 
and ulnar.  Throughout the procedure, she described swimming, floating and playing in 
the water.  At no stage did she report any subjective experience or show any objective 
sign of pain or distress.  After the procedure, she was asked, “What did you feel during 
the procedure?”  She replied, “I could feel the water lifting me and drifting me”.  
Obviously there was no water present.  The child had an intravenous cannula inserted 
in the back of each hand and the fractures reduced using a Bier’s block.  Another child 
presented to the Emergency Department with part of a sewing machine needle broken 
off and embedded through the nail and flesh of the end of her index finger.  The 
inflamed and painful tip of her finger was injected with local anaesthetic while she was 
in imagery.  No suggestions, direct or indirect, for analgesia, anaesthesia, or even 
altered sensation were given.  She lay on the operating table with her arm stretched out 
on an arm board and quietly described a ride on a chair-lift at a snow field.  She did not 
flinch or move in any way and no change was heard in her voice as the hypodermic 
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needle was inserted into the tip of her inflamed finger and the local anaesthetic 
injected. 
 
The fear and pain of medical procedures from capillary pricks to lumbar 
punctures are a source of great distress to children.  The illustrations clearly indicate 
that children, nonetheless, can cope with such painful procedures in a remarkably 
controlled manner.  Such altered experiences of pain are not confined to the clinical 
setting.  In many cultures, religious initiation ceremonies involve extensive tissue 
damage but the subjects seem oblivious to pain sensations (Anderson & Anderson, 
1994).  Some individuals earn their living by subjecting themselves to levels of tissue 
injury that most would find excruciating but they too, neither report, nor appear to feel 
pain (Greenfield, 2000).  Clearly, there exists a range of situations in which observers 
gain the strong impression that the individual does not “feel” pain.  The focus of this 
thesis is to examine in detail the precise effects that the processes of distraction, 
relaxation and imagery can have on children undergoing painful medical procedures.  
In this examination an attempt will be made to determine the relationship between the 
mechanisms of distraction and imagery on the various sensory, cognitive and emotional 
components that make up a child’s reaction to a painful procedure. 
 
Essentially, the research questions focus on how mental imagery alters the 
experience of fear and pain in children undergoing a painful medical procedure, how 
the effects compare to a distraction technique, such as watching a cartoon video, and, 
where relaxation fits in relation to imagery and distraction.  The aim of this thesis is to 
compare, contrast, and empirically account for the therapeutic effects of distraction, 
relaxation, and imagery on fear and pain in children undergoing painful medical 
procedures.  At the same time, this thesis will offer a model based on a constructive 
view of experience allied to recent advances in neurophysiology that can account for 
the empirical findings in the two studies in this thesis as well as results from other 
studies.  
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Theoretical Framework and Direction 
An understanding of how imagery alters the experience of pain and fear in children 
requires a level of theoretical analysis that encompasses the neurophysiology and 
psychology of pain and emotion (specifically fear), and cognition.  Inevitably, it will 
touch on consciousness and reality.  These are profoundly complex phenomena.  By 
way of introduction, this section offers a general overview of the ideas to be developed 
in this thesis.  A number of complex key concepts are addressed prior to describing and 
reporting the findings of the two studies undertaken in this thesis.  The key concepts, 
nociception, the psychology and neurophysiology of emotion, mental imagery, 
consciousness and ‘reality’ are mapped out in the following section to provide an 
overview of the theoretical framework. 
 
The thesis begins with a synopsis of current knowledge on the transmission and 
modulation of nociceptive input.  Despite the relatively advanced knowledge of spinal 
mechanisms of the transmission and modulation of nociceptive impulses, and 
identification of active brain areas in the experience of pain (Coghill, Sang, Maisog, & 
Iadarola, 1999; Derbyshire & Jones, 1998; Hofbauer, Rainville, Duncan, & Bushnell, 
2001; Hsieh et al., 1995; Treede, Kenshalo, Gracely & Jones, 1999; Willis & Westlund, 
1997) very little is known about how pain is perceived.  Indeed, what ‘perceived’ 
actually means remains an open issue.  The debate is exemplified by the considerable 
diversity of views on the neural correlates of consciousness (Baars, 1996, 1997, 1999; 
Crick & Koch, 2000; Flohr, 2000; Hardcastle, 2000; Posner & Rothbart, 1998; Roth, 
2000). 
 
The psychology of emotion is beset by a plethora of theories (Strongman, 1987, 
1996).  The emotion of primary concern in this thesis is fear because overwhelmingly, 
fear is the emotion that children experience when they are subjected to painful medical 
procedures.  The reviewed theories were selected because of their contextual relevance 
to procedural fear in children.  More is known of the brain neurophysiological 
correlates of fear than any other emotion.  This knowledge has developed out of animal 
studies (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1972; Phillips & LeDoux, 1992; Rasia-Filho, 
Londero, & Achaval, 2000; Weiskrantz, 1956) and brain lesions in humans (Adolphs, 
Russell, & Tranel, 1999; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994, 1995; 
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Anderson & Phelps, 2001).  With the advent of neuroimaging techniques, the 
neurophysiology of fear has focussed on the amygdala, a subcortical, bilateral group of 
nuclei in the limbic forebrain, and its connectivity with other brain regions (Davidson 
& Irwin, 1999; Furmark, Fischer, Wik, Larsson, & Fredrikson, 1997; Lane, Reiman, 
Bradley, Lang, Ahern, Davidson, & Schwartz, 1997; Lane, Reiman, Axelrod, Yun, 
Holmes, & Schwartz, 1998; Lane & Nadel, 2000; LeDoux, 1987; Paradiso, Johnson, 
Anderson, & O’Leary, 1999; Reiman, 1997; Schneider, Grodd, Weiss, Klose, Mayer, 
Nagele, & Gur 1997).  These findings have been incorporated in the model of fear used 
in this thesis.   
 
Novel neuroimaging techniques have also facilitated investigation into the brain 
regions that are active during mental imagery (D'Esposito, Detre, Aguirre, Stallcup, 
Alsop, Tippet, & Farah, 1997; Kosslyn, 1999; Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2000; Mellet, 
Petit, Mazoyer, Denis & Tzourio, 1998; Mellet, Tzourio, Crivello, Joliot, & Denis, 
1996).  Most of the research is on visual imagery and, despite some conflicting results, 
the most likely site of visual mental imagery is the visual association areas of the 
temporal lobe.  Mental imagery is, of course, common to recognised techniques used in 
the psychological reduction of pain such as hypnosis and guided imagery.  The use of 
hypnosis in managing pain and in particular procedural pain in children has been well 
researched over a number of years (Ellis & Spanos, 1994; Genuis, 1995; Katz, 
Kellerman, & Ellenberg, 1987; Kohen & Olness, 1993; Kuttner, 1988, 1989, 1997, 
Kuttner, Bowman, & Teasdale, 1988, LeBaron & Zeltzer, 2001; LeBaron, Zeltzer, & 
Fanurik, 1988; Milling, & Costantino, 2000; Montgomery, DuHamel, & Reid, 2000; 
Smith, Barabasz, & Barabasz, 1996; Wall & Womack, 1989; Zeltzer & LeBaron, 1982, 
1983).  Further detailed research has taken place into the subtleties of direct versus 
indirect suggestion in hypnosis (Fricton & Roth, 1985; Hawkins, Liossi, Ewart, Hatira, 
& Kosmidis, 1998; Lynn, Neufield, & Matyi, 1987; Lynn, Weeks, Matyi, & Neufeld, 
1988; Matthews, 2000; Matthews, Bennett, Bean, & Gallagher, 1985; Matthews, Conti, 
& Starr, 1999;).  Given this large body of research, and the focus on the baseline effects 
of imaging, without suggestions for altered sensation, the decision was made to 
concentrate on imagery in the form of guided imagery rather than hypnosis or a 
combination of the two interventions, which would increase the risk of inadvertent 
crossover in technique.  The subtle but significant differences between guided imagery 
and hypnosis are discussed in Chapter 6.  Although the empirical findings are of 
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primary relevance to imagery, it is anticipated, that they will contribute to the existing 
body of work on hypnosis, particularly the imaging component. 
 
The notion of ‘imaging’ is inextricably linked with consciousness.  The search 
for the neural correlates of consciousness is an area of brain research that has only been 
seriously considered since the 1990s and is very much the subject of ongoing debate 
(Metzinger, 2000).  The task of defining consciousness is, to a large degree, subject to 
practical realities and needs which are discipline based.  Pain and consciousness are 
obviously related and are commonly considered in the field of surgical anaesthesia.  
Indeed, neuroscientist Christof Koch developed an interest in consciousness while 
suffering the pain of a throbbing toothache.  Koch then teamed up with Francis Crick to 
become major contributors in the field of consciousness research (Wakefield, 2001).  
While it seems implausible that in some situations extensive nociceptive input is not 
perceived as pain, clinically, as in the vignettes described above, it happens.  The 
neural activity of nociception and the consciousness of pain are related but the 
relationship is not necessarily direct, concrete or inductive.  The view adopted from the 
neuroscience literature reviewed in this thesis is that consciousness is a phenomenon 
that emerges from activity in working memory (Baars, 1996; Baddeley, 1993; LeDoux, 
1998; Phaf & Wolters, 1997; Schachter, 1991) and that the brain is not a slave to the 
senses (Greenfield, 2000).  This is not to say that the working memory structures are 
the neural correlates of consciousness.  Exactly how the brain constructs our sensory 
experiences and how it produces consciousness has been dubbed the hard problem by 
Chalmers (cited in Crick & Koch, 2000).  Pain, as a sensory and emotional experience 
represented in consciousness, is part of the hard problem.  In exploring the 
relationships between pain, fear, distraction, imagery, consciousness and reality in 
children undergoing medical procedures, this thesis is inextricably located within a 
focussed area in the hard problem.   
 
The final component in the theoretical framework deals with reality.  Discourse 
on reality is fundamentally philosophical.  In psychology, one theory that fits within the 
constructivist approach and accommodates the notion of a reality shift as seen and 
described in imagery is George Kelly’s Psychology of Personal Constructs (1955).  
Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory is a theory of personality.  For Kelly, reality is not 
concrete and static, rather each of us actively construct our own version of reality.  
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Kelly’s use of the term ‘reality’ is intrinsically personal, encompassing beliefs, 
attitudes, relationships and so on but it is also universal.  Kelly holds that the universe 
is real and happening all the time but it is open to individual interpretation.  In 
developing a theory of personality, Kelly paid little attention to the notion of self in an 
individually constructed sensory reality but this notion fits with contemporary 
neurophysiology and Kelly’s fundamental postulate “A person’s processes are 
psychologically channelized by the ways in which he (sic) anticipates events” (Kelly, 
1955, p. 46).  Kelly clearly stated that ‘psychologically’ did not exclude 
‘physiologically’, his emphasis was simply on the psychological.  The application of 
Kelly’s constructivist view in this thesis holds to the psychological but also embraces, 
and applies, the underemphasized physiological attributes of his theory.  This move is 
corroborated in the neuroscience literature by the prevalent view that the brain 
constructs our sensory impression of the world in which we live (Greenfield, 2000; 
Kosslyn, 2001; Stuss, Picton, & Alexander, 2001).  This constitutes a fundamental shift 
from the traditional ‘predictable’ bottom-up, sensory – appraisal – response view, to an 
often, ‘surprising’ top-down dynamically construed and reconstrued sense of self in the 
world.  It will be argued that without such a shift, attempts to understand what is 
referred to as ‘cognitive modulation’ of pain (Petrovic & Ingvar, 2002; Petrovic, 
Peterson, Ghatan, Stone-Elander, & Ingvar, 2000; Villemure & Bushnell, 2002), be 
they ‘descending pathways to the dorsal horn’ or ‘shifts in attention’ will continue to be 
constrained by the limitations of the traditional bottom-up view of pain. 
 
A notable exclusion from the theoretical framework in this thesis is Piagetian 
developmental theory.  The reason for the exclusion is twofold.  Firstly, Piaget’s 
emphasis on development from the individual, to the social, fits poorly with the 
observation that children as young a five or six can construct and communicate their 
imagined world, and, as they develop, it seems that it is the ‘personality’ of their 
imagery that develops, rather than necessarily the degree of abstraction or social 
interaction.  In contrast to Piaget, it was Vygotsky (1962) who stressed that children 
develop from, and within a social setting, to the individual. Secondly, in this thesis, the 
Psychology of Personal Constructs (Kelly, 1955) is adopted in favour of the 
developmental approach.  The Personal Construct view of children is fundamentally at 
odds with developmental approaches (Rychlak, 1990; Vaughn & Pfenninger, 1994).  
The dissonance between the two approaches is outlined in Chapter 4, which focuses on 
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the philosophical and psychological aspects of Personal Construct Theory.  The two 
approaches are further contrasted with regard to procedural pain and fear in children in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Research Approach 
Two studies were designed to investigate procedural fear and pain in children.  The 
first study tested the effect of viewing a cartoon as a form of distraction on fear and 
pain in children undergoing venepuncture without topical anaesthesia as the painful 
medical procedure.  The second study investigated the effects of relaxation and 
imagery, independently, and as a combined intervention, on fear and pain in children 
undergoing the same medical procedure.  Chapters 2 to 7 review and criticize the 
literature relating to the key concepts in the theoretical framework.  In so doing, these 
chapters draw upon the neurophysiology and psychology of pain and emotion, 
constructivism with a specific focus on Personal Construct Psychology (PCP), together 
with an overview of imagery and procedural pain in children.  To begin, Chapter 2, 
Neurophysiology of Pain: Sensation and Emotion, describes the neurophysiological 
basis of pain and emotion and identifies the limitations of current knowledge of pain 
pathways and processing.  Chapter 3, The Psychology of Emotion, describes early and 
contemporary theories of emotion and relates these to the fear experienced by children 
undergoing painful procedures.  Chapter 4, Constructivism, describes the theoretical 
basis of constructivism through a review and critique of one of its main exponents, 
George Kelly, and his Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) Theory.  Chapter 5 
explores the problem of Procedural Pain in Children in a manner that shifts the focus of 
the problem from the child, to the health professional.  This is an atypical approach to 
the problem of procedural pain with allied implications for research and clinical 
practice.  The concepts of consciousness, imagery and hypnosis are reviewed in 
Chapter 6.  Frequently, Guided Imagery is poorly defined or spuriously labelled as 
hypnosis.  An attempt is made in this chapter is to define and differentiate between 
guided imagery and hypnosis.  The chapter concludes with a definition of guided 
imagery that is embedded in Personal Construct Psychology.  The focus of Chapter 7 is 
on imagery and distraction in the management of procedural pain in children.  The term 
imagery is applied to a number of interventions including pre-recorded audiotapes, 
emotive imagery and healing imagery.  These approaches are described and 
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differentiated from the guided imagery technique that was employed in this study.  
Previous studies investigating the effects of distraction on procedural pain, fear and 
distress in children are also reviewed in this chapter.  The chapter concludes with a 
constructivist view of distraction, imagery and consciousness.  Chapter 8 describes the 
first of two studies undertaken in this thesis.  The first study was designed to 
investigate the effects of distraction, in the form of watching a cartoon video, on fear 
and pain in children undergoing venepuncture as a painful medical procedure.  The 
results are also presented in this chapter.  Chapter 9 outlines the method undertaken in 
the second, the larger of the two studies in the thesis.  The second study investigated 
the effects of relaxation and guided imagery as combined and independent 
interventions on fear, pain and a number of related variables in children undergoing 
venepuncture as the painful medical procedure.  The results of the imagery and 
relaxation study are presented in Chapter 10.  Chapter 11, Discussion, is a synthesis of 
the key concepts laid down in Chapters 2-7 with the empirical findings of the two 
studies and culminates in a model of the proposed effects of imagery, distraction and 
relaxation on procedural fear and pain in children.  Finally, Chapter 12 concludes the 
thesis by addressing the aim, which was to propose how imagery alters the experience 
of fear and pain in children undergoing medical procedures and to differentiate between 
the effects of imagery, relaxation and distraction.  A number of suggestions for further 
research aimed at a further investigation of the model, the validity of a new measure of 
involvement in imagery developed in this research, and importantly, the relationship 
between the child and the health professional in the procedural context are also 
provided.  Statements of ethical approval from the relevant Institutional Ethics 
Committees are attached as Appendix A.  The remaining appendices contain material 
related to the analyses and are appropriately identified throughout the thesis.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
NEUROPHYSIOLOGY OF PAIN AND FEAR 
 
The previous chapter outlined the structure of the thesis; this chapter 
will focus on the neurophysiology of pain and emotion, specifically, 
fear.  The purpose of this chapter is to describe the neurophysiological 
aspects of pain transmission and modulation drawing upon the 
neurophysiology of sensation and emotion.  To achieve this aim the 
chapter has three sections.  The first section will briefly outline the 
philosophy of pain within the Aristotelian and Cartesian paradigms.  
Current pain mechanisms will follow, first with a description of the 
afferent pathways from nociceptor activation to the spinal cord and up to 
the brain, then the modulation of pain signals by way of the descending 
inhibitory pathways from brain to dorsal horn of the spinal cord.  The 
second section will focus on the emotion pathways in the limbic 
forebrain.  The final section will describe the body-mind relationship 
through the effects that the neuropeptides released in emotion have on 
the body as a whole.  This chapter on neurophysiology, the next on the 
psychology of emotion, and the following on constructivism will 
together provide a broad base for understanding the nature of pain as 
construed within the context of this study. 
 
Philosophical Perspectives on Pain 
Life and pain go hand in hand: to be alive is to feel pain at some time.  The word pain 
comes from the Latin poena, which means penalty or punishment.  Stimmel (1997) 
states, “The most ancient interpretation ascribes pain as a punishment for offending the 
gods” (p. 3).  Nowadays many would scoff at the notion of being punished by the gods 
but the notion that pain is a punishment may not be far fetched, particularly in those 
with extreme religious convictions or, indeed, in young children. 
 
Aristotle (384-322 B.C) believed that pain was a feeling in the heart and that it 
got there by way of the bloodstream.  He described pain as a “passion of the soul” 
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which essentially means a feeling of life, part of being alive.  An interpretation of the 
Aristotelian concept of ‘soul’ is given by Calhoun and Solomon (1984): 
 
In de Anima, Aristotle characterizes the human “soul” or “psyche”, which is 
best translated as “life principle.”  (Thus, plants have souls too insofar as they 
grow and reproduce, and animals have souls insofar as they can feel, move, 
and desire).  (p. 42, italics and parentheses are original) 
 
The Aristotelian view of pain prevailed until Descartes (1596-1650) postulated 
a shift from the Aristotelian notion of the heart, to the brain, as the centre for pain.  
Descartes postulated that pain travelled in small threads connecting the skin to the brain 
with branches to the pineal gland (Stimmel, 1997).  The Cartesian paradigm of mind 
and body as separate entities is essentially as pervasive in modern medicine as 
Aristotle’s philosophy was leading up to the 17th century.  Pain theory certainly 
developed as knowledge of anatomy and physiology developed through the 19th and 
20th centuries but the limited dualistic notion of mind and body as separate entities is 
one of the main factors that some suggest have retarded the development of medical 
science (Capra, 1983) including pain theory and management strategies (Main & 
Spanswick, 2000).   
 
An overview of the current scientific view of pain will now be given under 
Peripheral Mechanisms – from the tissues to the spinal cord, and Central Mechanisms – 
the spinal cord and brain.  This is the classic bottom-up sensory view of pain.  It is 
outlined here because, later, the bottom-up, sensory – appraisal view will be contrasted 
with the top-down constructivist view associated with contemporary neurophysiology.   
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Current Pain Mechanisms 
Algesic Chemicals: Pain and Inflammation 
When tissue is damaged, a number of chemicals are released into the extracellular fluid 
that bathes the bare nerve endings of pain fibres.  These terminal nerve endings are the 
nociceptors, the pain receptors; they constitute the beginning of the bottom-up view of 
pain.  The chemicals in the tissues include hydrogen ions (H+) (acidity), potassium ions 
(K+), serotonin and prostaglandins. Substance P (SP) is a pain neurotransmitter in the 
nerve terminals while the remaining chemicals are in the various components of blood 
(Prithvi Raj, 1996).  Histamine is in platelets, basophils and mast cells.  Bradykinin a 
powerful algesic, is in plasma; serotonin (the painful component in stinging nettles) is 
also in mast cells and platelets.  Many of these chemicals are involved in the 
inflammatory response and contribute to the cardinal signs of inflammation: pain, 
redness and swelling. 
 
Peripheral Mechanisms: Nociceptors and Afferent Nerves 
The term nociceptor describes a number of specialised receptors for pain, 
chemonociceptors respond to chemicals, mechanical nociceptors respond to strong 
mechanical stimulation and thermal nociceptors respond to extremes in temperature 
(hot and cold).  Nociceptors form the endings of the afferent nerves that transmit pain 
signals to the spinal cord.  The afferent nerve fibres for pain are the A-delta and C-
fibres.  Their cell bodies are located in the dorsal root ganglion close to the vertebral 
column.  These fibres differ in structure and function.  The A-delta fibres are thinly 
myelinated and therefore transmit impulses at a relatively fast rate (15m/sec).  The C-
fibres are unmyelinated so conduction velocity is slow (1m/sec).  The skin is supplied 
by A-delta mechanoreceptors, A-delta mechanothermal nociceptors, C polymodal 
nociceptors activated by mechanical, thermal and chemical stimuli, and by a 
miscellaneous group of C mechanical nociceptors and cold nociceptors (Prithvi Raj, 
1996, Stimmel, 1997). 
 
With repeated stimulation, most sensory receptors become fatigued and less 
responsive.  The nociceptors are a paradox; the opposite occurs, their threshold 
potential is lowered making them easier to activate, a phenomenon called sensitisation 
(Prithvi Raj, 1996).  Given that pain is a warning of actual or potential tissue damage, it 
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makes biological sense that repeated stimulation results in an enhancement rather than 
inhibition of signals to the spinal cord.  Once stimulated by chemicals, extreme 
temperature change or mechanically, the nociceptors transform the stimuli in a yet 
unknown way into nociceptive impulses that travel along the afferent A-delta or C-
fibres to the spinal cord. 
 
Central Excitatory Mechanisms: Spinal Cord to Brain 
The incoming A-delta and C-fibres terminate in the dorsal horn of the spinal cord, the 
substantia gelatinosa.  This area is highly specialized in terms of its structure and 
function.  It is divided into ten layers or laminae, referred to as the Rexed laminae.  Of 
the ten laminae, six are believed to receive nociceptive signals.  The dorsal root 
contains large and small fibres, which arrange just before entering the spinal cord 
(Stimmel, 1997).  The medial aspect contains the large myelinated fibres 
(proprioceptive, touch, pressure) and reflex activity fibres.  The lateral aspect contains 
the thinly myelinated A-delta and the unmyelinated C-fibres.  The A-delta fibres 
terminate in lamina I, the outer aspect of lamina II, and laminae V and X.  The C-fibres 
terminate in laminae I, II (outer) and V.  The highest concentration of nociceptive 
fibres is in lamina I. 
 
The substantia gelatinosa contains various cell types.  The two that are 
considered important for nociception are the stalked cells and the islet cells (Prithvi 
Raj, 1996).  It is thought that the majority of stalked cells are excitatory and the islet 
cells are inhibitory.  The fact that nociceptive impulses can be enhanced or inhibited 
adds the dimension of pain modulation to this area.  The proposed mechanism 
underlying the modulation of nociceptive input will be outlined after describing the 
ascending system. 
 
Ascending Nociceptive Pathways 
In humans the transmission of nociceptive impulses from their point of entry into the 
spinal cord to the brain is facilitated by a number of ascending nerve tracts (Martini, 
1998).  This makes biological sense because if one tract is damaged, the brain is not 
deprived of nociceptive input signalling the presence of tissue damage.  Furthermore, 
the tracts end in different parts of the brain allowing for more complex processing.  The 
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primary pathways are the spinothalamic tract, the spinoreticular tract and the 
spinomesencephalic tract.  The lateral part of the spinothalamic tract is referred to as 
the neospinothalamic tract (Prithvi Raj, 1996).  The cell bodies of these axons are in 
laminae I and V.  These axons project to the ventroposterolateral thalamic nucleus 
where they synapse with third order neurons that project to the somatosensory cortex.  
The medial part of the spinothalamic tract is referred to as the paleospinothalamic tract 
(Prithvi Raj, 1996).  These axons, together with the ones in the spinoreticular tract and 
the spinomesencephalic tract, project to the following sub-cortical structures: the 
reticular formation, periaqueductal gray area, hypothalamus and medial and 
intralaminar thalamic nuclei.  They then synapse with other neurons and project to the 
limbic forebrain and outer parts of the brain. 
 
Central Inhibitory Effects within the Brain and Spinal Cord 
Afferent nociceptive signals can be modulated in the dorsal horn.  Take for example a 
girl who accidentally jams her finger in the car door.  A number of automatic 
behavioural responses occur.  Initially, she will reflexively pull her hand away 
removing it from the noxious stimulus.  Then she will probably stimulate the area in 
one of a number of ways: shaking the hand; rubbing fingers with the other hand; 
putting it in her mouth and so on.  At the same time, she will verbalize her pain and 
look to quickly assess the damage.  In terms of nociception and neurophysiology, it is 
the shaking and rubbing that is interesting.  There is a definite neurophysiological basis 
for this behaviour in that the tactile stimulation activates the endogenous pain control 
system.  This is essentially, what Melzack and Wall postulated in 1965 as the Gate 
Control Theory of Pain (Melzack & Wall, 1965).   
 
Since the 1960s much has been discovered regarding pain and pain modulation 
not the least of which are the opioid receptors and associated neuropeptides.  An opioid 
is any substance that acts like morphine and the endogenous opioids are neuropeptides, 
so named because they were first discovered in neural tissue and ‘peptides’ because 
they are comprised of amino acids strung together.  The endogenous opioids belong to 
three families: the enkephalins, dynorphins and beta-endorphins.  Each of these 
families has members that are structurally and functionally related.  They are found in 
varying concentrations in many parts of the central nervous system including the dorsal 
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horn laminae I and V, the periaqueductal gray, the reticular system, the hypothalamus 
and the limbic system (Prithvi Raj, 1996).  The opioids exert a number of physiological 
effects by interacting with opioid receptors.  Of the various effects of opioids, the most 
important regarding the transmission of pain signals is analgesia. 
 
The first opiate receptor was discovered in 1972 (Pert & Snyder, 1973).  The 
discovery led to a deeper understanding of pain transmission and modulation as well as 
receptor physiology and sparked research into opioid receptors.  The three main 
receptors in terms of analgesic effects are classified as mu, delta and kappa (Dickenson, 
1994).  Although Pert (1990) holds that opioid receptors have both wave-like and 
particulate character, she holds that the molecular substance of all opioid receptors is 
the same, not only within an individual but also across species.   
 
The actual molecule of the rat brain opiate receptor is identical to the human 
brain opiate receptor and is also identical to the opiate receptor components in 
that simplest of animals, the tetrahymena” (p. 156).  
 
The analgesic effects of opioids are largely due to the effects of the opioid on 
the transmission of pain signals through the dorsal horn of the spinal cord, and 
activation of the descending inhibitory system described below.  The transmission of 
nociceptive signals is dependent upon the release of the neurotransmitter, substance P 
(SP).  Opiate receptors are located on the incoming A-delta and C-fibres  (Alvares & 
Fitzgerald, 1999; Dickenson, 1994).  In addition, in the dorsal horn are enkephalin 
releasing interneurons.  Some synapses are excitatory some are inhibitory.  The 
simplest and predominant action of the opioids is a presynaptic inhibition of the release 
of substance P (SP); this action is mediated mainly by the mu and delta receptors 
(Dickenson, 1994).  A simple analogy here is that SP is rather like water flowing from 
a tap (nerve ending).  While the water (SP) flows, nociceptive signals are transmitted 
up to the brain.  Located on the presynaptic side (on the pipe) are opioid receptors (mu 
and delta).  When the opioid receptors are stimulated, they turn the tap down to a 
trickle thus reducing the flow of water (release of SP) and analgesia results. 
 
Essentially, there are two ways to activate the enkephalin releasing interneuron 
in the dorsal horn (Cailliet, 1993).  One way is by stimulating the A-beta fast touch 
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afferents.  This is achieved by cutaneous stimulation and is the neurophysiological 
basis for rubbing an injured area described above.  This mechanism also underpins the 
effect of Transcutaneous Electrical Nerve Stimulation (TENS).  When the A-beta 
afferents are stimulated, they excite the enkephalin releasing interneuron with 
subsequent release of opioids onto the opioid receptors on the incoming pain afferents; 
the effect is analgesia.  The other way of activating the enkephalin releasing 
interneuron is via the central descending inhibitory system from the brain down to the 
spinal cord.  An important brain area in this mechanism is the periaqueductal gray area.  
It contains large numbers of opioid receptors and when these are activated, impulses 
are sent down to the dorsal horn and the enkephalin releasing interneuron is activated. 
 
The last aspect of the sensory component of pain worth mentioning involves a 
centrally mediated heightened sensitivity to pain.  This is a separate phenomenon from 
the sensitisation of nociceptors, which also causes an increased sensitivity to pain.  This 
second state of hypersensitivity occurs because of changes in the spinal cord.  In acute 
and chronic pain states, the person may experience an increased sensitivity to pain 
(hyperalgesia).  The heightened sensitivity means that normally non-noxious 
stimulation causes pain (allodynia).  The mechanism underlying hyperalgesia and its 
clinical manifestation, allodynia, is referred to as “wind-up”.  In wind-up, an impulse in 
the second order neuron in the dorsal horn is generated more easily because the 
threshold potential of the postsynaptic neuron is lowered.   
 
The neurophysiological description of pain described so far has accounted for 
peripheral and central transmission, modulation and exacerbation of pain, which 
according to most pain researchers paints the picture pretty much as it is currently seen.  
However, the foregoing does not explain some chronic pain states, for example, 
phantom limb pain, a pain problem that has puzzled researchers and clinicians for many 
years (Jensen, Krebs, Nielsen, & Ramussen, 1985; Melzack, 1990, 1999; Willoch, 
Rosen, Tolle, Oye, Wester, Berner, Schwaiger, & Bartenstein, 2000). 
 
Melzack: The Neuromatrix and Neurosignature. 
Much is written about the transmission of pain signals from the periphery to the dorsal 
horn and up to the brain, less is written about what happens in the brain and how 
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nociceptive input is perceived as pain.  Most descriptions of pain in the brain focus on 
neuroimaging studies that highlight areas of increased activity during experimentally 
induced pain.  These areas include the thalamus, anterior cingulate, insular, prefrontal 
and somatosensory cortices (Derbyshire & Jones, 1998; Hofbauer, Rainville, Duncan, 
& Bushnell, 2001; Peyron, Laurent, & Garcia-Larrea, 2000; Ploghaus, Tracey, Gati, 
Clare, Menon, Matthews, & Rawlins, 1999; Price, 1999).  The studies are, however, 
generally based on the pervasive bottom-up view of pain.  The fact that paraplegics and 
quadriplegics can sense body parts, or that a person who has had a limb amputated can 
sense the limb and even feel pain, led Melzack to consider the role of the brain in not 
only perceiving, but also actually constituting pain. 
 
Melzack (1999) holds that the brain contains a genetically determined template 
of the body that intrinsically generates the experience of sensation with or without 
sensory input.  According to Melzack, this template lies in the network of neurons 
between the thalamus and the cortex.  He refers to this network as the neuromatrix.  
The output from the neuromatrix, the neurosignature, percolates into awareness.  This 
model accounts for the sensations in amputated body areas or in plegias.  Melzack’s 
study of phantom limb pain lead him to four conclusions that form the basis of his 
neuromatrix theory. 
 
First, because the phantom limb... feels so real, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the body we normally feel is subserved by the same neural processes in the 
brain.  The brain processes are normally activated and modulated by inputs 
from the body but they can act in the absence of any inputs.  Second, all the 
qualities we normally feel from the body, including pain, are also felt in the 
absence of inputs from the body.  From this we may conclude that the origins 
of the patterns that underlie the qualities of experience lie in neural networks in 
the brain: stimuli may trigger the patterns but do not produce them.  Third, the 
body is perceived as a unity and is identified as the ‘self’, distinct from other 
people and the surrounding world... Fourth, the brain processes that underlie 
the body-self are... ‘built-in’ by genetic specification, although this built-in 
substrate must be modified by experience.  (Melzack, 1999, p. S123) 
 
Willoch, Rosen, Tolle, Oye, Berner, Schwaiger, & Bartenstein, (2000) 
investigated central neural circuitries of phantom limb pain using positron emission 
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tomography (PET) and hypnosis to alternate between phantom limb movement and 
phantom limb pain in eight subjects.  This study supports Melzack’s neuromatrix 
theory in that the sensation of movement correlated with activity in the motor and 
sensorimotor areas and subjectively rated phantom pain sensations related to activity in 
the anterior and posterior cingulate – areas of the brain that are normally involved in 
conscious awareness of pain. 
 
The clinical realities of phantom limb pain and sensations from deafferented 
regions cannot be avoided in theories of pain transmission.  The focus of inquiry in 
these and other puzzling phenomena is shifting from the periphery and spinal cord to 
the brain.  Dostrovsky (1999) also stresses the role of the brain in phantom limb pain. 
 
The fact that stimulation at sites in the thalamus can give rise to sensations on 
the patient’s phantom limb even many years following amputation implies that 
at least part of the cortical representation of the missing limb remains 
functional and still represents that body part  (p. S42). 
 
The picture is, however, far from complete.  Dostrovsky also reports on two 
cases where thalamic stimulation failed to produce phantom limb sensations.  On this 
finding, he suggests that perhaps the ‘brain’ can learn to disregard inappropriate 
cortical activity with a non-existent body part and focus on input from existing areas. 
 
Melzack’s neuromatrix theory is a step closer to understanding the perception 
of pain.  It also deals with the previously unexplained phenomenon of phantom limb 
pain; however, it falls short of explaining how pain is perceived in the thalamus and 
cortex.  What Melzack does offer is a deeper analysis of the relationship between the 
thalamus and the cortex and these structures and the ascending impulses from the 
spinal cord. 
 
The Neurophysiology of Emotion 
The other area that frequently barely rates mention in the neurophysiology of pain, 
other than fleeting reference to the limbic system, is emotion.  Pain is frequently 
discussed as a sensory-discriminative – affective-motivational dichotomy.  This is 
reflected in the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) definition of 
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pain... ‘An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience...’ with the balance of 
research and discussion heavily biased towards sensory neurophysiology and 
pharmacology.  Rarely are the sensory and emotional aspects of pain discussed in a 
manner that allows for a profound understanding of a person’s pain experience.   
 
The study of emotion is an extremely complex area compounded by the lack of 
consensus as to what emotion actually is.  The contemporary view in neuroscience is 
that cognition includes memory, emotion, attention, language, thought and 
consciousness (Crick & Koch, 2000; Mesulam, 1998; Roth, 2000).  Since the 1980s, 
brain scientist Joseph LeDoux has led the field in the neurophysiology of emotion 
(1979, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2002), particularly in 
regard to fear and the amygdala.  For this discussion of neurological aspects, emotion is 
best thought of in LeDoux’s (1987) terms as “A general term referring to a group of 
interrelated brain functions; emotion traditionally includes emotional experience, 
emotional expression and evaluation” (p. 419).  Much of this review relates to 
LeDoux’s published works together with a range of other researchers in the field.  
 
Early Brain Research on Emotion 
Research into the neurological basis of emotion has developed since the end of the 
nineteenth century.  LeDoux (1987) provides a detailed review of the key contributors 
in the field – Cannon and Bard, Papez, Kluver and Bucy, and MacLean. 
 
The research conducted into brain function in these early studies involved the 
surgical removal or ablation of various parts of an animal’s brain followed by 
observation of behaviour.  In humans, the brain was examined at autopsy where 
tumours or trauma to the brain were identified and mapped against various behavioural 
or neurological deficiencies.  Both of these techniques continue today although 
neuroanatomists now have the various neuroimaging techniques at hand to investigate 
brain function. 
 
Using these early techniques, LeDoux (1987, p. 422) states that Kluver and 
Bucy removed the temporal lobe in monkeys and observed that the monkeys no longer 
exhibited anger and fear reactions.  “They [the monkeys] approached humans, other 
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animals, and inanimate objects without the slightest hesitation”.  The monkeys also 
exhibited bizarre behaviour copulating with members of the same sex and other 
animals, and eating items that were usually avoided including raw meat and faeces. 
 
Kluver and Bucy (1937) described the striking features of the syndrome as what 
they termed “psychic blindness” or a visual agnosia.  That is, the monkeys were not 
blind but they were unable to attribute meaning to factors in their environment.  Kluver 
and Bucy (1939) suggested that the hippocampus that was the crucial structure 
involved in mediating emotional behaviour.  However, LeDoux points out it was 
damage to the amygdala rather than the hippocampus that was responsible for the 
observed phenomena. The amygdala was not brought into the emotion picture until 
MacLean proposed the notion of the ‘visceral brain’ and then the ‘limbic system’ in the 
early 1950s.  Although MacLean included the amygdala in the visceral brain or limbic 
system, it was thought of only as an output for parasympathetic functions.  
Furthermore, MacLean’s emphasis was on the hippocampus as the centre for emotion.  
LeDoux points out that we now know that the hippocampus is involved with cognitive 
functioning, such as memory, rather than emotional functions, and that the amygdala 
participates in both sympathetic and parasympathetic functions.  Moreover, the 
amygdala now takes the central position in the neurophysiology of emotion, 
particularly fear (Aggleton, 1992, 2000; Davis, 2000; Gallagher & Chiba, 1996; 
LeDoux, 1987, 1992, 1993b, 1998, 2002; McDonald, 1998). 
 
From ‘Limbic System’ to ‘Limbic Forebrain’ 
The term ‘limbic system’ implies a group of interrelated structures that together 
perform various neurological functions that are traditionally identified as olfactory and 
emotional (Martini, 1998; Sitoh & Tien, 1997).  The problem with this term is that 
there is lack of consensus as to which brain structures comprise the limbic system and, 
furthermore, there is little evidence to support the notion that the so-called limbic 
structures function as a system.  According to Heimer (1995), neuroscientists have 
included a vast array of brain structures in the ‘limbic system’.  The principal structures 
are listed in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 
‘Limbic System’ Brain Structures 
Cingulate and parahippocampal gyri Hippocampus 
Amygdaloid body Hypothalamus 
Neocortical areas in the basal frontotemporal region Olfactory cortex 
Ventral parts of the striatal complex Habenula 
Anterior and medial thalamic nuclei Brain stem areas 
 
Heimer (1995, p. 525) points out that some of these are separate anatomical and 
functional structures, for example, the amygdala and the hippocampus, which makes it 
difficult to conceive of the ‘limbic system’ as a functional unit.  Furthermore, the 
hippocampus is not primarily olfactory, nor is it significantly involved in emotions - 
two primary functions of the ‘limbic system’.  LeDoux (1987) adds, “A commonly 
mentioned criterion for inclusion in the limbic system is connectivity with the 
hypothalamus... which places the limbic system brain areas at every level of the 
neuroaxis, from the cerebral cortex to the spinal cord” (p. 424).  There is no doubt that 
some of the structures referred to in the limbic system are involved in emotion.  The 
difficulty seems to be with the notion of a system, hence LeDoux (1987) prefers the 
anatomical term ‘limbic forebrain’ when referring to these emotion-related structures.   
 
For the purpose of this review, and later, the focus on imagery, emotion, and 
consciousness, it is important to identify which limbic forebrain structures are involved 
in emotion, and what is known about their afferent and efferent connections.  LeDoux 
(1987) presents an overview of these connections based on the work of a number of 
researchers in the field.  The important limbic forebrain areas are the orbitofrontal 
cortex, amygdala, rhinal cortices, cingulate gyrus and the hippocampus. 
 
Cortical Association Areas 
Ascending sensory stimuli including nociceptive stimuli are relayed by the thalamus to 
the primary sensory cortices.  The primary sensory cortical areas, also called 
‘koniocortices,’ project to cortical association areas.  Jones and Powell (cited in 
LeDoux, 1987): 
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Confirmed that each koniocortex projects locally to modality-specific 
association areas and additionally demonstrated that these latter regions project 
in turn to limbic regions and neocortical areas in which convergent input 
arrives from two or more sensory modalities.  The cortical areas of sensory 
convergence also project to limbic areas. (p. 426) 
 
The important point here is that the limbic forebrain areas receive input from 
the association areas not from the primary sensory cortices (koniocortices). This is 
important because the association areas attach meaning and significance to the 
information in the sensory areas (Martini, 1998).  An inability to attach meaning to 
sensory input is reflected in the various agnosias (Boss, 2002; Mesulam, 1998; Tranel, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1997), which are observed clinically when an association area is 
damaged.  For example in a visual agnosia, the visual association area is damaged.  The 
person is not blind because his or her eyes and primary visual sensory cortex are 
functional but he or she cannot attribute meaning to what is seen.  This phenomenon is 
also seen in the Kluver-Bucy syndrome in monkeys described earlier. In that syndrome, 
there is damage to the cortical association areas and the amygdala with extreme 
behavioural changes being attributed to damage to the latter. 
 
The association areas corresponding to each koniocortex region are unimodal 
and include visual, auditory and somatosensory processing areas.  The unimodal areas 
project to polymodal (heteromodal) association areas which process sensory 
information involving multiple senses (Killcross, 2000; LeDoux, 1987; Mesulam, 
1998).  The polymodal areas project to the supramodal areas that then relay information 
to the hippocampus and to the cingulate gyrus.  Each of these progressions allows for 
increasingly complex processing of sensory information.   
 
Input to the Amygdala 
The amygdala appears to be a crucial structure in the emotional processing of sensory 
and complex cognitive information (Aggleton, 1992, 2000).  LeDoux (1987, 2002) 
places the amygdala at the centre of his discussion on the neurophysiology of emotion.  
Beginning with exterioceptive stimuli, that is, impulses ascending the spinal cord to the 
thalamus, these impulses travel through the primary sensory nuclei, which project, to 
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the koniocortices.  In addition, some impulses travel through associated sensory nuclei 
in the thalamus, which project information directly to the amygdala.  LeDoux holds 
that the information taking this short route is simple and primitive.  This includes pain 
signals.  The transmission in this pathway is rapid because it only involves one synapse 
compared to at least three synapses via the koniocortices and their unimodal association 
areas to the amygdala.  LeDoux also points out that the amygdala receives input from 
the terminal areas of the spinothalamic tract and the medial lemniscus.  This is also a 
short cut to the amygdala.  Nociceptive information travelling up the somatosensory 
spinothalamic tract can branch off to the amygdala before reaching the thalamus.  
However, Rolls (1999) argues that cortical analysis of the stimulus is likely to be 
required for an emotion to ensue. 
 
The mainstream flow of sensory information is from the thalamus to the 
koniocortices, that is, to each sensory area of the neocortex.  Complex sensory 
information is then transmitted from the koniocortices to each corresponding unimodal 
association area (Jones & Powell, cited in LeDoux, 1987).  The unimodal association 
areas are visual, auditory and somatosensory and each projects to the amygdala 
(McDonald, 1998).  This is the first of three pathways by which sensory information in 
the association areas reaches the amygdala.  The second pathway is from the polymodal 
association areas to the amygdala (Killcross, 2000).  The polymodal areas receive 
information from multiple unimodal areas and in doing so, combine visual, auditory 
and somatosensory input to form more complex formulations about the sensory input.  
The third pathway by which associated sensory information reaches the amygdala is 
from the polymodal to supramodal areas, which project to the hippocampus and from 
there to the amygdala.  LeDoux (1987) suggests that this pathway allows for complex 
interpretation of sensory information prior to emotional processing. 
 
The amygdala therefore receives sensory information at all levels of complexity 
and processing, from the immediate ‘raw information’ via the terminal areas of the 
spinothalamic tracts, medial lemniscus and thalamus, to increasingly complex 
processing from the unimodal, polymodal and supramodal association areas of the 
cortex.  Apart from sensory information, the amygdala also receives input from higher 
neocortical centres in the brain involved in cognition.  It is well known that along with 
sensory information, thoughts and memories can evoke a range of emotions, complete 
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with physiological effects (Bierman, 1996).  LeDoux (1987) suggests that cognition 
and emotion meet via the hippocampus.  “Cognitive processes (thoughts and 
memories) originating in circuits involving the neocortex and hippocampus might be 
related to emotional events by projections from the hippocampus to the amygdala” 
(p.433).  The amygdala, projects back to the hippocampus and the cortical association 
areas so the relationship is not simply linear and unidirectional.  Mesulam (1998) refers 
to this as ‘top-down’ processing; an important concept, which is developed further in 
this chapter and contrasted with the bottom-up, sensory – appraisal view. 
 
The limbic forebrain also receives interoceptive information from the viscera.  
The vagus nerve is the main afferent pathway from the viscera to the brain.  The vagus 
terminates in the nucleus of the solitary tract (NTS) in the medulla which projects to 
limbic forebrain areas including the central nucleus of the amygdala (LeDoux, 1987).  
There are also connections between the NTS and the amygdala via the pons and 
indirectly from the NTS to the pons, insular cortex and then to the amygdala.  LeDoux 
(1987) reports that both vagal and nociceptive, that is, visceral and somatic, stimulation 
produce neuronal excitation in several limbic forebrain areas including the amygdala, 
insular cortex, hippocampus and striatum.  In addition to the vagal afferent pathway 
providing information to the limbic forebrain, the amygdala is sensitive to changes in 
blood pressure and biochemistry.  Acute fluctuations in blood pressure are mediated, 
largely, by the autonomic nervous system.  The amygdala can therefore detect changes 
in the body that result from alterations in autonomic outflow from the brain.  This 
places the amygdala in an important position because it can also effect changes in 
sympathetic outflow through its afferent connections with the lateral hypothalamus.  
The amygdala, and indeed other limbic forebrain structures, are not just central nervous 
system targets; these structures also have efferent connections that facilitate in the 
simplest form, two-way communication with afferent structures.  However, the 
circuitry is often exceedingly more complex than a reciprocal pathway between two 
structures. 
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Output from the Amygdala 
The amygdala has output to at least three systems involved in the expression and 
experience of emotion.  The systems include the autonomic system, endocrine system 
and skeletomuscular system (LeDoux, 1987).  The autonomic responses that typically 
accompany emotion result from a shift in the sympathetic-parasympathetic balance 
towards an enhancement of sympathetic tone.  Clinically this is manifest as increased 
heart rate and force of contraction of the ventricles, together with bronchodilation and a 
heightened responsiveness that prepares the individual for the fight or flight response.  
The afferent pathways to the neurons that form the sympathetic pathways in the spinal 
cord are complex and widespread.  They include projections from the medulla, pons 
and hypothalamus.  The lateral hypothalamus receives projections from a number of 
limbic forebrain structures including the amygdala (LeDoux, 1987).  In this way, the 
amygdala can affect sympathetic output through the lateral hypothalamus. 
 
The other autonomic branch, the parasympathetic, is also affected by output 
from the amygdala.  LeDoux points out that the main parasympathetic output pathway 
is the dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus nerve in the medulla and that afferents to the 
dorsal motor nucleus come from the paraventricular and lateral hypothalamic nuclei, 
the amygdala, midbrain, pons and the nucleus of the solitary tract in the medulla.  
Clearly, the amygdala is not the only limbic forebrain structure involved in emotion-
related autonomic responses.  However, in providing a structural account of the 
relationship between the limbic forebrain and the autonomic pathways, LeDoux (1987, 
2002) highlights the role of the amygdala in emotional processing and suggests that it 
is a homeostatic centre of emotion. 
 
The effects of limbic forebrain structures, including the amygdala on hormone 
release fall into two categories, an effect on the adrenal medulla, which is an extension 
of the sympathetic nervous system, and effects on the hypothalamic – pituitary axis, in 
particular, the subsequent release of cortisol from the adrenal cortex (LeDoux, 1998, 
2002).  When sympathetic outflow is enhanced, the adrenal medulla, a sympathetic 
target, releases adrenaline and noradrenaline into the bloodstream.  Both of these 
hormones are sympathetic agonists; they stimulate adrenergic receptors (the receptors 
at sympathetic target tissue) throughout the body.  As an extension of the sympathetic 
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nervous system, the adrenal medulla will release adrenaline and noradrenaline in 
response to increased sympathetic outflow regardless of what caused the increase in 
sympathetic drive.  If the increase is a reflex response to a drop in blood pressure 
arising from haemorrhage then the adrenal medulla will respond.  Similarly, if the 
increase in sympathetic drive arises in the limbic forebrain, then the result at the 
adrenal medulla is the same, namely, release of adrenaline and noradrenaline.  The 
adrenal medulla is outside the central nervous system.  However, the effect of the 
limbic forebrain on the adrenal medulla is rapid because the two areas are linked by 
sympathetic neurons. The concomitant effect that emotion has on hormones occurs 
locally in the brain, specifically, in the hypothalamus and pituitary gland.   
 
In humans, focal bilateral damage to the amygdala occurs in the Urbech-Wiethe 
disorder, a very rare congenital disease that leads to calcification of the amygdala 
(Killcross, 2000).  This disorder provides researchers with a unique opportunity to 
study the effects of bilateral amygdala damage in humans.  Adolphs, Russell and 
Tranel (1999) reported a study of a 31-year-old woman (SM046) with bilateral 
amygdala damage from Urbech-Wiethe disorder.  Principally, they investigated the role 
of the human amygdala in recognizing emotional arousal from unpleasant stimuli.  
Interestingly, they found that SM046 “… showed a specific impairment in judging 
various classes of stimuli that signal unpleasant emotions: an inability to recognize 
their arousal, with a spared ability to recognize their valence.” (p. 168).  This finding 
suggests that the amygdala may be involved more in emotional arousal than in 
differentiating between what is pleasant and what is unpleasant.  Given that the 
disorder is congenital and may develop from birth, the researchers suggest: 
 
SM046 may have never acquired normal conceptual knowledge concerning the 
arousal of unpleasant emotions, and is hence unable to retrieve such 
knowledge on the experimental tasks.  (p. 170) 
  
Intact association areas in the cortex could account for the ability to recognise a 
fearful face while bilateral damage to the amygdala would preclude the ability to 
determine level of arousal.  This could be further investigated by putting a subject with 
bilateral amygdala damage in a series of frightening and neutral situations.  Under these 
conditions, one would expect the subject to be able to differentiate between the 
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experimental conditions but show no evidence of a significant difference in level of 
emotional arousal. 
 
In summary, the emotion processing in the brain occurs in a group of brain 
structures that occupy the limbic forebrain.  Even though there appears to be little 
consensus as to what emotion is precisely, there is agreement on the obsolescence of 
the notion of a ‘limbic system’ as an emotion system.  Of the limbic forebrain 
structures, the amygdala appears to be crucial to the experience, arousal and expression 
of emotion.   
 
Emotions, Neuropeptides and Healing 
While it is true that one brain area, such as the amygdala, can communicate with 
another area, such as the association areas or the hypothalamus via hard-wired 
pathways and synaptic transmission, these brain areas can also communicate with 
distant areas in the body where there are no nerve pathways.  It is proposed that an 
‘emotion network’ (Pert, 1999; Pert, Dreher, & Ruff, 1998) exists that extends beyond 
the hard-wired connections in the brain.  Current thinking in noetic science is that the 
balance between health and disease rests on the emotions through the effects of the 
neuropeptides produced in emotion on the immune system (Ader & Cohen, 1995; 
Cohen, Tyrrell, & Smith, 1991; Haas & Schauenstein, 1997; Kiecolt-Glaser, McGuire, 
Robles, & Glaser, 2002; Pert, Ruff, Weber, & Herkenham, 1985).  If such a network 
exists then it would account for the apparent link between the emotions, health and 
disease that was postulated as far back in time as Galen (A.D. 131-201) who proposed 
that, “a balance of the “passions” was essential for physical health.” (Kiecolt-Glaser, 
McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002, p. 84).  Such a link serves to emphasise that the 
emotional reaction to painful procedures (terrifying children) may not only have 
immediate practical consequences in terms of having to treat a so-called ‘difficult 
child’, it may have long-term health consequences through adverse effects on the 
child’s immune system.  
 
A peptide is a molecule constructed of amino acids linked together in a linear 
fashion.  A neuropeptide is a peptide made in a nerve cell.  For each neuropeptide, 
there is a corresponding neuropeptide receptor.  It is now known that monocytes and 
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lymphocytes secrete and respond to neuropeptides; the term favoured by 
immunologists is “cytokines” (Pert, 1999).  The first neuropeptide receptor was 
discovered in 1973 by Pert and Snyder; it was the opiate receptor.  The endogenous 
neuropeptide for the opiate receptor was discovered two years later.  Since then, 
neuroscientists have identified nearly 100 neuropeptides. 
 
An understanding of the action of neuropeptides rapidly collapses the 
reductionist ‘systems’ approach to human physiology.  Neuropeptides are 
neurotransmitters (nervous system) but some are also hormones (endocrine system) and 
some are made in the lymphocytes (immune system).  Jabbur and Saade (1999) refer to 
the ‘cross-talk’ between the nervous and immune systems and state, “The nervous, 
immune and endocrine systems in vertebrates appear to share common molecular 
mechanisms that can interact at peripheral and ultimately at central levels, as well” (p. 
S90).  Even at a basic ‘hard-wired’ level, it is now known that immune tissue is 
innervated with nerve fibres that influence immune responses (Ader, 2001).  In an 
interview, neuroscientist, David Felten illustrated the traditional discipline boundaries 
when he said:  
 
The bad news is now we have to start to talk in each other’s language and 
heaven forbid that immunologists and neuroscientists in the past ever used 
each other’s language – they’d rather use each other’s toothbrushes. (Felten in 
Moyers, 1993)   
 
The common molecular mechanisms are the neuropeptides and their receptors.  
Furthermore, neuropeptides enter the domain of psychology through their effect on 
consciousness and the emotions, which has led to the relatively new area of research 
referred to as psychoneuroimmunology. 
 
The link between emotions and neuropeptides comes from the initial finding 
(Lamotte, Snowman, Pert, & Snyder, 1978) that the limbic forebrain structures, 
particularly the amygdala and the hypothalamus, contain a high concentration of opiate 
receptors.  The relationship between the limbic forebrain and neuropeptides is, 
however, far from restricted to the opiates as these areas contain high concentrations of 
receptors for most neuropeptides (Pert, Dreher, & Ruff, 1998). 
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The neuropeptides form a communication network throughout the body.  They 
effect changes in the receiving cells and tissues when the neuropeptide couples with its 
receptor.  For example, changes in carbohydrate and fat metabolism occur in the cell 
when the neuropeptide insulin locks into an insulin receptor (a specific neuropeptide 
receptor for insulin).  Similarly, analgesia and euphoria result when the neuropeptide, 
β−endorphin, locks into an opioid receptor.  In fact, all effects of an opioid, either 
endogenous (endorphins and enkephalins) or exogenous (morphine, heroin), stem from 
receptor activation.  The effect depends upon the location of the cell containing the 
surface receptor for the neuropeptide. 
 
The common analogy of a lock and key is very useful in understanding the 
interaction between a neuropeptide and its receptor.  The effect of opening the door and 
entering will depend largely on the location of the door.  Fundamentally, neuropeptides 
and their receptors provide a mechanism whereby cells, in Pert’s (1990) terms, can 
‘talk’ to each other. 
 
Following the discovery of large numbers of neuropeptide receptors in the 
limbic forebrain structures, neuroscientists looked for, and found, other neuropeptide 
sites both within, and outside the central nervous system.  Areas containing large 
numbers of neuropeptide receptors are called ‘nodal points’ (Pert, Dreher, & Ruff, 
1998).  Within the central nervous system, areas other than the limbic forebrain were 
found to be nodal points.  Two areas described earlier, the dorsal horn in the spinal cord 
and the periaqueductal gray area in the brain, contain large numbers of receptors for 
virtually all neuropeptides (Lewis, Mishkin, Bragin, Brown, Pert, & Pert, 1981; Pert, 
Ruff, Weber, & Herkenham, cited in Pert, Dreher, & Ruff, 1998). 
 
The dualistic notion of a central versus peripheral nervous system is also 
challenged based on neuropeptide distribution and activity.  Neuropeptides travel 
throughout the brain and body and attach to specific receptors with widespread effects 
(Pert, Dreher, & Ruff, 1998).  The entire gut from the oesophagus to the large intestine 
is lined with cells that contain neuropeptides and neuropeptide receptors.  Pert (1990) 
suggests that the reason people feel emotions in their gut, as ‘gut feelings’ is the 
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richness of receptors in the area.  Neuropeptides and their receptors have also been 
found in the kidney, testis, pancreas and immune system organs and cells (Pert, Dreher, 
& Ruff, 1998).  Working on the premise that neuropeptides are the biochemical 
substrates of emotion, Pert (1990) uses the example of angiotensin and thirst to 
illustrate the relationship between neuropeptides and emotion.  It must be said, 
however, that many would not list thirst as an emotion.  It is, nonetheless, a feeling that 
leads to a behaviour (drinking) that serves a biological end, namely survival.  This is 
consistent with some of the psychological theories of emotion discussed in the next 
chapter such as Plutchik’s psychoevolutionary theory.  Angiotensin is a hormone and a 
neuropeptide made in the kidney and the amygdala.  Pert points out that in the brain, 
angiotensin induces the feeling of thirst, in the kidney, it causes the conservation of 
water.  Together the actions of the neuropeptide in the brain and kidney serve the same 
end - the homeostatic control of water.  The dual function of angiotensin as a hormone 
and as a neuropeptide illustrates the cross-systems actions of the neuropeptides – 
actions that extend to the immune system and, since the 1980s, have been the basis of 
research into psychoneuroimmunology. 
 
Neuropeptides and Immunity 
Within the reductionistic biomedical paradigm, nerve cells and immune cells have long 
been considered as substrates of independent systems - the nervous system and the 
immune system.  However, these cells and systems share common molecular biology 
and function (Ader, 2001).  Both are influenced by neuropeptides and each is capable 
of storing memory of previous events (Felten, in Moyers, 1993).  The nervous and 
immune systems are no longer considered independent; each has an impact on the other 
within the body as a whole.  Salzet, (2001) said: 
 
There is growing evidence that the nervous and immune systems can exchange 
information, through small molecules, either cytokines or neuropeptides.  
Furthermore, it appears that some so-called neurotransmitters like 
neuropeptides can function as endogenous messengers of the immune system, 
and that they most likely participate in an important part in the regulation of 
the immune response.  (p. 467) 
Pert, Dreher and Ruff (1998) point out that early work in the field of 
psychoneuroimmunology identified that monocytes were attracted to specific 
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neuropeptides and that immunocytes, “synthesise, store, and secrete neuropeptides” 
(p.32).  Monocytes are crucial cells in mediating an immune response.  Apart from 
their phagocytic action, they help to orchestrate both the cell mediated and antibody 
components of immunity by presenting antigens to T and B-lymphocytes.  The fact that 
these cells are influenced by neuropeptides places neuropeptides (and emotions) in the 
forefront of our defence system.  The interplay between the nervous system and the 
immune system is further illustrated by Pert, Dreher and Ruff (1998) who point out that 
neuroscientists have now demonstrated that nerve cells produce a number of immune 
cell products including interleukin-1, interleukin-6, interleukin-10 and tumour necrosis 
factor (TNF). 
 
As the ‘biochemical substrates of emotion’, neuropeptides and their association 
with immunity imply a connection between emotion and immunity. Given that a 
balanced immune system is essential to healing, Pert, Dreher and Ruff (1998) take the 
next step, which is the association between emotion and healing.  This is not a new 
concept.  The relationship between stress and illness has been evident for a long time 
(Solomon & Moos, 1964) but what Pert and her colleagues provide, as neuroscientists, 
is a perspective that focuses on the neurophysiology of emotion and healing.  The 
dominance of the Cartesian paradigm in medicine means that the ‘mind’ and ‘healing’ 
(body) are concepts that do not sit well with medical science.  However, many 
neuroscientists have moved beyond the restrictions of the Cartesian paradigm through 
psychoneuroimmunology, to embrace mind-body, or holistic, medicine.  As Ader 
(2001, p. 97) said, “Psychoneuroimmunology is an interdisciplinary field that has 
developed and now prospers by ignoring the arbitrary and illusory boundaries of the 
biomedical sciences.”  Such a position demonstrates the importance of how children, 
particularly those with chronic or malignant disease, respond to procedures.  The pain 
and fear they experience, on top of the stress of illness, may hamper the process of 
healing.   
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Emotion and Healing 
The effects of stress on the immune system are complex and appear to be determined at 
least in part by whether the stress is acute or chronic.  Research into the effects of stress 
on the immune system has produced mixed results.  Gerritsen, Heijnen, Wiegant, 
Bermond, & Frijda (cited in, Pert, Dreher & Ruff, 1998) induced a state of social fear 
(acute stress) in subjects with a public speaking task and found evidence of 
immunosuppression compared to a control group subjected to a non-demanding task: 
 
The subjects experienced feelings of tenseness accompanied by increases in 
blood pressure, elevated levels of cortisol, prolactin, and beta-endorphin, and 
immunological changes consistent with short-term stress: increased numbers of 
natural killer (NK) cells, decreases in levels of T helper cells (CD4), and 
decreased T-cell responses to antigenic challenge.  (p.34) 
 
On the other hand, Naliboff, Benton, Solomon, Morley, Fahey, Bloom, 
Makinodan, & Gilmore, (cited in Pert, Dreher, & Ruff, 1998, p. 34) found that “acute 
stress associated with activation of the sympathetic nervous system (fight or flight) 
often causes increase in NK [natural killer] cell activity”.  On the relationship between 
emotion and healing, Felten (in Moyers, 1993) holds the view that how a patient 
perceives a situation may be a very important factor in how their body responds.  Felten 
places great emphasis on the interaction between emotions and the immune system.  It 
is difficult to draw conclusions based on a few studies in an area that has many 
complex and interrelated variables but Pert, Dreher and Ruff (1998) postulate that an 
increase in NK cell activity may be needed in a fight or flight response to deal with 
potential pathogens, while at the same time other components of the immune system 
might be down-regulated to prevent excessive or prolonged inflammatory reactions and 
the likelihood of autoimmune imbalance and disease.  
 
It will be some time before neuroscientists are able to define exactly which 
components of the immune response rise or fall in response to the various types of 
stress, however, it appears that emotion and immunity are interrelated.  Kiecolt-Glaser, 
McGuire, Robies and Glaser (2002, p. 83) hold that negative emotions are implicated in 
the morbidity and mortality of a range of conditions whose onset and course may be 
influenced by the immune system.  On the nature of stress and potential for disease, 
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Pert, Dreher and Ruff (1998) hold that the important characteristics are stress that is 
chronic, inescapable, or unpredictable.  Regarding children experiencing pain and 
distress during medical procedures, the keyword is inescapable, and for children 
undergoing repeated procedures: inescapable and chronic.  In addition to the obvious 
effects relating to the quality and quantity of stress, Ader (1995) highlights the ability 
of an individual to cope effectively with the stress as a factor that influences the 
potential for stress-induced changes in immunity. Again, particularly with repeated 
procedures, a child’s inability to cope would have an adverse effect on the child’s 
immune status. 
 
The effects of inescapable stress on the immune system have been studied by 
Shavit and colleagues, (cited in Pert, Dreher, & Ruff, 1998) who demonstrated 
immunosuppression in rats subjected to inescapable or unpredictable stress.  Shavit 
labelled the inescapable or unpredictable stress as ‘opioid stress’ because the effects 
were reversed by the opioid antagonist naloxone.  Shavit also found decreased median 
survival time and percent survival rates in rats injected with rat mammary carcinoma 
cells and exposed to opioid forms of stress.  Lysle, Leucken and Maslonek (1992) also 
found that endogenous opioid activity is involved in conditioned stimulus-induced 
alterations in immune function in the rat, specifically a reduction in natural killer cell 
activity and that this effect is reversed by the opiate receptor antagonists naltrexone and 
N-methylnaltrexone.  Du, Jiang, Wu and Cao (1998) also reported antagonism of the 
immunosuppressive effects of endogenous opioids by naloxone.  On the specific effects 
of the opioid receptors on immunity, Zakharova and Vasilenko (2001) state: 
 
In most experimental and clinical studies, opioid-mediated analgesia proved to 
be accompanied by immunosuppression.  Opioid receptors of mu, delta, and 
kappa types are involved in the mechanisms of combined regulation of pain 
and immunity, with mu and delta receptors suppressing the immune response 
and kappa receptors enhancing it.  (Article in Russian, English abstract cited)  
   
However, while, Ben-Eliyahu, Yirmiya, Shavit and Liebeskind (1990) confirm 
that the suppression of natural killer cell cytotoxicity in the rat by footshock stress can 
be attenuated by opioid antagonists, and suggest the effect is mediated by endogenous 
opioids, they also found that suppression of NK cell cytotoxicity and analgesia 
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persisted in stressed rats pre-treated with naltrexone or saline, which suggests a non-
opioid mechanism.  The stressed rats in both groups had significantly higher 
corticosterone levels than the non-stressed controls.  Ben-Eliyahu et al. conclude that 
stress induced suppression of NK cell cytotoxicity may not be solely opioid related.  
Activation of the hypothalamic – pituitary – adrenal cortex axis by the amygdala, 
described earlier, is likely to be an important factor in raising corticosteroid levels in 
acute stress.   
 
Given that children undergoing medical procedures experience stress, distress 
and pain, a natural response is to produce endogenous opioids and cortisol.  In light of 
the studies demonstrating opioid induced immunosuppression associated with acute, 
inescapable stress, coupled with the immunosuppressive effects of cortisol, it is 
possible that many children, particularly those undergoing repeated painful medical 
procedures, will experience opioid stress and the related immunosuppressive effects. 
 
In contrast to the negative effects of stress on the immune system, Berk, Felten, 
Tan, Bittman and Westengard (2001) investigated the effects of humorous therapy and 
mirthful laughter on specific neuroimmune parameters in a group of 52 healthy men in 
schools of medicine and public health.  Blood samples were taken 10 minutes before 
the subjects viewed a humorous video for one hour.  Repeated samples were taken 
during the video, 30 minutes and 12 hours after the viewing.  Increases in natural killer 
cell activity, immunoglobulins G, A and M, and a range of related neuroimmune 
parameters were reported with some effects lasting 12 hours after the intervention. 
 
The implications of potentially negative versus positive neuroimmune effects 
for children with cancer receiving repeated painful and distressing treatments are 
obvious.  A goal of treatment should be to administer the treatment in a way that at the 
least, reduces, rather than exacerbates, helplessness and fear.  Central to the 
achievement of this goal is an understanding of how emotions are generated, that is, 
moving from the neurophysiology of emotion to the psychology of emotion, which is 
the topic of the next chapter. 
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Summary 
This chapter has outlined the neurophysiology of sensation and emotion with a view to 
describing the neurophysiology of pain.  Current pain mechanisms were described 
which at face value reveal the connection between tissue damage, the perception of 
pain in the brain and even how these signals are modulated by the central nervous 
system.  However, our understanding of pain neurophysiology is unable to explain 
complex phenomena such as phantom limb pain.  In an attempt to address this 
shortcoming, Melzack has moved the discussion from pain pathways to processing in 
the brain and in so doing, he suggests that the brain intrinsically generates the 
experience of sensation with or without sensory input. 
 
Although pain is defined as an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience, 
the predominance of Cartesian mind-body dualism in the medical sciences ensures that 
the balance of pain theory and treatment lies within the physical domain.  In both an 
epistemological and practical sense, the limitations imposed by this dichotomy limit 
our understanding of what pain is, and how it is best managed in clinical practice.  This 
chapter addressed the neurophysiological basis of somatosensation and emotion, both 
key aspects in the understanding of pain.  Of the areas in the limbic forebrain, the 
amygdala is considered to be of particular importance in modulating emotion, 
particularly fear.  The amygdala receives crude as well as highly processed 
somatosensory input and it is involved with the expression of emotional behaviour.  Of 
the many connections between the amygdala and surrounding brain areas, the link 
between the primary or unimodal association cortices and the amygdala are particularly 
important because these areas are active in the process of mental image formation. 
  
The effects of emotion on the individual are extensive, extending beyond the 
psychological.  Neuroscientists have shown that the neuropeptides released in emotion 
travel throughout the body and exert widespread effects on cells, tissues and systems 
including the immune system.  The implications regarding the health of children who 
are already stressed in relation to disease and undergoing painful medical procedures 
are profound and provide an added dimension to the rationale for improving the 
management of fear and procedural pain.  How this can be achieved, and how 
distraction and imagery intervene, requires an understanding of how emotions are 
  
 
51  
generated, particularly fear.  In addition to the neurophysiological understanding of 
emotion, there are many psychological theories of emotion – the pertinent theories are 
reviewed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION 
 
The previous chapter examined the neurophysiology of pain and fear.  
The focus of this chapter is on the psychological aspects of emotion.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the psychology of emotion 
within the context of procedural fear in children, with a view to laying a 
foundation for discussing the results of the two studies and their 
theoretical implications in Chapter 11.  The origins of the psychology of 
emotion lie in philosophy and the early physiological theories.  These 
are reviewed before moving to a psychoevolutionary theory, then the 
cognitive theories, and, finally, to two social theories of emotion.  The 
development of these theories demonstrates an increasing effort to 
capture the complexity of emotional responses.  
 
From Philosophy to Early Psychological Theories of Emotion 
Human beings have probably been attempting to understand their emotions since time 
immemorial.  Certainly, emotion is a topic that occupied the minds of the great 
philosophers as they attempted to answer the quintessentially human question, “What is 
it that makes me feel what it is that I feel?”  The notion of a ‘thinking brain’ and 
‘emotional heart’ can be traced back to Democritus (460-370 B.C), whereas Aristotle 
(384-322 B.C) placed both thinking and feeling in the heart (Hergenhahn, 2001).  Plato 
(427-347 B.C) believed that the rational soul was immortal and that the courageous or 
emotional soul, responsible for emotions such as fear, love and rage, was part of the 
body, and therefore mortal (Hergenhahn, 2001).  For Aristotle, Plato’s student, thinking 
took precedence over emotions, such as pleasure and pain, as can be seen in the 
Aristotelian hierarchy of souls where the rational soul (uniquely human) held a higher 
position than the sensitive soul (possessed by animals).  Emotion, in Aristotelian 
philosophy served to amplify an action tendency.  For example, the frightened person 
ran faster when experiencing fear, but at the expense of the ability to engage in rational 
thought (Hergenhahn, 2001). 
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It was, however, not until the 17th century that emotion was considered in a 
scientific context.  At that time, the prevailing paradigm was Cartesian.  Descartes, in 
building on the Platonic dualism of mind (soul) and body had established the dualistic 
dogma of mind and body as separate entities. Strongman (1987) summarises Descartes 
view of emotion: 
 
In animals, he [Descartes] thought that there is simply an environmental input 
and a bodily output.  In man, reason (or choice) intervenes.  Emotions (or 
passions) were vital to his viewpoint since he thought of them as changing the 
flow of animal spirits, the basic determinant of action.  Descartes suggested 
that there are six primitive emotions: admiration, love, hate, desire, joy and 
sadness.  These combine to produce the introspective feelings which we regard 
as emotion…  Descartes believed emotions to have four main functions.  They 
cause: (1) the appropriate flow of animal spirits in the body; (2) the body to be 
held ready for the various environmental goal objects which come its way; (3) 
the soul to desire these objects, which nature has already told us are of use; and 
(4) a persistence of the desire of these objects.  (p. 4.) 
 
Descartes referred to emotions as passions in the soul.  While this may seem 
difficult to comprehend, particularly the notion of ‘the soul’, what is worth noting is the 
early conceptualisation of emotions as passions.  Averill (1980) draws attention to the 
link between the words ‘passion’ and ‘passive’; that is, that emotion is not something 
that we do, rather emotion is something that appears to happen to us, as in, falling in 
love, being overcome with grief and overwhelmed by rage.  Strongman (1987) sums up 
Descartes on emotion with: “His [Descartes’] theory of emotion can be summarised as 
suggesting that emotion intervenes between stimulus and response, causing the 
response to be less rational than it otherwise would have been” (p. 5).  It is worth 
noting that Descartes did not include fear in his shortlist of the six primitive emotions.  
Most authors on emotion discuss fear at some point. 
 
The mind-body dualism emanating from Plato and later espoused by Descartes 
persisted for centuries and continues to influence thinking in medicine and psychology.  
Certainly, James (1884) and Lange (1885), who are credited with presenting what is 
considered the first psychological theory of emotion, drew on the relationship between 
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person and environment but like most theories before, and since, they incorporated the 
dualism inherent in the Cartesian paradigm. 
 
The James-Lange Theory 
The emphasis in the James-Lange theory is on the physiological changes that occur in 
the body during emotion.  According to James and Lange, emotion is the feeling that is 
produced by the physiological changes in the body.  The sequence of events in 
applying the James-Lange theory to the child experiencing fear during a painful 
medical procedure is: (1) the child sees the needle and feels the pain; (2) her mouth 
becomes dry, heart races, tummy churns, chest tightens; which leads to (3) feeling 
scared.  What is crucial to the James-Lange theory in this scenario is the order of 
events: the child feels scared as a result of the physiological changes.  It is the child’s 
awareness of these feelings in the James-Lange view that constitutes the emotion.  
However, as Kalat (1990, p. 426) points out, if James and Lange were right then not 
actually seeing the threat would not impact on the emotion.  According to the James-
Lange theory, it is the perception of the state of physiological arousal that is the 
emotion.  What James and Lange did not devote much attention to was what caused the 
physiological arousal in the first place.  It appears that the physiological response is 
linked to the stimulus in a primitive associative fashion with the ‘mind’ interceding 
only after the ‘reaction’ has occurred. 
 
The Cannon-Bard Theory 
While the James-Lange theory is regarded as a physiological theory, the Cannon-Bard 
theory emphasises the role of the thalamus and is described as a neurophysiological 
theory of emotion.  It emerged in the 1920s.  According to Strongman (1987, p. 17), in 
the Cannon-Bard theory, “An environmental situation stimulates receptors which relay 
impulses to the cortex. The cortex, in turn, stimulates thalamic processes which act in 
particular patterns corresponding to particular emotional expressions”.  Again, the 
order of events is crucial to the theory.  Applying the Cannon-Bard theory to the 
scenario of the child experiencing fear during a medical procedure suggests: (1) the 
child sees the needle and feels the pain as impulses are transmitted though the thalamus 
to the cerebral cortex; (2) the thalamus then discharges impulses to the viscera and 
skeletal muscles then almost at the same time (3) the thalamus relays information back 
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to the cortex which constitutes the emotion.  Functionally, the thalamus relays the 
majority of sensory input throughout the brain.   
 
The Cannon-Bard model shifts the cognitive, mindful response forward in time 
to occur simultaneously with the physiological response but like the James-Lange 
view, it retains an essentially dualistic function of mind and body.  Subsequent 
psychological models have been marked by attempts to integrate the two components at 
the same time acknowledging that both mindful and bodily aspects are more complex 
than the early theorists recognised. 
 
In the period between the physiological theories and the cognitive theories of 
the 1970s lie a number of theories of emotion based on motivation, arousal, 
physiology, behaviour and psychoanalysis.  A brief explanation and critique of these 
theories can be found in Strongman (1987).  These theories are not addressed because 
they bring little to bear on the focus of this thesis, however, a relevant theory of 
emotion that emerged in this period is Plutchik’s psychoevolutionary theory.  This 
theory has its origins in Darwin’s (1872) Expression of the emotions in man and 
animals. 
 
Plutchik’s Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion 
Plutchik’s psychoevolutionary theory began in the late 1950s and was further 
developed through the 1990s.  It has some theoretical relevance to the topic of fear in 
children undergoing painful procedures.  Specifically, Plutchik is included in this 
review because the behaviour, escape, that he attributed to fear is something that is seen 
on a daily basis when children struggle and are forcibly restrained during painful 
procedures.  Plutchik has spent more than forty years studying, researching and writing 
on emotion (Plutchik, 1958, 1962, 1980, 1990, 1993), having developed his theory and 
model of emotions on an analogy made by McDougall (cited in Plutchik, 1990, p. 109) 
between primary colours and the emotions: 
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The color-sensations present, like the emotions, an indefinitely great variety of 
qualities shading into one another by imperceptible graduations...  [colours are] 
reducible by analysis to a few simple primary qualities... And the same is true 
of the emotions. 
 
In 1958, Plutchik decided on eight basic emotions: fear, anger, joy, sadness, 
acceptance, disgust, expectation and surprise.  He built on the colour analogy and 
represented each emotion as a slice of a circle.  The circle represented similarity and 
polarity among the emotions, although the pattern is far from perfect.  Similar emotions 
are next to each other, for example surprise and fear, joy and acceptance, grief and 
disgust, and so on.  Polar emotions are opposite each other, for example, sadness and 
joy, acceptance and disgust.  Plutchik built in a third dimension, depth, in the shape of 
an inverted cone, to represent the intensity of the emotion.  The centre area of the circle 
represents mixed emotions, the vertical axis intensity - a maximum state of excitement 
to a state of deep sleep at the bottom.  The shape of the model implies that the emotions 
become less distinguishable at lower intensities (Plutchik, 1990).   
 
Plutchik’s reference to the intensity of emotion, particularly in regard to 
surprise is relevant within context of this thesis because the intensity domain may be 
related to distraction.  Within his theory of emotion, the low intensity domain of 
surprise is distraction.  High intensity is amazement; as the emotion increases in 
intensity, so too, does the likelihood of the person becoming aware of it.  Another way 
of conceptualising this is in terms of distraction/surprise as an element on a bipolar 
construct between boring and amazement; obviously the magnitude and direction 
aimed at in any distraction intervention will be towards the amazement rather than the 
boring end of the construct. 
 
While many emotion theorists focus on the subjective feelings and bodily 
perturbations of emotions, Plutchik’s teleological view is evolutionary.  This explains 
his emphasis on biological function rather than the emotion per se. However, returning 
to Plutchik’s view that the biologic function of joy is to reproduce would suggest that 
joy has no biologic function in pre-pubescent children, homosexuals, nuns or any other 
group of people who do not engage in reproductive behaviour.  Plutchik’s biologic 
view of emotion also fails to account for a range of complex human emotions such as 
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grief, jealousy or envy; these emotions are clearly not biologic in an evolutionary 
sense. 
 
In an attempt to deal with this issue in his later writing Plutchik refers to three 
component models “ the sequential model, the structural model, and the derivatives 
model” (Plutchik, 1998, p. 368, italics original).  The sequential model describes a 
stimulus – appraisal – behaviour – function sequence.  The structural model is based on 
the inverted cone representing the eight basic emotions, their similarities, polarity and 
varying intensities.  The derivatives model is where Plutchik expanded into related 
areas of psychology, from which he developed circumplex models for personality 
traits, personality disorders and ego defences (see Plutchik, 1993, 1997, and 1998).  
Plutchik (1993) listed what he sees as the relationships between what he considered 
were the eight basic emotions and their derivatives.  Table 3.1 is shortened version 
showing the relevant derivatives for fear, anger and sadness from Plutchik (1993, p. 
58). 
 
Table 3.1  
Shortened Version of Plutchik’s Emotions and their Derivatives 
Stimulus Appraisal Emotion Behaviour Function 
Threat 
 
“Danger” Fear Escape Protection 
Obstacle 
 
“Enemy” Anger Attack Destruction 
Loss of valued 
individual 
 
“Abandonment” Sadness Cry Reintegration 
 
 
In considering the emotional component of pain, Chapman (1993) listed 
Plutchik’s eight emotions together with each corresponding behaviour and function and 
said, “None of these affects relate to pain directly, but, given that Plutchik views 
emotions as cognitively mediated and future focused, the basic emotion clearly 
associated with pain must be fear” (p. 84).  However, for a patient with chronic pain 
who is repeatedly rejected and labelled as a malingerer by a range of health 
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professionals, and who wants to be heard and believed, the basic emotion may be anger 
(Fernandez & Turk, 1995).  Similarly, a child too, might react angrily to being 
repeatedly ‘hurt’ especially if the child had, quite reasonably, asked the health 
professional not to hurt her.  Of Plutchik’s eight emotions, fear is an obvious choice for 
the emotional component of procedural pain in children.  Yet given the appropriate 
circumstances, so too is anger.  Certainly in procedural pain in children, fear and anger, 
may be present in the child in varying combinations.   
 
The evolutionary and biologic focus limits Plutchik’s theory.  For example, the 
emotion matched with crying is sadness and yet an individual may cry ‘tears of joy’ or 
an infant will cry when hungry and indeed, a child will cry when in pain or when 
afraid.  The problem is in reducing a complex behaviour such as crying to a single so-
called biological and evolutionary function.  Plutchik is included in this review because 
the distraction – amazement dimension of surprise has theoretical and practical 
relevance regarding distraction techniques to manage fear and pain in children.  The 
fear – escape – protection triad also seems relevant to the emotional component of 
procedural pain in children.  However, this approach is very much consistent with the 
bottom-up, sensory – appraisal view.  That is, a danger situation is appraised as 
‘dangerous’ and the response is fear to effect an escape, which, in Plutchik’s view, 
addresses the biological aim of protection, but it has nothing to say about how a 
stimulus is defined.  Later, the constructivist view taken in this thesis will be presented 
as an alternative to the sensory – appraisal view.  Within the constructivist view, a 
danger situation is dangerous because it is construed that way.  If viewed as the 
negative pole on a bipolar danger – safe construct, a danger situation can be 
reconstrued towards the safe pole.  This approach will be explored more fully in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and in the Discussion, in Chapter 11.  However, a number of other 
theories of emotion demand consideration first.   
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Cognitive Theories of Emotion 
With hindsight, it seems almost inconceivable that emotion could be meaningfully 
discussed without addressing the role of cognition.  In the main, the emphasis in the 
cognitive theories is on appraisal.  Appraisal is seen as more than merely awareness of 
sensory input; it is an active process that encompasses meaning and a cascade of 
complex cognitions regarding self, the environment and others.  The cognitive theories 
are located within the bottom-up, sensory – appraisal model where the emphasis is on 
the brain as an ‘end-point’ that attaches meaning to the flood of sensory input.  One of 
the main examples of the cognitive theories, originally developed in the 1960s and 
1970s is that of Schachter and Singer. 
 
Schachter and Singer’s Theory of Emotions 
Schachter and Singer’s theory is essentially a contextual cognitive theory of emotion.  
According to Schachter and Singer, the state of physiological arousal that accompanies 
emotion is more or less constant in terms of quality.  That is, the physiological 
sensations that a person feels during joy are much the same as the sensations 
experienced in the other emotions, for example, fear. ‘Physiological sensations’ in this 
view are narrowly defined in terms of enhanced sympathetic output.  This is reflected 
in Schachter and Singer’s experimental use of epinephrine (adrenaline) to mimic the 
‘physiological sensations’ that accompany emotion.  Bodily perturbations of emotion 
are however far from being prescriptive or consistent, as in, tears of sorrow, grief, 
laughter and rage; trembling with cold, fear excitement, laughter and joy.  For 
Schachter and Singer, the sensations (sympathetic) experienced upon being told that 
you have just one a million dollars are much the same as the sensations experienced by 
the bank teller looking down the barrel of a shotgun during a robbery.  The emotions 
are obviously different in these examples.  The reason they are different according to 
Schachter and Singer hinges on the cognitive appraisal of the situation; that is, the 
context in which they occur.  The ‘million dollar windfall’ produces feelings associated 
with an increase in sympathetic activity, as does looking down the barrel of the 
shotgun.  What follows is a cognitive appraisal of the stimulus, which is then labelled 
with the appropriate emotion.  The recipient of the million dollars labels his autonomic 
arousal with “I’m rich” and the emotion is joy.  The bank teller labels his autonomic 
arousal with “I am going to die” and the emotion is fear.  However, even appraisal in 
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the given context requires appreciation of the respective roles and properties of the 
weapon.  An arms instructor might have an immediate rush of adrenaline while 
inspecting the inside of the barrel but having ascertained that the safety catch was on, 
and the weapon unloaded, is unlikely to experience fear.  A ‘Special Air Services’ 
(SAS) officer trained in unarmed combat collecting his pay during the robbery could 
construe this scenario as an opportunity to practice combat skills, rather than a 
frightening experience. 
 
According to Schachter and Singer, the emotion intensity is a function of the 
level of the autonomic arousal.  Winning $10.00 in a sweep at work might produce 
brief autonomic arousal and a cognitive label of “I was lucky which feels nice”.  
Similarly hearing a knock on the window on a windy night might induce a mild 
autonomic arousal and an appraisal of concern: “Was that the wind?” 
 
Schachter and Singer’s theory presents a view of emotion that has been 
criticised on a number of grounds.  Kalat (1990) provides a brief synopsis of Schachter 
and Singer's experiments.  Essentially Schachter and Singer devised an experiment 
where college students were given injections of epinephrine (a sympathetic agonist) 
and placed in euphoria inducing or anger inducing situations.  Some participants were 
told of the physiological effects of the injection.  Those in the euphoria group reported 
euphoria, those in the anger group reported anger, and those aware of the effects of the 
injection showed only a slight emotional response.  Schachter and Singer held that the 
injection induced the state of physiological arousal that was then labelled appropriately 
according to the situation that the students were in, and that the informed group did not 
experience emotion because they labelled the physiological arousal as an effect of the 
injection.  However, Kalat points to subsequent experiments where subjects were given 
placebo injections (not inducing physiological arousal) and then put into the euphoria 
and anger groups.  These subjects reported the emotions congruent with the group.  
According to Schachter and Singer, they should not report emotions because they were 
not physiologically primed with epinephrine.  Clearly, our cognitions affect our state of 
physiological arousal and vice versa.  Often we say “I was okay until I started to think 
about it.  Then the butterflies started in my stomach.”  Strongman presents a critique of 
Schachter and Singer’s theory drawing upon the writings of Izard, Leventhal, and 
Plutchik and Ax. 
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The first and most important point is that Schachter has not proved that 
emotion is dependent on sympathetic arousal and cognition.  He has 
demonstrated that it is influenced by both, but this could be so whilst it 
nevertheless remains independent of them.  (1987, p.92; italics original) 
 
The criticism is largely directed at the experimental design and proof of 
dependence.  If emotion were independent of cognition and arousal, there would be 
little left to define.  Furthermore, if ‘cognition’ is defined as a term that includes 
‘emotion’ (Mesulam, 1998, Roth, 2000) then the dependence – independence debate 
collapses.  Plutchik and Ax (cited in Strongman, 1987, p. 92) questioned the reliability 
of the epinephrine-induced state and the reliability and validity of pulse rate (used by 
Schachter) as a measure of sympathetic arousal.  Another concern with Schachter and 
Singer’s theory is the alleged lack of attention to the relationship between arousal and 
cognition, that is, when or how arousal and cognition combine in emotion to result in a 
particular emotional feeling (Leventhal; Leventhal & Tomarken, cited in Strongman, 
1987, p. 92).   
 
Apart form the intricacies between arousal and cognition, Schachter and 
Singer’s theory has been surpassed by a number of cognitive theorists, particularly 
Lazarus (1982, 1984, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c), Lazarus and Smith (1988), who have 
focussed more on appraisal, and the social aspects of emotion (Kemper, 1993; Oatley, 
1993; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987).  
 
Lazarus and the Role of Appraisal in Emotion 
Appraisal is central to the cognitive theories post Schachter and Singer.  Strongman 
(1987, p. 96) on appraisal states, “Essentially, appraisals are viewed as the cognitions 
which intervene between stimulus and response in emotion… An appraisal is a 
hypothetical construct which allows us to give some ‘meaning’ to our environmental 
situation”.  Within the traditional view, Strongman sums up Lazarus on appraisal by 
stating: 
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Lazarus suggests that there are two broad types of appraisal: benign and 
threatening.  Benign appraisals have three possible adaptive consequences… 
automatic coping may occur without emotion… the type of response we may 
make when crossing the road… A benign stimulus may provide us with more 
information such that it requires reappraisal… sight of a favourite dish to a 
hungry person being reappraised on discovering that it has been burnt… [and] 
Positive emotional states may follow from benign appraisals… Lazarus 
suggests further that threatening appraisals involve two possible processes. The 
primary process deals with an evaluation of threat or non-threat and the 
secondary deals with how to cope with the threat. (p. 99) 
 
In applying Lazarus’ primary process appraisal to the context of a child 
undergoing a painful procedure the primary process is “I am in a threatening situation”.  
In this scenario, the primary appraisal is amplified when the secondary appraisal – how 
to cope with the threat – reveals no solution other than resistance, which is 
overpowered by restraint, and screaming that is ignored. 
 
Knowledge and Appraisal 
A common clinical assumption about procedural fear in children is that the child is 
afraid because he or she knows what is going to happen.  Lazarus and Smith (1988) 
hold that knowledge by itself is not the cognition that produces emotion.  Furthermore, 
they distinguish between knowledge and appraisal as separate cognitions and stress that 
appraisal is what is necessary for an emotion to ensue.  Knowledge and appraisal are 
not the same.  In the healthcare setting, a traditional assumption is that there is no 
difference between knowing and appraising.  An example is the unethical practice of 
withholding medical information from patients, children and adults alike.  When death 
is approaching, the assumption is that it is ‘better’ if the person does not know his or 
her prognosis if it is poor.  The problem with this assumption is that knowing and 
meaning are not only assumed to be the same, the health professionals, and sometimes 
the family, consider that they are the authority on what the child or adult will feel in 
knowing that death is approaching.  Lazarus and Smith (1988) stress the importance of 
differentiating between knowledge and appraisal: 
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In a nutshell, knowledge, whether concrete and primitive or abstract and 
symbolic, consists of cognitions about the way things are and how they work.  
In contrast, appraisal is a form of personal meaning consisting of evaluations 
of the significance of this knowledge for well-being. (p. 282, italics original) 
 
On the nature of appraisal, Lazarus and Smith (1988) hold that 
 
In emphasising the distinctions between contextual knowledge and appraisal, 
and the dependence of appraisal upon knowledge, we are in no sense implying 
that the appraisal process follows predefined sequences or stages... Nor do we 
imply that the cognitive processes involved are necessarily conscious, verbally 
accessible, deliberate, or rational.  (p. 285) 
 
Knowing in this context relates to conscious awareness.  However much of the 
emotion activity in the brain is below the level of consciousness.  This issue will be 
expanded in Chapter 6 on the nature of consciousness, emotion and imagery, which 
suggests that an emotion such as fear can at least begin before the eliciting input is 
consciously known.  For a child undergoing a painful procedure, knowledge of the 
procedure, that a needle and syringe are used to take blood from the arm, is not what 
produces the fear response.  If it were, all children who knew a syringe and needle are 
used to take blood would be afraid.  They are not all afraid.  Within the bottom-up, 
sensory – appraisal view, it is the child’s appraisal of impending harm to self that 
produces the emotion, the fear.  Pre-procedural medical play, that is, allowing the child 
to play with the equipment has been shown to reduce procedural anxiety (Hatava, 
Olsson & Lagerkranser, 2000).  It is possible that medical play allows a child to 
become familiar with the equipment – more knowledge, but this also provides an 
opportunity for the child to reconstrue his or her reality for example through role-play.  
Herein lies a subtle but important difference between appraisal of sensory input and 
actively constructing the reality to which one responds.  This will be developed further.   
 
Returning to the child undergoing a painful procedure, the child does not 
rationally think “I am in a situation of potential harm to self therefore I am afraid.”  The 
child may be worried and un-trusting, something is wrong.  For a child who has never 
had a procedure, it could simply be the ‘unknown’ that is alarming.  This may be 
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reinforced by the overt behaviour of those present (in the extreme – physical restraint 
of the child), or the covert, for example, using language that the child does not 
understand.  Most of this is registered below the level of conscious awareness.  Within 
the appraisal model, whether or not the wariness escalates to fear, depends upon the 
attributed meaning for self.  Knowledge of the procedure is a factor in producing 
emotion; but alone, it is not enough.  Furthermore, within the constructivist paradigm, 
if the child’s sense of self can be reconstrued to a non-threatening context then even 
with knowledge of the procedure, it should be possible to reduce or even negate the 
child’s fear.  Parents and health professionals should not give up, or assume that a 
procedure will be distressing simply because “She knows what is going to happen." 
 
Over the past 20 to 30 years, many researchers in emotion have focused on the 
role of cognition from various points of view.  Even if cognition is not considered 
central, it is at the least considered as an integral part of emotion.  The study of 
emotion, like pain, is best served with a multidisciplinary approach.  Whereas the early 
physiological theories on emotion tended to focus on the bodily responses and the 
cognitive theories on the mind, the social theories centre on relationships.  The social 
theories by no means exclude cognition.  Indeed appraisal is an integral component of 
these theories but the emphasis is on an appraisal of self in relation to another 
individual or group.  Lazarus and Smith (1988) emphasized the importance of 
appraisal, but only within the nexus of self and environment.  Social theories take 
appraisal to the social level where the focus is on the relationships between self and 
others.  The impact and relevance of the social setting in emotion is the focus of the 
social theorists (Kemper, 1978, 1991, 1993, 2000; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1992) that 
will now be considered. 
 
 Social Theories of Emotion 
Chapman (1993) said, “The emotional expression of pain in the presence of supporting 
persons is socially powerful; it draws on a fundamental sociobiologic imperative, 
communicating threat and summoning assistance”. (p. 86 italics added).  Certainly, if 
for example, a child slips and falls over while playing basketball, and injures her knee, 
the immediate social group comprising, teammates, referees, parents and coach, 
respond appropriately by showing concern and assisting her.  However, the reaction to 
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the emotional expression of procedural pain is qualitatively, socially and culturally 
different to the expression of all other types of pain.  Procedural pain occurs in a 
situation where one person is allowed to inflict pain on another.  In many procedure 
rooms to this day, people do not act ‘normally’, in any other setting, such actions 
would attract charges of child abuse.  The ‘social’ aspects of emotion in relation to 
procedural pain cannot be ignored. 
 
Philosophical hegemony of the understanding of emotion has given way to 
various disciplines including sociology, neurophysiology and psychology, with each 
putting forward theories of emotion based on bodily responses and alterations to the 
human psyche.  Although neurophysiology and psychology have much to offer in 
understanding emotion, the sociologists argue that such an approach is incomplete and 
narrow, and ignores the fact that humans are social beings in a world shaped by social 
interaction and culture.   
 
Kemper (1991) provides an introduction to the sociology of emotion and 
illustrates the tension between the disciplines on the topic of emotion: 
 
At an international, interdisciplinary meeting on emotions a few years ago, I 
spoke to a plenary session on the topic, “What psychologists, 
psychophysiologists, and sociologists have to talk to each other about”.  I 
proposed that a complete theory of emotions required an integrated set of 
understandings about body, psyche, and society, and that a dialogue must take 
place between practitioners in these areas in order to enable such a theory to be 
constructed.  In the question period one psychologist vigorously attacked my 
position, maintaining that any putative social basis for emotions could be 
reduced to psychology, thus the sociological contribution was extraneous.  (p. 
301) 
 
While some researchers and clinicians remain territorial in their thinking, others 
have moved beyond the restrictions and limitations of their own discipline. Emotions 
are clearly complex phenomena that cannot be explained in uni-disciplinary terms.  As 
Oatley and Jenkins (1992) argue, “ Of all topics, it seems to us, understanding of 
emotions needs a multidisciplinary approach”(p. 56.).  When a child is subjected to a 
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medical procedure, it happens in a social setting.  According to Oatley, Johnson-Laird 
(1987), emotion can be viewed as a means of communicating to the social group.  
Alternatively, emotion occurs because of introspective appraisal of the social 
interaction between self and other.  Kemper takes this approach.    
 
Kemper: Power and Status in Emotion 
Kemper holds that a cause-effect relationship presides in emotion.  For Kemper, 
emotions derive from interactions between self and other, where each is an active 
participant.   
 
Undeniably we experience fear, anger, joy, sadness pride, guilt, shame, 
nostalgia, hope, hate, desire, contempt, and other emotions in consequence of 
what our interaction partners do to us and what we do to them.  (Kemper, 
1990, p. 307) 
 
 Kemper acknowledges the importance of appraisal in emotion but stresses that 
appraisal is socially based and derived from an individual’s perceived power and status 
level in the social interaction.  Concisely, Kemper places great significance on the 
power and status level in social relations and holds in many cases, the nexus between 
each other’s power and status causes emotion.  In his words: 
 
… I have proposed that social relations can be usefully expressed in two 
dimensions, “power” and “status,” and that a very large number of human 
emotions can be understood as responses to the power and/or status meanings 
and implications of situations. (Kemper, 1993, p. 42) 
 
Here, Kemper goes beyond the cognitive theories by asserting that emotion 
flows from an individual’s cognition of his or her power-status interaction with another 
human (social) being.  This is an interesting view of emotion in regard to relationships 
between individuals but extreme because of the emphasis on social interaction.  For 
example, Kemper’s view has little to offer in understanding the fear an individual may 
experience during a thunderstorm or a close encounter with a venomous snake or 
spider.  In terms of social interaction, Kemper offers the following definitions of power 
and status: 
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Power is understood as a relational condition in which one actor actually or 
potentially compels another actor to do something he or she does not wish to 
do...  Status, on the other hand, is understood as the relational condition of 
voluntary compliance with the wishes, interests and desires of another person.  
One actor accords status to another through acts of recognition of the other’s 
value.  These include considerateness, sociability, caring, respect, esteem, and, 
at its ultimate, love.  (1993, p. 42) 
 
Applying Kemper’s power and status view of emotion to a child undergoing a 
painful procedure suggests that the child’s fear goes far beyond the needle.  A deeper 
understanding of the so-called ‘needlephobic’ child and indeed the contribution of the 
health professional to the child’s fear is revealed.  An analysis of the power-status 
relationships involving the child undergoing a painful procedure emphasises that the 
balance of power lies with the health professional.  In Kemper’s terms the health 
professional exercises his or her power over the child by forcing the child to do 
something he or she does not want to do (have the procedure).  This alone will instil 
fear in the child even before the so-called stimulus (needle) is produced.  The 
mechanism underlying the fear-power axis, according to Kemper (1993), is an increase 
in the other’s power, which has the same effect as a decrease of one’s own power, and 
the emotion that results is fear or anxiety.  The reasoning underlying the fear in this 
situation rests on the child’s appraisal or meaning of the situation.  Kemper said that 
emotions could be understood as responses to the power and/or status meanings and 
implications of situations.  For a child experiencing procedural pain, to lose power 
means to lose control, to be vulnerable.  To summarise, the health professional is all-
powerful, the child is powerless; the child construes a power differential, and the 
resultant emotion is fear. 
 
Kemper’s second relational condition is status.  To recapitulate, Kemper said 
that in according status, there is voluntary compliance with the wishes, interests, and 
desires of another person.  Furthermore, status is accorded to another person through 
acts of recognition of the other’s value.  On one level, a health professional with many 
years of experience in caring for children could argue vehemently that he or she values 
children, is considerate, has respect for children, and is sociable.  However, what really 
matters is how the child construes his or her own status.  From the child’s viewpoint: 
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I told you that I did not want to have that needle but you did not listen, 
you did it anyway.  You obviously don’t care what I think or say.  You 
are not being considerate.  Nice people don’t hurt me.  You hurt me… 
 
  If the child perceives that his/her status is low because his/her wishes, interests 
and desires are being ignored by the health professional, then the emotion that will 
emerge will, according to Kemper’s theory be, anger.  The issue of who is responsible 
for the relational outcome is important because it will affect the outcome.  Kemper 
argues: 
 
Emotions will ensue depending on the particular power and status outcomes, as 
well as on the factor of “agency” – namely, the attribution of who is 
responsible for the relational outcome (self, other, or a third party).... Decrease 
in status leads to anger if the agent is other, shame if the agent is self, and 
depression if the situation is deemed irremediable.  (1993, p. 42) 
 
Presumably, the status level of the other person is also important.  If the child 
had no respect for the health professional and, by Kemper’s definition, therefore, the 
health professional has little status, the impact of the health professional’s attitude will 
be significantly less.  However, low status of the health professional is unlikely to be 
the case for children receiving treatment.  More often than not, the health professional 
is perceived by the child as a special person, an expert, and an authority.  These 
attitudes are shaped by culture and for the child, often reinforced by his or her parents.  
In most situations, the health professionals are guaranteed status, provided they look as 
if they know what they are doing, and fear is a more likely outcome. 
 
An important related issue impacting on the child in the procedure room is 
solidarity between the mother and the child.  In daily life, solidarity would be high but 
if the child perceives that solidarity with the parent has been lost in the procedure room 
then the consequences could be anger or fear.  If the child’s construct of the mother not 
coming to the rescue amounts to a sense of betrayal, then the emotion is likely to be 
anger.  However, if the child’s construct of the mother’s inaction reveals powerlessness 
in the mother, this will add to the sense of abandonment and the emotion will be fear.  
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‘There is nothing that I can do to stop this but even worse, Mum can’t do anything 
either’. 
 
Oatley and Johnson-Laird 
Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s theory is described as a communicative theory (Strongman, 
1996).  It could also be described as computer-based, cognitive, evolutionary, biologic 
and social because it draws upon all of these dimensions.  Essentially Oatley and 
Johnson-Laird hold that emotions are signals to the self and the social group.  Emotions 
occur when goals or sub-goals that are desired by the individual are met, giving rise to 
positive emotions, or not met, giving rise to negative emotions.  As signals to the 
individual and group, emotions are seen as a survival mechanism and motivational 
system for all mammals including humans. 
 
Emotions enable social species to co-ordinate their behaviour, to respond to 
emergencies, to prioritise goals, to prepare for appropriate actions and to make 
progress towards goals.  (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1992, p. 206) 
 
Prioritising goals and preparing appropriate actions to respond to emergencies 
for the benefit of the social group fits with fear but has less to offer regarding the other 
emotions.  Realistically, in the emotional experiences of daily life, most people do not 
have to respond to emergencies or signal danger to the social group. Oatley and 
Johnson-Laird see emotions as a necessary way of achieving this emergency response.  
Necessary because they argue that mammals and humans have “... only limited abilities 
to cogitate” (p. 206).  For Oatley and Johnson-Laird, if faced with an emergency, 
perhaps a threat, the individual or group needs to respond quickly and there may not be 
time to think through a sequence of logic: A is happening which is likely to cause B 
and perhaps C, I had better do D otherwise E might happen.  Lazarus and Smith would 
refer to this as ‘appraisal below the level of conscious awareness’ and say that it occurs 
almost instantaneously.  Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) use the term cognitive to 
include psychological activity both at, and below, the level of consciousness.  Not 
wishing to contribute to the debate on which comes first cognition or emotion, they 
state, “We do not claim that all emotions derive from thinking.  Some do and some do 
not” (p. 30). 
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Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) describe two distinct communicative 
cognitive processes: propositional and non-propositional.  They hold that propositional 
signals come from high-level conscious operating systems and that these are only 
required in complex emotions.  They cite jealousy as an example of a complex emotion 
comprised of anger and fear.  For Johnson-Laird and Oatley, (2000, p. 466) “… the 
emotions we call “complex” always involve at least one basic emotion, together with 
an evaluation of the self in a social situation”.  The social aspect is illustrated with 
reference to the social and cultural variations among the Todas of India described by 
Hupka (cited in Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 2000, p. 466) where a situation provoking 
jealousy in the West does not elicit the same effect amongst the Todas.   
 
Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) hold that ‘basic’ emotions result from non-
propositional signals, which are unlike propositional signals: 
 
They do not denote anything.  Like hormones, they function purely causally.  
They propagate globally among the processors to set them into specific modes 
at particular junctures of multi-goal planning sequences.  (p. 32) 
 
Central to Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s theory is the notion of the brain as a 
computer.  They refer to modules – autonomous processors that compute data once 
activated by non-propositional signals.  At a neurophysiological level in the case of 
fear, the amygdala, in Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s view, would be one of these 
autonomous processors and its afferent innervation, the non-propositional signals.  The 
non-propositional signals they say, “sets the system into one of a small number of 
emotion modes” (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987, p. 33).  In respect to the amygdala, 
the emotion mode would be fear.  For Oatley and Johnson-Laird, emotions serve to 
speed up the cognitive processes in the brain that transpire between input and output by 
functioning at the non-propositional level.  In this sense, emotions are cognitive 
signals.  They call into question the reliability of rational thought given the urgency of 
the task.  Their emphasis however, is more on emergency response than the broad 
spectrum of emotional nuances.   
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Emotions guide individual and group behaviour.  Social mammals are unable 
to determine the best course of action at many of the junctures in their lives.  
Even in humans, the resources for rational thought are often too slow and too 
error-prone to solve this problem.  The function of emotions is accordingly to 
bridge the gaps of rationality.  (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1992 p. 206) 
 
Essentially, for Oatley and Johnson-Laird, emotions are the monitoring or 
controlling signals between goals, cognition and actions.  They come from (at least 
initially) below the level of consciousness and are modified by higher (conscious) 
cognition involving appraisal of self, society, setting, culture and so on.  The 
demarcation between non-propositional and propositional cognitions may however be 
less precise than Oatley and Johnson-Laird advocate.  The rush of joy when a primary 
school child is told who she will be sitting next to for the term because that person 
happens to be her ‘best friend’ and even more importantly, is not a ‘boy’, are examples 
of propositional cognitions.  It is also difficult to discount the propositional cognitions 
that may race through a child’s mind and the rising fear as she lies in bed waiting to be 
taken back to the procedure room for the morning dressing of a wound. The suggestion 
here is that emotions can result from propositional and non-propositional cognitions, 
which are analogous to Lazarus’ conscious and subconscious appraisals.  At a basic 
level, Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s view is not unlike Plutchik’s psychoevolutionary 
theory, which emphasises the relationship between emotion, behaviour and function but 
it is not limited to a biologic and evolutionary view.  Oatley and Johnson-Laird 
emphasise the sociality of emotion and use a computer systems model to describe 
cognitive-emotion processes below the level of consciousness and, at a more complex 
level, they allow for ‘rational’ or propositional modifiers.  Indeed, Kemper’s emphasis 
on perceived power could be considered in Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s model as a 
propositional cognition involving appraisal of self and setting, which would, in their 
terms, add to the complexity of the emotion.  While it is unlikely that the conscious 
propositional cognition would be “I am powerless”, the gist would be realized through 
the lack of control.  At a basic level, the sensory aspect of the pain would be a non-
propositional signal, which sets the emotion system in action.  This could then be 
amplified by a range of propositional cognitions such as a sense of powerlessness, 
inability to escape, and that nobody is listening.  It is possible that the propositional 
appraisal precedes the non-propositional.  A child who is experiencing a high level of 
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pre-procedural fear could, for example, be focussed on a perceived lack of control, 
which like a pre-amplifier would boost the response from the non-propositional signal.  
This could account for the progression from an underlying (non-propositional) fear to 
full blown terror, generally operationalized as distress.  Moreover, interventions such as 
distraction and imagery may operate at the propositional level pre-procedurally and 
during the procedure by facilitating a construed a sense of control, power and escape 
 
As fear is the dominant emotion in children during medical procedures, Oatley 
and Johnson-Laird’s theory has some relevance.  The primary goal is protection of self 
from harm.  The emotion signal is fear; internally it initiates an action plan of escape 
and externally it sends a signal to the social group who recognise the signal - facial 
expression, cry, and tremor.  The problem for the child is that in the case of procedural 
pain and fear, the social group are the source of the fear.  They recognise the signals 
but they press on regardless.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has reviewed a number of theories of emotion from different disciplines 
and has revealed considerable variation within and between disciplines on the 
psychological and social nature of emotion.  The aim of this chapter was to explore the 
psychology of emotion in relation to the fear experienced by children undergoing 
painful medical procedures and in so doing, to lay the groundwork for the discussion of 
the psychological aspects of the proposed model of the effects of imagery and 
distraction on procedural fear presented in Chapter 11.  The origins of psychology are 
in philosophy and this is where the early writings on emotion are recorded.  The most 
important factor that can be traced back to the early Greek philosophers and which 
continues to influence modern thinking on emotion is the dualism of mind and body.  
Emotions were seen as belonging to the body and believed to obstruct rational thought 
and spiritual development.  Emotions are certainly accompanied by bodily sensations 
and as knowledge of anatomy and physiology developed through the 19th century, it 
was not surprising to find that James and Lange and later Cannon and Bard, focussed 
on the physiological rather than the cognitive aspects of emotion.  The physiological 
approach is limited because of the primacy of sensation and failure to consider the role 
of cognition or the impact of social factors.  For Plutchik, the emotions and their 
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corresponding behaviour are important survival and evolutionary phenomena.  In the 
case of fear, the behaviour is escape to ensure protection and survival.  The clinical 
reality of a child withdrawing and then thrashing and fighting against restraint suggests 
that the need to escape is relevant to procedural fear.   
 
From the cognitive theories on, Lazarus has stressed the role of appraisal.  
While the emphasis shifts from one theory and discipline to another, appraisal is a 
consistent theme.  Lazarus would stress that the child’s knowledge of what is going to 
happen is not sufficient for the emotion.  What is required is appraisal, conscious or 
subconscious, which attributes meaning to the situation (harm to self), and the emotion 
follows the cognition.  In the social realm, Kemper’s view is extreme in that emotions 
are reduced to phenomena that are dependent upon the balance of power and status 
between individuals.  However, given the low status and powerlessness of children in 
the procedure room, Kemper’s views seem relevant.  Any intervention that gives the 
child some sense of power and status will effect a reduction in fear according to 
Kemper’s theory.  Plutchik’s emphasis on the need to escape in fear and Kemper’s 
view on power can be incorporated into Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s model as 
propositional cognitions.  The interaction between imagery and the amygdala via 
polymodal association areas described in Chapter 2 is a pertinent example of one such 
non-propositional mechanism that may operate, and indeed modulate an emotion such 
as fear within Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s model of emotion.  In this chapter, the 
cognitive process of appraisal was central to the main theories of emotion, in the next 
chapter, the cognitive process shifts from appraisal or ‘bottom-up’ processing to a ‘top 
down’ process, that is, a construing of reality.  The relevant field in psychology that 
supports this element of the theoretical framework is Personal Construct Psychology.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONSTRUCTIVISM  
 
The previous chapter focussed on the psychology of emotion in relation 
to fear.  This chapter will broaden the discussion of pain and emotion 
through an analysis of the constructivist perspective in psychology. 
 
There are many approaches and applications of constructivism in a 
diverse range of fields including psychology, neuroscience, sociology, 
education, computer systems and mathematics to name just a few.  In 
this chapter, the philosophical basis of constructivism is reviewed and 
criticised before examining the constructivist view adopted in this thesis 
– Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) of Kelly (1955).  
 
 
An Introduction to Constructivism 
Constructivism is a way of viewing the world that addresses both knowledge 
(epistemology) and being (ontology) (Mahoney, 1988; Neimeyer, 1993, 1996).  To 
construct something means to build, to put the pieces together, and when the process is 
complete, whatever it was that was constructed is there to be seen, it exists, at least for 
a time.  Whatever is constructed can be pulled down (deconstructed) or modified 
(reconstructed).  In psychology, the term constructivism refers to the notion that 
humans gain knowledge about the world, themselves and others in the world through a 
process of mental construction, the act of which is referred to as ‘construing’.  In the 
previous chapter on the psychology of emotion, much was said about appraisal, 
particularly in relation to the cognitive and social theories.  While construing and 
appraisal seem similar, the two differ in terms of direction.  Appraisal is an 
intermediary between stimulus and response.  Appraisal fits with the notion of 
attaching meaning to ‘upstream sensory input’, that is, it is the essential cognitive 
process in determining emotional, physiological and behavioural responses.  An 
assumption underpinning the theories discussed in the previous chapter is that there is a 
knowable objective reality, the appraisal or personal assessment of which, conscious or 
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unconscious, precedes the emotional response.  However, for the constructivist, the 
process of construing is active and involves a feed-forward process.  Reality is not 
subject to sensory appraisal; each of us actively constructs our own sense of reality.  It 
is worth noting the emergence of constructivist language in neuroscience, specifically 
in regard to top-down modulation of bottom-up sensory input (Courtney & 
Ungerleider, 1997; Greenfield, 2000; Hugdahl, 2000; Frith, 2001; Mesulam, 1998; 
Pally, 1997).  For example, Greenfield (2000) posed the problem of understanding the 
neurophysiology of vision in constructivist terms. 
 
How can we find out how our eyes and brains collaborate to create the 
sense of vision that makes up our own version of reality? … For every 
connection carrying information from the eyes, there are at least ten 
coming in exactly the opposite direction from the higher areas of the 
brain.  (p. 73 and 79, italics added) 
 
Here Greenfield is emphasizing the role of top-down processing in vision.  She 
goes on to reject the Cartesian notion of the brain as a mere receiver of sensory input. 
 
There is far more to the senses than the brain acting as a mere sponge to 
the flood of light, sound, taste, smell and touch sensations coming from 
the outside world.  (Greenfield, 2000, p.79) 
It is difficult (at least neurologically speaking) to consider reality outside of our 
conscious awareness.  The primacy of neural functioning in constructing what we are 
aware of both externally in the sensory world and internally in the inner world of the 
mind is the view held by Crick and Koch (2000) who place great emphasis on 
consciousness as awareness of our sensory representations.  Reality and consciousness 
are discussed with imagery in Chapter 6 but for now, the emphasis is broadly on 
constructivism and the notion that reality is construed rather than being concrete.  An 
example of the diversity of reality in a group of people is the individually construed 
reality of flying in a large passenger jet aeroplane at an altitude of 10,000m.  
Presumably, all the passengers have the knowledge that they are in an aeroplane but the 
reality of ‘being in an aeroplane’ in the constructivist view is not a given; each 
passenger constructs his or her own ‘practical’ reality.  For some, “I am seated in a 
large room, which is a bit like a restaurant, with many other people and the very polite 
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serving staff bring us food and drinks.”  For another, “I am attached to a fuel tank with 
wings; I am surrounded by highly flammable aviation fuel and there is only a thin 
metal skin between me and the solid ground 10,000m below me.”  Some passenger 
aircraft are equipped with small monitor screens staggered along the underside of the 
overhead storage compartments.  During take-off and landing, a camera projects the 
view from the front of the aircraft – a disturbing experience for some passengers 
because the projected visual field is inconsistent with the passenger’s construed reality.  
Similarly, many people prefer to fly in large rather than small aircraft.  The larger the 
aircraft, the easier it is to construe one’s own reality.   
 
Another pertinent example is the construed reality of a trip to the dentist.   For 
some, the dentist’s surgery is a frightening place, and dentists really are nasty people.  
They are to be avoided until the pain of a toothache forces an appointment.  While for 
others, being in the dentist’s surgery is of no more concern than an appointment with 
the accountant.  The point is that for each individual, the nature or reality of a dentist’s 
surgery depends upon his or her own personal construing of “the dentist’s surgery”.  As 
Mahoney (1988, p. 3) said, “We are literally cocreators of the realities to which we 
respond”.  For the constructivist, we do not awaken each morning and stumble through 
a predetermined and fixed reality.  Each of us actively creates/constructs our own 
reality and as we stumble along, we discard some aspects, construe and reconstrue 
others and in doing so, we constantly shape and re-shape our own version of reality. 
 
The above illustrations reflect the variability in personal constructions around a 
spatial and interpersonal reality.  Regarding the individually construed reality of 
interpersonal relationships, the relationship between the health professional and child is 
a pertinent example.  Comments about children (and parents) are sometimes delivered 
as if a statement of truth, of what is ‘real’.  For example, “It is obvious what is going on 
here.  John, like many children at his stage in development, is difficult, manipulative, 
calculating, and lacks insight.”  A statement such as this is nothing more than a 
personal opinion and yet the health professional may argue adamantly that John ‘really 
is a nuisance’, and if others share this view, it becomes the ‘reality’.  However, within a 
Personal Construct view, the difficult and manipulative reality of John is only real to 
the health professional because he or she construes him as such.  It is unlikely that 
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every health professional, teacher, adult or child who encounters John shares the same 
reality. 
 
This introduction to constructivism began with a philosophical statement about 
epistemology and ontology that is, about knowledge and being.  The origins of 
constructivism lie in philosophy.  The following is a brief review and critique of the 
philosophical origins of constructivism.  The intent is to illustrate the basis upon which 
this perspective stands. 
 
Philosophical Origins of Constructivism 
According to Mahoney (1988), the philosophical underpinnings of constructivism did 
not appear in Western thought until Vico’s Scienza Nuova in 1725.  At this time, the 
Cartesian mind-body dualism was the dominant paradigm.  Mahoney (1988) states: 
 
Vico opposed the Cartesian dualism between thought and extension.  He 
began by asking how it came to be that the human mind could have 
evolved its capacities beyond those of animal mentality, and concluded 
that it was the power to transcend immediacy that gave rise to our 
symbolic abilities… He recognised the “conceit of scholars” in having 
assumed that human knowledge and knowing processes had been 
adequately rendered by the classics…  The cornerstone of his “new 
science” was the concept of “imaginative universals” (universali 
fantastici): “that is, imaginative class concepts or universals, to which… 
to reduce all the particular species which resembled them” (Vico, 
1725/1948, p.74)… His concept of imaginative universals did not imply 
a “bottom up” induction process so much as a “top down” constraint on 
experience.  (p.13) 
 
Modern constructivism is exemplified in what Mahoney describes as the shift 
from a “bottom up”, sensory based knowing of the world to a “top down” construction 
of reality.  The origin of this paradigm shift is in Vico’s writings.  Mahoney sums up 
the connection between Vico and constructivism with: 
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Vico’s contributions to constructive metatheory stem from his 
recognition that “knowing” is not a form of disembodied intellectual 
reflection but, rather, and active and embodied engagement with life’s 
challenges.  Anticipating the constructive emphases of Piaget, he argued 
that “to know” is “to make”.  (p. 15) 
 
With the origins of constructivism in Vico’s writings, Mahoney reveals the next 
step in the philosophy of constructivism was to transcend the epistemology and 
ontology debates in modern philosophy.  Ontological arguments are about the nature of 
being or theories of reality; they are sometimes referred to as existential, that is, 
relating to existence.  On the other hand, epistemological arguments are about the 
nature of knowledge, specifically, “What is knowledge?” and, “How is it that we know 
what we know?”  On the first of these arguments, ontology, Mahoney points out that 
the thrust of the debate has been between realism and idealism and, furthermore, 
scientists and historians of science frequently misuse these two terms.  In order to 
consider the ontological basis of constructivism or indeed to make any meaningful 
comment about ontology in the philosophy of science one must be clear at the outset on 
the difference between realism and idealism.  Mahoney (1988) draws upon Hirst for a 
straightforward distinction:  
 
[Realism is] the view that material objects exist externally to us and 
independently of our sense experience.  Realism is thus opposed to 
idealism, which holds that no such material objects or external realities 
exist apart from our knowledge or consciousness of them, the whole 
universe thus being dependent on the mind or in some sense mental. 
(Hirst, 1972, p. 77) 
  
Philosophers who have held the realist view include Bertrand Russell, William 
James and G.E. Moore, whereas the idealists include Berkeley, Kant and Hegel.  The 
problem with any dichotomy is that the answer, and it is assumed that there is an 
answer, must lie at one end or the other.  
 
The other main debate in philosophy is epistemological, that is, it is about 
knowledge.  As the ontological debate is dichotomous, so too is the epistemological 
debate.  On one side is rationalism and on the other is empiricism.  The rationalist view 
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is that knowledge of the world ‘out there’ can only be known by reasoned, that is, 
logical thought.  Major rationalists include Descartes and Spinoza.  Empiricism on the 
other hand, holds that all knowledge is based in experience.  That is, we ‘know’ what 
know because of our experience of it.  John Locke is credited with the origins of 
empiricism, the counter argument in Britain to the Continental rationalist views of 
Descartes and Spinoza. 
 
Constructivist philosophy aims to transcend the traditional realism-idealism and 
rationalism-empiricism dichotomies.  Whether it does, or not, or indeed if such a 
transcendence is possible are matters of ongoing philosophical debate.  Mahoney 
(1988) identifies the inadequacy of the realism-idealism and rationalism-empiricism 
dichotomies and holds that constructivism moves the debate to another critical level 
through an analysis of the philosophy of Kant.  Essentially, as an idealist, Kant 
criticised the empirical belief that all knowledge is experiential.  Moreover, the link 
with constructivism is that Kant drew attention to the role of the mind in shaping 
knowledge.  On Kant and constructivism, von Glaserfeld (1995) states: 
  
Kant’s analysis of the rational domain then confirmed the inaccessibility 
of anything posited beyond the reach of experience and maintained that 
the world we understand and live in becomes real to us, because we 
complete the picture by means of rational heuristic fictions.  (p. 49) 
 
 Mahoney too makes a clear connection between Kant and the philosophy of 
constructivism. 
 
While agreeing that all knowledge begins with experience, he 
challenged the idea that all knowledge is based in experience.  For Kant, 
sensation must precede and provoke the operations of thought, but once 
sensation has begun it is immediately moulded by the cognitive 
categories that constrain our knowing.  (Mahoney, 1988 p. 19) 
 
There is however, a problem with internal consistency in what Mahoney is 
saying about Kant and indeed with Kant’s reasoning.  One cannot be, on the one hand, 
anti-empiricism and on the other say, “sensation must precede and provoke the 
  
 
80  
operations of thought”.  The latter part of this quote drew the constructivists to Kant, 
"once sensation has begun it is immediately moulded by the cognitive categories that 
constrain (or as the constructivists would say construe) our knowing".  An analogy in 
brain neuroscience is the notion of top-down processing, the closest neural correlate of 
construing. 
 
While Mahoney holds that constructivism reframes the old ontological and 
epistemological arguments, Matthews (1992) argues that constructivism is essentially 
empirical and Aristotelian. 
 
Constructivism maintains the widespread, commonsensical, subject-
centred, Aristotelian-empiricist epistemological paradigm, and by 
correctly pointing to a major error in empiricist assumptions, it then 
swings to a relativist epistemology without abandoning the paradigm 
itself.  The relativist conclusion only follows within the empiricist 
paradigm, if this paradigm is rejected – and there are good reasons for so 
doing – no such relativist epistemological conclusions follow, and 
certainly no idealist ontological conclusions follow.  (p. 1) 
 
Matthews (1992) is by no means anti-constructivism, he acknowledges the 
value of constructivist theory particularly in teaching.  Matthews merely points out 
what he believes to be an epistemological inconsistency in constructivist theory and 
argues that constructivism has not transcended the doctrine of empiricism.  
 
According to Mahoney (1988), the next figure in the origins of constructivist 
philosophy is Vaihinger (1852-1933).  The essence of constructivism is in Vaihinger's 
writing.  Vaihinger implies with his ‘As if’ world that we constantly construct ideas 
about the world and then seek to validate or invalidate them in terms of what is real.  
However, the problem for constructivism in this statement is that, on the one hand, 
realism is denounced while on the other, it appeals to ‘reality’ to confirm or refute 
thought constructs.  Fundamentally, reality cannot be considered a construct in the 
mind of the individual and at the same time a gold standard against which constructs 
are measured.  Mahoney (1988) sums up the process of thinking in Vaihinger’s ‘As if’ 
mind as a series of ideational shifts whereby some ideas pass through three stages of 
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development, from the fictional, through the hypothetical, to the dogmatic.  The 
cognitive process in Vaihinger’s philosophy of mind within the constructivist 
framework is construing.  The idea, be it a fiction, hypothesis or truth is a construct 
which can be reconstrued in either direction.  According to Vaihinger, the idea is never 
lost, even if it was at one time perceived as a truth and then reconstrued to a fiction, it 
has not vanished; the idea exists but its validity may have shifted.  Furthermore, 
because the process is dynamic, a fictional idea could again become a truth.  An 
example would be shifting religious faith.  As a child, an individual may be ‘raised’ 
within a particular faith and have a religious construct that is held as a truth.  This truth 
may be discarded in adulthood.  The religious construct does not disappear, it exists as 
a fiction, which may or may not be reconstrued in later life to a hypothesis or even 
again as a truth.  This example illustrates many aspects of constructivist theory, which 
leads to Kelly (1955) and Personal Construct Psychology.   
 
Kelly: Personal Construct Psychology 
In 1955, George Kelly published The Psychology of Personal Constructs.  It heralded 
the beginning of an approach in psychology, which, to this day, remains controversial.  
That is nothing new; a controversial theory could be defined as a theory that is outside 
the accepted, dominant paradigm or culture.  Given the persistence of Cartesian 
dualism as the dominant paradigm in the social sciences (Capra, 1983), it is not 
surprising that Kelly’s theory remains on the outer of mainstream psychology, a view 
supported by Sarbin and Kitsuse (1994, p. 5) who said, “The prevailing mechanistic 
world-view has favoured the competing perspectives – psychoanalysis and learning 
theory”.  Despite this, there have been 14 biennial ‘International Congress on Personal 
Construct Psychology’ meetings throughout the world and there is an extensive and 
ongoing literature and research base and clinical focus in the field.  
 
Personal Construct Psychology is based on a holistic theory of the person 
whereby, in Kelly’s view, each individual creates his or her own way of seeing the 
world.  Kelly based his theory on the philosophical premise that our version of reality 
is constructed by each of us in our own unique way.  This is an idealistic view that PCP 
shares with Kant, but Kelly’s background was in science, and his theory also has a 
scientific, and certainly empiricist, flavour.  He viewed the individual as a scientist, 
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each with his or her ideas or views about the world, which are tested out rather as the 
scientist tests his or her hypotheses.  
 
The long-range view of man leads us to turn our attention toward those 
factors appearing to account for his progress rather than those betraying 
his impulses.  To a large degree – the blueprint of human progress has 
been given the label of “science.”  Let us then, instead of occupying 
ourselves with man-the-biological-organism or man-the-lucky-guy, have 
a look at man-the-scientist.  (Kelly, 1955 p.4 italics original) 
 
Kelly’s emphasis is on a (pro)active individual seeking to predict a changing 
world, Vaihinger’s ‘As if’ world where ideas shift between fiction and truth.  Kelly 
likened this process to the scientific method and suggested that this process underpins 
the manner in which we construe and reconstrue reality.  Not straying for the moment 
from Kelly’s sexist language: Man-the-scientist could be seen as an empiricist in the 
scientific tradition, that is, construing and then reconstruing, or not, as the case may be, 
based on impressions and judgements that can only be constructed because of the 
feedback gained in experience.  Kelly said: 
 
Man looks at his world through transparent patterns or templates which 
he creates and then attempts to fit over the realities of which the world 
in composed.  The fit is not always very good.  Yet, without such 
patterns the world appears to be such an undifferentiated homogeneity 
that man is unable to make any sense out of it.  Even a poor fit is more 
helpful to him than nothing at all.  Let us give the name constructs to 
these patterns that are tentatively tried on for size.  (p. 9, italics original) 
 
Kelly’s phrase, ‘the realities of which the world is composed’ strikes a chord of 
realism.  Either reality exists in this argument in a known and predictable form or it is 
created.  Constructivists favour the latter but as Matthews (1992) points out, there are 
strong arguments that constructivism is essentially empirical.  Presumably, the 
judgements Man-the-scientist makes when he tests his constructs are in relation to his 
interaction with his environment, that is, they are inextricably based on experience, the 
central tenet of empiricism.  Essentially, what Kelly is saying is that our actions, 
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inactions, passions, thoughts, feelings and all aspects of being human exist within a 
reality that we co-create through, and is represented in, our constructs. 
 
Constructs and Construing 
At first glance, constructs are ways of seeing the world, ideas, impressions or perhaps 
concepts.  Kelly has much to say about what a construct is, and indeed, what it is not.  
The term is complex and defies a simple definition. 
 
They [constructs] are ways of construing the world.  They are what 
enables man, and lower animals too, to chart a course of behaviour, 
explicitly formulated or implicitly acted out, verbally expressed or 
utterly inarticulate, consistent with other courses of behaviour or 
inconsistent with them, intellectually reasoned or vegetatively sensed.  
(p. 9) 
 
A construct has a similarity – contrast dimension, and a range of convenience.  
Kelly illustrates this point with a construct of tall versus short.   
 
One may construe tall houses versus short houses, tall people versus 
short people....  But one does not find it convenient to construe tall 
weather versus short weather, tall light versus short light or tall fear 
versus short fear.  Weather, light and fear are, for most of us at least, 
clearly outside our range of convenience of tall vs. short.  (1955, p.69, 
italics original) 
 
As for constructs being concepts, Kelly acknowledges their similarity but 
suggests that constructs are also ‘percepts’.  “The notion of a ‘percept’ has always 
carried the idea of it being a personal act – in that sense, our construct is in the tradition 
of ‘percepts’” (Kelly, 1955 p. 70).  Katz (1984) clarifies the terminology in a succinct 
and readable introduction to Kelly’s theory. 
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A ‘construct’ is loosely seen as a discrete bipolar dimension of 
discrimination.  Within an individual’s construct system, each construct 
is related to others via implicative or subsumptive relationships.  The 
objects dealt with, or upon which these constructs are focussed, are 
called elements.  Moreover, each construct possesses two ‘poles’ – a 
‘likeness’ pole and a ‘contrast’ pole.  The association of an element (be 
it a person, an event, a situation, or even another construct) with one 
pole or the other constitutes the basic act of construction [construing].  
(p. 315) 
 
McCoy (1977) makes the point that consciousness is not an essential feature of 
construing, which, as previously stated, puts appraisal and construing in a similar 
camp.  However, within Kelly’s theory, the process of construing is more than merely 
attaching meaning; the purpose of construing is to predict events in our constructed 
world and how one would react to such events.   
 
Constructive Alternativism versus Accumulative Fragmentalism   
Constructive alternativism is a philosophical position underpinning Kelly’s psychology 
of personal constructs.  Kelly holds that there is no known objective truth, only our 
constructions which are subject to alteration through the process of reconstruing.  For 
the individual though, a particular construct may be held as a truth for a period of time 
or indeed indefinitely.  The point is, if the individual construes something as true and 
real, then for the individual, it is true and real.  For example, a young child attached to 
an intravenous infusion pump may construe her reality as this monster has hold of me, 
and is killing me.  An infusion pump is a thing; it has certain qualities, including 
reliability.  It is difficult to discount its existence beyond our construction of it.  The 
essence of Kelly’s approach in this example lies in how the child constructs the 
meaning of the reality of being attached to a pump, the impact of the construed reality 
on the child, and in a therapeutic sense, how the child could reconstrue his or her 
reality.  This is more than an appraisal of sensory input.  Simply, for the individual, 
there are truths but they are only truths for as long as the individual construes them that 
way.  Kelly argues: 
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Even the constructs we daily take for granted are probably open to an 
incalculable number of radical improvements... What we tend to do is to 
accept familiar constructs as downright objective observations of what is 
really there ...  The fact that familiar constructs have equally subjective -
- though possibly more remote -- origins usually escapes us.  We 
continue to refer to them as objective observations, as the “givens” in 
the theorems of daily existence.  Yet it is doubtful that any of the 
“givens” we accept so “realistically” has yet been cast in its final form.  
(1955, p. 5) 
 
Rather than categorically arguing that nothing is true or given (itself a given) 
the essence of Kelly’s constructive alternativism perhaps lies in the clinical application 
of PCP namely, nothing has to be a given.  Clinically this underpins what Kelly 
described as loose versus tight construing, the notion of freeing up the tightly held 
constructs and considering different shades, or a different colour altogether.  In the 
example above of the child attached to the monster, an approach might be, “What sort 
of monster is this monster?”  “A bad monster.”  “Okay, if he was not a bad monster, 
what sort of monster could he be?” – loosening the tight construing around ‘bad’ to 
entertain the idea of a shift through an ‘okay monster’, to the other pole – ‘good’.  Then 
perhaps, if he were a ‘good monster’ what would he look like?  A little temporary 
creative artwork on the monster involving the child might help in the process of 
reconstruing from the frightening to the wonderful – ‘look what I made’ – version of 
reality. 
 
Kelly refers to the jigsaw puzzle approach to science as accumulative 
fragmentalism where the pieces (knowledge) that have been discovered are considered 
truths, which will eventually come together in a simulation of the universe.  The study 
of pain is a good example of accumulative fragmentalism.  Both the neurophysiology 
and psychology of pain tend to abide by the assumptions that there are pieces that are 
known, and chunks that are not yet, but will in the future, be known.  However, for 
Kelly: 
 
What we think we know is anchored in our assumptions, not in the bed 
rock of truth itself, and that world we seek to understand remains always 
on the horizons of our thoughts” (1977, p. 6).   
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The night sky could be construed as a constructivist analogy of pain.  Rather 
than a static, yet to be nailed down but we are working on it, picture, the night sky is 
dynamic, forever changing, and what you see depends upon your point of view.  Kelly 
holds that the constructions that we believe are givens are always open to 
reconstruction.  However, this requires, amongst other things, curiosity, effort and 
willingness.  The individual might be quite content or bound by the tight construing of 
the status quo. 
  
In regard to procedural pain in children, the view of the child, parent, nurse and 
doctor, each of whom is variously informed by experience and knowledge, is that the 
medical procedure is going to hurt.  Furthermore, it is very likely that the child will 
become distressed.  These are the givens in procedural pain in children – pain, fear and 
distress.  Underpinning this so-called reality is the notion of accumulative 
fragmentalism – we know the child will scream and have to be restrained.  However, if 
the paradigm is shifted to embrace Kelly’s constructive alternativism then the givens 
are no longer there.  This way of thinking has significant implications for practice but 
the paradigm does not shift on its own.  Kelly (1977) referred to this as ‘transcending 
the obvious’; anything, including pain, fear and distress is only obvious because it is 
based on a set of assumptions.  Essentially, Kelly calls for the review of long held 
assumptions and refers to this as constructive alternativism.  But ‘calling for change’ 
and effecting change are not the same.   
 
Kelly sums up his theory of the Psychology of Personal Constructs with a 
fundamental postulate and 12 corollaries (Kelly, 1955, pp.103-104).  The corollaries 
specify the various relationships and processes that govern constructs and construing 
with in the fabric of his theory.  A detailed exploration of the 12 corollaries is beyond 
the scope of this review, however, Kelly’s fundamental postulate is worth stating: 
 “A person’s processes are psychologically channelized [governed] by the ways in 
which he anticipates events.” (Kelly, 1955, p.103) 
 
It is intended to expand on personal construct theory later but before closing on 
Kelly, some criticisms other than the philosophical issues raised earlier must be 
considered.  Commonly, Kelly is pigeonholed as another cognitive theory, or criticised 
for failing to adequately deal with emotion.  Kelly anticipated this form of criticism and 
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was adamant regarding the redundancy of traditional approaches in psychology “The 
classical threefold division of psychology into cognition, affection, and conation has 
been completely abandoned in the psychology of personal constructs” (Kelly, 1955, 
p.130).  However, a cogent criticism relates to the origin of constructs. 
 
Katz (1984) expressed a concern regarding the origin of constructs in Kelly’s 
theory.  He points out that Kelly “assumes that constructs are elaborated through the 
use of other constructs” (p. 317) and that this leads to a fundamental flaw in the 
psychology of constructs, a question that has not been adequately addressed “From 
where does one actually get one’s first constructs?” (Katz, 1984, p.317).  Katz refers to 
this as the ‘Origin Problem’ and suggests, “All one need to do to make the Origin 
Problem disappear in a Kellian manner is to formulate this as a new postulate to be 
incorporated into the theory’s assumptive structure” (Katz, 1984, p.318).  Katz offers 
the following as a solution to what he sees as the Origin Problem - that is, the origin of 
the first constructs. 
 
Origin Postulate:  Each individual possesses phylogenetically rooted 
primitive constructs which emerge during characteristic periods in the 
individual’s ontogenic development, and which serve as points of 
departure for the elaboration of the individual’s personal constructs. 
(Katz, 1984, p. 318) 
 
Katz (1984) suggests that primitive constructs have evolved through natural 
selection, that they form the interface between the world of the biological and the 
ecological with the world of the psychological and personal.  He is cognisant of Kelly’s 
theory and describes primitive constructs in Kellian language in an attempt to maximise 
the fit with the psychology of personal constructs. 
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Personal Construct Psychology and Emotion 
The word emotion is not in the index to Kelly’s Psychology of Personal Constructs.  
This is not an omission, the term is excluded.  In the preface to the text, Kelly is frank 
about where he is taking the reader: 
 
For example, the term learning, so honourably embedded in most 
psychological texts, scarcely appears at all.  That is wholly intentional; we are 
for throwing it overboard altogether.  There is no ego, no emotion, no 
motivation, no reinforcement, no drive, no unconscious, no need.  (Kelly, 
1955, p. x) 
 
This is not to say that Kelly does not deal with emotion in his theory, he does.  
Kelly incorporated four terms in his theory that elsewhere would be called emotions: 
they are threat, guilt, fear and anxiety.  Kelly defined these terms within the psychology 
of personal constructs as “experiential or psychological phenomena” (Kelly, 1955, p. 
489) associated with the transition of constructs rather than discrete constructs as 
defined in the theory. 
 
According to Kelly’s theory, the constructs that we construe are in a constant 
state of flux.  We construe and reconstrue the world in which we live; sometimes this is 
achieved with relative ease, at other times with great difficulty.  Threat, guilt, fear and 
anxiety are said to be associated with difficult transitions.  The following is an 
overview of Kelly’s approach to threat fear and anxiety, within the context of 
procedural pain and fear in children.  Before explaining this, several of Kelly’s terms 
have to be defined. 
 
“Comprehensive Constructs are those which subsume a relatively wide variety 
of events” (p. 477).  Kelly illustrates what he means by a relatively wide variety of 
events when he discusses threat.  Reconstruing Kelly’s example to that of a child going 
to hospital, the hospital is a comprehensive construct because it represents a wide 
variety of events.  The hospital is full of potentially disruptive events, different food, 
separation from parents, medicine and so on.  In contrast to Comprehensive Constructs 
are Incidental Constructs. 
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“Incidental Constructs subsume a small variety of events” (p.478).  For a child 
with leukaemia, a painful medical procedure would be an example of an incidental 
construct.  It represents a small variety of events in the child’s construction.  It relates 
to an incident, which, in the child’s construing, is defined by specific characteristics 
whereas the complex treatment program and associated implications would be a 
comprehensive construct. 
 
“Core Constructs are those which govern a person’s maintenance processes – 
that is, those by which he maintains his identity and existence” (p. 482).  As the name 
suggests, core constructs are vital to one’s sense of self and well-being.  For Kelly, in 
achieving a state of health, one’s mental processes should follow core structures, which 
subsume a wide range of events (comprehensive) but are not overly permeable.  A 
construct is permeable if new elements are admitted that were previously not construed 
within its framework; this broadens the range of convenience of the construct.  Kelly 
suggests that if the person’s core constructs are too permeable then the person may 
construe everything as having deeply personal significance and that this underpins 
paranoia or hypochondriasis. 
 
“Peripheral Constructs are those which can be altered without serious 
modification of core structure” (p. 482).  Kelly points out that peripheral constructs can 
be comprehensive, incidental, permeable and impermeable.  The notion that they are 
peripheral to the core structure means that they carry less significance regarding the 
sense of self.  Kelly highlights the importance in therapy of getting it right regarding a 
person's peripheral and core structures.  This presumably is particularly important when 
dealing with children.  Our adult construing of what is peripheral and what is core may 
lack validity.  A simple example would be a child’s teddy bear.  To the staff in a 
hospital, the teddy bear amongst a bag of toys brought in by the child might be 
construed as just another toy – a peripheral construct.  For a child however, the teddy 
bear might be tied in some way to his or her sense of identity, a shared existence.  In 
this case, it would be a core construct and should be recognised as such.  In Kuttner’s 
follow-up video “No Fears, No Tears, 13 Years Later”, she made a point of finding out, 
from the child’s mother, the name of a child’s teddy (Maxi), who was used to comfort 
the child during a procedure. 
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Threat, Fear and Anxiety in Personal Construct Psychology 
It is interesting that Kelly differentiates between threat, fear and anxiety.  Mainstream 
psychology tends not to consider threat alone, and fear and anxiety are often used 
interchangeably.  As stated earlier, for Kelly, these psychological phenomena are 
associated with the transition of constructs.  The following is an overview of how 
threat, fear and anxiety are defined in personal construct psychology together with the 
relevance of this approach in regard to procedural pain in children. 
 
 “Threat is the awareness of imminent comprehensive change in one’s core 
structure” (Kelly, 1955, p.489, italics original).  Kelly adds, “In order for the threat to 
be significant, the prospective change must be significant” (p.489).  The example given 
earlier of a child going to hospital is a situation in which the child might feel 
threatened.  The change in the child’s core structure is significant but at the same time, 
it is comprehensive.  There are many elements to this change, so by definition it is 
comprehensive.  The difficulty for the child in effecting the change in his or her core 
structure is manifest as threat.  What differentiates threat from fear is the global or 
comprehensive nature of the change. 
 
  “Fear is like threat, except that, in this case, it is a new incidental construct, 
rather than a comprehensive construct, that seems about to take over” (Kelly, 1955, 
p.494, italics original).  Kelly adds, “The incidental construct is still a core construct, 
and hence the person’s maintenance processes are at stake, just as they are in the case 
of threat” (p.494).  Returning to the example of the child with leukaemia who is to 
undergo a painful procedure, the change in the child’s core structure is significant but 
this time it is incidental, it is related to the child’s construal of the painful procedure.  
This is an extremely important concept.  Within personal construct theory, a child 
undergoing a painful procedure is frightened because of the way he or she construes the 
reality of the procedure.  It follows that if we can help the child to alter (reconstrue) his 
or her reality then we might be able to facilitate a reduction in fear.  This point will be 
expanded in the discussion in Chapter 11.  The last feature associated with difficult 
transition of constructs in Kellian terms is anxiety. 
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“Anxiety is the recognition that the events with which one is confronted lie 
outside the range of convenience of one’s construct system” (Kelly, 1955, p.495, italics 
original).  Again let us take the example of a child with leukaemia but this time the 
child normally copes with the medical procedure, say a lumbar puncture.  During one 
of these procedures, the needle enters the subarachnoid space and the cerebrospinal 
fluid drips out.  The doctor says to the nurse “You had better page the neurologist, I 
have never seen anything like this before."  The child, the parent, and the doctor are 
probably all going to experience anxiety.  The doctor is confronted with events that lie 
outside her range of convenience, and critically, she does not know what to do.  The 
child and the parent experience anxiety because of what the doctor said.  Part of their 
construct system is “the doctor knows what she is doing and everything is okay."  
When the doctor expresses concern, this is outside the range of convenience of both the 
child’s and the parent’s construct system.  The phenomenon that accompanies this 
transition is anxiety. 
 
To conclude the discussion of Kelly’s views on anxiety, fear and threat, the 
following is a second illustration of Kelly’s views applied to an adult scenario that 
most health professionals could identify with and yet has similarity with the procedural 
pain reality for a child. 
 
Consider, for argument’s sake, a male health professional subpoenaed to appear 
in a Coroner’s court in relation to the death of a patient.  He has knowledge of all the 
'what ifs' that could damage him, and feels threatened because in Kelly’s terms, he is 
faced with a comprehensive change to core structure.  If council representing the 
deceased's relative identified something that he did or did not do that would lay the 
blame right on him then his emotion might be fear.  The change to core structure, in 
Kelly’s terms, would be incidental, over and above the existing comprehensive 
constructs.  In this case, the health professional would be experiencing an underlying 
sense of threat with a sudden influx of fear.  The reason that this manifests as fear is 
that he is suddenly faced with something that can seriously damage him, over which he 
has no control, he lacks power, and there is no escape.  This is analogous to the 
procedure room for a child.  Kelly emphasizes the unknown in fear versus the known in 
threat.  “We are threatened by hauntingly familiar things and frightened by 
unexpectedly strange things” (Kelly, 1955, p. 494).  The child who has had previous 
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procedures feels threatened by the known elements and is afraid of the unknown.  In 
this case the unknown could be, “I don’t know how I am going to get through this” – 
particularly given what happened last time.  This ‘unknown’ is frightening.  There is 
much more to procedural fear than the needle or the big machine; these are factors, 
certainly, rather like Coroner and the barristers, but the issue is also about the sudden 
unknown.   
  
 
Summary 
The philosophical origins of constructivism were reviewed and critiqued at the 
beginning of this chapter.  The claim that constructivism has transcended the 
epistemological and ontological debate is bold, particularly in light of cogent 
arguments that link constructivism with empiricism.  However, despite the 
philosophical vicissitudes and various interpretations of the origin of constructivism, it 
has developed through its main exponent in psychology, George Kelly, into a practical 
theory of personality.  The opinion that reality is constructed rather than static or given 
is common to Kelly’s psychology of personal constructs and the current thinking about 
the neural functioning of the brain.  The constructivist view forms part of the 
theoretical framework in this thesis because, as a theory about reality, it encompasses 
the psychological and neurophysiological aspects of fear and pain.  The key points 
from Kelly applied in this thesis are, firstly, that we construct the reality which guides 
our actions rather than simply or complexly responding to a given reality; secondly, 
Kelly’s philosophy of Constructive Alternativism reveals that nothing, specifically in 
the context of this thesis, about fear and pain, has to be a given; and thirdly, our version 
of reality, which by definition includes our sense of self in the world, can be 
reconstrued. 
 
The issues surrounding procedural pain and fear in children are complex.  So 
far, the theoretical framework in this thesis has drawn upon the neurophysiology of 
pain and emotion, the psychology of emotion, and constructivism.  The next chapter is 
on the problem of procedural pain in children. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PROCEDURAL PAIN AND FEAR IN CHILDREN 
 
The previous chapter introduced Personal Construct Theory and related 
this approach in psychology to procedural fear and pain in children.  The 
aim of this chapter is to explore the problem of procedural pain in 
children not simply from the health professional’s viewpoint but to gain 
a wider view of the problem by looking through the ‘eyes of a child’.  
The chapter begins with a critique of the mechanistic biomedical view 
of procedural pain and fear in children.  The widely held assumption 
that fear is dependent upon pain is challenged.  Within the related 
developmental model, there is a view that fears arise in children because 
of ‘incorrect appraisal’.  This view is criticised and contrasted towards 
the end of the chapter with a constructivist view of procedural pain and 
fear.  The importance of acknowledging fear rather than anxiety in 
procedural pain is emphasised and discussed within the context of 
studies that have combined drug (anxiolytic) and psychological 
approaches. The implications of context and meaning on pain are 
discussed with reference to a seminal study of wounded soldiers.  The 
last section focuses on the concept of seeing (constructing) a child-like 
view of the world as an important factor in communicating with children 
and understanding their fear and pain.   
 
The effective management of procedural pain in children is a worldwide 
problem.  Members of The International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) 
special interest group, Pain in Children, frequently discuss procedural pain in children 
and report on research in symposia held triennially.  Despite the surge in interest in 
procedural pain since the early 1980s, in many settings, children continue to suffer pain 
as a consequence of medical treatment. 
 
A medical procedure is “…any procedure conducted or supervised by medical 
personnel for the purpose of evaluating or modifying health status…” (Steward & 
Steward, cited in Steward, 1993, p.173).  Children undergo medical procedures in a 
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range of settings including emergency, out patient and nuclear medicine departments, 
ward procedure rooms, and increasingly, with the advent of ‘hospital in the home’ 
programs, the child’s home.  There are many reasons why children continue to suffer 
procedural pain.  The range of settings identified above has to be a factor; not all staff 
in these settings will be aware of the strategies that can be used to manage procedural 
pain.  Even within a single hospital, the management of procedural pain in children can 
vary greatly between one department and another.  Some areas are progressive in terms 
of staff attitudes and interventions, both pharmacologic and psychological, and 
procedural pain is well managed, yet, in other areas, distressed and terrified children 
continue to be restrained during medical procedures.   
 
Having the skin punctured by another is distressing for many people.  Fassler 
(1985) states that needle phobias have been studied in adult populations with an 
estimated incidence of 1 in 7 among 20-year-olds (Agras, Sylvester, & Oliveau, cited in 
Fassler, 1985, p. 371).  Clearly, many children carry their fears about procedural pain 
into their adult life.  Fassler also points out that Oswalt and Napoliello (cited in Fassler, 
1985, p. 371) have reported that fear of needles was the major reason for reluctance to 
donate blood.  It is likely that adult fears of needles originate in childhood experiences.  
With the advent of routine immunization, even the healthiest of children will have 
some experience of needle pain.   
 
For children, procedural pain is certainly negative, threatening and frightening.  
However, apart from acknowledging that fear exists, little is known about why children 
are fearful.  The obvious explanation is that children are afraid because of the pain that 
accompanies the procedure.  In this view, pain or the anticipation of pain, causes fear.  
This view has been advanced in the biomedical literature and taken to the logical 
conclusion that if the pain (cause/stimulus) is taken away then, the fear 
(effect/response) will disappear.  McGrath and McAlpine (1993) posed: 
 
Why are children afraid?  Generally, because needles hurt… Although no 
studies have been published on the topic, it is very likely that if the pain were 
eliminated, the fear would extinguish.  The diminution in fear might be gradual 
or might occur suddenly once the child experienced pain-free venepuncture.  
(p. S5) 
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The cause-effect view of procedural pain and fear is typical of the dominant 
biomedical paradigm in pain theory and practice.  The assumption is that the child’s 
fear is a function of the pain.  The exemplar described at the beginning of this thesis 
cites the case of the boy in an emergency department having a laceration on his leg 
sutured who was terrified despite the administration of more than adequate local 
anaesthesia.  Furthermore, modern dental treatment is relatively pain-free and yet 
millions of people are afraid of going to the dentist.  Clearly, the fear of medical 
procedures in children, and indeed adults, goes far beyond the pain.  Although effective 
management of pain will undoubtedly help, and is certainly the preferred option, it does 
not necessarily follow that fear will dissipate with adequate analgesia. 
  
The traditional cause – effect view of pain and fear has also been challenged 
(Bolles & Franselow, 1980) with the suggestion that fear can inhibit pain.  Bolles and 
Franselow proposed a Perceptual-Defensive-Recuperative Model of Fear and Pain.  
Essentially, they hold that pain and fear are best thought of as separate and conflicting 
motivational systems.  The motivational intent with pain is to rest and recuperate.  If 
one sprains an ankle, the function of the pain is to ensure rest and healing.  Fear on the 
other hand invokes a motivational response aimed at protection (Plutchik’s view).  The 
key point in Bolles and Franselow’s model is their contention that fear inhibits pain.  
They assume that fear moderates pain by activating the endogenous opioid system.  
Bolles and Franselow argue that in a fear response where the animal is primarily 
concerned with protection, fight or flight, the perception of pain is counterproductive.  
Only after the animal escapes will it sense the pain of its wounds.  Again, the function 
of the pain is to aid in recuperation. 
 
Bolles and Franselow’s argument makes sense especially for animals faced with 
life-threatening situations.  However, their analysis is based on two important 
assumptions.  The first assumption is that the endogenous opioid system is activated 
during a fear response and, secondly, that endogenous opioids are produced in 
sufficient amounts to cause effective analgesia.  Shavit, Lewis, Terman, Gale and 
Lieberskind (1984) showed that opioids are released in a stress response particularly in 
the case of helplessness (see Chapter 2), however, it is unlikely that the levels of 
opioids are sufficient to cause analgesia.  In 1980, when this model was published, the 
most likely explanation of  ‘natural’ analgesic effects was the endogenous opioids, 
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however, this model has not received much support.  There was a period when 
analgesia in hypnosis was thought to be an endogenous opioid effect.  However, 
hypnoanalgesia failed to be reversed by the opioid antagonist naloxone (Spiegel & 
Albert, 1983), which suggests some ‘other’ mechanism is involved.  Furthermore, 
endogenous opioid levels have been studied in humans at birth (an undoubtedly 
stressful and painful event for the neonate) and even the highest recorded levels are 
unlikely to induce analgesia.  In their seminal paper on pain in the human neonate and 
foetus, Anand and Hickey (1987) cite the research into endogenous opioids as a factor 
supporting the now recognized reality that neonates feel pain, or are at least receptive 
to nociceptive input.  Pain sensations in neonates are technically described as 
nociception rather than pain to avoid the difficulty in establishing the emotional 
component of pain in a neonate.  Anand and Hickey (1987, p. 1323) state: 
 
Endogenous opioids are released in the human fetus at birth and in response to 
fetal and neonatal distress (Gautray, Jolivet, Vieth & Guillemin, 1977).  
Umbilical-cord plasma levels of beta-endorphin and beta-lipotropin from 
healthy full-term neonates delivered vaginally or by cesarean section have 
been shown to be three to five times higher than plasma levels in resting adults 
(Csontos, Rust, Holt, Mahr, Kromer, & Teschemacher, 1979; Wardlaw, Stark, 
Baxi & Frantz, 1979). 
 
Anand and Hickey cite a number of investigations that showed high levels of 
endogenous opioids in the foetus and neonate under certain conditions including breech 
presentation, vacuum extraction, prematurity, hypoxaemia and infections.  While it is 
tempting to assume that the high levels of endogenous opioids will mediate adequate 
analgesia (as in Bolles and Franselow’s model), Anand and Hickey argue: 
 
… these high levels of beta-endorphin are unlikely to decrease anesthetic or 
analgesic requirements (Lerman, Robinson, Wills & Gregory, 1983), because 
the cerebrospinal fluid levels of beta-endorphin required to produce analgesia 
in human adults have been found to be 10,000 times higher than the highest 
recorded levels in neonates (Foley, Kourides & Inturrisi et al., 1979).  (Anand 
& Hickey, 1987, p.1323) 
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Bolles and Franselow’s model of fear and pain is biological and assumes a level 
of efficacy of the endogenous opioids that has not been substantiated.  For a child 
undergoing a painful medical procedure the context is one of fear and helplessness.  It 
is distinctly possible that such a state will induce the opioid stress described by Shavit.  
Any assertions that the child does not feel pain or that endogenous opioids are 
produced in sufficient amounts to effect analgesia are unfounded in both research 
(Anand & Hickey above) and clinical observations of terrified children screaming in 
pain and fear during medical procedures. 
 
Procedural Pain and Distress in Children: Anxiety or Fear? 
In the early 1980s, researchers (Katz, Kellerman & Siegel, 1980) held that pain and 
anxiety experienced by children during medical procedures could be combined to form 
a single construct – distress.  Jay, Ozlins, Elliott, and  Siegel (1983) subsequently 
developed the Observational Scale of Behavioural Distress (OSBD) for use in research 
into the distress associated with medical procedures.  What followed were a number of 
studies and papers on pain and distress and concern regarding anxiety associated with 
medical procedures (Katz, Kellerman, & Ellenberg, 1987; Kuttner, 1989; Kuttner, 
Bowman, & Teasdale, 1988; Peterson & Shigetomi, 1981; Jay, Elliott, Katz, & Siegel, 
1987; Jay Elliott, Woody, & Siegel, 1991; Zeltzer & LeBaron, 1982).   
 
In children, the assumed cause-effect relationship between pain and fear is 
exemplified in the label ‘distress’.  The term is useful in practice because most people 
can identify with what is meant by a ‘distressed child’, but it fails to shed light on the 
relationship between fear and pain.  On the one hand, most would agree that fear and 
pain are positively correlated.  As pain increases, fear increases. Fradet, McGrath, Kay, 
Adams and Luke (1990) found distress in children about to undergo venepuncture was 
correlated with pain behaviour.  McCaffery and Beebe (1994) suggest a spiralling 
relationship between pain, muscle tension and anxiety where an increase in pain 
heightens muscle tension and anxiety, which exacerbates the pain.  McCaffery and 
Beebe suggest the efficacy of relaxation in pain management is centred on removing 
muscle tension from the pain triad and thus breaking the cycle.  This model makes 
immediate sense, particularly with regard to muscle tension, but pain and anxiety are 
unaccounted for after muscle tension is removed from the equation.  Muscle tension 
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(physical) is the obvious choice for the focus of relaxation, particularly within the 
dualistic mind-body paradigm but relaxation also ‘feels good’; it is possible that 
relaxation also has an effect on pain at the cognitive/emotional level.  
 
Concern regarding the anxiety associated with medical procedures in children 
continued in the 1990s.  Anderson, Zeltzer and Fanurik (1993) wrote, “Procedures such 
as venous cannulation, lumbar puncture, bone marrow aspiration… are themselves 
often painful and anxiety provoking”.  (p.435, italics added).  Fradet, McGrath, Kay, 
Adams and Luke (1990) conducted a prospective survey of reactions to venepuncture 
in children and adolescents (3-17 years).  The authors state that the children “were 
asked to report on their pain and anxiety” (p.53, italics added).  Fradet et al. (1990) 
used the Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario Pain Scale (CHEOPS), a tool 
developed to measure postoperative pain in young children, as a measure of distress, 
which they then labelled as ‘anxiety’.  In another study, concern about the anxiety 
experienced by children during medical procedures led Jay, Elliot, Woody and Siegel 
(1991) to investigate the effect of combining Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy with oral 
Valium (an anxiolytic) in managing distress in children during painful medical 
procedures.  Jay et al. said, “The OSBD consists of eight operationally defined 
behaviours that indicate pain and anxiety” (p.319, italics added).  The authors found: 
 
The results of this study demonstrate that orally administered Valium did not 
potentiate the efficacy of CBT aimed at ameliorating children’s distress 
associated with BMAs [bone marrow aspirations] or LPs [lumbar punctures].  
(p. 320) 
 
In 1993 the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Health 
Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) released a clinical practice guideline booklet on 
acute pain management (including procedural pain) in infants, children and 
adolescents.  Again, the emphasis was on anxiety.  “What is the expected intensity and 
duration of anxiety?” (AHCPR, 1993 p. 7 italics added).  Regarding repeated 
procedures, the report suggested, “… provide maximum treatment for the pain and 
anxiety of the first procedure to minimize the development of anticipatory anxiety 
before subsequent procedures”  (AHCPR, 1993 p. 8 italics added) 
 
  
 
99  
All of these research articles, reports and papers refer to anxiety in children 
associated with procedural pain.  However, the point of contention here is that children 
do not experience anxiety with procedural pain, they experience fear; there is a 
difference.  The difference is evident in theoretical and clinical psychology, psychiatry 
and lay language.  Although associated with emotion, many theorists do not consider 
anxiety to be a specific emotion but fear is usually listed among the ‘classic five‘ – 
fear, anger, sadness, disgust and joy. Anxiety is a generalized state of heightened 
physiological arousal.  It is also a medical diagnosis.  Patients with anxiety are 
commonly treated with anxiolytic medication such as those in the benzodiazepine 
group (e.g. Valium and Serepax).  In everyday language, it is common to hear “I am 
feeling anxious today”, we do not hear “I am feeling fearful today”.  No one speaks of 
‘free-floating fear” because fear has a focus, even if it is the ‘unknown’.  The labelling 
of the affective component of procedural pain and distress in children as anxiety is 
consistent with the dominant paradigm, the biomedical model of health care.  The 
consequences of this approach are far-reaching.  A trembling, withdrawn and bracing 
child is experiencing fear as the health professional approaches.  As long as children in 
this state are continually labelled as anxious, the locus of the problem will always be 
with the child.  People suffer anxiety for many reasons but in all cases, the problem is 
considered to be the individual’s.  If we say, “This child is anxious” we are, in effect, 
removing ourselves from the child and reporting an observation in much the same way 
as saying, “This child is febrile” or “This child is dehydrated”.  If, on the other hand, 
we say, “This child is afraid”, the onus is then on us, as health professionals to identify 
what the child is afraid of, and to do something about it.  For many health 
professionals, the focus on anxiety may simply reflect the powerful traditions of 
education and practice.  If one has a word that describes a perceived state that everyone 
understands, there is no need to introduce another term.  The emphasis in the foregoing 
statement is on the word, ‘perceived’.  Of concern is the validity of the judgement and 
the consequences for the child and the health professional who misses the key issue that 
the child is scared.  It is also quicker and easier to ‘objectively’ label the child as 
anxious than to reflect on the object of the child’s fear, particularly if the child is afraid 
of the health professional and what he or she is going to do to the child.  A reluctance 
to consider the child’s fear may be exacerbated if the health professional has some 
residual guilt about what he or she is doing to the child in the name of treatment. 
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Given that children experience fear and not anxiety during medical procedures, 
it is not surprising that Jay et al (1991) found no potentiating effect in combining CBT 
with oral Valium.  It is also interesting to note that the researchers use the terms fear 
and anxiety interchangeably.  In a previous study Jay, Elliot, Katz and Siegel (1987) 
investigated one group of children who had Valium prior to the procedure, another that 
had CBT during the procedure and a third who had attention control.  They found that 
“Valium reduced anticipatory anxiety, the CBT package gave children coping skills 
that helped them throughout the BMA.” (cited in Jay et al., 1991, p.317).  In the 
combined Valium with CBT study (Jay et al., 1991) the aim was to see if combining 
Valium with CBT was more effective than either alone in reducing fear and distress.  
To their credit, the researchers measured anticipatory fear rather than anxiety with a 5-
point faces scale.  They also applied the Observational Scale of Behavioral Distress 
(OSBD) before, during and after the procedure.  The upshot was that the Valium did 
not potentiate the efficacy of the CBT and if anything may have hindered the learning 
of the cognitive-behavioural strategies (Jay et al., 1991, p.320).  While Valium might 
calm a child prior to a procedure (reducing overt signs of anxiety), it does little for the 
fear experienced during a medical procedure.  Drug companies are yet to produce a 
drug that will stop you being afraid.  The Valium-CBT study conducted by Jay et al. 
(1991) is pertinent to this discussion because it is illustrative of the difference between 
anxiety and fear.  The distress scores during the procedures (representing fear in this 
argument) were not reduced with the introduction of Valium. 
 
Returning to the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) 
booklet on acute pain management cited earlier, the first question it posed, “What is the 
expected intensity and duration of anxiety?” is typically biomedical in that the locus of 
the problem (anxiety) is transferred to the child.  This approach would be fine when 
considering the intensity and duration of fever in a child with septicaemia but it is not 
helpful in considering the effect of intervention on emotion.  Even if the expected 
intensity and duration of anxiety could be identified, any gain in knowing this is 
doubtful.  The focus should be on fear.  In the question framework, (1) “What is/are the 
object(s) of the child’s fear?” (2) “How do we as health professionals contribute to the 
child’s fear?” (3) “What can we do to help the child to reconstrue his or her fear?” 
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The second point made in the AHCPR booklet recommends the provision of 
maximum treatment for pain and anxiety including anticipatory anxiety.  Apart from 
general anaesthesia, one assumes that the authors advocate maximum local anaesthesia, 
analgesia, and anxiolytic medication despite the findings of Jay et al. (1991) that 
Valium did not reduce the distress associated with painful procedures.  The upshot is, 
in continuing to refer to anxiety, the AHCPR panel have missed the point, that it is pain 
and fear, not anxiety, that should be the focus of our interventions. 
 
 
Limitations of a Biomedical View of Procedural Pain in Children 
The following quote from the Australian National Health and Medical Research 
Council is typical of the biomedical approach to procedural pain in children. 
 
Non-pharmacologic strategies can be effective for pain and anxiety associated 
with minor procedures, especially if repeated on a regular basis.  They are less 
useful in the acute situation.  (NHMRC, 1999, p. 71, italics added) 
 
The terms, ‘non-pharmacologic’, ‘anxiety’, ‘minor procedures’ and ‘acute 
situation’ in this short quotation demand close scrutiny. The term ‘non-pharmacologic’ 
is exclusive rather than inclusive and implies drug or non-drug as the defining 
characteristic of a particular strategy.  The term does not define any set of strategies, it 
simply implies what they are not – namely, they are not drugs.  The term is also 
stereotypical and fails to acknowledge the range of interventions that elsewhere are 
described as psychological, cognitive and behavioural.  This approach is as 
meaningless, as defining a treatment as surgical or non-surgical.  The diagnostic term 
‘anxiety’ is used, when the word ‘fear’ would be a more apt descriptor of the emotional 
component of procedural pain.  The term ‘minor procedure’ is a value statement from a 
panel of expert ‘grown- ups’.  For a child, a seemingly insignificant procedure could be 
construed as ‘major’, even if it occupies a low position on the hierarchy of procedures.  
Usually, bone marrow aspiration is at the top of this hierarchy, closely followed by 
lumbar puncture, then cardiac catheterisation, burn dressing changes, insertion of 
intravenous cannulae, venepuncture and lastly fingerprick (capillary sample of blood).  
Bone marrow aspirations and lumbar punctures are certainly painful and distressing, 
but so are all the rest.  The point is, pain and fear, as experienced by a child is not a 
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function of perceived invasiveness, degree of difficulty or medical skill required to 
perform the procedure.  Anecdotally, we sometimes see children with acute leukaemia 
who have coped with their lumbar punctures and the effects of chemotherapy who 
become very distressed every time they have a fingerprick or a venepuncture.  A parent 
or health professional may be puzzled and believe that if the child can cope with a 
lumbar puncture he or she ought to be able to cope with a fingerprick.  That is, of 
course, an assumption made by an adult.  There is no simple explanation as to why 
some children find these so-called ‘minor procedures’ distressing other than for the 
child, they are major procedures.  From the child’s perspective, one factor might be that 
a lumbar puncture is out of sight whereas a fingerprick or venepuncture is well within 
the child’s view.  Actually seeing the needle, the hole and the blood may, in some cases 
make these so called ‘minor procedures’ more frightening. 
   
The phrase ‘less useful in an acute situation’ ignores available evidence.  The 
NHMRC do not define “acute situation” however, these strategies have been used with 
effect to manage procedural pain and distress in children in a range of “acute settings” 
including emergency departments, pathology out patients and ward procedure rooms 
(Anderson, Zeltzer, & Fanurik, 1993; Bullock & Shaddy, 1993; Kuttner, 1998; Syrjala 
& Abrams, 1996; Pederson, 1995; Sparks, 2001; Wells, 1998).  Psychological 
approaches to managing fear and pain are well suited to a range of ‘acute situations’.  A 
common myth about the use of psychological approaches is that these techniques take 
too much time, which might be what underpins the term ‘acute situation’.  The author 
has had a previously distressed child intravenously cannulated in imagery in three 
minutes in an emergency department.  Olness and Kohen (1996) describe the timely 
use of hypnosis with children in a range of ‘acute settings’ including the emergency 
department.  Moreover, the NHMRC should perhaps consider what is most important: 
getting a procedure over with in record time regardless of the impact on the child, 
parent and health professional, or performing the procedure in a manner that reduces 
the pain, fear, distress and stress on all involved. 
 
The importance attached to technical aspects and associated risks of medical 
procedures clearly influences professional’s views of a person’s pain and fear.  Health 
professionals who perform medical procedures including doctors, nurses, ambulance 
personnel and phlebotomists, who practice within a biomedical framework (the 
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dominant paradigm), tend to focus on the technical aspects of the procedure rather than 
the whole procedure, which includes the impact of the intervention on the child.  
Harrison (1991), in an article on preparing children for venepuncture, takes a 
procedure-oriented view and places emphasis on a ‘cooperative child’. 
 
If a child is tense or struggles, venepuncture is more difficult to complete, and 
the risks of accidental injury are greater….  There is a need, therefore, to find 
ways of encouraging children to be less anxious and more cooperative during 
venous blood sampling.  (p. 299) 
 
A noticeably telling phrase is “… encouraging children to be less anxious and 
more cooperative…” – More ‘grown-up’ perhaps.  Issues of compliance and 
cooperation could also be considered as concerns about ‘control over’ or ‘power over’ 
the individual with an emphasis on getting the procedure done, as evident in a paper 
aptly titled Tips and tricks for pediatric I.V. insertion, (Frey, 2000).  Frey begins with 
“Children and nurses alike dread the insertion of an intravenous (I.V.) device” (p. 54).  
In a question-answer format, the first question posed by the author is, “Should parents 
be present?”  The notion of parental presence is supported, to reduce ‘apprehension’.  
“Encourage the parent to calm and comfort the child, but don’t ask her to help restrain 
her; let another nurse take on this role. (p. 54 italics added).  The second question 
attempts to address pain and anxiety: “How can I minimize the child’s pain and 
anxiety?”  Frey suggests a simple explanation of the procedure and then states:  
 
Try these tricks to promote cooperation (italics added): 
Administer a local anaesthetic before venepuncture, according to policy. 
Perform I.V. insertion outside of the child’s hospital room.  Allow her room to 
be a safe haven. 
Give an age-appropriate explanation… 
Always be honest.  Tell the child that the venepuncture will hurt, but only for a 
short time… 
Provide as much privacy as possible and give her permission to cry. 
Allow her to have items that calm her… 
Let older children participate, which will help distract them, by ripping tape, 
opening alcohol swabs, and holding tubing… (p. 54) 
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 The bulk of the article is on technical aspects of the procedure (pp.54-56): 
 
What size device should I use? …  How do I choose a suitable site? …  How 
do I distend a child’s vein? …  How do I keep a child still during 
venepuncture? …  How do I secure the device? …  How do I protect a joint 
site? …  How long can I leave a peripheral device in place?  
 
The procedure-oriented view is exemplified in Frey’s concluding ‘formula for 
success’: 
The next time you perform venepuncture on a child, put these pointers into 
practice.  They’ll help you approach your patient with less apprehension and 
more confidence.  (p. 56) 
 
For procedure-oriented clinicians and researchers, what matters is that the child 
does exactly what he or she is told with a view to achieving the intended medical 
outcome.  For example, when performing venepuncture the health professional is 
primarily concerned with maintaining control (power) over the child and obtaining the 
blood.  As Frey (2000 p. 55) said, “It’s better [for whom?] to restrain the child and 
obtain I.V. access in one attempt than to make multiple attempts in a flailing distressed 
child”.  This statement articulates the widely held assumption that when restraint is 
used, the procedure will be quicker and therefore distress will be minimised.  
Moreover, given Frey’s ‘formula for success’, ‘It’s better’ presumably relates to the 
nurse rather than the child. 
 
The medical practitioner performing a lumbar puncture is primarily concerned 
with the placement of the needle and getting the cerebrospinal fluid; the person 
performing a venepuncture is primarily concerned with getting the blood.  More often 
than not, if the result is obtained then the procedure is deemed a success, regardless of 
the impact on the child.  Sometimes, even within this limited view of practice, the 
procedure is unsuccessful, for example, the vein is missed.  In such a case, it is 
common for a health professional to keep trying until a suitable vein is accessed.  This 
can involve any number of venepunctures, sometimes three of four attempts by one or 
more health professionals before the blood is eventually obtained and the procedure is 
deemed a success.  If the pain and fear experienced by the child are acknowledged at 
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all, these are justified in terms of, ‘He or she will get over it’ and, “At least we got the 
blood” or as stated by Frey (cited above) ‘It will only hurt for a short time’.  While it is 
fair to say that health professionals generally would prefer not to see children in pain, 
for many, the pain of a procedure is rationalized in terms of the proposed benefit of 
treatment for the child.  Even if procedural pain is identified as a problem, within the 
biomedical model it is seen as the child’s problem. 
 
The procedure-oriented focus of the biomedical model is most damningly 
evident in the following statement from a National Health and Medical Research 
Council (Australia) report on acute pain.  The section on procedural pain in children 
states: 
 
To optimise compliance, preparation of children for painful procedures must be 
approached systematically and properly handled by health care professionals. 
(NHMRC, 1999, p. 71, italics added) 
 
Issues of ‘compliance’ in medicine reflect the belief that the patient ought to 
behave in a manner that is expected, prescribed or ordered.  Either patients comply, or 
they do not comply, with treatment schedules.  The essence in the quotation above is 
that the child should do exactly what he or she is told to do during the procedure.  
There is an assumption that if the child complies (behaves) then, for the health 
professional, the procedure will be easier, over with quicker, and better – better for the 
health professional and for the child.  The compliant child may sob throughout the 
procedure but in ‘being compliant’, the child will appear less distressed than the non-
compliant child.  This reinforces the health professional’s belief that the compliant 
child feels less pain and therefore less fear.  Conversely, a non-compliant child 
becomes distressed, and resistant to treatment.  This increases the level of difficulty in 
performing the procedure for the health professional and is coupled with an increase 
risk of complications or injuring the child.  The effect on the health professional is 
anxiety, and sometimes anger.  At the same time, the health professional may construe 
the increase in the child’s distress as logical because the risk of injury has increased.  
The health professional is stressed, anxious and angry and the whole procedure 
becomes a disaster.  The blame is laid, by the health professional, and sometimes also 
by the parents on the child,  “You are only making it worse for yourself.”  “If you had 
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not pulled away, I would not have to do it again.”  “If you had stayed still, it would not 
have hurt so much, and it would be over with by now.”  The health professional who 
has to repeatedly perform procedures begins to dread the thought of another screaming 
and resistant child, and wishes, “If only they would hold still and do what they are told, 
it would not be as painful.”  All of this reinforces the misguided belief that being 
compliant is the key to feeling less pain, and therefore less fear.  In both cases, the 
stereotypical, compliant – passive – non-complaining, (no pain) and the non-compliant 
– resistant – complaining, (painful) assumptions essentially arise from pre-causal or 
transductive reasoning, where two unrelated events occur simultaneously and the 
individual assumes that a causal relationship exists between them even as the non-
complaining child might be terrified and hurting deeply but not obviously. 
 
Impact of Context and Meaning in Pain 
Certainly, there are situations where pain would be expected but it is not verbalised or 
even noticed.  This probably has more to do with conscious awareness and how the 
individual construes his or her reality than it does with endogenous analgesia.  It is 
possible that the fearful animal or human faced with a life-threatening situation does 
not notice pain because attention and behaviour are aimed at survival.  However, for a 
child undergoing a venepuncture, his or her attention is focussed on the procedure.  An 
accidental prick to the finger while pruning roses on a sunny Sunday afternoon may not 
be noticed until the blood is seen, whereas having a finger pricked by a phlebotomist in 
a pathology department, hurts. 
 
The notion that context can modify the experience of pain was first raised by Lt. 
Col. Henry Beecher, an army anaesthetist who treated men wounded in combat during 
World War II on the Venafro and Cassino Fronts and the Anzio Beachhead in Italy.  
Beecher (1946) classified the wounds received by a soldier in battle into one of five 
categories: “extensive peripheral soft tissue injury, compound fracture of a long bone, a 
penetrated head, a penetrated chest or penetrated abdomen” (p.96).  He asked each 
patient “As you lie there are you having any pain?”  Beecher found, 
 
 
  
 
107  
Of all the patients considered [n=215] only one-quarter, on being directly 
questioned shortly after entry in a Forward Hospital, said that their pain was 
enough to cause them to want pain relief therapy; three-quarters did not need 
such relief.  This was the case notwithstanding the fact that the most recent 
morphine had been administered hours before.  (p.104) 
 
It is important to note that Beecher’s observations were some 19 years before 
Melzack and Wall’s gate control theory. In 1946, Beecher made the following 
comments on the findings of his study. 
 
Pain is an experience subject to modification by many factors: wounds 
received during strenuous physical exercise, during the excitement of games, 
often go unnoticed.  The same is true of wounds received during fighting, 
during anger.  Strong emotion can block pain.  That is common experience.  In 
this connection it is important to consider the position of the soldier: His 
wound suddenly releases him from an exceedingly dangerous environment, 
one filled with fatigue, discomfort, anxiety, fear and real danger of death, and 
gives him a ticket to the safety of the hospital.  His troubles are over, or at least 
he thinks they are.  (p. 99)   
 
Given the extensive tissue damage associated with any one of the five 
categories, and the soldiers’ apparent lack of pain, Beecher’s passing footnote 
regarding the wounded soldiers’ reactions to venepuncture is most important. 
 
A badly injured patient who says he is having no wound pain will protest as 
vigorously as a normal individual at an inept venepuncture.  It seems unlikely 
that the freedom from pain of these men is to be explained on the basis of any 
general decrease in pain sensitivity.  (p. 98, italics added) 
 
Incredibly, Beecher’s comments suggest the wounded soldiers were more 
concerned with the procedural pain associated with an inept venepuncture than any 
pain from their wounds.  Beecher’s comments are profound, particularly given the 
comparatively limited understanding of pain in 1946.  He acknowledges alterations in 
pain perception, the interplay between pain and emotion, the role of appraisal and 
finally the social context of pain.  The only statement that bears critique is strong 
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emotion can block pain.  It is likely that the circumstance of the emotion rather than the 
emotion per se alters perception of pain.  Even in his own study, if strong emotion 
blocked pain, the wounded soldiers would not have complained at what Beecher 
describes as inept venepuncture.  Beecher later compared postoperative analgesia 
requests in soldiers and civilians (Beecher, cited in Schechter, 1985): 
 
On returning to the United States he [Beecher] noted that 82% of civilians who 
had undergone similar operations requested pain relief.  After interviewing 
these patients, Beecher surmised that the context or meaning of pain was a 
critical variable in the perception of pain.  For the soldiers, pain was 
representative of injuries received for valour and offered a ticket home.  For 
the civilians, pain represented potential disability and an uncertain future.  (p. 
17) 
 
Within a PCP framework, Beecher’s soldiers actively construed the reality to 
which they responded both in battle, and in the forward hospital.  In the heat of battle, 
the construed reality for many soldiers is one of fear.  In Kelly’s terms, fear is the 
phenomenon that accompanies an awareness of an imminent incidental change in one’s 
core structure.  Staying alive – death is a core construct that is subject to an incidental 
change (the bullets and shrapnel flying about).  Suddenly, the soldier is wounded, and 
despite the severity of the wounds, the soldier reconstrues to the positive (staying alive) 
pole.  It is possible that for the soldier, extreme pain equated with a severe (enough to 
be moved to safety) wound.  In this reality, the wound and associated pain (but not the 
pain of an inept venepuncture) represent life, whereas in Beecher’s follow-up study on 
post-operative pain, the pain represented disability and uncertainty. 
 
A Constructivist View of Procedural Pain and Fear in Children 
The problem with ‘the problem of procedural pain and fear’ is the health professionals’ 
adherence to a mechanistic and reductionistic biomedical approach to practice, which 
either ignores the problem of procedural pain and fear or sees these as the child’s 
problems.  The projection is exemplified in the focus on anxiety rather than fear.  
Certainly, over the past 20 years, many health professionals have identified a need to 
improve their practice regarding the management of procedural pain in children.  
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However, many continue to practice within a biomedical disease oriented approach 
where the problem of procedural pain is conceptualised as the child’s problem. 
 
The Report of the Subcommittee on Assessment and Methodologic Issues in the 
Management of Pain in Childhood Cancer (McGrath, Beyer, Cleeland, Eland, 
McGrath, & Portenoy, 1990) proposed: 
 
… that clinicians develop and use a Pain Problem List for every child with 
cancer.  The Pain Problem List is the outcome of an assessment process that 
begins with the pain history.  The history is used to characterize the pain 
according to its mechanism… the related syndrome… and other key features 
that may influence the decision to implement one therapy rather than another.  
(p. 815) 
 
Children with cancer suffer with many pains, clearly, not the least of which is 
procedural pain.  On one level, the identification of pain problems is an important step 
towards improving the management of pain in children with cancer.  However, in 
compiling a list of the child’s problems, the focus is limited to the child.  McGrath et 
al. (1990) state: 
 
The purpose of the Pain Problem List is to identify problems amenable to 
intervention and to assist in selecting the most appropriate treatment to reduce 
pain in accord with the cause and contributing factors.  (p. 816) 
 
The report contains an example of a Pain Problem List for a 4-year-old girl with 
acute leukaemia and mucositis after chemotherapy.  Briefly, the stated problems are 
severe mouth pain, mild bone pain, anxiety, reduced eating, nightmares and disturbed 
sleep related to bone marrow aspirations (p. 816).  Even within the biomedical 
paradigm, the absence of procedural pain from this pain Problem List is puzzling.  As a 
matter of course, procedural pain would be a significant pain experienced by a child 
with leukaemia. Most important though, all of the pain problems are listed as the 
child’s problems arising from a diagnosis of leukaemia.  An alternate way of viewing 
this is that the health professional has a number of problems associated with the 
treatment of a child with leukaemia.  This requires a fundamental shift in the way 
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health professionals think and practice.  The shift however has both a legal and an 
ethical foundation.   
 
Health professionals have a legal duty of care and an ethical responsibility to 
deliver care in a manner that causes the least harm to the child.  If a standard of care 
that reduces harm to a child is possible but not delivered then the health professional 
may be deemed derelict in his or her duty of care.  Such practice could also be 
considered unethical.  The continued projection of problems associated with treatment 
on to the child is suspect and will no doubt result in litigation.  One way of addressing 
this would be to compile a Pain Problem List for the child and a Pain Problem List for 
the health professionals.  Taking the example given by McGrath et al. (1990) of a 4-
year-old girl with leukaemia and mucositis, the child’s Pain Problem List should 
include procedural pain related to bone marrow aspiration, lumbar puncture, 
venepuncture and fingerprick and any other painful procedure inflicted on the child.  
The Pain Problem list for the health professionals should identify the pain of medical 
procedures as a problem for the health professional and lead to strategies that will 
minimize harm to the child.  Another problem would be fear, not as the child’s problem 
but the health professionals’, as a consequence of their interventions, which should be 
linked to strategies aimed at reducing the fear.  
 
If the problem of procedural pain is reconstrued as the health professional’s 
problem then the standard of pain management in children is likely to improve.  An 
approach to practice predicated on,  “What strategies can I implement while doing this 
procedure to cause the minimal pain, fear and distress?”  would seem to be an essential 
starting point if one is genuine about improving the management of procedural pain 
and fear in children.  There is no doubt that this approach drives a number of clinicians 
and researchers in the field but it is time the view was articulated. 
 
One way of expanding our understanding of the fear experienced by a child in a 
medical procedure is to view the child, health professional, the parent, setting and 
procedure through the constructivist lens.  This approach was discussed in the previous 
chapter.  The obvious source of fear is pain.  Kelly (1955) suggests that in order to 
understand a phenomenon, we should ‘transcend the obvious’ – an approach that is, in 
this case, likely to lead to a deeper understanding of fear and pain in children 
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undergoing medical procedures.  McGrath and Hillier (1996) suggest a progressive 
approach to pain management in children that transcends the notion of a simple cause-
effect relationship between tissue injury, pain and fear. 
 
Although the causal relationship between an injury and a consequent pain 
sensation seems direct and obvious, the things children know, do, and feel all 
affect their pain.  It is essential to recognize and evaluate the impact of these 
factors in order to relieve any type of pain that children experience.  (p. 334) 
 
The ‘things children know, do and feel’ within a Personal Construct framework 
are the basis of the construed reality.  Again, a pertinent question from Personal 
Construct theory is “How does this child construct his or her sense of reality?”  Within 
the constructivist framework, the child’s fear and pain are part of their construed reality 
and as such may be reconstrued.  This however requires a level of analysis and 
intervention that transcends the traditional bottom-up, sensory – appraisal, and 
developmental views of fear and pain.   The child’s construct of reality is just that, it is 
the child’s and is as real to him or her as any other person’s construct is to them.  The 
developmental view has little to offer because the notion that the child is forever 
attempting to know and understand the ‘real and known’ (adult-like) reality is rejected.  
Unlike the developmental view, the child’s reality is considered unique rather than 
deficient.    The developmental (deficiency) model, evident in much of the pain 
literature has even been applied to appraisal.  For example, Peterson (1989) states: 
 
In addition to the absence of mature cognitive skills that could aid in appraisal 
of the stressor, young children may be more subject to cognitive distortions 
that influence appraisal.  Errors in appraisal undoubtedly occur at all ages, but 
seem more likely in young children whose cognitive development predisposes 
them to unfounded inaccurate beliefs…. Consider the child who, when told he 
would have eye surgery, believed his eyes were to be removed (Petrillo & 
Sanger, 1972) or the common childhood fear that all of one’s blood will leak 
out during a venepuncture (Sheridan, 1975).  Thus, distortions in perception of 
the stressor are often a direct product of the child’s cognitive level (Burbach & 
Peterson, 1986).  (p. 381, italics added) 
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Within the developmental framework, ‘error in appraisal’ means that the child 
does not attach the ‘true, correct and real’ (adult) meaning.  The child’s cognitive skills 
are considered deficient compared to an adult’s.  The constructivist position, however 
is more concerned with the child’s version of what is real, the impact that the child’s 
constructs have on the child, and whether it would be helpful if the child were able to 
reconstrue his or her reality.  The constructivist position is less concerned with what is 
supposedly right or wrong.  Similarly, in regard to ‘unfounded inaccurate beliefs’, the 
child’s beliefs are founded, they are based on the child’s construction of the situation.   
 
To appreciate the full force of the constructivist view, consider the example of 
fear of the dentist. The fear that many adults experience in the dentist’s surgery is 
frequently based on painful treatment in childhood (Arntz, van Eck, & Heumans, 1989; 
Rainer, 2000; Walker, Milgrom, Weinstein, Getz, & Richardson, 1996).  Doebling and 
Rower (2000) estimate that about 40 percent of modern western society is apprehensive 
about dental visits, 20 percent are highly fearful, and about 5 percent avoid oral health 
care completely.  This makes the dentist’s surgery a meaningful setting to reflect on 
what it is like to be disempowered, afraid, and to suffer procedural pain.  The following 
scenario represents one avenue for thinking about procedural pain through the eyes of a 
child, an approach that will be developed later in this chapter. 
 
Imagine every time you go to the dentist, a couple of very strong, large, 
overbearing assistants hold you down as the dentist drills your teeth.  The dentist’s 
assessment of your fear, if at all, is essentially developmental.  Your knowledge base of 
dentistry is not as advanced as his/hers is.  You fear the worst – being ignored, no 
control, being held down, and excruciating pain, “What if the dentist drills through the 
nerve?”  There is no escape; you are powerless, vulnerable and afraid.  The dentist 
knows that he or she is not going to drill through your nerve.  In Peterson’s (1989) 
terms you have made an, ‘error in appraisal’, you have ‘an inaccurate and unfounded 
belief’.  The dentist’s comments: “You are brave – aren’t you?” “You had better hold 
still or it will take longer” or “This will only sting a little bit” are unlikely to resolve 
your fear and yet this is exactly the sort of treatment many children receive during 
painful medical procedures. 
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A significant limitation of the developmental approach is a tendency to assess 
the child’s understanding in comparison to one’s own professional and adult 
knowledge base, which is considered the incontrovertible objective reality.  The child 
who believes that all his blood will leak out during venepuncture may not be convinced 
that it will not, simply by being corrected by the health professional.  In fact, there are 
coagulation disorders, for example, haemophilia, Von Willebrand’s disease and 
disseminated intravascular coagulation (McCance & Huether, 2002), when profuse 
bleeding is a problem.  In simply correcting the child, the health professional will fail 
to address the child’s fear.  Unfortunately, the fears experienced by children in health 
care settings are commonly poorly understood because many health professionals are 
unable to consider the child’s perspective.  A constructivist approach with a child who 
believes that he or she is going to bleed to death would certainly not be to simply deny 
the child’s view and to attempt to argue against a perceived deficiency in cognitive 
ability.  The child’s version of reality is acknowledged and understood.  
 
Constructively, one could begin with an overview of A.A. Milne’s description 
of Piglet and Winnie-the-Pooh walking, on a very windy day, to Owl’s house.  
Nervously, Piglet contemplates the possibility of a big tree falling on them, Pooh 
construes alternatively to the opposite pole, and Piglet is comforted:   
 
One day, Piglet and Winnie-the-Pooh were walking to Owl’s house.  It was a 
very windy day, so windy that they had to lean into the wind to walk along and 
Piglet’s ears were blown back like banners.  Eventually they got to the shelter 
of the Hundred Acre Wood, where they could stand up straight and listen to the 
wind roaring through the treetops.  Then Piglet said,  ’Supposing a tree fell 
down, Pooh, when we were underneath it?’  ‘Supposing it didn’t,’ said Pooh 
after careful thought.”  (Milne, 1990, p. 130).   
 
Do you know what happened next?  The tree didn’t blow down, they walked on, 
and soon they were knocking on Owl’s door.  The idea of course is to illustrate the 
notion of an alternative view.  Linking the child’s reality with the story and introducing 
the notion of an alternative would follow: 
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I guess this worrying about all your blood leaking out is a bit like Piglet 
worrying about the tree falling over.  The tree could have fallen over, but did 
the tree fall over?  No.  You know, blood actually does not like to be on the 
outside because it dries up, like glue dries up when it is out of the tube and it 
cannot be runny anymore.  Have you ever seen dried up blood, or dried up glue 
on the outside of the tube?”…  “If your blood did not leak out, where would it 
be?” – “On the inside”.  “Okay, sometimes other things get leaks don’t they?”  
“Have you ever seen a flat tyre on bike, or on a car get fixed with a patch?”  A 
balloon, needle and tape could be used to demonstrate.  “What could we use to 
stop the blood leaking out the tiny hole that the needle makes?” – “Tape, not 
just any old tape, but special tape”.  This would be followed with a discussion 
about skin growing, like hair and nails grow, and the body’s own glue – dried 
up blood. 
 
There is little doubt in practice, and in the literature (Broome & Hellier, 1987; 
Fradet, McGrath, Kay, Adams, & Luke, 1990; Hart & Bossert, 1994; Tichy, Braam, 
Meyer, & Rattan, 1988) that children fear painful medical procedures.  For example, 
Tesler, Savedra, Ward, Holzemer, & Wilkie (1989) investigated the language that 
children use to describe pain.  An interpretation of their findings within a PCP 
framework is outlined below.  Tesler et al. compiled a list of 129 words that children 
had reported using to describe pain and printed these individually on cards.  The 
authors randomly presented the cards to 958 children aged 8 to 17 years across a 
number of urban and suburban high schools, middle schools and primary schools.  The 
children sorted the words into three categories 
 
… “words they knew and used,” to describe pain, “words they did not know,” 
and “words they knew but did not use,” to describe pain.  The children were 
also asked to assign an intensity value to the words they used to describe pain, 
by sorting them into categories denoting small, medium, large, and worst pain.  
(p. 61) 
 
The words that related to the affective component of pain that were selected by 
50% or more of the sample and categorised with an intensity value of Large or Worst 
Pain were: 
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Awful Killing 
Terrible Horrible 
Never go away Dying 
Frightening Screaming 
Suffocating Deadly 
Uncontrollable Unbearable 
Terrifying Dreadful 
Torturing 
 
On face value, these terms provide some insight into the construed reality of 
pain for child.  While certain terms might be used by an adult, such as, ‘awful, terrible, 
never go away, dreadful’, others, such as, ‘killing, deadly, screaming, suffocating’ are 
particularly insightful.  There is clearly a difference between an adult construing pain 
as ‘awful’ and a child as ‘deadly’.   
 
It is also worth examining these terms for clusters and themes.  For example, 
frightening, terrifying and screaming cluster on a personal state, a feeling.  Awful, 
terrible, horrible and dreadful constitute an experiential theme that is extremely bad.  
Never go away, uncontrollable, unbearable and torturing could centre on 
powerlessness.  Suffocating, killing, dying, deadly, cluster on a theme of death.  
Torturing and suffocating – suffering at the hands of another.  Collectively, severe pain 
carries a feeling that is extremely bad, there is nothing that you can do, you could die 
and they are doing it to you.  The customary “Pain is an unpleasant sensory and 
emotional experience …” seems rather short of the mark.  For a child, pain is a 
terrifying sensory and emotional experience…  Pain is a horrible sensory and 
emotional experience…  Pain is an unbearable sensory and emotional experience… 
Pain is a deadly sensory and emotional experience; and, pain is torture. 
 
In addition to a qualitative thematic analysis, the impact of some of these pain 
terms for a child can be extended within a PCP framework by considering the term as 
one end of a bipolar construct and matching each with a corresponding pole.   
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For example: 
Awful  – Great 
Killing  – Allowed to live 
Dying – Living 
Deadly – Alive 
Suffocating – Breathing/life 
Terrifying  –  Safe 
Uncontrollable  – In control 
 
Essentially, being alive and feeling great, safe and in control are states and 
qualities that are central to life.  In Kelly’s terms, these are core constructs; they 
represent part of an individual’s core structure.  If an incident suddenly threatens the 
core structure, represented in this example by a shift to the negative pole, the feeling 
that accompanies the transition is fear.  The focus of an intervention to address the fear 
would be on reconstruing to the positive pole, that is, restoring a sense of being alive, 
feeling good, safe and in control.  Clinically, we can have an immediate and direct 
effect on control.  We can give control, or we can take it away.  This, it would seem is 
an important starting point.  
 
Context and meaning are clearly important factors in shaping the experience of 
pain and fear.  If we are to understand the impact of context and meaning on pain and 
fear for a child, then, an ability to appreciate the world of a child must be an advantage.  
Being an adult can be an obstacle to understanding the construed realities of childhood.  
However, it can be argued that some of our childhood constructs and ability to construe 
as a child construes remains, in varying degrees through our memories and emotions.  
Elsewhere, this concept has been referred to as the ‘child within’ or the ‘inner child’ 
(Capacchione, 1990; Mills & Crowley, 1990).  Within a PCP framework, the nexus 
between construing as a child and construing as an adult could be considered as a core 
construct of child construing – adult construing.  For an adult, the ability to construe as 
a child construes could be a function of how tightly he or she is fixed around the adult 
pole.  In Kelly’s terms, loosening around the adult pole would facilitate a shift towards 
the child pole.   
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Much emphasis is placed in mainstream psychology on development.  
Certainly, in a biological sense, the word ‘develop’ means “to grow into a fuller, 
higher, or maturer condition” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Little, Fowler, 
Coulson, Onions, & Friedrichsen, 1991, p. 534).  Somehow, socially and culturally, the 
fuller, higher, or maturer condition became advanced, complete, preferred and more 
valuable.  A slightly older meaning of the word develop is, “To unfold more fully, 
bring out all that is contained in” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Little et al., 
1991, p. 534).  In this sense, developing as an adult might include the ability to call 
upon, and apply, a range of life experiences and skills, including the ability to construe 
as a child construes. 
 
For many clinicians who are ‘good with children’ unfolding and revealing the 
ability to construe as the child construes is the basis of really communicating with 
children.  Mills and Crowley (1991) employ the extreme metaphor of ‘the child 
within’: 
 
For those of us who work with children, “Return to the beginning, become a 
child again” [Tao Te Ching] can truly be a helpful passage to remember….  
There is general agreement on the need for providing a safe environment in 
which the qualities of rapport, respect, and cooperation can be fostered.  For 
us, contacting the child within is the pivotal element in building these many 
dimensions of the therapeutic relationship.  Indeed, it may even be the single 
most critical element in ultimately reaching the child.  (p. 217, italics are 
original) 
 
The proposed constructivist view, however, is not so much on ‘becoming a 
child again’, rather, maintaining the adult perspective but loosening around the adult 
pole and allowing a little permeability to an adult construing – child construing core 
construct.  Arguably, the ability to fluctuate between construing one’s world as an adult 
and as a child, underpins the brilliance of children’s writers such as A.A. Milne who 
first published Winnie-the-Pooh in 1928.  Essentially, the art of being a children’s 
author is to communicate, with intrigue and appeal, a story that will be understood by 
children.  In sum, for anyone who works with children, seeing the world as a child sees 
the world is essential for effective communication and understanding. 
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For the procedure-oriented health professional, the notion of ‘construing as a 
child construes’ may be perceived as ‘new-age garbage’.  Such practitioners may be 
highly skilled and competent at ‘getting the job done’.  However, in getting the job 
done, children often suffer extreme pain and fear at the hands of the clinician.  Yet it 
must be said, one can be a technical expert, and at the same time, be concerned with the 
impact of procedural pain and fear on the child, and furthermore, willing to do 
something about it.  For those health professionals who are willing to confront the pain 
and distress that they cause, seeing the procedure through a child’s eyes can be a 
difficult but profound experience.  Construing as the child construes, constructs a child-
like interpretation of the situation and provides insight into the fear experienced by the 
child.  The development of insight usually means that the client has adopted the 
language and views of the health professional. The argument here is the reverse: in 
order to understand a child’s fear during a medical procedure, one must be cognisant of 
what the experience means for the child.  If one views medical procedures through the 
eyes of a child, it is not surprising that the child is terrified and even less surprising that 
so-called words of reassurance are often ineffective.  It is one thing to say “this child is 
distressed”, it is another to see distress in a child and to do something about it.  
 
Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the relationship between procedural pain and 
fear from the child’s point of view.  Mainstream thinking about pain and fear in 
children is largely structured within two related pervasive models, the biomedical, and 
the developmental.  Within this paradigm, fear is seen as a function of the pain and it is 
assumed that if the pain is managed, the fear will disappear.  This assumption is 
challenged when we see frightened children undergoing procedures with adequate local 
anaesthesia and in a vast number of adults who are afraid of visiting the dentist. The 
notion that fear inhibits pain was challenged.  Certainly, with regard to current 
knowledge about endogenous opioids, it seem highly unlikely that sufficient opioids 
are released to effect any significant level of endogenous analgesia in a fear response.  
Furthermore, common sense clinical observation of a terrified child screaming in pain 
and fear would suggest that if anything, the fear exacerbates the pain. 
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An important distinction was made in this chapter between anxiety and fear.  If 
an affective component of pain is considered at all, then within the biomedical view, it 
is passively labelled as anxiety, whereas the identification of fear demands attention.  
Most importantly, if health professionals recognise that children experience fear in 
relation to procedure pain then the basis of the fear can be explored and the ‘problem’ 
and indeed the challenge of procedural pain becomes the health professional’s.  
Projection of the ‘problem of procedural pain’ on to the child is reflected in the 
emphasis on compliance, where the ‘problem child’ is the non-compliant child.   
Within the biomedical view, children who comply and behave do not appear to be 
distressed, they tend not to complain and it is assumed that these children feel less pain 
and ‘anxiety’ because they do what they are told.  On the other hand, the belief that 
underpins the non-compliant and resistant child’s, screams of pain and fear, is that they 
are only making it worse for themselves by not holding still and not doing what they 
are told.  Constructively, from the child’s perspective, a sense of control, 
empowerment, status, being included and participating, factors discussed earlier, are 
more likely to impact on the emergence, of fear than issues surrounding the biomedical 
notion of ‘compliance’. 
 
In contrast to the developmental view, which views children as partially 
developed adults making ‘errors in appraisal,’ the constructivist view, in which a 6 
year-old is considered a complete and whole person who happens to be aged six, is 
favoured.  Arguably, it is better to understand how a particular six year-old construes 
his or her reality than to define the child in terms of what he or she cannot achieve in 
relation to an adult.  Beecher’s (1946) study of wounded soldiers is an interesting 
account of the personal reality of pain and fear, but in terms of procedural pain, it is his 
passing footnote on the observation that the soldiers with horrendous wounds would 
complain bitterly at an inept venepuncture that is most revealing.  Beecher’s comments 
illustrate the uniqueness of procedural pain.  Here were a group of soldiers with serious 
wounds, some of whom presumably would not survive, not complaining of wound pain 
but complaining bitterly at someone having difficulty performing a venepuncture.  This 
observation does not fit with the ‘hierarchy of procedures’ and the mechanistic 
biomedical view of pain.  Beecher rightly concluded that the soldiers’ lack of wound 
pain was unlikely to be related to altered sensitivity.  If however, one moves from a 
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bottom-up, sensory – appraisal view to a top-down constructivist view of pain then the 
solution to Beecher’s observations lie in the soldier’s construed reality.   
   
Finally, the notion of calling upon one’s ability to construe the world as a child 
was raised as an important factor in communicating with children and understanding 
the impact of procedural pain and fear on children.  With regard to procedural pain in 
children, the word ‘unpleasant’ in the IASP definition of pain is vastly inadequate. 
Drawing on Tesler et al. (1989), a more apt definition is perhaps,  “Pain is an 
unbearable, horrible, terrifying and deadly sensory and emotional experience…”  The 
word ‘experience’ in the IASP definition pertains to consciousness, which together 
with imagery and hypnosis, are the topics of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE CONCEPTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS, IMAGERY AND HYPNOSIS 
 
The previous chapter identified the limitations of the biomedical view of 
procedural pain in children and stressed the importance of considering 
the child’s view.  The aims of this chapter are to explore what is meant 
by consciousness, and imagery, to differentiate between imagery and 
hypnosis and to describe the imagery technique employed in this study. 
 
 
Consciousness, Altered States of Consciousness and Imagery 
The pursuit of knowledge about consciousness and what some might refer to as ‘altered 
states of consciousness’ and imagery encompasses religion and science.  Within the 
scientific realm, the main domains in which consciousness is considered are cognitive 
psychology and brain neurophysiology.  Whatever the stance, like emotion, 
consciousness and imagery are not easily defined.  As with emotion, a diverse range of 
views can be adopted when defining consciousness and imagery, even within the 
scientific domain.  If the discussion is extended to consider ‘reality’ then one turns 
once again to the philosophical domain.  Although conceptual boundaries are foggy, it 
is important to establish the particular perspective adopted in this thesis with regard to 
consciousness and imagery.   
 
Cerebral Lateralization and Consciousness 
The human brain is grossly divided into two hemispheres, the left hemisphere and the 
right hemisphere.  The concept of lateralization attributes specialized functions to each 
hemisphere.  For example, language in most people is localized in the left hemisphere.  
Many of the perceived functions and apparent specialization of each hemisphere were 
discovered during clinical observations of patients with unilateral cerebral damage.  
Commonly a person who has suffered a left sided cerebral lesion with a contralateral 
hemiplegia is dysphasic or aphasic.  This is attributed to lateralization of language to 
the left hemisphere.  Conversely, speech deficits are less common in patients with a 
right-sided cerebral lesion.  Nass and Gazzaniga (1987) state: 
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The left hemisphere appears crucial to intellectual functioning as evidenced by 
the frequent impairment in aphasics and the lack of depth of such skills in the 
right hemisphere even in those commissurotomy patients with rich language 
skills. (p. 724) 
 
Intellectual functioning is not, however, dependent upon language.  Nass and 
Gazzaniga (1987) also point out that intellectual functioning can continue in the 
aphasic and that dementia may or may not interfere with language. 
 
Nass and Gazzaniga (1987) hold that the concept of human consciousness is 
more than cognition and perception of the environment.  “It [consciousness] is what 
makes us self-aware and directive in our actions” (p. 724).  Regarding laterality of the 
brain and consciousness, Nass and Gazzaniga point out that the prospect of laterality 
playing a part in consciousness is largely determined by how consciousness is defined.  
If consciousness is synonymous with arousal and wakefulness, then the relevant brain 
structures are the brain stem, reticular formation, and deep midline structures; these 
structures are not lateralized.  If, however, levels of arousal or degree of vigilance are 
part of consciousness, then the right hemisphere may be thought to dominate (Nass & 
Gazzaniga, 1987).  Consciousness can however be construed as more than wakefulness 
and awareness. 
 
If one considers consciousness in a more philosophical sense (Globus, 
Maxwell & Savodnik, 1976), then at first approximation it is the process that 
allows for our subjective sense of reality. (Nass & Gazzaniga, 1987, p. 724, 
italics added) 
 
With this definition, the left hemisphere would be dominant, again, reflecting 
the variance regarding laterality, depending upon how consciousness is defined. 
 
Consciousness, Reality, and Working Memory 
Without becoming embroiled in the intractable realist – idealist debate, it is necessary 
to reiterate the various positions that can be adopted concerning the relationship 
between ‘reality’ and ‘consciousness’.  At one extreme is common sense ‘realism’, the 
taken for granted view that there is an external reality and that consciousness simply 
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reflects that reality.  At the idealist extreme, the notion of reality is laid aside as a 
determinant of consciousness and there is only consciousness that exists in its own 
terms.  The middle of the road positions vary in as much as some presuppose an 
external reality to which consciousness approximates, others, the social constructivists, 
see consciousness jointly produced through social interaction, while others, holding the 
PCP view, maintain that reality is individually construed.  The everyday examples that 
clearly upset the extremist camps, such as dreaming and phantom limb pain, could 
ultimately be explained by both positions but this thesis strongly favours the 
constructivist camp.  In so doing, it not only takes seriously the phenomenon of 
phantom limb pain, it holds that the mental operations that give rise to the experience 
of pain in parts of physically non-existent limbs and body areas can also serve to negate 
actual pain sensations from existing limbs and regions.  In holding this position, this 
thesis must briefly articulate some of the research that has been devoted to isolating the 
neurophysiological activity that parallels these mental activities. 
 
There is a clear constructivist parallel between consciousness and 
neurophysiology.  LeDoux, Wilson and Gazzaniga (1979) said: 
 
It [consciousness] is the system that is continually observing our actual 
behaviour, as well as our cognitions and internal moods.  In attributing cause to 
behavioural and psychological states, an attitudinal view of the world, 
involving beliefs and values, is constructed, and this becomes a dominant 
theme in our self-image.  (p. 553, italics added) 
 
Thus for LeDoux, Wilson and Gazzaniga, consciousness is a multifaceted 
construct.  It involves monitoring and appraisal of the self in a psychological, social, 
and culturally determined world.  The question that is hotly debated in neuroscience 
(Metzinger, 2000) relates to the where and how consciousness is represented in the 
brain.   
 
The consciousness literature expanded in the 1990s and focussed on the 
relationship between working memory and consciousness (Baars, 1996; Baddeley 
1993; Phaf & Wolters, 1997; Schachter, 1991).  In proposing the notion of a ‘working 
memory’, Baddeley (1986) emphasised the active, or ‘working’ aspects of thinking and 
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memory.  This was in contrast to the traditional ‘short-term memory’, which was 
considered more as a transient space for the temporary storage of information.     
LeDoux had earlier (LeDoux, Wilson, & Gazzaniga, 1979, cited above) spoken of 
consciousness as a monitoring system; some 20 years later, for LeDoux the ‘system’ is 
working memory.  Moreover, LeDoux provides an overview of the possible 
relationship between working memory, consciousness and fear.  In particular, LeDoux 
(1998) emphasises the ‘information storing’ role of the cortical association areas and 
refers to these areas as ‘buffers’.  Each sensory system has one or more buffers, which 
make up part of the working memory.  For LeDoux, we are conscious of what we are 
currently thinking about and what we are currently thinking about is in working 
memory.  The difficulty is in defining what ‘conscious of’, or ‘aware of’ actually 
means.  This is the topic of much ongoing debate and is clearly beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  Consciousness could be construed as the ‘working aspect’ of working 
memory.  Certainly, general anaesthetics suppress neuronal activity – the working 
aspect of neural tissue and, with this, consciousness is impaired, and then lost. 
 
The principal brain areas involved in working memory are the lateral prefrontal 
cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, orbital cortex and association areas (LeDoux 
1998).  These structures do not function in isolation or simply as receivers of 
information.  Back projections with other brain areas provide input and feedback.  For 
example, the cortical association – hippocampal connections are important in laying 
down new memories in the neocortex. The critical areas relevant to imagery and fear 
are the two-way connections between the association areas and the amygdala.  These 
areas and their connections were described in Chapter 2.  Regarding conscious 
awareness of activity in cortical regions, awareness is not necessarily associated with 
activity in the primary and secondary sensory and motor areas of the cortex.  Conscious 
awareness is, however, associated with activity in the association areas and the 
cingulate cortex (Roth, 2000).  Similarly, activity in the primary visual cortex is 
necessary but not sufficient for the ‘seeing’ of things.  Crick and Koch (1995) hold that 
we are no more aware of neural activity in the primary visual cortex than we are of 
activity in the retina.  Similarly, regarding the conscious perception of pain, the 
somatosensory cortex is a pathway rather than an endpoint for awareness of pain.  The 
sensation of pain is associated with activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and the 
somatosensory association areas (Roth, 2000).  Both of these areas are included in the 
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working memory view of consciousness.  A most important concept to grasp regarding 
the functioning of these brain areas is the reciprocal nature of the connections between 
them; they are active processors, not passive ‘receivers,’ of information.  The notion of 
an active working memory over a passive ‘short-term’ storage mechanism is a prime 
example of the shift in focus in brain neurophysiology from the brain as an ‘end-point’ 
processor, to the brain as, not only a processor, but a generator of neural activity and 
concomitantly, a generator of what is loosely described as conscious experience. 
 
With this in mind, this thesis holds the association between ‘consciousness’ and 
the activity in the working memory structures as the most tenable neurophysiological 
accompaniment to the constructivist position.   
 
This position allows the development of a model describing how imagery and 
the imaging aspect of hypnosis could serve analgesic functions.  If the construed reality 
in imagery is the core of consciousness and it is pain-free, then in imagery, subjects 
would report significantly lower levels of pain during a medical procedure than those 
who were not engaged in imagery.  Furthermore, given the connectivity of these areas 
with the amygdala, the activity in these areas is central to the generation and experience 
of a fear response.  Similarly, if the construed reality in imagery were non-threatening, 
then subjects would report significantly lower levels of fear than those who were not 
engaged in imagery. 
 
In a slightly different manner, Chapman and Nakamura (1998) draw upon a 
constructivist approach to consciousness and hold that hypnotic ‘focused’ analgesia 
could work through a combination of two mechanisms, both of which depend on the 
view that suggested alterations to sensation take ‘primacy in consciousness’.  The first 
mechanism is described as ‘hypnotic obstruction,’ whereby the suggestion of analgesia 
could give rise to the creation of novel (hypnotic) schema that takes a higher priority in 
consciousness.  In so doing, the hypnotic ‘analgesia’ schema block the emergence of 
what Chapman and Nakamura refer to as ‘normal’ (pain) schema.  The second 
mechanism suggested is that hypnotically focussed and sustained attention may keep 
the ‘analgesia’ schema in the forefront of consciousness, that is, to keep the block in 
place.  Chapman and Nakamura argue: 
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… somatosensory imagery is the key element in the contents of consciousness, 
and that the mechanisms behind hypnotic analgesia phenomena are largely 
related to the competition among schemata for a dominant position within the 
contents of consciousness.  (p. 23) 
 
It is interesting to note Chapman and Nakamura’s constructive approach to 
consciousness.  Their model provides insight into the role of suggestion in hypnotic 
analgesia whereby the susceptible individual incorporates, through somatosensory 
imagery, the suggested schemata ‘into’ his or her consciousness.  The model preferred 
in this thesis emphasises the process of imaging which alters the experience of fear and 
pain through a complex web of interactions between brain areas for fear, pain, mental 
imagery and consciousness.  The Chapman and Nakamura model tends towards a linear 
view that consciousness is a space that admits or does not admit, schemata, images, 
neuronal impulses, and the like.  In this thesis, consciousness is construed as a 
phenomenon that emerges within the collective activity of neurons, groups of neurons 
and their inter-connectivity.  To illustrate, consciousness of the odour of Chanel No. 9® 
is not a case of ‘olfactory impulses’ carrying the ‘Chanel No. 9® impulse set’ into 
consciousness.  Consciousness of the odour of Chanel No. 9® is a phenomenon that 
emerges within the activity of a host of neurons that fire in a particular manner.  The 
olfactory impulses merge in the working memory with many other sensory and 
internally generated impulses concerning the context and significance of the odour.  
Moreover, it is argued that in imagery, consciousness of the odour of Chanel No. 9® 
can emerge within intrinsic neuronal activity.  In an equivalent manner, when 
considering the what, where and how of mental images, Kose and Corriss (1996) draw 
upon the writings of Sartre and Wittgenstein and suggest that the focus should be on 
the process of imaging rather than the image per se. 
 
“What is an Image?” or “How is an image processed?” are clearly the wrong 
kinds of questions.  Such questions presuppose answers that treat images as 
“objects” in the mind (or brain).  (p. 161) 
 
In paraphrasing Sartre, Kose and Corriss (1996) said, “ ... within imaginative 
consciousness, an image is not in consciousness but is a consciousness” (p. 158).  
Marks (1999) takes this view to the extreme when he claims that mental imagery is the 
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basic building block of all consciousness.  Certainly, the view taken in this thesis is that 
the process of imaging is conscious, and the process can be initiated, and indeed, 
modified by external (bottom-up) or internal (top-down) mechanisms.  The approach of 
Sartre reminds us that it is one thing to be able to identify the regions of the brain that 
are active during the conscious experience of ‘external’ events or ‘willed images’, it is 
quite another to be able to claim precisely what consciousness is.  Nonetheless, 
sufficiently impressive advances have been made in the search for the 
neurophysiological correlates of consciousness to enable us to explore the practical 
matter of imaging and its effects in a more informed manner than even ten years ago. 
   
Images, Imaging and Imagery 
Most people are familiar with mental images; however, the task of defining a mental 
image or imagery is problematic.  Beyond the experiential, a definition of a mental 
image requires a neurologically based explanation of the what, where and how of 
image formation.  Research using functional MRI (fMRI) into mental image generation 
has produced conflicting results, mainly regarding localization and laterality.  When 
mental imagery is investigated, the imagery is usually limited to a visual task, for 
example, asking subjects to imagine particular shapes, objects or scenes.  However, 
imagery can involve any or all of the senses, and a range of cognitions involving 
language, memory and emotions.  Certainly, when imagery is used as a therapeutic 
intervention to control pain and fear, the imagery is considerably more complex than 
simply visualizing a rectangle.  Indeed, in guided imagery, multiple brain areas will be 
active, possibly including those concerned with working memory, language, auditory, 
somatosensory and visual areas.   
 
As a cognitive process, mental imagery is a construed reality that has both 
conscious and unconscious qualities.  The obvious conscious qualities relate to the 
sensory aspects – “Mental imagery refers to the activation of sensory representations 
that are not part of the ambient reality” (Mesulam, 1998, p. 1034).  As to which brain 
areas are involved in mental imagery, Mesulam holds: 
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The neural substrates for mental imagery appear to include the same areas that 
would have supported the corresponding acts of perception if the imagined 
scene were actually unfolding in the external world.  (1998, p. 1034) 
 
However, there remains a question as to whether all those areas are actually 
required to be active during imagery. 
 
D'Esposito, Detre, Aguirre, Stallcup, Alsop, Tippet, and Farah (1997) point out 
that the conflicting results regarding the brain areas activated in imagery may be due to 
“particular aspects of the methods, experimental designs, and subjects used in each 
case” (p.725).  In an attempt to overcome the limitations of previous studies D’Esposito 
et al. (1997) used fMRI to scan two groups of normal subjects.  One group, labelled 
concrete, engaged in a simple imagery task generated with words ‘apple’, ‘house’, 
‘horse’, the other group, labelled abstract, engaged in more difficult imagery also 
generated with words, ‘treaty’, ‘guilt’, ‘tenure’.  The authors report that the left inferior 
temporal lobe (Brodmann’s area 37) was the most reliably and robustly activated area 
across subjects.  They also found “in two subjects the activated region in area 37 in the 
lateral lobe extended superiorly into area 19 of the left lateral occipital lobe” (p. 727).  
They were therefore unable to determine which was the primary site of activation.  
Importantly though, they report that, no activity was observed for any subject within 
the primary visual cortices (area 17).  The researchers concluded with: 
 
The results of this experiment support the hypothesis that mental imagery is a 
function of visual association cortex, and that image generation is 
asymmetrically localized to the left.  (p. 727) 
 
Similarly, support for areas other than the primary visual area being involved in 
visual imagery comes from Goldenberg, Mullbacher and Nowark (cited in Kosslyn, 
Behrmann, & Jeannerod, 1995) who report on a case of a cortically blind, brain-
damaged patient who retained the ability to form visual mental images.   
 
… her primary visual cortex was almost totally lesioned… Thus, her imagery 
apparently did not depend on intact area 17. but rather relied (at least in large 
part) on higher-level visual areas that were not damaged.  (p. 1341) 
  
 
129  
Kosslyn et al. report that the patient denied that she was blind and they suggest, 
“… this belief could have been based on her confusing visual mental images for actual 
percepts.” (p. 1341).  What is particularly interesting about this patient is the impact of 
top-down processing (from the undamaged higher-level visual association areas) in her 
construction of visual reality.  Furthermore, there is a suggestion, quite contrary to 
Mesulam, that the areas involved in perceiving the ‘real’ world will be active when a 
person is engaged in imagery. 
 
D’Esposito et al. (1997) focussed on visual imagery and found that the visual 
association area of the left temporal lobe was a major site of image activity.  The 
findings are, however, not conclusive.  Mellet, Tzourio-Mazover, Bricogne, Mazover, 
Kosslyn and Denis (2000) used regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) to investigate 
cerebral activity in subjects who performed a task that required high-resolution visual 
mental imagery.  They found no activity in the primary visual area, which is consistent 
with other studies, but significant activity in the right inferior temporal cortex.  Mellet 
et al. suggest that the left inferior temporal lobe may be involved in simple imagery and 
that complex imagery is localized to the right side.  Bilateral activity in the temporal 
lobes would be expected if the visual association areas were active in visual imagery 
because the visual association areas extend bilaterally into the temporal lobes, and in 
humans, the temporal lobe is activated during the conscious experience of a visual 
stimulus (Logothetis, 1999).   
 
The functional brain studies are also important regarding the interplay between 
imagery and emotion because they locate image activity in the association areas of the 
temporal lobe and these areas have strong connections with the amygdala.  Moreover, 
the heteromodal (polymodal) association areas exert a top-down influence on activity 
in the unimodal association areas (Mesulam, 1998), and these regions interact with the 
amygdala.  In this way, input to the amygdala can be modulated by the imagery-based 
activity in the association and related working memory areas.  However, in noting the 
connections between the association areas and the amygdala, we are reminded of the 
pitfalls of mind-body dualism where the association areas, working memory and the 
phenomenon of consciousness might be taken to be the ‘mind’.  The position taken in 
this thesis, and presented in Chapter 2 is very much that the mind and body are one.  
The mind does not preside over so-called ‘matter’, the body.  It is important to point 
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out that as the brain is part of the body-mind whole, the effects of imagery are not 
simply confined to alterations in conscious awareness.  The hard-wired connections 
between brain regions, together with the extensive communication network afforded by 
the neuropeptides (Pert 1999; Pert, Dreher, & Ruff, 1998), are a template via which 
emotion and imagery can exert widespread effects throughout the body.  Imagery-based 
sexual arousal is a clear example of the potentially widespread effects of mental 
imagery.  Similarly, if a person actively constructs a mental image that is frightening, it 
is frightening because of the unconscious flow-on, from the association areas in 
working memory to the amygdala and from the amygdala back to the association areas 
together with the extensive autonomic and hormonal output effects of amygdala 
activation.  Collectively, these are effects of imagery in consciousness within a person.     
 
Practical Issues in the use of Imagery 
Having considered some of the broad philosophical and neurophysiological aspects of 
consciousness, it is now necessary to review the various practical aspects of imagery as 
a technique.  The manner in which imagery was used in this research will be described 
in some detail.  This will provide a focus to consider related techniques such as 
hypnosis.   
 
Imagery can be loosely defined as “the internal experience of an event without 
the external stimuli” (Zahourek, 1988, p. 8); “Any thought representation that has a 
sensory quality” (Horowitz; cited in Zahourek, 1988, p. 8), and “quasi-sensory or 
quasi-perceptual experiences of which we are self-consciously aware and which exist 
for us in the absence of those stimulus conditions…” (Richardson, cited in Zahourek, 
1988, p. 8).  Of these definitions, Zahourek’s “internal experience of an event without 
the external stimuli” is perhaps the easiest to comprehend.  It is easily demonstrated in 
the lemon tree exercise where a person imagines a lemon tree, picking a lemon, cutting 
it in half and biting into the juicy flesh.  Most people will experience some aspects of 
imagery, that is, the internal experience of biting a lemon without actually having a 
lemon.  Some will describe the colour and texture of the lemon, the shape, smell and 
taste.  All of these experiences are aspects of imagery.  Some will even experience 
salivation as a physiological response to the image of biting into the lemon.   
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In clinical practice, one needs to be able to provide a simple and straightforward 
explanation of what imagery is.  This is especially the case when working with children 
where even Zahourek’s definition is likely to be confusing.  The task of explaining to a 
six-year-old what imagery is requires a basic illustration of something with which the 
child is familiar.  In this study, the researcher approached the topic of imagery by 
drawing on the analogy with dreaming: 
 
“You know when you wake up in the morning, and you have been dreaming, 
those dreams seem very real, like it was just happening.  Well, did you know 
that you can do that in the daytime?  I call that imagery or using our 
imagination, like a daydream.” 
 
By linking the concept of imagery to a commonly experienced event, children 
are generally able to understand what imagery is.  With younger children merely 
talking and engaging in story telling can invoke images.  In discussing the use of 
imagery in the management of procedural pain in children, Zahourek’s definition “the 
internal experience of an event without the external stimuli” is a practical starting point.  
The imagery used in this study and much of the literature and research on pain and 
imagery is referred to as ‘guided imagery’. 
 
Guided Imagery 
Guided imagery is a technique, often combined with relaxation, that can be used with 
children as young as five years, through to adolescents, adults and the elderly.  The 
focus in this study was with children so the technique will be described in relation to 
children, however, imagery techniques can be used across the life span. 
 
The first step is to approach the topic of imagery with the child.  The analogy 
with dreams outlined above is a useful way of achieving this.  It is also helpful to 
approach the topic in a positive manner, such as “I know a way that we can make this 
easier, would you like to try?”  The foggy window analogy is another useful way of 
illustrating imagery. 
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“You know when you breathe on a window and it all fogs up, you can’t see 
through the window.  Sometimes you can see a little bit but it looks different.  
Well, imagery is a bit like fogging up the window, you might be aware of some 
things happening but it is different” 
 
The next step is to identify something that the child likes to do.  This can be 
done with a direct, open-ended question “What do you like doing, what is good fun?”  
The aim here is to allow the child to choose what he or she would like to imagine, 
something that is experiential and enjoyable.  A little prompting may be required to 
identify the child’s interests.  At this stage, it is better to focus on activities that involve 
others rather than solitary pursuits such as reading a book, although this is not 
imperative.  Some children enter into imagery imagining a favourite computer game 
but more often children say that they like playing sport, playing in their backyard, 
playing on the swings and slides, swimming or being at the beach.  When the child has 
identified what he or she would like to imagine, for example, playing on the swings and 
slides at the local playground, the process is simply explained and it can begin with a 
relaxation phase. 
“Okay, that sounds like good fun.  What we can do is, while you are imagining 
and playing on the swings and slides, and telling me about what is happening 
there, we will do the blood test.  I will tell you when we will do the test so 
there will be no surprises.  The first step to relaxing is to take a big, deep 
breath in.... and... out.  That’s good, another deep breath in... and out.  What we 
are going to do is let our muscles go all floppy and we will start with feet.  Just 
notice the feeling of your feet on the floor and wiggle your toes.  Ah! That’s 
good. Now we will work our way up through your legs noticing the sensations 
at the back of your legs and across your knees and letting them go all floppy.  
Take another deep breath in... and out.  Now notice the feeling of your weight 
on the chair (or lying on the bed) and up your back to your shoulders.  When 
we get to shoulders, the best thing to do is to let them drop.  Ah! That’s good.  
Now we are going to work our way up through your neck.  Notice the feeling 
of your hair around your neck and your ears.  Now around to your eyes and 
your forehead.  If you like you can close your eyes.  (At this point, most 
children will close their eyes.  It is not essential that eyes are closed and this 
should certainly not be pushed.)  Now we will go back down to your shoulders 
and down both arms together, through your elbows to your fingers”.  
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Sometimes you can ask a child to relax each finger as if he or she was tracing 
around each finger with a pencil. 
 
“Now I don’t know what it looks like, where your playground is.  What does it 
look like?  Is it a sunny day, or a cloudy day?  Is there a swing? What are you 
going to go on first?”  The intention here is to give the child choices and to 
establish the present tense rather than describing a memory of a previous event.  
The ‘guided’ part of guided imagery involves asking the child simple questions 
about his or her imagery.  For example, “Where are you now?”  The child 
might say “I’m going over to the slide.”  “Okay, when you get there go up to 
the top but count how many steps there are to the top and tell me when you get 
there.”  “I am at the top.”  “How many steps up to the top?”  “Eleven.”  “Okay, 
have a look around and tell me what you can see from the top.”  “I can see my 
brother.”  What is he doing?”  “He is on the swing”  “Okay when you are 
ready, slide down the slide and we will do the blood test thing.  Tell me when 
you are sliding down the slide.”  “Now I’m going down the slide.”  “There 
goes the blood test, are you at the bottom?  Where are you going now?”  “Back 
up again.”  “Okay, tell me when you get to the top...”  The child may then have 
another go on the slide or the swing or engage in some other activity.  Another 
couple of minutes in imagery and then he or she is informed that the procedure 
is over and we can finish the imagery.  “When you are ready, you can finish 
your imagery and the way we do that is to count backwards in our mind from 
four to one and when you get to one, open your eyes, look at the floor and then 
look up, and we are all finished.” 
 
The way children respond to imagery varies greatly.  Some children will go 
through the experience unaware of anything that is happening to them.  Some children 
will open their eyes and check out what is happening.  This does not necessarily mean 
that they are ‘out of their imagery’.  Frequently, on coming out of imagery, children 
stretch and appear a little displaced.  Sometimes the exercise may appear to have failed 
but in procedural pain and imagery, there are many levels of success.  The following 
case from a previous study (Whitaker, 1994) illustrates this point. 
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An 11-year-old boy presented to the pathology out patient’s department to 
have a venepuncture.  On each of the preceding two days, he had been 
restrained and given intramuscular procaine penicillin by a general 
practitioner.  His father brought him in, the boy was visibly terrified.  He sat on 
a raised bench-like structure that had a mattress, sheet and pillow.  The 
relaxation and guided imagery technique described above was used with the 
boy.  His imagery focus was swinging on the swing with his father pushing 
him higher and higher.  As he did this, his eyes were moving up and down 
behind closed lids.  The nurse then inserted the 23-gauge butterfly needle into 
his arm.  At this point, he opened his eyes and began to cry.  He sat there 
throughout the venepuncture quietly sobbing.  After the child and his father 
had left, the comment to the nurse was that case was not particularly 
successful.  She replied “Oh yes it was, normally it would take two of us to 
hold a child like that down and another to do the venepuncture.”  The boy had 
cried when the needle was inserted but he did not move and certainly did not 
require the slightest restraint.  He was upset but he was also in control. 
 
The emphasis in guided imagery is on communicating with the child about 
whatever it is that he or she is imagining.  The aim is to allow the child to construct an 
experience in imagery and to share that experience with the person guiding the child’s 
imagery.  The child’s imagery is experiential, involving the child and usually familiar 
others.  The child describes his or her imagery as it unfolds and the person guiding the 
imagery simply asks the child about various aspects of the imagery.   
 
The constructivist position taken in this thesis extends to the child’s sense of 
self in imagery; that is, in imagery, the child constructs his or her sense of self in a 
scene that transcends the immediate physical reality and becomes a reality in imagery.  
At a theoretical level, the following definition is offered: 
 
Guided imagery is a therapeutic technique that allows two people to 
communicate on a reality that one of them has chosen to construe in the 
process of imaging. 
 
The guide as it were adopts the role of an inquisitive blind person in the world 
of the child, and, with the exception of brief references to the medical procedure, 
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endeavours to “inhabit the child’s world” as completely as possible.  The ability to 
access one’s child-like constructs is clearly an asset in achieving this. Occasionally, the 
child will involve the guide in his or her imagery.  For example, a child with a long 
history of very painful and traumatic procedures once said, in imagery, after skating 
across a frozen lake to his house, “Now we are having tea and you are here.”  I asked, 
“What are we having for tea?”  He replied, “Pizza, and you’re having two pieces!” 
 
In guided imagery, the person has chosen what it is that he or she would like to 
imagine.  Often children do not choose a quiet peaceful and relaxing scene.  Frequently 
imagery involves playing a sport or at a playground or playing in the backyard.  Often 
the imagery is active and engaging.  For example when asked “What was the easiest 
part of your imagery to see?”, one five year-old boy, who had been playing football in 
imagery said, “When I was up forward and smashed someone”.  In guided imagery the 
flow of communication tends to be from the child to the person guiding the imagery.  
The child simply verbalises his or her imagery.  The person guiding the imagery 
follows the description and asks questions that are pertinent to the imagery.  For 
example if a child was playing a game of netball in imagery, the person guiding the 
imagery might ask:  “What does it look like where you play netball?”  “Is it inside or 
outside?”  “Who has got the ball?”  “Where are you?”  “Tell me when you go for a 
shot.”  “What is the score?” 
 
Interspersed in this would be the child’s description of the game.  Some 
children in imagery will talk and talk with detailed description of their imagery.  When 
this happens the role of the guide is reduced.  Others verbalise less of what is 
happening in their imagery.  In these cases the guide, if experienced, may feel 
comfortable in letting the child go but usually more questions are asked. 
 
For anyone who is familiar with hypnosis, the above will sound very much like 
hypnosis.  The following is a comparison of imagery and hypnosis together with the 
rationale for why the distinction is important in this study. 
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The Difference between Hypnosis and Guided Imagery 
Where guided imagery focuses on the mental ‘imaging’ aspect of imagery, hypnosis 
focuses on the individual achieving a state whereby he or she is more receptive to 
suggestion, which may be achieved with or without the use of imagery.  Barber (1996) 
acknowledges the difficulty in defining hypnosis and offers the following as a working 
definition: 
 
Hypnosis is an altered condition or state of consciousness characterized by a 
markedly increased receptivity to suggestion, the capacity for modification of 
perception and memory, and the potential for systematic control of a variety of 
usually involuntary physiological functions (such as glandular activity, 
vasomotor activity, etc.).  (p. 5) 
 
Inherent in Barber’s definition is the use of suggestion, but crucially, the 
suggestion is given with a particular therapeutic goal in mind.  In differentiating 
between hypnosis and imagery, Syrjala and Abrams (1996) state: 
 
“Imagery” and “visualization are synonymous in our use of the terms and 
generally indicate incorporation of visual images, whereas “hypnosis” may or 
may not include visual imagery.  … hypnosis implies an effort to achieve a 
state of highly focussed attention, during which time the patient is more 
susceptible to suggestion.  Suggestion is an integral part of hypnosis, whereas 
suggestion may or may not be offered in imagery, relaxation or meditation 
strategies.  (p. 231, emphasis added).   
 
With regard to the distinction between imagery and hypnosis, three cardinal 
differences stand out.  They are, first: in guided imagery there is no deepening of a 
trance like state.  In hypnosis, there is typically an induction phase where the aim is to 
deepen the trance state through focussed attention and suggestion.  In imagery, the 
person simply verbalises the imagined scene.  Second, therapeutic suggestion is not 
used in imagery.  Suggestions for analgesia or altered sensations for example, are not 
given.  These are integral to the hypnotic techniques.  Third, post-hypnotic suggestion, 
(a suggestion given in hypnosis coupled with a cue), is not used in guided imagery.  
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These are commonly given in hypnosis.  All three aspects – induction and trance, 
hypnotic suggestion, and post-hypnotic suggestion, require further consideration.   
 
Hypnosis usually begins with an induction process, which is when the 
deepening of trance state begins.  With adults, the induction process is standard but 
with children, LeBaron and Zeltzer (1996) argue that because children readily engage 
in make-believe and fantasy, “… an adult-style “induction” process as a prelude to 
using imagery and suggestion in children seems redundant”.  Similarly, Kuttner (1993) 
points out in hypnosis with children that there is much less emphasis on hypnotic 
induction compared to adults, as children are usually highly suggestible.  Ellis and 
Spanos (1994) hold that the lack of an induction procedure in guided imagery as the 
main difference between the two approaches to treatment.  
 
The imagery-based strategy was not defined as hypnosis… [it] did not include 
a hypnotic-induction procedure.  Thus it is more accurately described as a 
guided imagery treatment than a hypnotic treatment.  (p. 102) 
 
Ellis and Spanos defer to hypnotic induction as the criterion of differentiation 
between hypnosis and imagery but they do not explain what a hypnotic induction is.  
Furthermore, they do not define imagery beyond saying what it is not, namely, 
hypnosis.  Opinion is divided on the relevance of a ‘trance’ in hypnosis.  Syrjala and 
Abrams (1996) said: 
 
Hypnosis and imagery are widely agreed to be states of highly focussed 
attention during which alteration of sensations, awareness, and perceptions can 
occur.  More in dispute are the questions of whether hypnosis is an altered state 
of consciousness requiring a trance, and whether it is distinct from imagery 
because of this.  (p. 231) 
 
Hypnotic induction techniques are numerous and most importantly regarding 
children, they are varied.  Olness and Kohen (1996) provide an excellent overview of 
induction techniques used with children and group these under visual, auditory 
imagery, movement imagery, storytelling, and ideomotor, progressive relaxation, eye 
fixation, distraction and group inductions.  Olness and Kohen emphasise, “Any 
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induction method may also be used as a method of deepening, or intensification of the 
hypnotic experience …” (1996, p. 52).    
 
Images are used in hypnosis but they are dovetailed with suggestion.  A central 
tenant of hypnosis is that the efficacy of the hypnotic experience lies with the 
suggestion rather than the image, which is a direct contrast to imagery.  Rosenberg 
(1990, p. 207) said, “Images do not intrinsically evoke specific effects; the 
practitioner’s verbalization must include therapeutic suggestions.”  It is important to 
point out that Rosenberg is referring to images within the hypnotic paradigm.  
Certainly in hypnosis, the goals of treatment are achieved through suggestion.  When 
imagery is incorporated in hypnosis, it is a vehicle for the suggestion.  However, 
images are not confined, nor necessary, within the hypnosis paradigm.  As LeBaron 
and Zeltzer (1996, p. 312) point out, “Although hypnotic techniques for children often 
make use of imagery, the two are not at all the same”.    
 
Classically in hypnosis, the clinician will offer direct or indirect suggestions 
that are intended to be therapeutic.  The use of a pain switch is an example of a 
hypnotic technique for pain reduction.  The suggestion may be direct as in, “As you 
turn the switch down, you will feel less and less pain in your hand”.  Alternatively, the 
indirect equivalent would be “After you have found the switch that will turn down the 
pain sensations, you can turn it down, and as you do this you may be surprised at the 
change in sensation in your hand.”  A plethora of examples of direct and indirect 
suggestions used in hypnosis and pain management can be found in Barber (1996), 
Elton, Stanley and Burrows (1983), Hammond (1990) and Zeltzer and LeBaron (1982).  
Olness and Kohen (1996, p. 204) describe a number of techniques of hypnoanalgesia 
used with children.  These range from direct suggestions, such as painting on numbing 
medicine, glove anaesthesia or a switchbox, distancing suggestions, as in moving pain 
away from the self or transferring pain to another body part, to suggestions for feelings 
that are antithetical to pain such as comfort, laughter and relaxation.   
 
Hypnosis, for some, places much emphasis on language and in particular the 
phrasing of suggestions.  Hammond (1990, p. 40), stresses the importance of mastering 
the hypnotic language and lists 82 examples of hypnotic phrasing designed to “… assist 
you to become smoother in your delivery of inductions and suggestions.” These 
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phrases are so central to the hypnotic technique, in Hammond’s opinion, that he 
stresses, “It may be useful to tape record these phrases and listen to them repeatedly.  
This will assist you in internalising this new way of speaking.”  The following phrases 
are examples from Hammond’s list. 
 
And I wonder if it will surprise you when … 
One of the things I’d like you to discover is … 
I wonder if you’ll enjoy how naturally, how easily … 
I’d like you to begin allowing … 
And maybe you’ll enjoy noticing … 
I don’t know if you’re aware of these changes, and it doesn’t really matter. 
I wonder if you’ll decide to … or … 
I want to remind you of something you already know, which is… (pp. 40-41) 
 
The degree of emphasis on ‘new ways of speaking’ varies from one practitioner 
to another but seasoned practitioners in hypnosis hold that the art of the hypnotic 
technique is embedded in the subtleties of language and suggestion. 
 
The last factor to be presented here that differentiates hypnosis and imagery is 
the use of a particular type of therapeutic suggestion in hypnosis: post hypnotic 
suggestion. A posthypnotic suggestion is a therapeutic suggestion given by the 
clinician to the patient while he or she is in hypnotic trance.  The type of posthypnotic 
suggestion will depend upon the goal of the treatment.  A cue is given to the patient 
that will invoke the posthypnotic suggestion.  Posthypnotic suggestions are given for 
relaxation, anxiety reduction, and trance induction or behaviour modification, for 
example, with the aim of reducing cigarette smoking or excessive eating.  The 
following are examples of posthypnotic suggestions; each has a cue that is linked to a 
desired outcome. 
 
“Whenever you take a deep breath [or whatever cue you determine 
appropriate], you might notice how curiously comfortable you feel, with 
nothing to bother you, and nothing to disturb you.”  (Barber, 1996, p. 26 
parentheses in the original) 
 
  
 
140  
“Whenever I gently touch your arm, like this [cue], you will discover, at that 
moment, how really comfortable your arm feels.” (Barber, 1996, p. 93) 
Any time they [patients] would like to recapture this feeling of comfort, they 
need only take a deep, slow breath [cue] and take out their mental picture; they 
can once again feel their bodies relax as the tension flows out and the comfort 
flows in.  Syrjala and Abrams (1996, p.245) 
 
 Whenever you start biting your nails … the moment you put your fingers in 
your mouth [cue] … you will get a horrible bitter taste in your mouth.  This 
will become stronger and nastier … and will make you feel sick.  (Waxman, 
1990, p. 430) 
 
Posthypnotic suggestion can be used in procedural pain management in 
children.  An excellent example can be seen in Leora Kuttner’s (1986) videorecording 
No Fears, No Tears: Children coping with cancer pain.  Kuttner demonstrates a 
number of hypnotic techniques with children undergoing painful procedures in the 
treatment of cancer.  The one referred to here is with a child named Leslie, the cue is 
stroking Leslie’s finger, and the desired outcome is deep relaxation transferred to the 
child’s back during a bone marrow aspiration.  The following passage from the tape 
illustrates the incorporation of a posthypnotic suggestion in hypnosis to manage 
procedural pain in a child. 
Pre-procedure 
Kuttner: “Now, as I stroke your back, can you feel the difference?  Can you 
feel your back feeling rested and relaxed? 
Leslie: “Yes” 
Kuttner: “Excellent!… Okay, so all that I will have to do during the 
procedure is rub this hand and remind you that we can transfer it to 
your back, okay” 
 
During the procedure, while stroking Leslie’s finger: 
Kuttner: Okay, Allow the sleepiness to come into your back.  And, as I 
stroke your hand, your back feels more and more comfortable.  
Can you feel that beginning? 
Leslie: Mmm mm 
Kuttner: Excellent! 
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In conclusion, of the three aspects which have been argued to distinguish 
hypnosis from guided imagery, the two that revolve around suggestion may be the most 
significant in theoretical terms.  Given the model of consciousness proposed in this 
thesis it is clear that the trance-like state or focused attention that is a feature of 
hypnosis may be akin to the child’s imaging in as much as both represent a top-down 
construction of a ‘reality’ other than the immediate here and now.  Where hypnosis and 
imagery differ in the management of procedural pain is that in hypnosis, the clinician, 
by means of suggestion, attempts to direct the person’s attention towards an altered 
sensation, that competes with the sensations of the procedural reality, akin to Chapman 
and Nakamura’s model of competing schema.  In guided imagery, on the other hand, 
the guide works assiduously to sustain the child’s construction of an alternative 
‘reality’ with only minimal reference to the here and now.  The guide may let the child 
know when the needle is being inserted and about other significant procedural events 
but otherwise the child is encouraged to maintain an image of a place and time quite 
apart from the procedural setting.  What remains confusing is that the boundaries 
between hypnosis and guided imagery have never been well described and, 
furthermore, hypnosis is a technique that often draws on imagery.   
 
At this point, it is worth re-emphasising that the aim of this study is to 
investigate and differentiate between the effects of imagery, distraction and relaxation 
as they apply to any technique – guided imagery or hypnosis.  In so doing, the 
proposed effects of imagery and relaxation may also apply to the ‘imagery’ and 
‘relaxation’ components of hypnosis but suggestion is absent.  Certainly, clinically, in 
using hypnosis, there are situations where the use of suggestion will afford a better 
outcome than the use of imagery alone, particularly if the child has difficulty with 
imagery.  For example, hypnotic techniques for managing procedural pain, are 
commonly used with children under the age of five years, and would be preferred over 
imagery because children under about four-and-a-half to five years have difficulty in 
engaging, describing, and sustaining imagery.  Thus, in some particular situations 
hypnosis, with an emphasis on suggestions may be an ideal strategy to alleviate pain 
and distress.  However, in other circumstances it may be that it is the consistent shift in 
consciousness, achieved through either imagery, or hypnosis, that performs best, by 
invoking a construed reality that works to invalidate afferent pain signals and renders 
fear inappropriate. 
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Summary 
The aims of this chapter were to explore what is meant by consciousness, to relate 
consciousness to imagery, to define guided imagery at both the theoretical and practical 
levels, and to differentiate between guided imagery and hypnosis.  The chapter began 
with a discussion on consciousness, altered states of consciousness and imagery. 
 
The tentative view taken in this thesis is that consciousness is a phenomenon 
that emerges from a range of brain activities and that consciousness is represented in 
the reality of the moment.  The view in contemporary neuroscience is that 
consciousness is awareness of what is in working memory.  A problem arises here in 
nailing down what ‘aware of’ actually means.  The language used also tends to 
encourage the view that ‘things’ enter a space, when they are in that space, they are 
conscious, and when they are out, they are not conscious.  As a concept, consciousness 
is not easily defined.  The notion of a working memory view of consciousness has 
merit, but the stance taken in this thesis is that consciousness is more related to the 
‘working’ aspect of working memory than something temporarily bouncing around in a 
group of brain structures.   
 
Similarly, identifying what an image is, is problematic because if imaging is the 
stuff of consciousness then ‘an image’ does not ‘enter’ consciousness, rather, imaging 
is consciousness.  Neuroimaging studies, although conflicting, point to the association 
areas of the temporal lobe as active areas during visual mental imagery.  The primary 
visual area appears an unlikely site for the generation of visual images or perhaps more 
accurately, the process of imaging.  The association areas are however part of the 
working memory structures and if consciousness is a phenomenon that emerges from 
activity in these regions, then whatever is imaged would be consciousness.  When this 
is advanced within the constructivist view, whatever is imaged becomes reality.  
Furthermore, the important links to emphasise regarding a potential effect of imagery 
on fear are the two-way connections between the association areas (involved in 
imaging) and the amygdala (involved in modulating), the experience of fear. 
 
The upshot of all of this is that the structures that are common to the 
phenomenon of consciousness, including awareness of pain, the association areas and 
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the anterior cingulate cortex, are also involved in the process of imaging.  Moreover, 
given that that which is visually real and conscious in visual imagery pertains to 
activity in the visual association areas rather than the primary visual area, that which is 
somatosensorialy real and conscious in imagery may pertain to activity in the 
somatosensory association areas regardless of afferent upstream nociceptive input to 
the primary sensory cortex.   
 
If one person talks to another who has his or her eyes closed, many people 
assume that what they are observing is hypnosis.  Imagery and indeed guided imagery 
focuses on the mental act and effects of imaging.  The difference between guided 
imagery and hypnosis is centred on the use of suggestion in the latter.  The practical 
aspects of the guided imagery technique employed in this study were described in this 
chapter.  In the next chapter, research into imagery and distraction techniques in the 
management of procedural pain is reviewed but the two approaches are also compared 
and contrasted, by drawing on, and developing, the themes related to neurophysiology 
and consciousness presented in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
IMAGERY AND DISTRACTION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PROCEDURAL 
PAIN IN CHILDREN 
 
The previous chapter delineated a constructivist view of consciousness 
and reviewed brain neurophysiological processes thought to underpin 
mental imagery and conscious awareness.  In this chapter, two 
psychological approaches to the management of procedural pain are 
reviewed: imagery and distraction techniques.  The imagery studies are 
complicated by the lack of consistency in definition and technique.  
Despite this, the main approaches are reviewed within the context of 
procedural pain in children.  Distraction techniques also vary 
enormously but they do converge on a central tenet, that is, distracting 
attention from the painful procedure.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of imagery and distraction within the constructivist view of 
consciousness and reality and related neurophysiology. 
 
Imagery and Procedural Pain in Children 
Over the past decade, there has been an enormous increase in interest and application 
of imagery in the management of procedural pain in children.  While researchers and 
authors on the topic are clear about the procedural aspect, be it venepuncture, bone 
marrow aspiration, lumbar puncture and the like, they are not clear, or consistent, in 
referring to ‘imagery’.  Furthermore, the frequent shifts in terminology between 
imagery, guided imagery, relaxation, and hypnosis add to the confusion.  Lambert 
(1996), for example, refers to hypnosis/guided imagery as a single intervention to 
improve the postoperative management of pain and anxiety in children.  Langley 
(1999) highlights the difficulty in making sense of the literature in her review of the 
effectiveness of guided imagery in the care of children.  “Reviewing the literature on 
guided imagery was not straightforward because authors use the terms, 
‘relaxation/imagery’ and hypnosis interchangeably” (p.18).  When reviewing an article 
on imagery, the reader will frequently find many interpretations of the term, including: 
‘imagery scripts’, ‘imagery audiotapes’, ‘emotive imagery’, ‘healing imagery’, 
‘memory recall’, ‘imagery/hypnosis’, ‘hypnosis’ and ‘guided imagery’.  The term 
‘guided imagery’ can refer to all, some, or only one of the above.  Furthermore, it is not 
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uncommon to find that an author refers to ‘imagery’ without defining or describing 
what is meant by the term. 
 
Vague use of the term ‘Imagery’  
The vague or undefined use of the term ‘imagery’ in the literature occurs at two levels: 
firstly in articles that generally advocate the use of imagery (e.g., Kasson, Sentivany & 
Kato, 1996; Medforth, 1995), and, secondly, in research papers that fail to define or 
outline the technique in the method.  For instance, in a review of approaches to the 
preparation of children for painful procedures, Broome (1990) advocates the use of 
relaxation, distraction and imagery.  Reference was made to a number of strategies for 
preparing children, including books, puppets enacting the procedures, videotaped 
modelling (p. 539), and imagery (p.540).  There was however, no description of what 
imagery is.  Similarly, in a subsequent article Broome, Lillis, McGahee and Bates 
(1992) use the term ‘imagery’ loosely.  The researchers investigated the use of 
relaxation, imagery and distraction exercises on pain, fear and parental anxiety in 
children aged 3 to 15 years, who underwent lumbar punctures for the treatment of 
cancer.  The imagery technique was not outlined and it was not clear if the distraction 
exercises were part of the imagery or whether they constituted a separate intervention.  
It is not possible to say whether any effects were due to the imagery, the relaxation, or 
the distraction exercises, or a combination of these.   
 
Later, Broome, Rehwaldt, and Fogg (1998) investigated temperament in 
relation to distress and pain responses in 19 children and adolescents aged 4 to 18 years 
who underwent lumbar puncture for the treatment of cancer.  The researchers taught the 
child/adolescent and parents imagery, relaxation and distraction exercises.  In each 
case, the parents ‘coached’ their child or adolescent in the ‘behavioural techniques’ 
during the procedure.  Again, the imagery technique was not defined and it was not 
clear as to whether the distraction exercises were part of the imagery or a separate 
intervention.  The researchers gave subjects and their parents a teaching package for 
use at home.   
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The package included a videotape of a mime demonstrating the techniques, a 
booklet for the parents explaining how to use the techniques with their child… 
audiotape of instructions and music to practice relaxation and imagery.  (p. 50) 
 
Broom et al. found a significant improvement in pain reports over a 5-month 
period but behavioural distress did not change significantly.  Apart from the limitations 
of a small sample size coupled with a wide age range, it was not possible to identify 
which effects were due to relaxation, imagery, or distraction.  The description of the 
learning package suggests that music and audiotaped instructions were included but it 
was not clear whether these were used during the procedures.  
 
Similar issues emerged in the study by Kazak, Penati, Boyer, Hilmestein, 
Brophy, Waibel, Blackall, Daller, and Johnson. (1996) who used guided imagery, 
breathing exercises, and counting, as part of a psychological intervention devised to 
reduce child and parental distress in children undergoing lumbar punctures and bone 
marrow aspirations for the treatment of leukaemia.  Again, it was not possible to 
identify which effects were due to guided imagery, breathing or counting.  There were 
three groups of children: a control group accessed three months before the instigation 
of the psychological interventions; a pharmacology only group; and a combined (drug 
and psychological intervention) group.  The children in the combined intervention 
group received the same premedication as the children in the pharmacology only group.  
The premedications listed were injectable 1% lidocaine, midazolam and morphine 
sulphate. 
 
The findings of Kazak et al. were mixed.  The mothers in the combined 
intervention group reported lower levels of distress in their child compared to the 
ratings of the mothers in the pharmacology only group.  The nurses’ ratings supported 
this finding but the researchers report, “… the majority of measures… showed no 
significant effects of the CI [combined intervention] condition over the PO 
[pharmacology only] condition.  (Kazak et al., 1996, p. 626).   
 
There were a number of distinct flaws in this study.  The parents were trained in 
imagery and they undertook the role of guiding their child’s imagery but there was no 
indication of how successful this was for the parents or the child.  Furthermore, it was 
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not clear whether parents and children used some, or all of the interventions.  In 
addition, the level of medication was problematic.  Kazak et al. state, “The use of 
additional doses of midazolam and/or morphine to a maximum safe dose was 
encouraged to attain adequate sedation” (p. 620).  ‘Adequate sedation’ in this context 
would be deep sedation.  The term ‘conscious sedation’ is frequently used to describe 
the level of sedation attained pharmacologically to manage procedural pain in children.  
In this study, the researchers use the term conscious sedation to describe the effect of 
the premedication.  “Conscious sedation implies that the patient remained responsive to 
verbal and tactile stimuli.” (p. 620).  The researchers do not comment on any effect that 
the premedication might have had on a child’s ability to engage in the psychological 
interventions – a problem that Jay, Elliot, Woody and Siegel (1991) found in 
combining Valium with Cognitive Behavioural Therapy in their study.  Conscious 
sedation with midazolam and morphine achieves a significantly deeper level of 
sedation than small doses of oral Valium.  It is possible (in fact desirable) that a child’s 
attention span and ability to concentrate would be greatly affected in a state of 
conscious sedation.   
 
In conclusion, this sample of studies demonstrates a lack of consistency in 
guided imagery interventions and highlights some of the methodological trappings that 
plague studies with multiple interventions.     
 
Emotive Imagery 
Jay, Katz, Elliott and Siegel (1987) used what they referred to as imagery/distraction in 
the form of emotive imagery as part of a cognitive-behavioural package to investigate 
the efficacy of nonpharmacologic intervention in the management of distress during 
bone marrow aspiration (BMA) in children.  In addition to the cognitive-behavioural 
intervention, the researchers also used oral Valium and minimal treatment-attention as 
additional interventions with the latter being the control condition.  The authors cite 
Lazarus and Abramavitz as the source for the emotive imagery used in their study.  The 
following excerpt describes what the authors mean by emotive imagery. 
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In this technique, emotive images are used to inhibit anxiety.  Children’s hero 
images, such as Superman, Wonderwoman, or the Incredible Hulk, were 
ascertained by discussions with the child.  Then a fanciful, age-appropriate 
story designed to elicit positive affect was created by weaving together the 
medical situation with one of these hero images.  For instance, a child may 
wish to imagine that he or she is Superman’s agent and that Superman has 
asked him or her to undergo the painful medical procedures as part of a special 
mission.  (p. 861) 
 
The other components of the cognitive-behavioural package were filmed 
modelling, breathing exercises, positive incentive and behavioural rehearsal.  The 
filmed modelling consisted of the child viewing a video of another child undergoing a 
BMA and coping.  Fifty-six children underwent a BMA in each of the three groups.  
The measured dependent variables included observational behavioural distress, self-
reported pain scores, pulse rate, and blood pressure.  With regard to the findings, the 
researchers stated: 
 
Repeated-measures analyses of covariance indicated that children in the 
cognitive-behaviour therapy condition had significantly lower behavioural 
distress, lower pain ratings, and lower pulse rates than when they were in the 
attention-control condition.  When children were in the Valium condition, they 
exhibited no significant differences from the attention control condition except 
that they had lower diastolic blood pressure scores.  (p. 860) 
 
In this study, the imagery was one component of a five part cognitive-
behavioural intervention.  The authors suggested that the results provide support for the 
efficacy of the cognitive-behavioural intervention in reducing pain and distress.  It is, 
however, not possible to identify which aspect of the intervention or combinations were 
effective given that the intervention was essentially not a single intervention but a 
combination of at least five interventions. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
149  
Healing Imagery 
In an article titled “Guided imagery gets respect”, Davenport (1996) acknowledges that 
there are many styles of guided imagery.  The two approaches described focus on 
healing and psychotherapeutic aspects of imagery. 
 
Two of the major ones are called scripted imagery and receptive imagery.  In 
the first approach, the guide directs the patient to imagine a designated 
scenario, whether it is a relaxing walk on the beach for stress management, or a 
picture of vital cells within the immune system combating disease during 
cancer treatment. 
 
Receptive imagery elicits the most personally meaningful images as they arise 
during the session.  The guide encourages the patient, while in a deeply relaxed 
state, to focus all his or her attention and to allow images to form that are 
descriptive of her or his present state of experience.  (p.28) 
 
The emphasis in Davenport’s ‘scripted imagery’ is on incorporating specific 
suggestions aimed at achieving a particular therapeutic goal, which, as outlined in the 
previous chapter, is the basis of hypnosis.  The second example, ‘receptive imagery’ 
describes an imagery based psychotherapeutic intervention where the aim is to elicit 
deeply personal images that reflect the patient’s personal state, feelings, concerns and 
so on.  For Davenport, the essence of receptive imagery is, “… the reclaiming of those 
parts of oneself that have been disowned, forgotten, or covered over, and reconnecting 
with the full scope of one’s human potential” (p. 26).  Both of these approaches are 
very different to the guided imagery technique described in the previous chapter and 
employed in this study in which children simply select and describe activities that they 
know and enjoy and ‘create’ with the help of the guide.   
 
Memory Recall 
Foertsch, O’Hara, Stoddard and Kealy (1998) investigated the use of what they referred 
to as an ‘imagery-based’ intervention on distress in 23 children aged 3 to 12 years who 
underwent a series of four burn-dressing changes.  The apparent failure of imagery to 
alleviate distress in children in this study was perhaps more related to the imagery 
technique than alleged concerns regarding the procedure.  Burn-dressing changes are 
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certainly a source of great pain and distress for children.  Burn pain is complex and 
often difficult to manage.  Allodynia, hyperalgesia, wind-up and subsequent resistance 
to the analgesic effects of opioids compound the problem.  The intervention was based 
on Kuttner’s (1988) ‘favourite stories’ technique.  The keywords here are ‘based on’.  
Kuttner’s technique is pure hypnosis.  Kuttner (1988) refers to the ‘favourite stories’ as 
“A hypnotic pain-reduction technique for children in acute pain” (p. 289) and does not 
refer to her technique as imagery.  It is highly unlikely that Kuttner would agree that 
this study was a replication of her study for the following reasons.   
 
Foertsch, O’Hara, Stoddard and Kealy (1998) describe their ‘familiar imagery 
treatment’ as 
 
…  presenting familiar stories to the child that were based on memories and 
experiences from his or her life.  Information for the creation of the stories was 
gathered from brief interviews with the parent and the child before the dressing 
change.  For example, a three-year-old child particularly enjoyed going to the 
local K-mart, where he would watch toy trains on display.  Another child had 
just decorated her home for Christmas and had enjoyed putting up stockings 
and a Christmas tree.  (p. 220) 
 
The researchers in this case were asking the children to recall memories of 
previous activities that the children had engaged in and that they enjoyed doing.  
Kuttner’s ‘favourite stories’ were imaginative rather than experiential.  Kuttner gives 
three examples in her article: ‘Grandma Tiddly and the Elephant’, Cinderella and the 
Magic Fairy’ and ‘Goldilocks eating baby bears porridge’ (pp. 291-294).  Kuttner also 
places great emphasis on the central tenets of hypnosis – suggestion and metaphor – in 
the ‘favourite stories’ technique. 
 
The hypnotic process used during the surgical procedure incorporated aspects 
essential for a child’s hypnotic trance, such as an active involvement with the 
child, flexibility, informality, and narrowed and increased absorption of 
attention.  Procedural and sensory information was interwoven within the story 
line.  This included weaving indirect or direct suggestions for comfort, 
diminishing pain awareness, and increased coping within the story line.  (p. 
291) 
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Foertsch, O’Hara, Stoddard and Kealy (1998) give no indication that these 
principles were incorporated in their ‘familiar imagery technique’.  Simply asking a 
child to recall a memory of an enjoyable experience is neither imagery nor hypnosis.  It 
is therefore not surprising that Foertsch, O’Hara, Stoddard and Kealy found no support 
for their main hypothesis, that imagery treatment would be superior to control 
treatment in the alleviation of distress with burn-dressing changes.  At the same time, 
there are some similarities between this technique and guided imagery, the notable 
exception being that the child was asked to recall these events, presumably from his or 
her current position.  In guided imagery the child constructs the image and participates 
in it.  It would be interesting to find out what ‘tense’ the children used in their 
descriptions. 
 
Imagery Scripts and Audiotapes 
The use of imagery scripts or pre-recorded audiotapes is also an approach that is 
referred to as ‘guided imagery’.  Mannix, Chandurkar, Rybicki, Tusek and Solomon 
(1999) used a ‘guided imagery’ tape to determine the effect of adjuvant imagery on 
patients with chronic tension type headache.  The authors found that subjects who 
listened to the tape experienced reduced headache frequency and severity, reported 
improved quality of life and a decrease in disability caused by headache.  Kolcaba 
(1998) tested the effects of ‘guided imagery’ (using a guided imagery tape) on comfort 
enhancement in women undergoing conservative treatment for cancer of the breast 
(lumpectomy and radiotherapy).  This study revealed a significant improvement in 
comfort scores related to radiotherapy between the treatment and control groups but not 
on the total comfort measure. 
 
Guided imagery, as defined and described in the previous chapter, is a 
technique that is dependent upon communication.  It is hard to see how a pre-recorded 
tape could be included in this definition of guided imagery.  A tape could be an 
example of directed imagery but certainly not guided.  In order to guide a person’s 
imagery, one has to listen and respond to the description of imagery.  It would not be 
possible to employ the technique in this study without engaging the child in two-way 
conversation.    
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In the same way, it is desirable, though not necessary, to be physically present 
with the subject when using the technique described in this study.  The author once 
used guided imagery in an interview on radio.  The author was in the Australian 
Broadcasting Studio in Melbourne while the interviewer was in a studio in Sydney 
(Whitaker, 1998).  In this case, the interviewer (a Scotsman) described walking up a 
mountain track in the Scottish highlands.  He described in detail the terrain of the track 
and the surroundings – ‘boulders’, trees, the view and the mountain air – a detailed 
description despite the physical absence of a guide.  The importance of interaction 
remains however, and in this case, the mechanics of verbal communication, (listening, 
anticipating, pausing and speaking), were intensified because of the lack of visual cues. 
 
The use of a guided imagery tape is similar to a self-hypnosis tape.  The subject 
can enter a state of relaxation, listen to a story, sometimes with music, and follow the 
instructions and suggestions provided by the clinician.  An example of this sort of tape 
used with children is the Magic Island Audiotape (California Publications cited by 
Smart, 1997).  Smart used this tape in a study investigating the use of ‘guided imagery’ 
with children aged 4 to 8 years who underwent Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), 
an investigation that frequently causes distress in children.  Data were collected from 
20 subjects who were randomly allocated to an experimental group, who listened to the 
Magic Island Tape through headphones, and a “control group, who heard no music 
through their headphones” (p. 238).  Smart does not say if the children in the control 
condition heard anything through their headphones.  Smart states, “Seven out of 10 
children who listened to the music and imagery tape remained still for the MRI and did 
not need sedation” (p.239).  This study has clinical significance with obvious practical 
applications, however, in terms of investigating the therapeutic effect of guided 
imagery, it has a number of limitations.  The researcher acknowledges that it is not 
known whether it was the calming music, the storyline, or a combination of both that 
distracted the children (p.239).  It is interesting to note that the researcher uses the term 
‘distraction’.  The assumption here is that guided imagery, at least this approach, is a 
form of distraction.  This assumption is also evident in the method.  After the 
procedure, the researcher asked the children the following questions: 
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Did you enjoy or like listening to the music and the story on the tape? 
Did the music and the story help you to relax? 
Were you afraid or scared during the test? 
Would you like to use music and stories again if you ever need another test 
done? 
 
These four closed questions seek a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response.  Each question 
could have been phrased in an open ended manner, even with children as young as four 
years.  More important though, the researcher did not ask the children about their 
imagery.  There is no indication that any of the children engaged in imagery during the 
procedure, although, from Smart’s description of the content of the tape, one goal was 
clearly to encourage imagery: 
 
Slow, rhythmic, background instrumentation plays continuously during the 
story.  The tape begins with five minutes of progressive relaxation….  The 20-
minute storyline focuses on a ride in a hot-air balloon through white “cotton 
candy” clouds to a series of magical islands. … The narrator stimulates 
imagination by inviting listeners to “travel wherever they want to go.”  (p. 241) 
 
In a study of adults, Kwekkeboom, Huseby-Moore and Ward (1998) 
investigated imaging ability with a group of 60 graduate students who were led to 
believe that participating in the study involved self-disclosure through a short speech – 
“What I dislike about my body and physical appearance” (p. 193).  Subjects were told 
that the speech would be videotaped and analysed by the researchers.  Only those 
participants whose anxiety scores increased with the knowledge of the speech were 
included in the study.  Thirty participants listened to a pre-recorded imagery script.  
The use of a pre-recorded relaxation and imagery script is a restrictive approach to 
imagery.  The tape was 12 minutes in duration and took the following format: 
 
The guide instructed a muscle relaxation exercise followed by imagery 
involving a walk along a river, sitting under a tree amid wildflowers, and 
viewing a sunset.  (p. 193) 
  
This sounds very pleasant and appealing but the degree of passivity is a 
problem and it is easy to see that some participants might find it hard to focus on this 
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particular image.  The findings reflect this issue.  Successful imagery was established 
by a reduction in anxiety score of 5 points or more on the STAI anxiety questionnaire.  
Based on this criterion, imagery was only effective in reducing anxiety in 23 percent of 
the participants.  Furthermore, the authors report that, for 3 participants, anxiety scores 
actually increased 5 points after listening to the imagery tape.  It is possible that the low 
efficacy of ‘imagery’ in this study reflects a failure on the part of the participants to 
actually engage in imagery.  Under these circumstances, the audiotape could be 
construed as an auditory distraction rather than a prompt for imagery.  Moreover, for 
the participants whose anxiety increased, the tape may have been perceived as an 
irritation. 
 
To conclude, pre-recorded tapes force a particular image, and pace, on the 
recipient and are likely to be met with greater resistance, and produce less involvement, 
than the techniques that allow open communication between the child and the guide. 
 
Guided Imagery 
Pederson (1995) investigated the use of imagery on children’s pain and anxiety during 
cardiac catheterisation.  In describing the technique, Pederson does not appear to have 
deepened a trance nor given suggestions for analgesia or altered sensory perception of 
pain.  The following excerpt from Pederson’s brief description of an imagery 
experience of a 14-year-old girl playing soccer provides some insight into the 
technique.  The child is in present tense as she describes her soccer game. 
 
“Now while your body is feeling loose and relaxed, you might choose to play a 
soccer game in your mind, just the way you would like it to go.  You could 
look around you and notice how the soccer field looks … what the sky looks 
like, … the uniforms that you and your team-mates are wearing, … and where 
the soccer ball is now.  [more comments about surroundings, the wind, team-
mates, whistles blowing]  What happens when the game starts?”  The child 
responded, “The ball is kicked really high and it comes toward me… I’m going 
to kick it really hard.”  (Pederson, 1995, p. 369) 
 
It is interesting to note Pederson’s comment regarding difficulties in 
‘sustaining’ imagery. 
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The intervener used intervals of quiet relaxation between imagery experiences 
because of the difficulty in sustaining imagery for longer than 15 to 20 
minutes.  (Pederson, 1995, p. 369) 
 
It is not clear whether the children had difficulty sustaining imagery, or whether 
it was the intervener’s difficulty.  The use of the word ‘intervener’ to describe someone 
who uses imagery ‘on’, rather than ‘with’ a child is an interesting point and perhaps 
illustrates subtle but important aspects of the imagery technique.  If the intervener 
attempted to maintain control of the imagery as opposed to guiding and being guided 
by the child then the problems sustaining imagery for longer than 15 to 20 minutes are 
understandable.  The technique described earlier in the current study has been 
employed with children to manage procedural pain for 45 minutes and longer with 
ease. 
 
Pederson found that imagery did not reduce children’s pain during cardiac 
catheterisation.  Unfortunately, there is no reported level of response or way of gauging 
how involved the children were with their imagery – whether imagery was achieved by 
all, some or none of the children in the imagery group.  Pederson does however 
comment on an effect on anxiety levels in the imagery group. 
 
The Imagery group had the highest State Anxiety Mean before catheterisation, 
yet this group had the lowest Mean of distress behaviours during the 
procedure.  Therefore, imagery may have assisted these children in coping with 
their anxiety.  (Pederson, 1995, p. 372) 
 
A significant reduction in anxiety without a concomitant reduction in pain is 
sometimes seen in children using hypnosis or imagery to manage procedural pain.  
Kuttner (1988) comments on this finding: 
 
This split [between pain and anxiety] suggests a dissociation from the pain.  As 
is sometimes the case during a hypnotic trance, pain sensations may not be 
entirely eradicated, they may simply become more distant, less relevant, and 
therefore less upsetting and painful.  (294). 
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Underpinning the notion of distance from the pain is the idea that children can 
feel the pain sensations but it does not bother them.  This concept is developed later.  
 
In reviewing these studies, it is clear that there is much confusion on what 
imagery actually is and often it is not very clear precisely what form of interventions 
has been used.  It is not surprising that the effects of interventions have varied although 
there has been enough success to warrant continued investigation into exactly which 
component of the interventions elicits which particular change in the pain and fear 
experienced during medical intervention.  In this vein the next section, will consider 
what could be argued to be the minimal effect of any psychological intervention – 
distraction. 
 
Effects of Distraction Techniques on Procedural Pain and Fear in 
Children 
Frequently health professionals and parents suggest behavioural strategies such 
as counting or looking the other way, as ways to distract the child, to facilitate coping, 
and hopefully to reduce the pain and distress of medical procedures.  In a study that 
investigated the types of coping strategies used by children, parents and clinicians 
during venepuncture, Hodgins and Lander (1997) found: 
 
... parents and the laboratory personnel were frequently observed advising 
children to use behavioural strategies such as “count to ten” or “look the other 
way.”  (Hodgins & Lander, 1997, p. 282) 
 
Studies into the efficacy of distraction in reducing procedural pain, fear and 
distress produce mixed results.  Vessey, Carlson and McGill (1994) found that children 
distracted with a kaleidoscope during venepuncture reported significantly less pain and 
scored less on indicators of behavioural distress.  However, in a subsequent multi-site 
study Carlson, Broome and Vessey (2000) found no significant difference in pain, fear 
or distress scores between children distracted with the kaleidoscope and those receiving 
standard treatment during venepuncture.  A study by Manne, Redd, Jacobsen, 
Gorfinkle, Schorr and Rapkin (1990) incorporating parent coaching and distraction 
with children undergoing venepuncture revealed significant reduction in parent distress 
but child self-report of pain and nurse ratings of child distress were not significantly 
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affected.  Fassler (1985) found that children who participated in medical play, injecting 
dolls with water and having a story read to them exhibited significant reductions in fear 
but not verbal expression of pain associated with injections.  In reviewing literature on 
the effects of distraction on children’s pain and distress for a meta-analysis, Kleiber and 
Harper (1999 p. 44) found “…33% of the studies on distraction and distress behaviour 
reported statistically insignificant results, and 75% of the studies on distraction and 
pain reported insignificant results.”  The authors acknowledge that it is not known if 
the failure to demonstrate a significant effect was related to method or variability in the 
efficacy of distraction. 
  
Megel, Houser and Gleaves (1998) used audiotaped lullabies as distraction in 
children aged three to six years having immunization injections.  No significant 
differences were found between experimental and control groups for heart rate, blood 
pressure or pain scores.  Overall, however, distress scores were significantly less in the 
experimental group.  The authors also considered gender effects and found no 
significant difference between boys and girls in heart rate, blood pressure (systolic and 
diastolic) or pain scores.  Interestingly, boys showed significantly higher total distress 
scores than the girls.  This is contrary to the widely held assumption that boys hide 
their feelings. 
 
Audiotapes were used as distraction in an earlier study (Ryan, 1989) with older 
children, aged nine to twelve, undergoing venepuncture.  The tapes were musical and 
selected by the child.  In this small study of 14 participants, there was no significant 
difference in pain scores between the distraction group and the standard treatment 
group.  The external validity of this study is compromised by the small sample size and 
lack of random allocation to groups.  Furthermore, pain was the only dependent 
variable investigated.  Given the sensory and affective nature of procedural pain in 
children, a measurement of fear for example, would have enhanced the value of the 
study. 
 
Wells (1998) chose to investigate the effect of a live dog versus a stuffed dog 
and no dog on pain, fear and distress in children undergoing repeated port access 
procedures via an implanted venous access device.  Despite the small sample size of 
eight, the within-subjects design led Wells to conclude that a live dog was more 
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effective in reducing children's stress responses than either a stuffed dog or no dog 
during potentially painful medical procedures. 
 
Sparks (2001) independently investigated the effect of two distraction 
techniques (touch and bubble-blowing) on immunization needle pain in children aged 
four to six years.  Sparks used the Child Medical Fear Scale to obtain a measure of pre-
procedural fear and used this as a covariate in the analysis.  Sparks reported that both 
forms of distraction significantly reduced pain perception and that fear was a 
significant covariate, but distraction was effective even when fear was not held 
constant. 
 
Investigations using cartoons as distraction are limited.  Cohen, Blount and 
Panopoulos (1997) investigated carton distraction as an intervention to reduce distress 
and pain associated with immunization injection in children aged four to six years.  
Three groups were utilized: a cartoon with the nurse coaching, a cartoon with the nurse 
coaching and a previous 15 minute training session with the child, parent and nurse role 
playing desired behaviours, and a standard intervention group with no cartoon or 
distraction.  The authors reported significantly higher pain and distress scores in the 
control condition and no significant difference between the nurse coach and parent 
coach conditions for distress or pain.  Fear was not measured in this study. 
 
Mason, Johnson and Woolley (1999) compared the effect of viewing a cartoon 
video, a short story and control condition on behavioural distress during medical 
procedures in eight children aged 2.4 – 4.5 years with cancer.  They found that the 
short story procedure, which involved parent-child interaction, was more effective than 
either the control condition or the cartoon film.  Pain was not measured.  The children 
in this study were very young, perhaps too young to attend to the cartoon.  It is possible 
that close interaction with the parent was more comforting and distracting than the 
television.  In another study using parents to distract children, aged four to seven years, 
during intravenous cannulation, Kleiber, Craft-Rosenberg and Harper (2001) found no 
difference in behavioural distress or self-report of pain between the experimental and 
control conditions. 
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Distraction techniques have also been compared to topical anaesthesia (eutectic 
mixture of local anaesthetics – EMLA®) for efficacy in reducing procedural pain and 
distress in children.  EMLA does not produce complete anaesthesia of the skin in all 
cases (Fanurik, Koh, & Schmitz, 2000; Lander, Fowler-Kerry, & Oberle, 1996).  
Cohen, Blount, Cohen, Schaen, and Zaff (1999) compared distraction, EMLA, and 
standard care during three immunizations on fourth graders over a 6-month period.  
“Distraction resulted in more nurse coaching and child coping and less child distress 
than did EMLA or typical care on an observational measure.” (p. 851).  Cohen et al. 
also reported that EMLA did not result in increased coping or decreased distress.  In an 
earlier study, Arts et al. (1994) compared the effects of EMLA, a placebo cream and 
music distraction (described as ‘contemporary, up-beat’ and the same for all) on pain 
associated with intravenous cannulation pain in children aged four to sixteen years.  
The researchers found differential age-related effects of the interventions.  Essentially, 
EMLA was most effective in the young (4 to 6-year-olds) but this decreased in the 
older children. The music distraction had no significant effect on pain scores.    
 
Rather than comparing EMLA versus distraction, Fanurik, Koh and Schmitz 
(2000) investigated the effect of EMLA with and without distraction on pain and 
distress associated with intravenous cannulation prior to gastroscopy in children aged 
2-16 years.  Children were allocated to one of six groups and half had age appropriate 
distraction interventions (bubble blowing, musical story books and self choice of music 
via headset).  All children had EMLA applied at lease 60 minutes prior to the 
procedure.  Interestingly, only 17 percent of the sample with EMLA reported no pain at 
all, and overall, pain ratings were not influenced by the distraction intervention, or by 
age group.  However, distress scores were significantly lower for older children, and 
for children in the distraction conditions. 
 
As with the imagery studies, investigations of distraction have displayed a 
variety of techniques and elicited a range of effects.  Nonetheless, the success of some 
provides even more incentive to establish the precise conditions under which imagery 
and distraction will work.  One method of achieving this is to consider the 
psychological and neurophysiological mechanisms that accompany these interventions.   
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Distraction and Imagery Compared 
In this section, distraction will be compared and contrasted with imagery in terms of 
cognition, the brain areas involved, and the effects of each intervention on pain and 
fear.   In the constructivist model, the essence of distraction is a shift in attention from 
the procedure and related pain to a secondary, sensory focus that is introduced.  
Globally, distraction techniques are essentially homogenous in that in all cases, the 
distraction stimulus competes with bottom-up procedure-related afferent input for 
representation in the central nervous system.  Unlike the bottom-up appraisal of 
sensory (pain or distraction) input, in the proposed model of imagery, the child’s sense 
of self or ‘reality’ is constructed within top-down neural pathways and mechanisms in 
the brain. 
 
Conceptually, both at cognitive and neurophysiological levels, distraction and 
imagery are not the same.  Cognitively, distraction tasks tend to involve a ‘competing 
story’ that the child has to make sense of in a largely ‘passive’ way.  The child may be 
actively construing either the pain or the distraction task but the child’s essential task is 
to attend to one or the other.  Should the child attend to the ‘pain story’ there is little to 
‘call’ her back to the distraction task other than a directive from a third party.  If the 
distraction is constant or no longer novel, then it may fail as a ‘competing story’ as the 
child loses interest.  If this happens, the ‘competing story’ may no longer grasp the 
child’s attention.   In contrast, to this is imagery where the constant interaction between 
the child and the guide affords every opportunity for full engagement.  The child 
actively constructs and attends to her ‘own story’.  The child’s imagery, her ‘own story’ 
becomes the central focus for the child and for the person guiding the imagery.   
 
In imagery, a high degree of engagement with the child is maintained by a 
‘guide and be guided by the child’ approach to the child’s imagery.  The person guiding 
the imagery has usually constructed his or her own, often detailed, version of the 
child’s imagery.  Even after the procedure, the child’s imagery affords an opportunity 
for further engagement, unlike distraction techniques, which tend to cease at the end of 
the procedure.  The child’s description of her imagery often initiates discussion and 
interest from those present.  The content of the child’s imagery can be intriguing for the 
parents, nurses and doctors.  Sometimes a nurse or a doctor will exclaim, “I was 
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following what you were describing, and I was imagining …”, or “That was amazing, 
while you (the child) were talking, I felt as if I was …” Such comments, particularly 
from a ‘powerful’ health professional, can be extremely uplifting for a child.   
 
Distraction techniques do not tend to elicit the same level of post-procedural 
interest and interaction with the child.  Worse still, is the biomedical procedure-
oriented approach where the child is removed or the health professional bolts from the 
procedure room as soon as possible.  The immediate post-procedure period is important 
because this is when the child will reflect on the procedure, and from a Personal 
Construct perspective, new constructs will be formulated and existing ones can be 
reconstrued.  In the case of repeated procedures, the implications are clear.  Post-
procedural reinforcement of control and coping, together with encouragement and 
praise are extremely important.  The child can choose to do imagery again or 
sometimes the child reaches a point where he or she says, “No, this time I might just 
…” and perhaps uses a distraction technique, which is an excellent outcome, because 
the child is in control. 
 
A summary of the comparison between imagery and distraction is presented in 
Table 7.1 
 
Table 7.1 
A Constructivist Comparison of the Characteristics of Imagery and Distraction 
 IMAGERY DISTRACTION 
Neural Processing Top-down Bottom-up 
Focus of attention Intrinsic Extrinsic 
Role Active Passive 
Attendant task ‘Own story’ ‘Competing story’ 
Cognitive Process Construing Appraisal 
Engagement Participant, two-way Observer, one-way 
Reality / Sense of Self Imagery related Procedure related 
Range of Choice Individual, Open Limited to distractor 
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The obvious superordinate factor differentiating imagery and distraction in the 
above comparison is how consciousness is typically defined – Imagery in the 
constructivist model, and distraction in the traditional sensory-appraisal approach.  The 
following section develops the concepts in the above comparison by considering 
imagery, distraction and consciousness within the constructivist position. 
  
A Constructivist View of Distraction, Imagery and Consciousness  
A distractor, within the traditional bottom-up, sensory – appraisal model is a stimulus 
that competes with pain stimuli for attention and a place in consciousness.  The ability 
to ‘be distracted’, in this model, depends upon the extent to which attention is diverted 
and how long the shift can be maintained.  Conversely, within the constructivist 
perspective, the ability to be distracted is largely a function of how one constructs the 
‘distractor’ rather than the specific qualities of the distractor. Certainly, what one 
person finds distracting, another might find irritating, annoying or frustrating.  With 
this in mind, rather than attempting to find the ‘best’ distraction technique, a more 
fruitful point to consider is what aspects of the physical and social environment in 
which distraction occurs are most likely to encourage active construction of the 
distractor. 
 
If a technique involves a health professional, for example, blowing bubbles, 
then, more than anything it is the approach of the health professional that matters.  
Consider the manner in which a magician performs tricks for a group of children, 
compared to an adult audience, and the extent to which it is the trick, or the magician, 
that is captivating.  In Chapter 5 the notion of drawing on the ability to construe as a 
child construes was raised as an important factor in communicating with children.  The 
point is, there is more to using bubbles as a distractor than simply blowing through the 
device.  Undoubtedly, there is a marked difference between the health professional who 
blows bubbles at the child, and one who says, “Lets see if we can land a bubble on 
Mum’s nose.  Ah look!  There is one, right on the end of Mum’s nose! Lets see if Mum 
can land one on your nose.”  
 
This example illustrates that it is often not the features of the distracting stimuli 
that are critical, as one would expect in a bottom-up, sensory – appraisal model, but the 
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manner in which the child construes the stimuli.  More importantly, this example shows 
that often there is a ‘joint’ construction of the distraction in which the child and parent 
attend to, and make meaningful, features of the environment unrelated to the painful 
procedure.  On other occasions, the child may have to work with others not actually 
present to jointly construct the alternative reality – the production team of a cartoon, for 
instance.  On a few occasions, the child may devise all the necessary aspects of the 
reality him or her self. 
 
Clearly, the constructivist perspective on distraction and imagery forces us to 
address the concepts of awareness, consciousness and reality directly because each 
implies a shift in awareness, being conscious of something at the expense of another, 
perhaps an ‘altered consciousness’ and in constructivist terms, a construed shift in 
reality.  In the previous chapter, consciousness was defined in terms of a phenomenon 
that emerges from a range of brain activities and that consciousness is represented in 
the reality of the moment.  In writing on consciousness, Cairns-Smith (1999, p. 38) 
proposed, “… to be conscious is to have feelings and sensations, and emotions and 
moods associated with them.”  Cairns-Smith coined the term ‘Evanescent Self’, “… a 
description of the conscious aspects of the brain’s activities…” (p. 38) as a description 
of the sense of self that is conscious.  ‘Evanescent’ is defined as, “That is on the point 
of vanishing…that quickly vanishes; fleeting…” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 
Little, Fowler, Coulson, Onions, & Friedrichsen, 1991, p. 689).   
 
For Cairns-Smith then, that which is conscious is not permanent, whatever is 
conscious, feelings, sensations and emotions, collectively referred to as qualia, is 
fleeting, on the edge of consciousness and can emerge and fade around consciousness.  
In this way, the Evanescent Self is in a constant state of flux, inextricably linked with 
feelings, sensations and emotions.  Carins-Smith is quick to differentiate between 
‘conscious’ and ‘aware’ by stating that ‘aware’ means to have current information on 
things going on within and around us.  Awareness is not synonymous with 
consciousness because we can be ‘unconsciously aware’ and respond appropriately to 
that of which we are ‘unconsciously aware’.   
 
Greenfield (2000) cites, (as does Cairns-Smith), the phenomenon of ‘blindsight’ 
as an example of being unconsciously aware.  Classically, in blindsight, the subject has 
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lost half the visual field but when, for example, a letter is placed in the blind field and 
the subject is asked to ‘guess’ what the letter is, most times, they ‘guess’ correctly  
(Cairns-Smith, 1999; Greenfield, 2000).  Awareness cannot be the same as 
consciousness if we can be ‘unconsciously aware’.  Greenfield gives a more familiar 
example of being unconsciously aware and effecting an appropriate response as in a 
professional tennis player who successfully returns a ball served at a speed of 120 mph 
(193 kph).  Greenfield points out, “… it takes a full 500 milliseconds for ‘you’ to 
become aware [conscious] of what is going on.” and, the tennis player who receives the 
serve, “… has under 400 milliseconds to work out where the ball is going to land.” (p. 
182).   
 
For Cairns-Smith, ‘thought’ is no more of a determinant of consciousness than 
awareness because like awareness, we are continuously processing unconscious 
thoughts. 
  
Indeed most of the time, we operate intuitively, making judgements and 
arriving at conclusions without quite knowing why.  … Most of us are also 
familiar with occasions in which the solution to some problem comes to us, 
fully formed, after a period when we have been consciously thinking about 
something else.  (Cairns-Smith, 1996, p. 185) 
 
The implication of this for distraction techniques is that we do not have to 
contend only with what the child is consciously thinking and aware of, we must also 
consider the impact of unconscious thought and what he or she is ‘unconsciously aware 
of’ during a procedure.  In Cairns-Smith’s terms, this is the domain of the ‘Greater 
Self,’ which is unlike the immediate and short-term Evanescent Self.  The Greater Self, 
“is the more permanent self embodied in that great unconscious part of our inner 
model…” (p. 251), and, “… the computing aspects of the brain’s activity…” (p. 38).  
The ‘computing aspects of the brain’s activity’ encompasses the neurons, synapses and 
interrelated brain regions.  As for the likelihood of a single seat of ‘consciousness’ or 
‘Evanescent Self’, consciousness theorists (Baars, 1996, 1997, 1999; Cairns-Smith, 
1996, 1999; Crick & Koch, 2000; Flohr, 2000; Greenfield, 2000; Hardcastle, 2000; 
Posner & Rothbart, 1998; Roth, 2000) hold that this is extremely unlikely to exist.  The 
phenomenon of consciousness is generally accepted to be a something that emerges 
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from, and involves, multiple brain regions, the closest approximation involves the 
‘working memory’ structures and pathways outlined in Chapter 6.  The ‘things’, of 
which we are consciously aware, are a multitude of qualia.  What is important in terms 
of this thesis is the interplay and relatedness of brain regions involved in constructing 
and experiencing these qualia. 
 
Neurophysiological Correlates of the Constructivist Model 
Considering the proposed neural basis of distraction in relation to pain, we can develop 
these ideas further.  Brain scanning techniques have been applied to investigate 
distraction and well as imagery.  Petrovic, Peterson, Ghatan, Stone-Elandar and Ingvar 
(2000) used the cold pressor test to experimentally induce pain in subjects while 
engaging in a cognitive distraction task, a maze test.  At the same time, active brain 
areas were identified with PET scanning sensitive to increased regional cerebral blood 
flow (rCBF).  Petrovic et al. reported that the cold pressor test evoked significant 
activity in the contralateral primary sensory cortex (S1), and bilaterally in the 
somatosensory association areas (including S2), the ACC (anterior cingulate cortex) 
and the mid-insula.  These regions are classically activated during the conscious 
experience of pain (Derbyshire & Jones, 1998; Ploghaus, Tracey, Gati, Clare, Menon, 
Matthews, & Rawlins, 1999; Price 1999).  They are also working memory structures 
(Baars, 1996; Baddeley, 1993; LeDoux, 1998; Phaf & Wolters, 1997; Schachter, 1991).  
If consciousness is taken to be related to the ‘working’ aspect of working memory then 
part of the conscious experience of pain is expressed, and represented, in increased 
activity in the working memory structures. 
 
The activity in the somatosensory association areas and periaqueductal 
gray/midbrain were significantly modified, i.e. relatively decreased, when the 
subjects were also performing the maze task.  The altered activity was 
accompanied with significantly lower ratings of pain during the cognitive task.  
In contrast, lateral orbitofrontal regions showed a relative increase of activity 
during pain combined with the maze task as compared to only pain, which 
suggests the possibility of the involvement of the frontal cortex in modulation 
of regions processing pain.  (p. 19).  No significant activation was observed in 
left S1 [primary sensory cortex] for the hand  (p. 23) 
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The pattern of brain activity associated with the pain stimulus observed by 
Petrovic et al., the contralateral primary sensory cortex (S1), to somatosensory 
association areas, and on to the ACC (anterior cingulate cortex) and mid-insula 
conforms to the classic bottom-up, sensory – appraisal model.  Activity in the 
association areas, in this model is subject to what is coming ‘up’ from the primary 
sensory area and activity in the association areas then feeds the ACC and together this 
activity emerges as ‘consciousness’. 
 
However, not all their data fitted a simple bottom-up process.  For instance, if 
activity in the PAG had increased, then this would suggest activation of the 
downstream inhibitory system and blockade of the bottom-up nociceptive afferents at 
the dorsal horn (closing the gate).  However, this mechanism was not supported 
because Petrovic et al. found decreased activity in the PAG.  This focuses discussion of 
the effects in the brain, rather than the dorsal horn. 
 
Another interesting and complicating feature of this study with regard to the 
brain effects of distraction during pain, was the decrease in activity in the 
somatosensory association areas and no significant activation in the primary sensory 
cortex.  Petrovic et al. point out that it was not possible to determine whether the 
noxious signals were modulated at the cortical or subcortical levels or a combination of 
the two.  Certainly, the decrease in activity in the association areas coupled with 
increased activity in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex suggests top-down modulation of 
bottom-up signals.  These areas are working memory structures.  The cognitively 
complex task may have placed greater demands on working memory and higher 
regions in terms of completing the task.  This in turn may have invoked the top-down 
modulation described by Mesulam (1998).  Such a top-down modulation may explain 
the following, a recent review on the cognitive modulation of pain.  Petrovic and Ingvar 
(2002) said: 
 
… the ACC may be divided into a caudal region, showing increased activity 
during pain per se, an adjacent part preferentially involved in general attention 
and a rostral region involved in emotional processing.  When the activities 
induced by pain modulation are plotted on a map of the ACC, it is apparent 
that these increases reside in the emotional sub-region.  (p. 2) 
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One factor that must be considered in interpreting the results of brain scans in 
relation to experimentally induced pain is that the pain is qualitatively very different to 
procedural pain in children.  For example, the lack of activity in the association areas in 
the Petrovic et al. study could be related to the fact that the subjects were volunteers 
who had consented to participate in the study and the pain stimulus was induced using 
the cold pressor test.  This is very different to a terrified resistant child undergoing a 
medical procedure.  The implication is that further research on the activity of brain 
regions in distraction and in imagery, involving children who are undergoing medical 
procedures is needed to determine the functional areas within a clinical rather than 
experimental context.  
 
This form of research, while still in its early stages, is beginning to map out the 
cortical and subcortical areas that might be involved in the top-down modulation of 
pain and associated emotions.  The details are only beginning to emerge but this work 
nonetheless encourages us to examine further the nature of distracting stimuli and their 
observable effects.  This research can be pursued alongside the study of the 
neurophysiological mechanisms that will mediate the effects of the distractors. 
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Summary 
This chapter began with an overview of the many interpretations of ‘imagery’ in the 
literature and their application in the management of procedural pain in children.  The 
‘imagery’ literature reflects a diverse range of techniques and a lack of clarity; some 
studies describe ‘imagery’ as a ‘distraction’ and others as ‘hypnosis’.  The lack of 
specificity makes it difficult to draw conclusions on the efficacy of imagery described 
in these studies.  The problem is compounded by combined (relaxation, music, 
behavioural, pharmacological) interventions where the effects of multiple independent 
variables are not isolated.  Despite these concerns, some studies have demonstrated 
positive effects of these interventions with regard to reducing procedural pain in 
children.   
 
The second section in this chapter reviewed studies that have investigated 
various distraction techniques in the management of procedural pain in children.  It is 
generally held that if a child’s attention can be distracted during a painful procedure 
then pain, and subsequently distress, will be less.  However, results regarding the effect 
of distraction on pain are mixed.  Close examination of the reported research suggests 
that the positive effects may be more on fear (anxiety is the common measure) than on 
pain per se. 
 
The aim of the final section in this chapter was to differentiate between the two 
approaches reviewed and investigated in this thesis, namely imagery and distraction.  It 
was argued that differences exist at cognitive and neurophysiological levels.  
Essentially, distraction techniques compete with procedure-related sensory input for the 
child’s attention.  Therapeutically, it is hoped that the child will attend more to the 
distraction than to the painful procedure.  Conceptually, this presents the child with a 
‘pain story’ and a ‘competing story’.  In both stories, the child is a passive observer of 
bottom-up sensory input.  In the case of an ‘enchanting’ distraction, or in imagery, 
however, the child actively constructs her ‘own story’ that is, her own reality and, 
unlike the bottom-up appraisal of sensory input consistent with passive distraction, an 
emotionally engaging distraction, or imagery is constructed within the top-down neural 
networks in the brain.  A key issue regarding distraction techniques is how the child 
constructs the distraction.  If the child becomes involved, or engages with, and is even 
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amazed at whatever the distraction is, then, a qualitative shift occurs and the experience 
is more than simple bottom-up distraction.  Under these circumstances, the child would 
be invoking the top-down processes, a ‘story of her own’.   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
STUDY ONE: CARTOON DISTRACTION 
 
This chapter describes the first of two studies undertaken in this thesis.  
The aim of the first study was to investigate the effect of watching a 
cartoon as a form of distraction on fear and pain in children undergoing 
venepuncture.  The method and results are presented and discussed in 
this chapter but the findings are further discussed in relation to the 
second, the imagery study, in Chapter 11 of the thesis, Discussion.  
 
Background 
Much research into procedural pain and fear/anxiety has been concerned with the 
overall effects of psychological interventions (Arts, Abu-Saad, Champion, Crawford, 
Fisher, Juniper, & Ziegler, 1994; Broome, Lillis, McGahee, & Bates, 1992; Carlson, 
Broome, & Vessey, 2000; Cohen, Blount, Cohen, Sachen, & Zaff, 1999; Kildow, 2000; 
Kleiber, Craft-Rosenberg, & Harper, 2001; Kleiber & Harper, 1999; Kuttner, 1997; 
Manne et al., 1990; Powers, 1999; Ryan, 1989; Seers & Carroll, 1998; Sparks, 2001; 
Vessey, Carlson, & McGill, 1994).  Less research  (Chapman & Nakamura, 1989; 
Petrovic et al., 2000) has been concerned with the psychological processes by means of 
which children can experience less pain and fear during a medical procedure.  The 
focus in this thesis is on the means by which distraction, relaxation and imagery alter 
the experience of procedural pain and fear in children.  The first empirical study 
focussed on distraction using cartoons while the second examined relaxation and 
guided imagery in tandem.  Both studies attempted to address the methodological 
failings that, regrettably, have plagued the area and which will be considered in depth 
in relation to the first study on distraction.  However, before embarking on these issues, 
it is worth re-emphasising the manner in which ‘distraction’ is perceived in this thesis 
and how distraction relates to relaxation and imagery. 
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A Constructivist Perspective on Distraction 
Our consciousness, reality, or ‘sense of self’ in a sensorial world is viewed in this thesis 
within the constructivist paradigm as a phenomenon that is constructed and emerges in 
the brain at two levels: firstly, at a ‘primitive’ passive level, and secondly, at a more 
complex, active level.  At the heart of Kelly’s Psychology of Personal Constructs is the 
notion that we actively construct the realities to which we respond (Kelly, 1955).  The 
constructive essence of Kelly’s approach is a constant theme throughout this thesis, but 
the always-active notion of construing is arguably overemphasised in Kelly’s theory.  
In the spirit of constructivist theory, if we actively construe, then, we can also shift to 
the opposite pole and ‘passively’ construe.  One could argue that, at times, when we are 
not focussed on anything in particular, we are passively construing our world.  In this 
‘passive mode’ of construing, our sense of self in the world is ‘as if’ we are receivers of 
sensory input, as if, we are functioning in a bottom-up sensory appraisal manner.  
Clearly, the view, captured by Greenfield (2000) in the neuroscience literature, is that 
the brain is more than a sponge to the senses, but at times, the apparent passivity of our 
construing gives the impression that we are very much in a ‘receiving’ mode.  
Arguably, when we are tightly construed around the ‘passive’ pole and not actively 
construing much at all, it is unlikely that we will be distracted because by definition, to 
be distracted requires that we are distracted from ‘something’.  Where all of this comes 
into play is in considering construing as a bipolar passive – active construct, of which 
distraction is an element, and in considering how distraction techniques relate to the 
other two interventions under investigation – relaxation and imagery. 
 
In this thesis, a distinction is drawn between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ construing.  
Where passive construing is a resting mode, requiring less effort and energy, active 
construing is demanding: it requires effort and considerable energy.  An analogy exists 
with the traditional subconscious – conscious dichotomy in the sensory – appraisal 
paradigm, where the notion that we are not always aware of all sensory input is openly 
accepted (Greenfield, 2000).  Similarly, within the sensory – appraisal paradigm, we 
can choose to attend to some things and not others.  In daily life, we move back and 
forth between passive and active modes of construing our world.  A prolonged period 
of intensely active construing, a mentally ‘busy day’ can be incredibly tiring.  For 
arguments sake, suppose the manager’s parting words were, “If I don’t get this problem 
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sorted, I will have to ring you at home tonight”.  After such a day, we might long for 
some time around the passive pole.  For example, on calling into a video shop on the 
way home, we will choose the familiar, ‘golden oldie’ and avoid the new and intense 
thriller.  As we watch, we notice (passively construct) the dog barking outside, and the 
children arguing upstairs but are content, in the passive mode, at least, until the 
telephone rings.  Suddenly, we are actively construing the sound of the phone in an 
intensely negative manner. 
 
This view of passive and active construing is akin to Fiske and Neuberg’s 
model of social cognition (cited in Augoustinos & Walker, 1995).  In their model Fiske 
and Neuberg posit a continuum from category based informal processing to 
individuating data based processing.  The former is more likely, when, what the person 
is dealing with is uncomplicated and irrelevant, and the process is “automatic and 
sometimes unconscious”  (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995, p. 46).  Individuating based 
data processing occurs when the person is confronted by a novel situation that requires 
careful attention. 
 
Similarly, in a medical procedure, the idea is not to have the child simply living 
the, often accepted, passive role, but actively construing, engaging in, identifying with, 
and ultimately, in Plutchik’s terms, being amazed by the distraction.  This raises the 
dimensions of balance and focus; balance between active and passive construing, and 
focus on the procedure, versus focus on the distraction. 
 
The child who is about to have a medical procedure will be actively construing 
some aspects of her reality and passively construing other aspects.  This is a crucial 
moment in terms of how the child might construct the procedure and it emphasises the 
importance (and effects) of pre-procedural play, familiarization with the environment 
and the approach of the health professionals.  Most damaging, is an emphasis on 
compliance and, ‘sit there and don’t move’, from the health professional, because it 
reinforces the child’s sense of helplessness, powerlessness and fear.  Under these 
circumstances, the child is virtually encouraged to actively construe the frightening 
aspects of the procedure and passively construing everything else, including the 
clinician’s attempt to introduce a distractor.  In cognitive psychology, this is referred to 
as selective attentional bias, whereby an anxious or fearful individual is likely to attend 
  
 
173  
selectively to threat-related stimuli (Eysenck & Keane, 2001).  In Fiske and Neuberg’s 
terms, it is developing an individuating schema for the procedure.  If this is the case, 
then in order for the child to actively construct the distractor, the fear must be 
reconstrued.  This is where the approach of the health professional is all-important.  
The aim then, in employing a ‘distraction technique’, is to allow and encourage a 
switch in focus of the child’s active – passive construing, whereby the child actively 
construes the distractor and passively construes the procedure. 
 
  When a frightened child is presented with a distractor in the procedure room, 
he or she is very much in the ‘here and now’, actively construing the fearful aspects 
and passively construing the distractor.  If a degree of rapport and trust can be 
established with the child then the child may begin to construe the distraction in a more 
active manner, becoming involved in the distraction.  Arguably, a distractor becomes a 
distraction when it is actively construed.  When this happens, the process, including the 
interaction between the health professional or the parent, and the child becomes a 
‘distraction technique’.  For example, in using a pop-up book to distract a child during 
a painful procedure, the child may begin by passively construing the distractor, the 
book, pages, colours, figures and so on, and actively construing some other aspect of 
the environment.  The aim then, in employing a distraction as a  ‘distraction technique’, 
is to reverse this, whereby the child actively construes the distractor and passively 
construes the procedure.  We know, as discussed in the previous chapter, that in some 
instances, this is possible and that this type of distraction can be effective in reducing 
procedural pain (Kuttner, 1986, 1989). 
 
Research on Cartoons as Distraction   
Comparatively few studies have used cartoons as forms of distraction during medical 
procedures but among those that have are Cohen, Blount and Panopoulos, (1997) and 
Mason, Johnson, and Wooley (1999).  Cohen et al. investigated the effect of nurse and 
parent coaching of a child to watch a cartoon video compared to standard treatment of 
children undergoing routine immunizations.  Reported measures of distress and self-
report of pain were significantly higher in the control condition compared to the 
intervention conditions.  In a small study of eight children, Mason et al. measured 
distress but not pain and found that a ‘short story’ was more effective than a cartoon in 
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reducing procedural distress.  There is some evidence then that cartoons can distract 
children though the effects are generally limited to emotional tone and only 
occasionally to the painful sensory component of the experience.  In addition, a variety 
of methodological issues have emerged from these, and other studies in distraction 
(Broome et al., 1992; Kildow, 2000; Manne, Redd, Jacobsen, Gorfinkle, Schorr, & 
Rapkin, 1990; Mason et al., 1999; McCarthy, Cool, & Hanrahan, 1998; Powers, 1999; 
Schiff, Holtz, Peterson, & Rakusan, 2001) specifically the nature of the procedure, the 
purity of the distraction technique, sample sizes and assignment to conditions, and 
measures used.  Each of these requires more consideration. 
 
Examination of the procedures used in distraction studies suggest much of the 
research involves the use of combinations of interventions – ‘cognitive behavioural 
therapies’, distraction, relaxation and imagery – where it is not possible to identify the 
effects of the specific elements of an intervention (Broome et al., 1992; McCarthy et 
al., 1998; Powers, 1999; Schiff et al., 2001).  This concern was overcome in this study 
by limiting the distraction task to a single intervention.  The distraction was not only 
confined to a cartoon video, the same video was used in all cases.  Also evident in a 
number of studies was the small sample size, ranging from 2 to 14 participants, but 
seldom was it evident whether randomisation of participants to experimental or control 
conditions occurred (Broom et al., 1992; Hoffmann, Doctor, Patterson, Carrougher, & 
Furness, 2000; Kildow, 2000, Manne et al., 1990; Mason et al., 1999; McCarthy et al., 
1998).  This study attempted to ensure some degree of methodological rigor with 
random allocation to experimental and control conditions from a sufficiently large 
sample to allow meaningful analysis of the measures.  The final key methodological 
issue concerns measures.  Distress and anxiety are common measures in distraction 
studies, some studies have incorporated a self-report of fear, but few have incorporated 
a comprehensive range of measures (Broome, Lillis, McGahee & Bates, 1992; Carlson, 
Broome & Vessey, 2000; Carpenter, 1990; Sparks, 2001; von Baeyer, Carlson, & 
Webb, 1997; Wells, 1998).  Given the sensory and emotional nature of pain, a separate 
measurement of pain, with an emphasis on what was felt in the arm during the 
venepuncture, and a self-report of procedural fear were considered important dependent 
variables in this and the second study.   
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Measuring the Pain Experience 
As has been amply discussed, issues surrounding the quantification of phenomena such 
as pain and fear are complex.  It is evident that the selection of appropriate measures is 
critical in examining the effectiveness of distraction and imagery.  This discussion on 
measures begins with the notion of what is being measured in a ‘pain measure’ and 
when it is important to try to differentiate between the sensory and emotional 
components of pain.  This is followed with a brief discussion of the issues relevant to 
the measures employed in this, and the second study 
 
 Although pain is defined as a sensory and emotional experience, there is a 
common tendency to focus on the ‘sensory’ component.  If ‘emotion’ is considered, 
then it is usually couched in the term ‘affect’.  For example, the word ‘fear’ does not 
appear in the index to the IASP publication, Measurement of pain in infants and 
children (Finley & McGrath, 1998) and next to Emotion is ‘See Affect’.  When asked, 
“How much did it hurt?  The person asking the question is usually asking about 
severity of the sensation and the respondent answers in terms of the intensity of the 
sensation. However, particularly with regard to procedural pain in children, the 
response is often emotionally laden, at least to some degree.  Thus, it is possible that 
self-report measures are skewed towards the ‘sensation’.  Behavioural measures of 
pain, on the other hand, provide a pain score but because some of the observed ‘pain’ 
behaviours are also ‘fear’ behaviours, particularly in children, for example, crying, 
grimacing, verbal request for support, tension, shivering, restraint, and kicking, it is 
possible that the behavioural measures skew towards the emotion.  Indeed, as McGrath 
(1998) points out, four of the behaviours in the Observational Scale of Behavioral 
Distress (OSBD) are common to the ‘pain’ scale, the Children’s Hospital of Eastern 
Ontario Pain Scale (CHEOPS).  In sum, if the aim is a measure of  ‘pain,’ and pain is a 
composite of sensation and emotion, whether a measure leans towards one or the other 
is not particularly relevant.  If, however, one is wishing to differentiate between the 
‘sensory’ and ‘emotional’ (fear in this case), components of pain then the sensitivity of 
the measure to one or the other component is relevant.  This implies the need to 
measure fear and pain separately. 
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Other problematic features of the measurement process concern the age of the 
children and the nature of the procedure.  Measurement of pain and fear becomes 
increasingly difficult with younger children (Champion, Goodenough, von Baeyer, & 
Thomas, 1998; Goodenough, Champion, Laubreaux, Tabah, & Kampel, 1998), 
however, visual analogue scales have been found to be valid and reliable tools in 
measuring pain in children over 5 to 6 years (Mathews, McGrath, & Pigeon, 1993).  
They are commonly used in research and clinical practice to measure pain in children.  
Champion, Goodenough, von Baeyer and Thomas (1998) provide an excellent review 
of self-report measurement of pain in children and conclude that “Most children 5 years 
of age and older can reliably use visual analogue and faces scales to rate their pain.”  
(p. 153).  In the light of this review, it seemed appropriate to incorporate self-report 
measures for both pain and fear in children but considerable care was taken about the 
age of children given each measure. 
  
It appears that context and type of pain may be important factors influencing the 
validity of behavioural measures of pain.  Beyer, McGrath and Berde (1990) compared 
self-report and CHEOPS scores in children post surgery and found discordance 
between the two measures.  However, they concluded that the CHEOPS might be less 
sensitive to pain if the child has been in pain for several hours as the pain behaviours 
may habituate as pain persists, and that postoperative assessment of pain should not 
rely solely on behavioural tools such as CHEOPS.  Similarly, with regard to 
behavioural measures of pain, Mathews, McGrath and Pigeon (1993, p. 100) state, 
“Reliability and validity are highest when measuring short, sharp pain (e.g., from 
injection or lumbar puncture)”.  Given the acute procedural nature of the pain under 
investigation in this study, the behavioural measure, the CHEOPS, was deemed 
appropriate for the younger children. 
 
 A final methodological issue that plagues research is the procedure that induces 
pain and fear.  Venepuncture is a common procedure performed on children to obtain a 
sample of blood for analysis.  Rather than using a variety of painful procedures, as in 
an emergency department, the procedure in this, and the second study, was 
standardized to a venepuncture so that all children underwent the same procedure.  
Human research ethics committees would not allow researchers to inflict pain on 
children merely for the purpose of research but inflicting some pain on children in the 
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course of treatment is considered inevitable and therefore ‘ethical’.  Consequently, 
researchers use children who undergo venepuncture as part of treatment to investigate 
paediatric pain, evaluate measurement tools and investigate effects of pharmacologic 
and psychological interventions on pain (Bournaki, 1997; Caty, Ellerton, & Richie, 
1997; Hodgins & Lander, 1997; Humphrey, Boon, van Linden van den Heuvell, & van 
de Wiel, 1992; Lander, Fowler-Kerry, & Oberle, 1992; Van Cleve, Johnson, & Pothier, 
1996).  In reviewing the research into pain and venepuncture, Lander et al. (1992), 
concluded that the technician, time taken to perform the procedure and volume of blood 
did not contribute to the prediction of children’s pain.  They did find that age and 
anxiety were significant predictors of pain and, not surprisingly, concluded that 
venepuncture pain can be recommended for the study of issues in children’s pain. 
 
In summary, there were two broad aims in the first study, to examine the effect 
of a single uncontaminated intervention, cartoon distraction, and to do so in a rigorous 
fashion, addressing a range of methodological concerns of previous studies.   
 
Two hypotheses were formulated to address the stated aims.  Firstly, it was 
predicted that audiovisual cartoon distraction would reduce the child’s perception of 
the pain associated with venepuncture, and secondly, that audiovisual cartoon 
distraction during venepuncture would reduce the child’s fear associated with the 
procedure.  In was also expected that pain and fear would be strongly and positively 
correlated.  This study also provided an opportunity to explore correlations between 
behavioural and self-report measures of pain in children. 
  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred English-speaking children, 57 boys and 43 girls aged three to 16 years 
were drawn from a convenience sample of children who presented to a Pathology Out 
Patients department of a large metropolitan children’s hospital for venepuncture.  The 
hospital was chosen because of the accessibility to large numbers of children 
undergoing venepuncture as a standard painful procedure. Children requiring a 
venepuncture (some tests would require only a fingerprick) were invited to participate 
in this study unless excluded on the following criteria.  
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Application of topical anaesthesia.  A small number of children were excluded 
because they presented with topical anaesthesia applied before the venepuncture.  
Topical anaesthesia will alter the sensory component of pain. 
 
Involvement in other research at the hospital.  Parents were asked if their child 
was involved in any research study at the hospital.  Approximately two children were 
excluded on this criterion, as per the requirements of the hospital Human Research 
Ethics Committee. 
 
Ability to communicate in English – child and parent.  Surprisingly, given the 
diverse range of cultures represented in the city, only one child was excluded because 
the parent was not able to communicate in English.  As translation services were not 
available in this study, informed consent could not be obtained in this case.  
  
Pre-existing pain, or a child unaccompanied by a parent or significant other 
(eg grandparent).  As it turned out, no children were excluded on these criteria but both 
were stringently applied. It would be unethical to involve a child in a research project 
without the consent of the parent or guardian, and, methodologically, inclusion of the 
parent or significant other would help negate any potential separation anxiety effects. 
 
Materials 
Cartoon Distractor 
A single cartoon was selected rather than several, to ensure consistency of the 
intervention.  Copyright was a limiting factor in selecting a cartoon.  One major 
distributor would not allow their cartoons to be viewed in a hospital.  The child, parent, 
nurse and researcher in a small blood collecting room were deemed a ‘public viewing’ 
and a breach of copyright.  Further enquiries were made with another major distributor 
of very well known cartoons, who stated that children in hospitals watch their cartoons 
on video frequently.  They allowed their product to be used in the research with the 
provision that the cartoon would not be named in any report.  It is for this reason that 
the actual name of the cartoon used in the study is withheld. 
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Measures 
The two dependent variables investigated in this study in relation to distraction were 
pain and fear.  Given the age range, both behavioural and self-report measures of pain 
were used; fear was not measured in the very young children (3 and 4 year-olds).  
 
Pain 
Two measures of pain were used in this study depending on the child’s age.  
The Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario Pain Scale (CHEOPS), a behavioural pain 
tool (Gauvain-Piquard, Rodary, Rezvani, & Lemerle, 1987) was used over self-report 
in the children aged 3 to 4 years.  The tool has established validity and reliability 
(Mathews, McGrath, & Pigeon, 1993) and its use in pain research in children continues 
(Galinkin et al., 2000; McCarty, Mencio, Walker, & Green, 2000).    
 
In this study, VAS pain scores were obtained from children aged 5 years and 
older.  A number of Visual Analogue Scales are available for use with children to 
measure pain.  The one used in this, and the second study was the Astra® 
Pharmaceuticals plastic pain ruler with a sliding blue curser.  This tool was chosen over 
a line drawn on a piece of paper because of its novelty and ease of use in the clinical 
setting.   On one side are the two faces from the Wong-Baker Faces rating scale (Wong 
& Baker, 1988) the ‘zero pain’ face and the ‘level 4’ pain face.  On the reverse side is a 
scale in millimetres from zero - 100.  ‘NO PAIN’ is written under the smiling face at 
the left and on the reverse side corresponds to zero.  ‘WORST PAIN EVER’ is written 
under the grimacing face on the right, which, on the reverse side, corresponds to the 
maximum score of 100.  The ‘Worst Pain Ever’ face (face 5) on the Wong-Baker Faces 
Scale has tears falling.  Astra® selected ‘face 4’ on their pain ruler in an attempt to 
improve the validity of the tool (tears could easily be interpreted as sadness not pain).  
The Astra® tool could however be interpreted by a young child as a measure of Happy 
versus Sad.  If for example the researcher said, “I want you to move this blue thing 
along to tell me how bad it was”, the child may rate on any number of constructs: 
Happy – sad, good – bad, pleasant – unpleasant.  The validity of this tool is dependent 
upon good communication at the levels described above – transmission of information, 
reception and understanding.   
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Fear 
Hester’s Poker Chip tool was developed in the late 1970s to measure pain in 
young children (Hester, 1979; Hester, Foster, & Kristensen, 1990).  The recommended 
age range is 4 to 8 years.  This tool has well-established validity and reliability and is 
widely used to measure pain in children in research (Gharaibeh & Abu-Saad, 2002; 
Hester et al., 1998; Johnston, Stevens & Arbess, 1993; West et al., 1994).  Cross-
cultural validity is strong (Gharaibeh & Abu-Saad, 2002; Romsing, Hertel, Moller-
Sonnergaard, & Rasmussen, 1996).  There are two versions of the tool to measure pain.  
The first consists of four red poker chips where each poker chip represents a ‘piece of 
hurt’.  The second version has a white poker chip and four red ones.  The red poker 
chips represent ‘pieces of hurt,’ as in the first version, but in the second version, the 
white poker chip represents ‘no hurt’.  When the second version is used, the poker 
chips are laid out in a horizontal line in front of the child with the white poker chip on 
the left.  An explanation is given to the child that the white one means ‘no hurt’, the 
first poker chip next to the white one is one ‘piece of hurt’ the second one is more hurt, 
‘two pieces of hurt’ and so on up to the most hurt, ‘four pieces of hurt’.  The child 
picks up or points to the appropriate poker chip to signify the level of pain or hurt 
experienced. 
 
This tool was simply adapted to measure fear whereby the white chip was no 
fear or not scary. The first chip is one ‘piece of fear’ or ‘scariness’ or ‘a little bit 
scared’, the second, two ‘pieces of fear’ or ‘scariness’ and so on up to the fourth poker 
chip’ which was the most amount of fear or ‘really… really (sic) scary’ or ‘most 
afraid’.  This idea was canvassed on the PEDIATRIC-PAIN discussion group 
(PEDIATRIC-PAIN@ac.dal.ca) and was supported by researchers familiar with the 
tool.  When used to measure pain, the recommended upper age is set at 8 years; the 
suggestion being that older children may find the tool childish (Matthews, McGrath, & 
Pigeon, 1993).  However, for older children who may feel awkward about verbalizing 
their level of fear, the instrument allows these children to communicate their level of 
fear in a non-verbal manner by simply picking up a corresponding poker chip and 
handing it to the researcher.  Culturally, as casino gambling is a growth industry in 
Melbourne, the term ‘poker chip’ is likely to be construed as ‘cool’ rather than 
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‘childish’.  Had the tool been introduced as four ‘little red discs and a white one’, older 
children may have construed it as ‘childish’. 
 
Fear was measured in all children aged five and over.  One white chip meaning 
‘no fear’ or ‘not at all scary or frightening’ then four red chips each representing an 
increase in scariness or fear from one to four.  The poker chips were laid out with the 
white one on the left in front of the child.  Each child was asked to rate his or her level 
of fear experienced during the venepuncture by picking up the appropriate poker chip 
and handing it to the researcher.  The respective age ranges of the participants in 
relation to the three measures is summarized in Table 8.1  
 
Table 8.1 
 Breakdown of Measures according to Age 
Measure Age Range (years) N 
CHEOPS – All  3 – 7 54 
 CHEOPS – Only  3 – 4 30 
 CHEOPS – VAS Pain – Poker Chip Fear 5 – 7 23 a 
 VAS Pain – Poker Chip Fear Only  8 – 16 46 
Poker Chip Fear – All  5 – 16 69 
VAS Pain – All  5 – 16 69 
 
Note 
a One five year-old child was extremely distressed after the procedure.  The behavioural 
measure was applied but it was not possible to obtain a self-report (VAS) of pain or a Poker 
Chip fear score.  Hence the sum of rows two and three is one less than the total CHEOPS in the 
first row.   
 
Procedure 
Children accompanied by a parent or significant other presented to the pathology Out 
Patients Department with a request form from a medical practitioner for a blood test.  
The majority of blood tests require a venous sample of blood; this is taken by 
venepuncture and then sent for analysis.  The parent presented to the window, handed 
the nurse the request form, which showed the child’s age and the requested blood test.  
If a child fell within the age of three to 16 years requiring a venepuncture, the 
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researcher was informed and the child and parent were directed to the room in which 
the study was conducted.  At this point, a brief verbal explanation of the project was 
given to the parent and child.  The parent was then given a plain language statement, 
which she or he read.  The parent was asked if there were any queries and the assent of 
the child was sought.  If the parent and child were happy to participate in the study, a 
consent form was reviewed and handed to the parent.  The parent then read the consent 
form; the researcher invited questions.  Any queries were addressed and when the 
parent and researcher were satisfied that a full and thorough understanding of the study 
had been reached, the parent was invited to consent to the participation of her or his 
child in the study by signing the consent form.  The parent retained a copy of the plain 
language statement showing the contact details of the researcher, a Clinical Nurse 
Specialist, Pain Control Service at the Hospital, and the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Ballarat that granted ethical approval of the project.  
The parent was told that any later questions or concerns about any aspect of the project 
could be directed to any one of the three points of contact. 
 
Random Allocation to Groups 
Children were randomly allocated to either the control or experimental condition based 
on odd or even birth date.  That is, the children with an odd birth date were allocated to 
the control group; children with an even birth date were allocated to the experimental 
group.  This procedure would satisfy conventional definitions of randomness, “…that 
there is no known law capable of being expressed in language that correctly describes 
or explains events and their outcomes.”  (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 167). 
 
The Painful Procedure: Venepuncture 
All venepunctures were performed in the child’s arm using a tourniquet and 23-gauge 
butterfly needle.  Topical anaesthetic was not used in any case because at the time the 
study was conducted, that was standard practice in the department.  
 
The children in the control group underwent the venepuncture in the usual 
manner with the nurse performing the procedure whilst chatting with the child.  The 
television mounted to the wall was turned off.  In the experimental group, the children 
underwent the same procedure in the same setting but their attention was directed 
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towards a television mounted to the wall showing the cartoon.  Each child in the 
experimental condition began watching the cartoon with the parent, nurse and 
researcher in the room.  The nurse directed the child’s attention to the cartoon on the 
television.  At a particular point in the cartoon, the nurse placed the tourniquet on the 
child’s arm and performed the venepuncture while directing the child’s attention to the 
cartoon. 
 
A number of parameters relating to the experimental condition were consistent 
between cases.  These included the child occupying the same position in the room for 
each case, sitting at an identical distance from the television, the television volume and 
brightness were the same, and each venepuncture commenced at same point in the 
cartoon. 
 
Immediately after the procedure the researcher said to the children aged five 
and over: 
“I am interested in how scary or frightening that was for you, while you were 
having the blood test.  These Poker Chips tell me about scariness.” 
 
An explanation of the tool was given and each child’s understanding of what 
each Poker Chip represented was confirmed.  The Poker Chips were laid out on the 
bench in front of the child with the White Chip on the left.  The child was then asked to 
pick up the Poker Chip that would tell the researcher how scary or frightening it was 
for the child during the blood test; the white one – not at all scary or frightening then 
from one to four indicating increasing scariness with the fourth chip meaning really 
really (sic) scary.  A fear score was then written on the data sheet.  The tool was easily 
understood even by the younger children.  Only on a couple of occasions were repeated 
explanations required to confirm the child’s comprehension of the tool.   
 
Immediately after measuring fear, each child five and over, was shown the VAS 
and how it worked.  The researcher showed the child how the blue plastic bit slid from 
one end, no pain at all, through gradually increasing amount of pain, up to the end 
which meant a ‘really huge pain, the biggest pain ever’.  The researcher then handed 
the VAS to the child and asked the child to show him how much it hurt in his or her 
arm by moving the blue bit along the groove.  The child then handed the VAS back to 
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the researcher and a score from zero – 100 was entered on the data sheet.  The child 
and parent were then thanked for participating in the study before leaving the 
department.  For children aged 3 to 7 years, as soon as the child and parent left the 
department, the researcher scored the child’s behaviours during the venepuncture on 
the CHEOPS and the score was entered on the data sheet.  In the case of the 
experimental condition, the video was then rewound to the same starting point. 
 
 
Results: Cartoon Study  
To ensure that the random allocation of participants to the two experimental conditions 
had not inadvertently resulted in the unequal distribution of a number of potentially 
confounding factors, one t test and a series of chi-square analyses were performed. 
These analyses examined the extent to which the age, gender of participant, history of 
previous venepuncture, nurse taking the blood, time of day (morning or afternoon) and 
parents present were balanced between the two groups. The distributions are tabulated 
as Appendix B.  The results established that randomisation had been effective and that 
none of the variables was distributed in a manner that could not have occurred by 
chance. 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Data Transformations 
Table 8.2 shows the descriptive statistics for each dependent variable across the whole 
sample.  During preliminary examination, the variables were inspected for significant 
departures from normality.  Two dependent variables – Fear and Pain (VAS) were 
subject to transformation because of significant skew in each case.  The distribution of 
the behavioural (CHEOPS) scores was satisfactory on preliminary inspection and thus 
not subjected to transformation.  It must also be kept in mind that the samples used in 
the CHEOPS analyses were not discrete.  The age range (3 to 16 years) of the sample 
meant that self-report measures could not be administered to all participants.  This 
necessitated the use of a behavioural measurement of pain in the younger children.   
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Table 8.2 
 Descriptive Statistics and Transformations  – Whole Sample 
 Transformation N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
CHEOPSa Nil 54 9.60 2.28 -.115 -1.076 
VAS Painb Log (VAS + 10) 69 1.55 .243 -.020 -.355 
Fearc Log (Poker + 1) 69 .29 .219 -.090 -1.06 
 
Notes 
a The CHEOPS measure was applied to children aged 3 to 7 years. 
b Children aged 5 to 16 years gave a self-report of pain on a VAS. 
c Children aged 5 to 16 years gave a self-report of fear using the Poker Chip Tool   
 
Table 8.3 shows the transformed means and standard deviations of the 
dependent variables for the control and cartoon conditions. The untransformed means 
and standard deviations are shown in Table C-1 (see Appendix C). 
 
Table 8.3 
 Transformed Descriptive Statistics – Control and Cartoon Conditions 
 CONTROL  CARTOON 
 n Mean  SD  n Mean  SD 
Pain – CHEOPS 29 10.66 2.00  25 8.44 2.04 
Pain – VAS 36 1.61 .22  33 1.50 .25 
Fear – Poker Chip 36 .38 .20  33 .20 .19 
 
 
Dependent Variable Analyses 
Though checks had shown age, gender and previous experience of venepuncture were 
equally distributed in the two conditions, the fact that these variables had been shown 
to influence some of the dependent variables (Goodenough, Champion, Laubreaux, 
Tabah, & Kampel, 1998; Goodenough, Thomas, Champion, Perrott, Taplin, von 
Baeyer, & Ziegler, 1999; Manne, Jacobsen, & Redd, 1992) warranted their inclusion as 
covariates. 
 
The effect of cartoon distraction on self reported pain (VAS), approached 
significance F(1,64) = 3.13, p =. 08, η2 = .05.  Behavioural scores were significantly 
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lower in the cartoon distraction condition than in the control condition, F(1,49) = 
13.93, p < .001, η2 = .22.   Fear scores were also significantly lower in the cartoon 
distraction compared to the control condition, F(1,64) = 13.74, p < .001, η2 = .18.   
 
Correlations 
The strongest correlation in this study was between Fear and Pain scores, r(68) = .47, p 
< .001.  The observational measure of pain (CHEOPS) was used in 69 children aged 
three to seven years.  Of the 69 children, a sub-sample, consisting of 23 five to seven 
year-olds rated VAS pain scores CHEOPS pain scores and Poker Chip fear scores.  Self 
reported fear correlated significantly with the CHEOPS scores (r = .45, p = .03) but 
poorly with VAS pain scores, (r  = .27, ns).  The correlation between CHEOPS pain 
scores and VAS pain was weaker than with fear, and only approached significance, r = 
.37, p =. 08.  None of the correlations involving this sub-sample differed significantly. 
 
 
Discussion 
The first hypothesis, that audiovisual cartoon distraction reduces the child’s perception 
of the pain associated with venepuncture, was partially supported by the self-report 
(VAS) measure of pain in children aged six to 16 years.  The hypothesis was supported 
on the behavioural measure (CHEOPS) applied to children aged three to seven years.  
Support for the second hypothesis, that audiovisual cartoon distraction during 
venepuncture reduces the child’s fear associated with the procedure, is more 
compelling.  Fear scores, measured in children aged 5 to 16 years, were significantly 
less in the cartoon distraction compared to the control condition.  Fear was not 
measured in the children aged three and four years so support for the second hypothesis 
is restricted to children aged 5 to 16 years.   
 
In order to reconcile the apparently contradictory findings in relation to pain 
and distraction, it is necessary to explore more fully the measures employed.  Amongst 
the 5 to 7 seven year-olds the three measures: behavioural pain (CHEOPS), self-
reported fear and self-reported (VAS) pain were obtained.  In this sub-sample, it was 
clear that despite its name, the CHEOPS correlated more strongly with self-reported 
fear than with self-reported pain.  This trend in the data is similar to the findings of 
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Beyer, McGrath and Berde (1990), who found discordance between self-reported pain 
and CHEOPS scores and raised concerns about the validity of the CHEOPS in 
measuring postoperative pain.  Despite the view held by Mathews, McGrath, and 
Pigeon (1993) that reliability and validity of the tool are highest in procedural pain, the 
data in this study suggest that in the procedural context, the CHEOPS may be more 
sensitive to fear or distress than it is to pain.  Interestingly, Fradet, McGrath, Kay, 
Adams, and Luke (1990) used the CHEOPS as a measure of distress associated with 
venepuncture in children and then labelled the CHEOPS measure of ‘distress’ as 
‘anxiety’.  In children aged three and four years, it is difficult to say whether the 
CHEOPS measures pain or fear, however, the data in this study, together with the 
concerns raised by Beyer et al. (1990) suggest at times, the CHEOPS may lean towards 
the fear. 
 
In this, the cartoon study, the CHEOPS measure was recorded by the researcher 
immediately after the child and parent had left the department.  The potential for bias in 
the sub-sample is acknowledged because the CHEOPS was recorded after the child had 
rated his or her pain, although it must be stressed that the CHEOPS consists of a 
number of clear and well-defined observations.  Regarding the stronger correlation with 
fear compared to pain in the sub-sample, it is possible, although extremely unlikely, 
that the children confused fear for pain on the Poker Chip Tool while at the same time 
confusing pain on the VAS for something else.  In administering the Poker Chip Tool, 
the word ‘scary’ was used in conjunction with fear.  Although difficult to put into 
words, there is something unique about communicating with a child about his or her 
fear or how scary something is.  There is a sense of emotional disclosure that in many 
ways seems even more personal than a self-report of pain.   
 
In conclusion, this, the first of two studies, provides partial support regarding 
the efficacy of cartoon distraction as an intervention for procedural pain.  The effect on 
fear is more convincing.  If the CHEOPS is seen to be a measure of the affective 
component of procedural pain, then we can conclude, albeit cautiously, that cartoon 
distraction reduced fear, in the 3 and 4 year-olds, but we can be confident that it 
reduced the self-report measures in the older children. A failure to demonstrate a 
significant effect of distraction on pain has been noted in previous studies (Carlson et 
al., 2000; Fassler, 1985; Kleiber et al., 2001; Kleiber & Harper, 1999; Manne et al., 
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1990; Meagel et al., 1998; Ryan, 1989).  However, in other cases (Cohen, Blount, & 
Panopoulos, 1997; Kuttner, 1986, 1989; Sparks, 2001) distraction is reported to have 
an effect on pain.  A rationale, based on the notion of passive versus active construing 
of the distractor could account for the mixed effects of distraction on procedural pain.  
If a child actively construes the distractor, and begins to lay over his or her own 
constructed sense of self in relation to the distractor then this would invoke the kind of 
top-down neural processing that is consistent with imagery.  Under these 
circumstances, the child may, to a degree, construct an altered reality and with it a 
sensory reality that is not consistent with the reality of the procedure room.  In this 
study, observing the cartoon might be consistent with the notion of the child construing 
somewhere between the passive and active pole on a passive construing – active 
construing construct.  If some children tended to lean towards the passive pole, then, 
they would construe the cartoon, as if, in a bottom-up sensory appraisal manner, as a 
‘competing story’ while actively construing the ‘pain story’ that is unfolding in the 
procedure room.  Under these circumstances, the opportunity for engagement is limited 
because the child is an observer of information on the television.  The child is faced 
with a limited range of choice, essentially, to focus on the cartoon, or the procedure.   
Clearly though, for some children, the cartoon was an effective distractor for pain.  The 
argument here is that what makes a distractor an effective distraction, is when it is 
actively construed by the child.  Importantly, regarding fear though, the child has 
something to focus on that is inconsistent with the procedure.  The mere presentation of 
a cartoon could be a surprising variation from the typical (and expected) ‘clinical and 
serious’ milieu of the procedure room, thus making it easier to construe the context in a 
non-fearful manner.  It is possible that, even if not actively construing to the point of 
absorption and preoccupation, in loosening and shifting away from the passive pole, 
the child gains some sense of control, and participation, and that this, coupled with 
consciousness of the cartoon, is enough to have an inhibitory effect on the typical 
cascade of fear responses.  These ideas will be developed further in the main discussion 
in Chapter 11.  
 
The greater effect of distraction in this study on fear than pain associated with a 
medical procedure suggests that children as young as five and possibly younger are 
able to differentiate between the emotional and sensory components of procedural pain, 
that is, what hurts and what is scary.  Interventions should therefore be targeted at both 
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components.  This view has gained momentum over the past 25 years in the paediatric 
pain literature (Anderson, Zeltzer, & Fanurik, 1993; Eland & Anderson, 1977; Kuttner, 
1986, 1998; McGrath & Hillier, 1996) but in many settings still is not put into practice. 
 
Summary 
This chapter described the first of two studies undertaken in this thesis.  The aim of the 
first study was to investigate the effects distraction on fear and pain, which, together 
with the findings of the second study, addresses the main aim of the thesis, to compare, 
contrast, and account for the therapeutic effects of distraction, relaxation, and imagery 
on fear and pain in children undergoing painful medical procedures. 
 
  The results of this study suggest that distraction, in the form of watching a 
cartoon, has a significant effect on fear and a partial effect on pain associated with the 
procedure.  It appears that of the two constructs, fear and pain, pain is the one that is 
more resistant to the positive effects of distraction, at least, the distraction employed in 
this study. 
 
Conceptually, the notion of passively versus actively construing the distractor, 
taking a passive role, and being very much in the ‘here and now’ of the procedure room 
were raised as factors that might account for the lesser effect of this distraction 
intervention on procedural pain.  These issues will be explored in detail in Chapter 11, 
Discussion, after describing the Method (Chapter 9) and Results (Chapter 10) of the 
second study into the therapeutic effects of relaxation and imagery on procedural fear 
and pain. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
METHOD: STUDY TWO – RELAXATION THERAPY AND GUIDED 
IMAGERY 
 
 
This chapter outlines the method undertaken in the second study, which 
investigated the effects of imagery and relaxation on the experience of 
procedural pain in children.  Previous studies have identified failure to 
determine the level of involvement of a child in imagery as a 
methodological limitation.  This was addressed in this study through the 
development and implementation of a new scale to measure 
involvement in imagery.  A variety of additional measures were 
employed to capture the cognitive, emotional and imaging aspects of the 
child’s experience.  These are discussed after first giving the 
background to the study.  The fundamental research question, subsidiary 
questions and hypotheses concerning the effects of imagery and 
relaxation are stated. 
 
Background 
This, the larger of the two studies in this thesis, was designed to build on the distraction 
study with a view to investigating the effects of relaxation and imagery on pain and 
fear in children undergoing a medical procedure.  As was discussed in Chapter 7, 
relaxation (RT) is often combined with guided imagery (GI), as a combined 
intervention.  No studies have, to date, independently investigated these as distinct 
interventions.  Furthermore, those studies that have used combined interventions have 
frequently failed to examine the full range of psychological dimensions related to pain 
and fear that could be altered by such interventions. 
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Relaxation 
Relaxation, as an intervention intended to reduce fear and pain within a medical context 
can be viewed from two perspectives: the physiological and the psychological.  The 
physiological effects of relaxation, the so-called ‘relaxation response’ (Benson, 1976), 
tend to be aligned with a decrease in activity of the sympathetic nervous system, which 
is manifest in decrease in heart rate, blood pressure (if normally hypertensive), 
breathing rate, oxygen consumption, blood lactate levels, and, of course, a decrease in 
muscle tension (Hewitt, 1985).  At first glance, it may appear that the relaxation 
response is mediated by a simple shift in the sympathetic – parasympathetic autonomic 
balance, towards an enhanced parasympathetic outflow.  However, vagal 
(parasympathetic) bronchoconstriction, and a reduction in sympathetic bronchodilation 
are not consistent with the positive effects of relaxation in acute respiratory conditions 
such as asthma (Payne, 1995).  While the physiological effects of relaxation appear to 
mimic many parasympathetic effects and contrast with many sympathetic effects, the 
relationships appear to be correlational, rather than causal.  Nonetheless, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the physiological concomitants of relaxation are antithetical 
to those accompanying the experiences of pain and fear, however, it is also conceivable 
that the physiological effects of a relaxation-based intervention are less important than 
the cognitive changes elicited by a relaxation intervention in reducing pain and fear. 
 
As an intervention, relaxation is interesting because, in addition to the obvious 
physiological effects, there are changes in thinking associated with being in a relaxed 
state.  In drawing on the notion of distraction as a function of passive versus active 
construing, relaxation could be viewed, in part, as a type of distraction from the 
sensations of the procedure, to sensations in other parts of the body; ‘in part’, because 
when coupled with focussed attention on breathing, the ‘relaxation response’ is 
enhanced.  If relaxation is a form of distraction, one would expect the effects of 
relaxation on pain and fear to be similar to the effects of distraction.  Yet, there is 
something qualitatively different about being in a relaxed state compared to being 
distracted.  Quite simply, relaxation ‘feels good’; it is this ‘feeling’ that qualitatively 
differentiates relaxation from distraction. 
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It is important to point out that ‘relaxation’ as used in this study was a simple 
progressive muscle relaxation exercise with occasional deep breaths.  Conceptually, in 
this thesis, the cognitive aspect of relaxation (passive rather than active construing) is 
similar to distraction rather than active involvement in deep relaxation, coupled with 
suggestions, which would be more akin to a hypnotic technique.  In comparing 
relaxation with imagery, the passive – active contrast in construing is the salient factor 
that distinguishes the two interventions.  During a relaxation exercise, the child may be 
construing the relaxed state somewhere between the passive and active pole but his or 
her consciousness, reality, ‘sense of self’, tends to be in the ‘here and now’ of the 
procedural room.  Engagement in imagery, on the other hand, implies a definite shift to 
the active pole and what the child constructs in imagery is an alternate reality, complete 
with unique qualia. Where relaxation, as used in this study, tends to operate around the 
passive end of a passive construing – active construing continuum, imagery invokes a 
shift to the opposite (active) pole. 
 
There are many reported studies on relaxation and pain (Anbar, 2001; Brown, 
Douglas, & Flood, 2001; Good, Stanton-Hicks, Grass, Anderson, Lai, Roykulcharoen, 
& Adler, 2001; Houston & Jesurum, 1999; Kwekkeboom, 2001; Lang, Benotsch, Fick, 
Lutgendorf, Berbaum, Berbaum, Logan, & Spiegel, 2000; Murphy & Carr, 2000; 
Powers, 1999; Schiff, Holtz, Peterson, & Rakusan 2001; Schofield & Davis, 2000).  
Relaxation is generally considered useful in managing pain.  However, the relevance of 
much of the research to procedural pain in children is limited because of the types of 
pain investigated and the age of participants.  Typically, relaxation is investigated with 
regard to its effect on chronic pain (Corrado & Gottlieb, 1999; Schofield & Davis, 
2000) or cancer pain (Grealish, Lomasney, & Whiteman, 2000; Kwekkeboom, 2001; 
Pan, Morrison, Ness, Fugh-Berman, & Leipzig, 2000; Wallace, 1997).  Many studies 
are on adults (Cupal & Brewer, 2001; Good et al., 2001; Hattan, King, & Griffiths, 
2002; Hewitt, 1985; Houston & Jesurum, 1999; Logan et al., 2001) rather than children 
(Bullock & Shaddy, 1993; Hobbie, 1989; Murphy & Carr, 2000). 
 
Seers and Carroll (1998) conducted an extensive review of studies on relaxation 
techniques for the management of acute pain and concluded that there was only weak 
evidence to support the use of relaxation for acute pain.  Many studies suffer from 
methodological weaknesses including lack of randomisation, small sample size, lack of 
  
 
193  
adequate controls, combined interventions and lack of a detailed explanation of the 
relaxation technique.  Wallace (1997) points out that relaxation and imagery are 
frequently combined as a single intervention (Bullock & Shaddy, 1993; Cupal & 
Brewer, 2001; Hobbie, 1989; Kwekkeboom, 2001; Skaggs, 1999).  Krueger (1987) 
wrote, “Because most pain studies have paired imagery with other components, such as 
relaxation or distraction exercises, conclusions about the unique phenomenon of 
imagery cannot yet be drawn”.  Such designs do not allow the identification of 
individual or combined effects of each intervention.  Although Krueger raised the 
methodological issue in 1987, ‘non-pharmacologic’ interventions are often investigated 
in combination.  Clearly there is a continued need to address this issue through 
carefully controlled studies of the independent and combined effects of relaxation and 
guided imagery interventions. 
 
Imagery 
Having considered the possible impact of relaxation on pain and fear and also 
acknowledged that frequently relaxation is combined with imagery in guided imagery 
(Bullock & Shaddy, 1993; Cupal & Brewer, 2001; Wallace, 1997; Whitaker, 1994; 
Zahourek, 1988) or in hypnosis (Anbar, 2001; Kuttner, 1997; LeBaron & Zeltzer, 
1996; Murphy & Carr, 2000; Olness & Kohen, 1996), it is necessary to consider in 
more depth the effect of imagery as an independent intervention.  In keeping with the 
main thrust of this thesis, this will be done from a constructivist perspective. 
 
As the child engages in imagery, his or her construing becomes more active and 
focussed on whatever is imaged.  As the imagery develops, there is a concomitant shift 
in the child’s consciousness and ‘sense of self’.  In constructivist terms, the child 
‘actively construes the reality to which he or she responds’.  This two-part 
constructivist tenet is particularly relevant to the effects of imagery on pain and fear: 
firstly, the notion that ‘reality’ is actively constructed in imagery; and, secondly, that 
the child responds to the reality that is constructed.  If the constructed reality is pain-
free and fun, then, in actively constructing this reality in imagery, one would expect 
self-reports of pain and fear associated with the ‘procedural reality’ to be significantly 
reduced in children who are able to ‘get into’ the imagery.  Conceptually, successful 
engagement in imagery is marked by the degree of shift from the passive to active pole, 
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and the attendant shift from the reality of the procedure room to the reality in imagery; 
this is, however, not a given.  The designs of previous studies using imagery as an 
intervention have drawn criticism (Langley, 1999; Wallace, 1997) because the 
researchers have not commented on the child’s ability or success in engaging in 
imagery during the procedure.  Broome, Lillis, McGahee, and Bates (1992) also 
identified the failure to assess the actual ability of children to use imagery and 
relaxation techniques as a limitation in their own study on the use of these techniques 
to manage procedural pain in children with cancer.  In anticipating the likelihood that 
not all children will engage deeply, that is ‘get into’ the imagery, it is vital that any 
investigation into the effects of imagery includes an assessment of the extent to which 
the child has successfully engaged in imagery. 
 
Central to measuring the independent variable ‘imagery’ is the concept of 
‘absorption’.  This concept is not new; it is widely discussed in the hypnosis literature 
as a predictor of ‘hypnotisability’ (Monteiro, MacDonald, & Hilgard, 1980; Tellegen & 
Atkinson, 1974; Yanchar & Johnson, 1981).  However, given the specific context of 
procedural pain, that the intervention was imagery not hypnosis, and the lack of 
emphasis on suggestion, measures of hypnotisability (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974; 
Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1959) as an indicator of absorption in imagery are unlikely to 
be valid.  Hence, there is a need to develop a measure of absorption that is specific to 
imagery and procedural pain in children. 
 
Effects of Imagery 
As well as ensuring that the discrete effects of relaxation and imagery are 
examined, and that checks are made on the success of the imagery intervention, the 
current study sought to address the failure of past research to explore the full range of 
psychological effects that interventions of this type might produce.  When considering 
this issue it is important to remember the age of the children experiencing the 
procedure and intervention.  The validity of self-report is an important methodological 
consideration in research with children.  Given that the participants in this study could 
be as young as six, the most important principle driving the validity of the self-report 
measures was simplicity.  The validity of a child’s self-report is dependant upon the 
child understanding the question and providing a true and accurate answer.  On the use 
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of self-report measures with children (within the context of pain), Mathews, McGrath, 
and Pigeon (1993) state: 
 
Self-report measures rely on children reporting their own subjective pain 
experiences.  Because the child must have adequate cognitive and 
communicative skills, the lower age limit for use of these measures is 
approximately four.  (p. 98) 
 
Four-year-olds can identify and describe pain and fear.  They can also tell us 
whether what they are thinking or feeling is good, bad, or just normal.  Of more 
concern is the validity of a four-year-old child’s self-report of relaxation and bother.  
Champion, Goodenough, von Baeyer, and Thomas (1998, p. 133) point out, “…young 
children especially 3 and 4 year olds, are more likely to select the endpoints of VAS or 
category scales with multiple options…”  The commonly reported minimum age for the 
valid and reliable use of visual analogue scales to measure pain in children is five years 
(Finley & McGrath, 1998; Mathews, McGrath, & Pigeon, 1993).  A significant factor 
here is that this is the age most children start school.  School aged five-year-old 
children could probably report on a visual analogue scale how relaxed they felt and 
how much something bothered them.  However, to allay concern regarding the self-
report of ‘feeling relaxed’ and ‘bothered’, a conservative margin of one year was 
considered appropriate following discussion with health professionals experienced in 
working with children and several primary school teachers.  Therefore, only children 
aged six years and older were asked to participate in this study. 
 
As well as ensuring the general format of the measures was appropriate for the 
age of the sample, research in this area has to be mindful of the breadth of the child’s 
experience during the procedure.  The psychological dimensions that could constitute 
the experience were considered earlier in relation to the research on relaxation but can 
be extended to assess additional dimensions that might be affected by imagery and 
related interventions.  For example, in a study exploring a child’s favourite story as a 
hypnotic technique to reduce procedural pain, Kuttner (1988) noticed how much the 
pain ‘bothered’ a child whose self-report of pain was high, but whose self-reported 
anxiety and observed distress were low. “It [the discrepancy between pain and bother] 
suggests that although Samantha was aware of pain, it did not bother her” (p. 294).  
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Kuttner suggests this occurred through dissociation from the pain: that the pain 
sensations “may become more distant, less relevant, and therefore less upsetting and 
painful” (p. 294).  However, in this child’s case, her self-report of pain was 5 out of 5, 
suggesting that the intensity was at a maximum level.  In light of Kuttner’s comments, 
asking children about how much what they felt in their arm during the blood test 
bothered them was a worthwhile question.   
 
Self-reports of ‘bothersomeness’ have also been incorporated in a number of 
adult pain studies including an investigation in to the effects of nitrous oxide (Zacny et 
al., 1999), and fentanyl (Zacny, Coalson, Klafta, & Klock, 1996) and on 
‘bothersomeness’ of experimentally induced pain (cold pressor test) in healthy subjects.  
In both studies, the pharmacologic intervention significantly reduced measures of pain 
intensity and bothersomeness of pain.  These studies strengthened the case for the 
incorporation of a measure of the extent to which procedural pain bothered the child. 
 
A number of other dimensions have been thought relevant to the pain and fear 
experienced by children beyond the notion of how much the pain “bothered” them.  
The term ‘valency’ has been applied to emotion (Adolphs & Tranel, 2000; Fernandez 
& Turk, 1995; Wintre & Vallance, 1994) to categorize emotions as positive or 
negative.  Children as young as 3 years can understand the link between situations and 
the emotions they provoke (Wintre & Vallance, 1994).  A logical progression from the 
absence of positive or negative emotion is to ask about neutral or no emotion.  
Thoughts too can be classified according to valency as positive, negative or neutral.  
From the perspective of the child, this most easily and accurately equates to good, bad, 
or just normal thoughts.  Measurement of both of these variables is dependent upon the 
child’s self-report of a subjective experience but children as young as 4 years have been 
found capable of accurate and reliable self-report subjective experiences (Champion, 
Goodenough, von Baeyer, & Thomas, 1998).  This very simple classification of 
emotional and cognitive tone appeared a worthwhile adjunct to any comprehensive 
assessment of intervention effectiveness. 
 
The term ‘uptight’ has been in common use in the English language since the 
1960s.  In the world of paediatric pain, the term ‘distress’ is favoured, however, 
laypersons could not be expected to have a similar understanding of the term ‘distress’ 
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because its use is not common.  The term ‘uptight’ however, is used in everyday 
conversation and in the media.  ‘Uptight’ was therefore selected as a preferred 
descriptor over distress.  Parent and nurse ratings of how uptight the child was were 
sought in this study to obtain another view of the psychological impact of procedural 
pain on children.  Previous studies have drawn on parent and or nurse ratings of pain, 
anxiety and distress.  Opinions vary regarding the validity of these measures. Manne, 
Jacobsen, and Redd (1992) and McCaffery and Wong (1993) considered parent ratings 
of child distress to be more accurate than the ratings of health professionals, although, 
Manne, Jacobsen, and Redd did suggest that parent ratings reflected parental anxiety 
and that the nurse ratings were associated with observations of the child’s behaviour.  
Despite mixed opinion, parent and nurse ratings were included to obtain a diverse range 
of measures and views of the impact of the procedure on the child.   
 
While self-report measures are typically seen to be the most important mode of 
learning about the child’s experience the observations of parent and nurse can clearly 
add to the “picture” that is produced by the interventions.  However, as has been 
suggested, both sets of observations might be confounded, by the observer’s own 
emotional state, in the case of the parents, and by the concern for a quick and efficient 
procedure and the attendant focus on particular forms of behaviour, in the case of the 
nurses.  One way of addressing these issues is to employ a more “objective” and 
comprehensive observational schedule.  The Observational Scale of Behavioural 
Distress (Jay, Ozolins, Elliott, & Caldwell, 1983) is specifically designed to measure 
distress in children associated with painful medical procedures.  The tool has been used 
in a number of settings on a range of painful procedures and has well-established 
validity (Broome, Rehwaldt, & Fogg, 1998; Foertsch, O'Hara, Stoddard, & Kealy, 
1998; Jay, Elliott, Katz, & Siegel, 1987; Pederson, 1995), and reliability (Jay & Elliott, 
1984, 1986; Jay, Ozolins, Elliott, & Caldwell, 1983).  It seemed appropriate to 
incorporate this measure to round out the impressions of the child’s behaviour during 
and after the procedure. 
 
Research Questions 
Previous chapters have identified pain as a multifaceted construct with cognitive, 
emotional and sensory qualities.  When imagery and relaxation are introduced in a 
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painful procedure, they too can have cognitive, emotional and sensory qualities.  The 
fundamental research question in this study focuses on how imagery and relaxation 
modulate a child’s thoughts, feelings and reporting of fear and pain as well as their 
expressive behaviour during a medical procedure.  Formally, the research question is: 
What are the effects of distraction, relaxation and imagery on procedural fear and pain 
in children? 
 
In the light of the examination of previous research, several issues stem from 
this fundamental question.  Firstly, there is a need, in a randomised controlled design, 
to identify the effects of imagery on a child’s reaction to a painful procedure.  
Secondly, there is the issue of whether there are distinct effects of imagery on fear and 
pain beyond those produced by relaxation.  Finally, the study should establish in what 
ways relaxation, imagery and distraction are similar in terms of their general 
psychological impact, and how they differ.   
 
The two interventions under investigation in this study, relaxation and imagery 
were expected to have differential effects on pain, fear, distress and the related 
variables.  The children in the imaging conditions were expected to actively construct 
an alternate reality, in imagery, and as such, the imaging conditions would produce 
significantly lower pain, fear, bother, distress and uptight scores than the non-imaging 
conditions.  Similarly, reports of positive thoughts and feelings would be greatest in the 
imaging conditions. 
 
Relaxation, like distraction, was expected to draw mainly on the notion of 
passive, rather than active construing, although it is acknowledged that in terms of how 
the child felt, relaxation would add a sense of actually feeling good, even in a 
fundamentally threatening situation.  A difference was expected across the range of 
dependent variables between the non-relaxation, and the relaxation conditions. In terms 
of the ‘distraction-like’ effects of relaxation, coupled with an expected positive effect 
on feelings, it was anticipated that, the relaxation conditions would produce 
significantly lower pain, fear, bother, distress and uptight scores than the non-relaxation 
conditions.    
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Given that there was very little time between meeting the child and explaining 
the study and the onset of imagery for those in the imaging conditions, it was 
anticipated that the relaxation phase would allow the child to engage more fully in the 
imagery.  As a consequence, children in the combined relaxation and imagery condition 
were expected to report significantly lower pain, fear, bother and distress scores, more 
positive thoughts and feelings, and would be rated by parents and nurses as less uptight 
than children in the imagery, or relaxation only conditions.  Similarly, but more 
specifically, across both imaging conditions, it was predicted that children who were 
engaged more fully in imagery would report significantly lower pain, fear, bother and 
distress scores, more positive thoughts and feelings, and would be rated by parents and 
nurses as less uptight than children who were less engaged.   
 
The relationships between the various dimensions of pain and fear were also 
anticipated to be affected by the more powerful imagery intervention.  The correlations 
between fear, bother, pain, thoughts and feelings were expected to be weaker in the 
imaging conditions than the non-imaging conditions because in the imaging conditions 
the children would be construing a reality in which these variables would be less 
relevant.  There should be no procedural pain focus in the imaging conditions around 
which these ratings could coalesce.  An exploration of the extent to which pre-
procedural ratings of fear and being uptight were correlated with procedural assessment 
was also anticipated.  
 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty English-speaking children were drawn from a convenience 
sample of children who presented to a Pathology Out-Patient department for 
venepuncture.  Children aged 6 to 16 years were invited to participate in this study 
unless excluded on the same criteria that were used in the Cartoon Distraction Study.  
In this study, only about four children were excluded because of involvement in other 
research, pre-existing pain or application of topical anaesthesia.   
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Setting 
This study was undertaken in the same Pathology Out Patients Department, as was the 
Cartoon Study.  The same room was also used.  Stability of the environment during the 
conduct of the study was achieved by maintaining the following conditions.  Lighting: 
fluorescent lights brightly illuminated the room.  These were on and fully functional.  
Privacy: the sliding door to the room was closed during the procedure.  Background 
noise: the study was conducted in a busy pathology department.  The staff undertook 
their work in the usual manner.  Telephones would ring; staff would talk with each 
other, their patients and the parents.  Often babies would scream and children could be 
heard crying.  Position in the room: for each procedure, the child sat in a chair, the 
younger ones sat on the parent’s lap as per standard procedure in the department.  The 
nurse collecting the blood always sat to the left of the child.  The researcher always sat 
to the right of the child.  The small video camera mounted on the tripod was always in 
front of the child at a distance of approximately 1.5m.  Room temperature: the ambient 
temperature was held constant by the air conditioning system in the hospital.  Room 
odour: the somewhat ‘clinical’ odour of the department did not change throughout the 
study.  At no stage were therapeutic oils burned or areas painted.  Parental presence: 
no procedures were performed without a parent or significant other present.  
Appearance of staff: there were no changes in the attire worn by staff throughout the 
study.  Equally, the researcher did not significantly change his casual attire.  Other 
distractions: no other distractions, for example television, music, computer games or 
play, were introduced during the conduct of the study. 
 
Measures 
To ensure the full range of psychological responses following the procedure and the 
interventions were examined a number of self-report measures, including level of 
relaxation, valence of thoughts and feelings, pain, fear and bother, were collected.  
Given that the participants in this study were as young as six, the most important 
principle driving the choice of these measures was their simplicity and ease of use.  In 
an attempt to obtain a broader view of the psychological impact of the procedure on the 
child, measurement of the three remaining dependent variables involved the parents’ 
and nurses’ perceptions of the child and an observational measure of the child’s distress 
applied by the researcher and an independent Clinical Nurse Specialist in paediatric 
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pain.  Detailed description of the manipulation checks, self-report dependent measures 
and observational measures follow.   
   
Manipulation Checks 
Relaxation 
The children were asked to rate how relaxed they felt on a verbal scale of zero to 10.  
The use of a verbal scale requires effective communication, which is dependent on not 
only effective transmission and reception of information but also understanding.  The 
latter is often incorrectly assumed, particularly when communicating with children.  To 
avoid errors in understanding the term ‘relaxed’, the researcher also used the word 
‘floppy’ and demonstrated what ‘being relaxed or floppy’ meant.  Having the child 
raise the researcher’s arm by picking up his wrist helped to achieve this.  The arm was 
deliberately relaxed and heavy.  The researcher asked the child, “What will happen to 
my arm if you let go?”  Most children said that it would drop.  A couple were not sure.  
The researcher said, “Okay let go”.  The researchers arm would then drop onto the 
child’s knee.  The researcher then demonstrated ‘not relaxed’; a tense weightless arm 
held by the child that did not drop when let go.  This brief exercise confirmed the 
child’s understanding of the term ‘relaxed’.  Each child was asked to rate how relaxed 
or floppy he or she felt during the blood test on a verbal scale where zero meant ‘not 
relaxed at all’ and 10 was ‘most relaxed’ (really floppy).   
 
Involvement in Imagery 
A new scale, the Imagery Absorption Scale (IAS), was developed in consultation with 
health professionals experienced in imagery and pain management in children.  The 
following section describes the development, and implementation of this scale. 
 
Clinically, there is certainly something different about being in imagery.  This 
difference is experienced by the individual and can be observed in the person’s affect 
and behaviour.  Typically, a child will describe herself in a scene in the present tense, 
often the description is detailed, it flows easily, if something amusing happens, the 
child will smile or laugh, and if the guide asks something that does not fit with the 
imagery, the child will simply correct the guide.  Moreover, the person guiding the 
imagery shares many aspects of the individual’s imagery.  There is often a concurrent 
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construct of the individual’s imagery in the mind of the person guiding the imagery.  
The task of developing an Imagery Absorption Scale specific to procedural pain in 
children was dependent upon identifying the behavioural differences between being in 
a normal conscious state and being in imagery and defining these within the context of 
a painful procedure.  The criteria deemed important in developing the scale were 
identified in a previous study (Whitaker, 1994) that examined the types of images that 
help children through painful procedures.  The mode of operationalizing these 
components as a reliable measure is described below.  The purpose of the Imagery 
Absorption Scale was to assess the extent of engagement in imagery.  The seven 
criteria, together with corresponding values in the are shown below in Figure 1.  Each 
factor was defined and scored as follows: 
 
Eyes Closed.  More often than not, children will close their eyes when engaging in 
imagery.  They may begin with eyes open but when they feel okay to go with the 
imagery, they will close their eyes.  Scoring: 1 – eyes closed during the imagery, a brief 
opening of eyes then eyes closed again would also be scored as 1;  0 – eyes open 
throughout procedure.  
  
Did you feel as if you were here or there?  Children who deeply engage in imagery will 
say upon cessation of the imagery that they felt as if they were there – in the pool, on 
the swings, actually bouncing the basketball down the court – rather than here in the 
hospital or whatever setting the child is physically in.  Three options are given to the 
child, “When we were doing the blood test (any procedure), did you feel as if you were 
here, there – in your imagery, or somewhere in between?”  Sometimes children will 
say, “I felt as if I was in between, sometimes there, sometimes here”.  The child who 
tends not to engage in imagery will say, “I felt as if I was here”.  These three 
possibilities are scored as: 2 – there; 1 – in between; and 0 – here. 
 
Appears relaxed.  Children who engage in imagery appear relaxed even if the imagery 
is active as in playing sport.  Scoring: 2 – appears relaxed for entire procedure; 1 – 
periods of being tense or fidgeting; 0 – appears tense throughout procedure. 
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Speech – normal to calm with no sign of apprehension.  The tone of the child’s speech 
is normal to calm in imagery.  The child sounds as if he or she is in the place of 
imagery, not in a hospital about to have a painful procedure.  There is no apprehension 
or sense of fear in the child’s voice.  Scoring: 2 – normal or calm speech throughout the 
procedure; 1 – an episode of apprehension;  0 – apprehensive, fearful or distressed 
speech throughout the procedure. 
 
Easy flowing description of Imagery.  In imagery, the child’s description of the imagery 
flows easily and is in the present tense.  Some children say a lot, some say less.  The 
important characteristic here is the quality of the speech.  It is not a case of “What does 
he or she want me to say next?”  The description of the imagery flows and can easily be 
followed by the person guiding the imagery.  If the guide asks an inappropriate 
question, the child will correct the guide.  For example, on getting out of a swimming 
pool in imagery, the guide might ask, “Have you dried yourself off?  The child 
responds with, “No, my towel is on the other side of the pool.”  Scoring: 1 – flows 
easily as described above in the present tense; 0 – does not flow or past tense is used or 
sounds ‘made up’ rather than a description of what is being experienced. 
 
Appropriateness of affect and imagery.  When in imagery, the child’s affect matches 
the description of what is happening.  For example, if something amusing happens, the 
child will smile or laugh.  If the child describes winning a game or a race or simply is 
having fun, their affect is appropriate.  Scoring: 1 – appropriate affect; 0 – 
inappropriate affect. 
 
Ability to sustain imagery throughout the procedure: Possible scores are 3, 2 or 1.  If 
the child sustains the imagery for the entire procedure, the score is 3. For part of the 
procedure (brief lapse), the score is 2.  Sometimes a child will open his or her eyes, 
perhaps check out what is happening, ask a question about the procedure and then go 
straight back to describing the imagery; this would be scored as 2, a brief lapse in 
imagery.  Sometimes a child will lose the focus of the imagery altogether.  If there was 
total loss of imagery, the score is 1. 
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Parameters Possible  
Score 
Eyes closed 1 0  
Did you feel as if you were here or there? 2 1 0 
Appears relaxed 2 1 0 
Speech: normal to calm with no sign of apprehension. 2 1 0 
Easy flowing description of Imagery 1 0  
Appropriateness of affect and imagery 1 0  
For the entire procedure 
or 
3   
Part of the procedure (brief lapse) 
or 
 2  
Total loss of Imagery   1 
IAS SCORE (Out of 12)    
 
Figure 1.  Imagery Absorption Scale (IAS) 
 
The items were experientially defined, refined, and developed into a scale by 
the researcher.  The development and implementation of the scale was then 
corroborated in discussion with an expert Clinical Nurse Specialist in the field of 
imagery and pain management in children.  The score represents how absorbed a 
person is in imagery during a painful medical procedure.  The maximum score is 12.  
The children who were highly absorbed in the imagery, compared to the rest were of 
particular interest in this study.  High involvement in imagery was anticipated to lead to 
an IAS score of nine or greater.  As a bipolar construct of high vs. low, any score less 
than 9 was considered low.  The reliability of the measure and the extent to which this 
was a reasonable division into high/low imagery was an additional aspect of the study. 
 
Given this was a new scale, interrater reliability of the tool and internal 
consistency of the seven items were examined.  Two independent observers, in addition 
to the researcher, one an expert in the field of pain in children with more than five years 
clinical experience in using imagery with children, the other, a novice, who had never 
used imagery, rated a random selection of 20 cases from the imaging conditions.  The 
extremes of experience in the independent observers were purposefully selected to 
determine if level of experience influenced the implementation of the scale.  
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Independently. Each observer sat with 20 copies of the Imagery Absorption Scale 
shown in Figure 1 together with the scoring criteria, viewed each video, marked each 
item accordingly and summed each item to give a total, which was the IAS score for 
each case.  The observers completed this process independently. 
 
Interrater reliability between the researcher and two independent observers, one 
experienced in using imagery, the other with no experience, was high.  Correlation 
analyses established the following coefficients: Researcher and experienced observer, r 
= .95; researcher and inexperienced observer, r =  .94; the two independent observers 
who never met each other, r =  .91. 
 
A high level of internal consistency of the 7-item IAS Cronbach’s alpha of .86 
was demonstrated.  Table D-1 (Appendix D) shows the “corrected item-total 
correlation” for each of the seven items in the IAS, together with the “alpha value if 
item deleted”.  The item that stands out in the corrected Item-Total correlations in 
Table C-1, as being the weakest is Item 2, “Place”.  In relation to most instruments, 
however, this correlation is not low.  The alpha value if the item was deleted would 
only move from .86 to .87.  Clinically, the response to the question “Did you feel as if 
you were here, in the hospital, there, in your imagery, or somewhere in-between?” has 
much relevance for the child, and the person guiding the imagery.  Therefore, on both 
clinical and statistical grounds, this item was not deleted from the scale.  It is also 
interesting to note the item that best reflected the total score on the IAS is Item 4, 
“Speech – normal to calm with no sign of apprehension”.  Again, clinically, signs of 
apprehension in the child’s speech quickly alert the person guiding the imagery that the 
child is beginning to lose focus.   
 
Dependent Variable Measures 
Pain 
The Astra® Pharmaceuticals plastic pain ruler was described in relation to its use in the 
Cartoon Distraction Study.  The same tool was used in this study to measure pain.  The 
researcher demonstrated the use of the ruler to measure pain by showing the child how 
the blue plastic curser moved along the scale from zero to 100.  The researcher 
explained:  
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This pain ruler tells me about how much it hurt in your arm when the nurse did 
the blood test, how much pain you felt in your arm.  Down here, you can see is 
zero, no pain at all and then it goes up in tens, 10, 20, 30, 40, and so on, each 
division means more and more pain right up to 100 which is the most, the 
highest, that is the worst pain ever.  Do you see what I mean?  Here, take this 
and move this blue thing along to show me how much it hurt in your arm.   
 
Fear 
Pre and post procedural fear scores were taken using Hester’s Poker Chip Tool (Hester 
1979; Hester, Foster, and Kristensen 1990) adapted for fear.  This tool was also used in 
the Cartoon Study.  The Poker Chips were laid out left to right on a bench in front of 
the child.  The researcher explained: 
 
These Poker Chips tell me about fear, about how scary things are, you can tell 
me how scary, how frightening this is for you (Pre-procedural measure) right 
now, sitting here, about to have a blood test taken in your arm.  There are five 
Poker Chips, the white one on the end here is zero, that means no fear at all, 
not at all scary, then it goes up, 1, 2, 3, 4, each one of these red Poker Chips is 
a piece of scariness.  This first one means a little bit scary, a little bit of fear.  
This one is 2, it is like two bits of scariness or fear, then this one is 3, that 
means very scary or a lot of fear, and this one, number 4, is the most, this is a 
huge amount of fear.  Can you point to the one that will tell me how much fear 
you are feeling, how scary this is for you right now? 
 
The same tool was used immediately after the procedure.  The child was asked 
to point to the Poker Chip that showed how much fear he or she felt during the blood 
test.   
 
 Bother 
A second Astra® Pharmaceuticals Pain Ruler was adapted by printing the words ‘NOT 
BOTHERED’ at the zero (left) end of the ruler and ‘VERY BOTHERED’ at the 100 
millimetre (right) end.  The researcher explained: 
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You can tell me how much what you felt in your arm during the blood test 
bothered you on this ruler by moving the blue thing along between 0 ‘not at all 
bothered’, up in tens, 10, 20, 30, 40, and so on up to 100, which means that 
you were very, very, hugely bothered by what you felt in your arm.   
 
As with the pain scale, the child moved the blue cursor between 0 ‘not 
bothered’ and 100 ‘very bothered’. 
   
Valency of Thoughts and Feelings 
In regard to thoughts and feelings during the procedure, all that was required in this 
study was to have the child determine if he or she was thinking good thoughts, bad 
thoughts or just normal thoughts, (not good or bad) during the venepuncture.  The same 
applied for feelings.  Immediately after the procedure, each child was asked about his 
or her thoughts during the procedure, and then about feelings.   
 
Uptight Ratings by Parents and Nurses 
A verbal scale of zero to ten was used.  Each parent and nurse performing the 
procedure was asked to rate how uptight the child appeared before and during the 
procedure.  These ratings were taken independently.  The parent was asked when the 
nurse left the room, and the nurse was asked after the parent and child left the 
department. 
 
Distress  
Implementation of the Observational Scale of Behavioral Distress (OSBD) is relatively 
simple but the tool is cumbersome and demands attention to detail.  In a research 
setting, the easiest way to apply the measure is to a videorecording of the procedure; 
this was the method adopted in this study.  The 15-second time schedule for scoring the 
observed behaviours was set by recording onto a 30-minute audiocassette a single note 
on a piano at 15-second intervals.  This played in the background as the videos were 
scored.  Videorecording of the procedures also allowed scoring with the OSBD by a 
second independent observer.  Data were then entered into Microsoft Excel® and 
distress scores computed according to the weightings stipulated in the design of the tool 
(Jay, Ozolins, Elliott, & Caldwell, 1983).  The procedure can be divided into phases to 
give a distress score for each phase or these can be summed to give a total distress 
  
 
208  
score.  In this study, four phases were initially defined: Phase 1, Tourniquet placed on 
the child’s arm.  Phase 2, Needle penetrates the child’s skin.  Phase 3, Needle is 
removed.  Phase 4, Bandaid® applied.  The number of times each of the eight items is 
observed are summed and weighted to give distress score for each phase.  These were 
subsequently combined to give a total distress score.  Independent reliability checks on 
total OSBD scores have yielded Pearson correlation coefficients from .97 to .99 (Jay & 
Elliott, 1986, p. 4).  In the current study, interrater reliability between two independent 
observers was high.  The correlation coefficient between the two independent observers 
scoring a random sample of children (n = 60) was .97. 
 
Procedure 
The mode of presentation for venepuncture was the same as described in the Cartoon 
Study.  Each child presented with a parent or guardian to the Pathology Outpatient 
department for a venepuncture as part of his or her medical management in the 
hospital.  The main difference in this study was the lower age was set at six years.  The 
nurses directed children aged six or older to the same room used in the Cartoon Study.  
Provided the child had not met any of the exclusion criteria, the child and parent were 
invited to participate in the study after the project had been explained.  In each case, the 
child’s assent and parent’s consent were established and then the parent signed the 
consent form.  The children had never met the researcher.  There was about a five 
minute lead up time in which the project and involvement was explained, the Plain 
Language Statement read by the parent, the consent form was signed and the child was 
randomly allocated to one of the four conditions.  In the imaging conditions, there was 
no practice run, that is, imagery occurred for the first time with the procedure.  The 
children, either went straight into the imagery (GI condition) or began relaxing (about 
three minutes) and then into the imagery (RT/GI condition). 
 
Each child was randomly allocated to one of the four conditions by having the 
child pull a coloured poker chip from an opaque white A4 postage pack. The child, 
parent and researcher were blind to the contents of the envelope.  The postage pack 
contained four coloured poker chips identical in shape and size.  Each poker chip 
corresponded to one of the four conditions.   An explanation of this was on the Plain 
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Language Statement and was given verbally to the child.  The child was invited to put 
his or her hand into the envelope, rummage around and take out one poker chip.   
 
The colours and corresponding conditions were: 
Gold Poker Chip  VP1:  Control 
Blue Poker Chip  VP2: Relaxation 
Red Poker Chip  VP3: Guided Imagery 
White Poker Chip   VP4: Relaxation Therapy with Guided Imagery 
 
Once the child was randomly allocated to one of the four conditions, the pre-
procedural measures were taken and the venepuncture was performed according to the 
group to which the child was allocated. 
 
Pre-Venepuncture: Process and Measures.  
Seven highly experienced nurses worked in the area each identified by a number for the 
purposes of the research.  The age and gender of the child were recorded.  Parent 
present was recorded as Mother, Father, both parents or ‘other’.  Other could be a 
guardian, grandparent, aunt, uncle, etc.  Previous experience of a venepuncture was 
noted.  The child’s pre-procedural fear level was measured using Hester’s Poker Chip 
Tool adapted for Fear.  This was done before the tourniquet was placed on the child’s 
arm.  A small Panasonic® video camera mounted on the tripod was then set to record 
mode by the researcher using a small infrared remote control.  Up to this point, the 
sequencing and conduct of these preliminary steps was identical in every case.  Starting 
the video camera heralded the onset of the particular condition. The condition to which 
the child was randomly allocated determined the next step in the procedure.   
 
Relaxation Technique 
The relaxation technique employed in this study in the relaxation condition and the first 
part of the relaxation and imagery condition was a simple breathing and progressive 
muscle relaxation technique from toes to fingers.  The relaxation procedure began with 
the researcher explaining the difference between being tense and being relaxed and 
demonstrating this by making a fist and tensing the forearms and then relaxing, “going 
floppy”. The researcher would then say to the child sitting in the chair, “Okay, the best 
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way to start relaxing is to take a nice big deep breath in…. and out”.  This was repeated 
twice for a total of three deep breaths. “Now we might start with feet.  Can you give 
your toes a little wiggle?  Ah! That’s good, I can see your toes moving.”  “We are 
going to start with feet, just notice the feeling in your feet and let your ankles relax”.  
“Notice the sensation of your feet on the floor” (if the child’s feet reached the floor).  
”Now, we are going to move gradually up your legs, and relax those muscles at the 
back of your legs below your knees, and another nice big deep breath in… and out, 
that’s good.”  “Now, we will work our way up, through your knees, and legs to your 
bottom, on the chair, notice the weight of your bottom on the chair.”  “Okay, around to 
the bottom part of your back, and the feeling of your back against the chair.”  “Now, 
gradually moving up your back, relaxing those muscles, up to your shoulders”.  “The 
best thing to do with shoulders is to let them drop a little, Ah!  That’s good”.  “Now we 
will move gradually up the back of your neck, and if you like, you can turn your head 
one way like looking over your shoulder, like this, (researcher turns his head), and then 
over the other shoulder and finding a comfy position in the middle.”  “Again, noticing 
your breathing, as you breathe in… and out, and around your ears, then to your 
forehead and your eyes, letting those muscles relax.”  “Okay, now down the front part 
of your neck, and out to the tips of your shoulders… and now down both arms together, 
through your elbows, to your wrists and to your fingers, letting them go all floppy”. 
 
 
Guided Imagery Technique 
The Guided Imagery technique described in Chapter 6 was used with the children in the 
Imaging Conditions.  An example of the imagery protocol is offered in Figure 2 as a 
reminder of the technique. 
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“Now I don’t know what it looks like, where your playground is, what does it 
look like, is it a sunny day, or a cloudy day?  Is there a swing? What are you 
going to go on first?”  The intention here is to give the child choices and to 
establish the present tense rather than describing a memory of a previous event.  
The ‘guided’ part of guided imagery involves asking the child simple questions 
about his or her imagery.  For example, “Where are you now?”  The child 
might say, “I’m going over to the slide.”  “Okay, when you get there go up to 
the top but count how many steps there are to the top and tell me when you get 
there.”  “I am at the top.”  “How many steps up to the top?”  “Eleven.”  “Okay, 
have a look around and tell me what you can see from the top.”  “I can see my 
brother.”  What is he doing?”  “He is on the swing”  “Okay when you are 
ready, slide down the slide and we will do the blood test thing, tell me when 
you are sliding down the slide.”  “Now I’m going down the slide.”  “There 
goes the blood test, are you at the bottom?  Where are you going now?”  “Back 
up again.”  “Okay, tell me when you get to the top...”  The child may then have 
another go on the slide or the swing or engage in some other activity.  Another 
couple of minutes in imagery and then he or she is informed that the procedure 
is over and we can finish the imagery.  “When you are ready, you can finish 
your imagery and the way we do that is to count backwards in your mind from 
four to one and when you get to one, open your eyes, look at the floor and then 
look up, and we are all finished.” 
 
Figure 2.  Guided imagery description 
 
Generally the researcher would guide the child’s imagery for about 4-5 minutes 
then the nurse would come into the room and prepare the equipment, which would take 
only about another minute.  By this time (about 6 minutes), the child would be ‘as 
engaged in his or her imagery’ as he or she was likely to be.  As the study was 
undertaken in a busy clinical setting, sometimes a wait of a few more minutes occurred 
before the nurse to came.  If this happened, the child would just continue describing his 
or her imagery.  Sometimes the nurse would come into the room earlier and the 
researcher would hold the onset of the procedure until the child had been in imagery for 
about 4-5 minutes.  The researcher would then say, “Okay while you are, ‘in the pool’, 
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‘on the slide’, ‘bouncing the ball’, we will pop the tourniquet thing on your arm, what 
is happening now?”  The nurse would place the tourniquet on the child’s upper arm and 
locate a suitable vein.  The researcher would then nod to the nurse who then performed 
the venepuncture.  After the needle was withdrawn and a Bandaid® applied, the child 
would continue for another minute or two.  If, for example, the child was in the middle 
of a game of basketball, the researcher would say, “Let’s imagine you have got a ‘fast 
forward’, fast forward, and there is 30 seconds left on the clock, tell me what happens 
in the last 30 seconds”. 
 
If a child lost focus and became distressed, when the needle was inserted, the 
researcher would ask the child about a component of the imagery.  For example, “You 
were telling me about riding your skateboard down your driveway, when you get to the 
end, what do you do next.”  The child would either go back to the imagery or lose 
interest all together. 
 
The combined Relaxation Therapy and Guided Imagery (RT/GI) began with the 
child taking several long slow deep breaths followed by exactly the same progressive 
muscle relaxation technique as in the relaxation condition, described above.  In the 
RT/GI condition, this phase lasted only a couple of minutes, whereas in the RT 
condition, the exercise was repeated.   
 
Procedure According to Condition 
 Control Condition 
Contact between the researcher, the child, and the parent was identical up to the child 
being randomly allocated to a condition.  This took about five minutes.  As in the other 
conditions, there was a wait of about three to five minutes for the nurse to come into 
the room.   The children in the control condition had the venepuncture performed in the 
standard manner.  This involved the nurse casually chatting with the child.  Present in 
the room were the child, parent(s) usually the mother, the nurse and the researcher who 
stood near the closed sliding door.  In the control condition, the researcher was present 
in the small room as an observer.  When the procedure was over and the Bandaid® 
applied, as in the other three conditions, the researcher administered the post procedural 
measures and then thanked the child and parent for their participation in the study. 
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Relaxation Condition 
Children in the relaxation condition underwent the venepuncture using the relaxation 
technique described above.  Once the child had relaxed from toes to fingers, the 
relaxation was repeated in a random manner, that is, switching from one side to the 
other and back again, and up or down the body.  Again, after about 4-5 minutes of 
relaxing, the nurse would come in and prepare the equipment for the venepuncture.  
This would take another 1-2 minutes.  During this time the relaxation technique 
continued.  The venepuncture was performed as the researcher talked to the child about 
relaxing a particular area then focussing on another area. 
 
 Guided Imagery Condition 
In the GI condition, the researcher briefly spoke with the child about imagery.  The 
child was asked to identify something that she or he liked to do, something that was 
‘good fun’.  When the nature of the imagery was established, the researcher explained, 
“’Imagery’ is imagining that you are actually doing that while we do the blood test”.  In 
every case with imagery, the researcher said, “I will tell you when we are doing the 
blood test.  While you tell me about what is happening there, I will tell you what is 
happening here.  There will be no surprises”. One child asked not to be told when the 
blood test was happening.  
 
Once the child had decided what he or she would like to imagine, the researcher 
said, “Okay, that sounds like fun, the way we start is to just take a couple of nice big 
deep breaths, and if you like, you can close your eyes and just imagine that you are … 
(wherever the child has chosen).  What does it look like, where you are?”  The opening 
questions were specific to the child’s choice of imagery.  The researcher ensured that 
the child had at least 4-5 minutes in imagery before the nurse commenced the 
procedure.  Sometimes the nurse would have to wait a couple of minutes and 
sometimes the child had more time in imagery before the nurse entered the room.  The 
venepuncture was then performed as the child described his or her imagery. 
 
Relaxation Therapy and Guided Imagery (RT/GI) Condition 
The process of identifying a topic of interest to imagine in this condition was identical 
to the GI condition described above.  The RT/GI began with the relaxation technique 
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described above.  This was brief, lasting only about 2 minutes compared with the 
relaxation alone condition.  Unlike the relaxation alone condition, the researcher said to 
the children towards the end of the relaxation phase, “Okay, when you are ready, you 
can close your eyes if you like and just imagine that you are there, what does it look 
like, where you are?  And so on. As stated above, the researcher ensured that the child 
had at least 4-5 minutes in imagery before the nurse commenced the procedure. 
 
Post-Venepuncture Process and Data Collection 
For those children in the imaging conditions, the imagery was brought to a close after 
the Bandaid® was placed on the child’s arm.  These children were asked if they felt as 
if they were here in the hospital, there, (wherever their imagery was) or in between, a 
bit there and a bit here.  The response was recorded according to the numerical code on 
the data sheet.  At this time the video recording was stopped.  In the control and RT 
conditions, the video recording ceased after the Bandaid® was applied.   
 
Each child was asked to rate how painful the blood test was using the Astra® 
Pharmaceuticals Pain ruler.  Then each child was asked how scary or frightening he or 
she felt during the procedure.  A score was taken, again using Hester’s Poker chip tool 
adapted for fear.  The children also rated how relaxed they felt during the procedure 
and how much what they felt in their arm bothered them. 
  
All children were then asked about their thoughts during the blood test.  
Responses were rated as good, bad, or just normal, neither good nor bad.  All children 
were then asked about their feelings during the blood test.  Similarly, responses were 
rated as good, bad or just normal. 
 
By this time, the nurse had left the room to send the blood for analysis.  The 
child’s parent was asked to rate how ‘uptight’ she or he felt the child was on entering 
the department and again during the blood test.  Both of these ratings were on a verbal 
scale of zero, ‘not at all uptight’, to 10, ‘extremely uptight'. The nurse who performed 
the procedure also rated how uptight the child was on entering the department and 
during the blood test on the same verbal scale after the child and parent had left the 
department. 
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The videotapes were later analysed independently by the researcher and a 
Clinical Nurse Specialist in pain management employed by the hospital.  Two 
measures were applied to the video, firstly, the level of involvement in imagery in the 
RT/GI and GI cases using the Imagery Absorption Scale (IAS) devised by the 
researcher and, secondly, a measure of distress using the Observational Scale of 
Behavioural Distress (OSBD) (Jay, Elliott and Caldwell 1983).  The scoring of the 
videos on the IAS and OSBD was the final stage in data collection. 
 
Summary 
This chapter outlined the method undertaken in the second study to investigate the 
effects of imagery, with and without relaxation, and relaxation alone, on the experience 
associated with venepuncture as a painful medical procedure.  A number of measures 
were taken in this study including self-reports, specific observations of behaviour, and 
global assessments of the child by parents and nurses.  The nature of the research 
question and the subsidiary questions leading to the hypotheses meant that the number 
of dependent variables was quite high compared to most other studies and the cartoon 
study described in Chapter 8.  The videorecording of each case meant that the 
researcher and an independent observer could apply objective measures of distress and 
imagery absorption at a later time. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
RESULTS: RELAXATION AND IMAGERY STUDY 
 
The previous chapter outlined the hypotheses, measures and method 
undertaken in the second study.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
present an overview of the sample and the checks for randomisation, to 
state and clarify the data transformations performed prior to the 
analyses, and to report the results of the statistical analyses.  
 
Overview of the Sample 
One hundred and twenty children aged six to 16 years participated in this study, 52 
boys and 68 girls.  The mean age was 10 years and nine months (standard deviation, 2 
years and 10 months).  Of these, 77 percent had previous experience of a venepuncture.     
 
Checks on Randomisation 
To confirm that the random allocation of participants to the four experimental 
conditions had not inadvertently resulted in the unequal distribution of a number of 
potentially confounding variables, a series of chi-square analyses were performed. 
These analyses examined the extent to which the gender of participant, the nurse 
involved in the procedure, the parent present, and previous experience of venepuncture 
were balanced across the four conditions. The distributions and analyses are tabulated 
and attached as Appendix E.  None of the chi-square analyses was significant.  This 
established that randomisation had been effective. 
 
A one-way ANOVA with the four experimental conditions as the factor and age 
as the dependent variable did suggest a preponderance of older participants in the 
control condition, but the effect was insignificant, F (3, 116) = 1.77, ns.  Tukey post 
hoc tests gave no indication that the mean age in the Control condition (11.77) differed 
from the other three conditions: RT (10.53), GI (10.37) and RT/GI (10.33).  
Nonetheless, given the recognised influence of age on perceptions of fear and pain, the 
presence of a slightly older control sub-sample was deemed important enough to use 
age as a covariate when examining the hypotheses.  Gender and previous experience of 
venepuncture (yes/no) were also added as covariates despite their even spread across 
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the conditions, given their suggested link with many of the dependent variables 
(Chambers, Giesbrecht, & Craig 1999; Carr, Lemanek & Armstrong, 1998; Crow, 
1993; Dahlquist & Busby, 2002; O’Keeffe, 2001). 
 
Preliminary Examination of the Dependent Variables 
During a preliminary examination, the variables were inspected for significant 
departures from normality.  Following Tabachnick and Fidell (2000), variables were 
subject to transformation where there was any evidence of non-normal distribution, 
either in the form of significant skew or outliers in the sample as a whole, or within the 
four experimental conditions.  Table 10.1 shows the means and standard deviations of 
the transformed variables across the whole sample as well as the manner in which they 
were transformed.  The untransformed means and standard deviations for the whole 
sample are shown in Table F-1 attached in Appendix F.  The untransformed (Tables F-
2 to F-5) and transformed (Tables F-6 to F-9) means and standard deviations for each 
of the key dependent variables within the four conditions are also attached in Appendix 
F.    
 
Table 10.1    
Transformed Descriptive Statistics – Whole Sample 
 Transformation 
X = Score 
N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Pain X.4 118 3.32 1.58 .04 -.27 
Fear Pre X.7 120 1.46 .78 -.10 -.63 
Fear Post X.7 120 .94 .84 .39 -.87 
Bother X.8 119 2.69 2.05 .22 -.99 
Valency of thoughts X.7 120 1.45 .39 .15 -.99 
Valency of feelings X.7 120 1.53 .37 -.10 -.69 
Uptight Parent Pre X.8 120 3.29 2.22 -.19 -1.34 
Uptight Parent Post X.8 120 2.67 1.87 .25 -.88 
Uptight Nurse Pre  X.8 120 3.15 1.59 -.25 -.53 
Uptight Nurse Post X.8 120 2.81 1.70 .20 -.85 
Distress - OSBD X.1 117 .46 .54 .35 -1.84 
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Tables 10.2 and 10.3 show the means and standard deviations for the pre-
procedural and post-procedural measures across the four conditions.  These statistics 
were calculated using the same transformations listed in Table 10.1 
 
Table 10.2  
Descriptive Statistics on Pre-Procedural Transformed Measures According to 
Condition (n = 30) 
 Non-Imaging Imaging 
 Non-relaxed Relaxed Non-relaxed Relaxed 
 (Control) (Relaxation) (Imagery) (Relaxation 
and Imagery) 
 Mean (SD) Mean  (SD)  Mean  (SD) Mean  (SD) 
Fear Pre 1.33 (.67) 1.40 (.95)  1.53 (.86) 1.57 (.63) 
Uptight 
Parent Pre 
2.81 (2.25) 3.17 (2.21)  3.29 (2.38) 3.88 (1.98) 
Uptight 
Nurse Pre 
2.70 (1.65) 3.12 (1.54)  3.32 (1.59) 3.46 (1.57) 
 
Table 10.3  
Descriptive Statistics on Post-Procedural Transformed Measures According to 
Condition (n = 30) 
 Non-Imaging Imaging 
 Non-relaxed Relaxed Non-relaxed Relaxed 
 (Control) (Relaxation) (Imagery) (Relaxation 
and Imagery) 
 Mean (SD) Mean  (SD)  Mean  (SD) Mean  (SD) 
Pain  3.44 (1.12) 3.33 (1.52)  3.40a (1.66) 3.10 a (1.90) 
Fear Post 1.17 (.84) .95 (.97)  1.00 (.86) .65 (.61) 
Bother 3.04 (1.82) 2.77 (1.91)  2.41 a (2.14) 2.54 (2.33) 
Thoughts 1.70 (.40) 1.70 (.37)  1.83 (.35) 1.78 (.37) 
Feelings 1.59 (.36) 1.71 (.44)  1.71 (.30) 1.72 (.34) 
Uptight 
Parent Post 
2.90 (1.93) 2.53 (1.74)  2.66 (1.98) 2.59 (1.91) 
Uptight 
Nurse Post 
2.81 (1.78) 2.71 (1.45)  2.90 (1.85) 2.82 (1.74) 
Distress 
 
.50 (.54) .36 (.52)  .55b (.57) .44 a (.54) 
Notes: 
an = 29 
bn = 28 
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Preliminary Examination of the Independent Variables 
Effect of the Manipulations on Relaxation 
To confirm the relaxation manipulation was having the intended effects, a 2 
(Relaxation) X 2 (Imaging) ANCOVA was performed on the relaxation scores 
following transformation to eliminate skew. Age, gender, and previous venepuncture 
were entered as covariates.  The transformed data are shown in Table 10.4.  
Untransformed means and standard deviations for the relaxation scores on the whole 
sample and by condition are attached shown in Table G-1 (see Appendix G). 
 
Table 10.4  
Descriptive Statistics: Transformed Relaxation Scores across the Four Conditions 
 Condition n Mean (SD) 
Control 30 2.39 (.59) 
Relaxation 29 1.77 (.62) 
Imagery 29 2.13 (.74) 
Relaxation and Imagery 30 1.87 (.72) 
 
As one would expect, children in the two Relaxation conditions (Relaxation and 
combined Relaxation and Guided Imagery) reported significantly higher relaxation 
scores than the non-relaxation conditions, F(1,111) = 15.311, p < .001.  There was no 
significant effect of imagery on relaxation scores, F(1,111) = .609, ns.  There was no 
interaction between the imagery and relaxation conditions, F(1,111) = 2.122,  p = .148. 
 
Involvement in Imagery 
The untransformed means and standard deviations for the IAS scores on the combined, 
and individual imaging conditions are shown in Table H-1 (see Appendix H).  To 
establish if relaxation had any effect on imagery absorption, a comparison of the two 
imaging conditions, with and without relaxation, with respect to involvement in 
imagery (IAS score) was performed.  There was no significant difference in mean IAS 
scores between the Imagery (GI) and combined Relaxation and Imagery (RT/GI) 
conditions.  (MGI = .60, MRT/GI  = .50; t = 1.002, df =  52.6, ns). 
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Consideration of Covariates 
In light of previous research and the existence of marginal, although not significantly 
distorted distribution, age, gender and previous experience of venepuncture were 
identified for their potentially confounding effects in the main analyses to follow.  Prior 
to these analyses, it was considered useful to determine if any of these potentially 
confounding variables did affect the key dependent variables.  Consequently, the 
effects of gender and previous venepuncture (yes/no) were examined with a series of 
ANCOVAs.  In each case, the variables not under investigation were entered as 
covariates in the analyses and all means were adjusted for the covariates.  Hierarchical 
multivariate regression was used to determine any effects of age, as described below. 
   
Effect of Gender, Previous Venepuncture and Age 
The effect of gender on pre-procedural fear and self-reported pain, approached 
significance: pre-procedural fear, F(1, 116) = 3.29, p = .07, η2 = .03; pain, F(1, 114) = 
2.72, p = .10, η2 = .05.  The trends were towards boys reporting less pre-procedural 
fear (Mboys = 1.32) and pain (Mboys = 3.06) than the girls, fear (Mgirls = 1.57) and pain 
(Mgirls = 3.52).  Despite the tendency for boys to rate their pre-procedural fear lower 
than the girls, there was no effect of gender on procedural fear, F(1, 115) = .63, ns. 
 
The effect of previous venepuncture on pre-procedural fear also approached 
significance, F(1, 116) = 2.85, p = .09, η2 = .02, with children who had previous 
venepuncture reporting less pre-procedural fear (Myes = .40) than those who had not had 
a previous venepuncture (Mno =  1.67).  The effect of previous venepuncture on self-
reported pain was also significant, (Myes = 3.15, Mno =  3.86), F(1, 114) = 4.65, p = .03, 
η2 = .04.  There was a trend towards an effect of previous venepuncture on procedural 
fear, (Myes = .88, Mno =  1.13),  F(1, 115) = 2.56, p = .11, η2 = .02.  These results 
suggest that previous experience of venepuncture tends to reduce self-reported pain, 
and fear, before and after the procedure.   
 
The effect of age was examined using a series of hierarchical multivariate 
regression analyses of pain, pre-procedural fear and procedural fear.  In the analyses of 
pain and pre-procedural fear, gender and previous venepuncture were entered at step 
one and age was entered at step two.  Age added significant predictive capacity in the 
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analysis of both pain, R2 Change = .04, F(1,114) = 5.44, p = .02, and pre-procedural 
fear, R2 Change = .08, F(1,116) = 10.50, p = .002.  In the analysis of procedural fear, 
age, gender and pre-procedural fear were all entered at stage one, and age added at step 
two.  Age added no predictive capacity when examining procedural fear, R2 Change = 
.003, F(1,115) = .47, ns. 
  
In summary, gender, previous experience of venepuncture, and age, were all 
shown to have some effect on the dependent variables and confirmed their importance 
as covariates. 
 
Relationships between the Dependent Variables  
A series of correlation analyses examined the association between the variables across 
the entire sample (Table 10.5). The strongest correlation across the entire sample was 
between pain and bother (r = .75).  Pain also correlated strongly with procedural fear (r 
= .66), the parents’ (r = .51), and the nurses’ (r = .50) rating of how uptight the child 
was during the procedure.  Pain also correlated strongly with valency of feelings (r = 
.50).   
 
Apart from the strong correlation between bother and pain, bother also 
correlated strongly with procedural fear (r = .54), parent (r = .52), and nurse (r = .50) 
uptight ratings.  Bother also correlated strongly with valency of feelings (r = .50), 
thoughts (r = .50), and observed distress (r = .45).   
 
The strongest correlations with thoughts were fear (r = .54), and bother (r = 
.50), followed by parents’ uptight rating (r = .48), valency of feelings (r = .46), and 
pain (r = .45).  Pain (r = .50), fear (r = .50) and bother (r = .50) all correlated strongly 
with feelings. 
 
The correlations represented in Table 10.5 were examined for themes using 
factor analysis.  The 11 variables were entered into a principal components analysis.  
Suitability of this data set for factor analysis involved a number of standard 
considerations.  Firstly, regarding sample size, opinions and recommendations vary.  
Tabachnick and Fidell (2000) favour 300 cases for factor analysis.  However, as Pallant 
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(2001) points out, Tabachnick and Fidell concede that a smaller sample size is likely to 
be adequate if the correlations are strong and reliable and the analysis reveals only a 
small number of factors.  Certainly, this was the case in the factor analyses described 
here.  The majority of the correlation coefficients are above .3 and significant at the .01 
level.  Nunnally (cited by Pallant, 2001) points out that the ratio of subjects to items is 
an alternative way of approaching the issue of sample size.  The recommendation is 10 
cases for every item to be factor analysed.  Applying this criterion to the present study 
would suggest a minimum sample size of 110, although 5 cases for each item (55 in 
this study) is also suggested as adequate in most cases (Pallant, 2001).  The issue of 
sample size is acknowledged as a potential limitation in the analyses, however, given 
the strength of the correlations, the small number of factors computed, and the 
acceptable ratio of items to cases, factor analysis was deemed a reasonable way of 
analysing the relationships between the variables. 
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Table 10.5 
Correlations: Whole Sample 
  Pain Fear 
Pre 
Fear 
Post 
Bother Valency 
of 
Thoughts 
 
Valency 
of 
Feelings 
 
Parent 
Pre 
Parent 
Post 
Nurse 
Pre 
Nurse 
Post 
Distress 
 Pain  r  1.000 .418a .655a .751a .454a .502a .171 .509a .314a .498a .447a 
  N 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 115 
 Fear Pre r   1.000 .549a .337a .262a .285a .361a .387a .518a .320a .432a 
  N  120 120 119 120 120 120 120 120 120 117 
 Fear Post r    1.000 .540a .538a .501a .159 .549a .302a .440a .335a 
  N   120 119 120 120 120 120 120 120 117 
 Bother r     1.000 .495a .500a .264a .522a .411a .498a .452a 
  N    119 119 119 119 119 119 119 116 
Thoughts  r      1.000 .463a .193 .482a .208 .256a .261a 
  N     120 120 120 120 120 120 117 
Feelings  r       1.000 .205 .387a .273a .261a .314a 
  N      120 120 120 120 120 117 
Parent Pre r        1.000 .423a .472a .197 .225 
  N       120 120 120 120 117 
Parent 
Post r         1.000 .424
a .615a .360a 
  N        120 120 120 117 
Nurse Pre r          1.000 .611a .379a 
  N         120 120 117 
Nurse 
Post r           1.000 .405
a 
  N          120 117 
Distress  r            1.000 
  N           117 
Note:  
aCorrelation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Principal components analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues greater 
than 1.  Varimax rotation produced the two factor solutions presented in Table 10.6.  
The two factor solution accounted for a total of 50.37 per cent of the variance, with 
Factor 1 contributing 29.39 per cent and Factor 2 contributing 20.98 per cent. 
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Table 10.6 
Varimax Rotation of Two Factor Solution for Whole Sample Correlations 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Dependent  
Variable 
Procedural Pain 
Experience 
Pre-procedural 
Emotional State 
Pain .81  .24  
Fear Post .75  .25  
Bother .72  .33  
Thoughts .61    
Feelings .58    
Parent Post .55  .48  
Nurse Pre   .91  
Nurse Post .40  .56  
Fear Pre .36  .51  
Parent Pre   .45  
Distress .39  .40  
% of variance explained 29.39  20.98  
 
Both factors contain a number of strong loadings of the dependent variables.  
Of the seven variables loading on the Procedural Pain Experience Factor, the first five 
are self-reports, and the last two are parent, and nurse ratings of how uptight the child 
was during the procedure.  The variables in the second factor load on the nurses’ 
assessment of how uptight the child was before the procedure.  Clustered around this 
are the other two pre-procedural ratings – the child’s pre-procedural fear and the 
parents’ rating of how uptight the child was before the procedure.  The nurses’ post-
procedural rating also appears here.  Overall, the second factor represents the child’s 
Pre-procedural Emotional State.  Together, the two factors present a logical summary 
of the relationships between the measures across the whole sample.  The main factor is 
the experience of procedural pain for the child and the second factor, a construct of the 
child’s emotional state immediately before the procedure.   
 
Subject scores on each of the two factors were saved and subsequently both sets 
of scores were examined with a MANCOVA using a 2 x (Imaging – Non-imaging), 2 x 
(Relaxation – Non-relaxation) design.  Table 10.7 shows the means and standard 
deviations of the two factor scores across the conditions. 
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Table 10.7 
Two Factor Scores: Means and Standard Deviations According to Condition 
  Condition 
Non-imaging – Imaging 
Condition 
Non-relaxation – Relaxation 
Mean (SD) n 
Procedural Pain 
Experience Score 
  
  
Non-Imaging Non-Relaxed .35 (.83) 30 
  Relaxed .03 (1.11) 30 
  Total .19 (.98) 60 
     
  Imaging  Non-Relaxed -.21 (.81) 27 
    Relaxed -.23 (1.05) 28 
    Total -.22 (.93) 55 
      
  Total Non-Relaxed .08 (.86) 57 
    Relaxed -.10 (1.08) 58 
    Total -.01 (.98) 115 
      
      
Pre-procedural 
Emotional State Score 
  
  
Non-Imaging Non-Relaxed -.30 (1.06) 30 
  Relaxed -.11 (.87) 30 
  Total -.21 (.96) 60 
      
  Imaging  Non-Relaxed .17 (1.01) 27 
    Relaxed .31 (.96) 28 
    Total .24 (.98) 55 
      
  Total Non-Relaxed -.08 (1.06) 57 
    Relaxed .10 (.93) 58 
    Total .01 (.99) 115 
 
The MANCOVA, with age, gender and previous experience of venepuncture as 
the covariates, revealed a significant multivariate effect of imagery in reducing the Pain 
Experience Score (Factor 1.), F(1,115) = 6.80, p = .01, η2 = .06, and conversely, an 
increase in the Pre-procedural Emotional State score (Factor 2), F(1,115) = 5.51, p = 
.02, η2 = .05.  Relaxation had no effect, Pain Experience Score, F(1,115) = 1.57, ns, 
Pre-procedural Emotional State Score, F(1,115) = .32, ns.  There was no interaction 
between imagery and relaxation on the Pain Experience Score,  F(1,115) = .65, ns, nor 
on the Pre-procedural Emotional State Score, F(1,115) = .03, ns. 
 
In summary, the Pain Experience Factor Score was significantly lower in the 
imaging, compared to the non-imaging conditions.  Curiously, the Pre-procedural 
Emotional State Score was higher in the imaging conditions – possible explanations for 
this finding will be discussed in the next chapter.  The relaxation conditions had no 
effect on the pain experience factor score or the pre-procedural emotional state score. 
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Dependent Variable Analyses: Effects of Imaging and Relaxation 
Conditions on the Dependent Variables 
In light of the significant positive effect of the manipulations on the second factor 
score, pre-procedural fear, and the pre-procedural uptight ratings were added to age, 
gender and previous venepuncture as the covariates in the follow-up univariate 
ANCOVAs to investigate the effects of the manipulations on each of the dependent 
variables. 
 
The follow-up univariate ANCOVAs revealed a slight trend towards an effect 
of imagery on pain, F(1,105) = 2.01, p = .16, η2 = .02, no effect of relaxation, F(1,105) 
= 1.31, ns, nor any interaction between imagery and relaxation, F(1,105) = .01, ns. 
 
Self-reported procedural fear was significantly lower in the imaging conditions, 
F(1,105) = 8.41, p = .005, η2 = .07, similarly, the relaxation conditions showed a 
significant reduction in procedural fear, F(1,105) = 6.05, p = .02, η2 = .05,.  There was 
no interaction between imagery and relaxation, F(1,105) = .29, ns.   Planned 
comparisons showed that the combined intervention (relaxation and imagery) elicited 
significantly less procedural fear than either relaxation alone (contrast estimate, .412, p 
= .02) or imagery alone (contrast estimate, .413, p = .02). 
 
Each child was asked immediately after the procedure to rate how much the 
procedure bothered him or her.  The imaging conditions had an effect on bother, 
F(1,105) = 4.81, p = .03, η2 = .04, but the relaxation conditions had no effect, F(1,105) 
= .32, ns, nor was there any interaction, F(1,105) = .96, ns. 
 
The imaging conditions had a positive effect on the valency of thoughts, 
F(1,105) = 7.56, p = .007, η2 = .07, and a positive effect on feelings, F(1,105) = 3.80, p 
= .05, η2 = .04.  Relaxation did not affect thoughts, F(1,105) = .37, ns, but there was a 
slight trend towards an effect on feelings, F(1,105) = 2.07, p = .15, η2 = .02.  There 
was no interaction between imagery and relaxation with regard to thoughts, F(1,105) = 
.91, ns, or feelings, F(1,105) = 1.62, ns. 
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There was no effect of imagery on distress, F(1,105) =  .16, ns, but there was an 
effect of relaxation, F(1,105) = 3.62, p = .06, η2 = .03.  There was no interaction 
between imagery and relaxation: F(1,105) = .59, ns. 
 
After the procedure, parents and nurses were each asked to rate how ‘uptight’ 
the child was.  Imagery had an effect on parent ratings, F(1,105) = 4.19, p = .04, η2 = 
.04, but not on nurse ratings, F(1,105) = .73, ns. Relaxation had no effect on parent 
ratings, F(1,105) = 1.60, ns, nor on nurse ratings, F(1,105) = .59, ns η2 = .02.  There 
was no interaction between imagery and relaxation; parent ratings, F(1,105) = 1.30, ns; 
nurse ratings F(1,105) = .89, ns. 
 
In summary, the follow-up ANCOVAs on the post-procedural dependent 
variables demonstrated only a slight trend towards a reduction in self-reported pain but 
significant effects on most of the related variables including fear, bother, valency of 
thoughts and feelings and the parent post-procedural uptight rating.  Relaxation reduced 
procedural fear and showed a tendency towards a positive effect on valency of feelings. 
  
Correlations in the Non-imaging and Imaging Conditions 
It was anticipated that the imaging conditions would alter the extent to which pain and 
the other dependent variables, fear, bother, thoughts, feelings, parent and nurse uptight 
ratings and distress were related to each other.  The correlations between the dependent 
variables in the non-imaging and imaging conditions are shown in Tables I-1 and I-2 
(see Appendix I).  The correlation between pain and procedural fear in the imaging (r = 
.54) conditions was less than the same correlation (r = .81) in the non-imaging 
conditions.  The correlation between fear and bother was also weaker in the imaging (r 
= .42) compared to the non-imaging (r = .66) conditions, as were the correlations 
between pain and thoughts (imaging, r = .38, non-imaging, r = .41) and pain and 
feelings (imaging, r = .53, non-imaging, r = .62).  A strong and significant correlation 
between pain and bother was common to the imaging (r = .77) and non-imaging (r = 
.73) conditions. 
 
In order to focus on the effect of imagery, repeated factor analyses were 
performed on the relationships between the dependent variables in the non-imaging and 
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in the imaging conditions.  It was recognized that the small sample sizes render the 
factor loadings unstable but given the continued high values of the correlations (Tables 
H-1 and H-2) and the foregoing discussion of sample size, it was seen to be worth 
exploring.  In these analyses, only the eight post-procedural measures were entered as 
only these were subject to the effects of the imagery manipulation.  Tables 10.8 and 
10.9 show the factor solutions for the non-imaging and imaging conditions. 
 
Table 10.8 
Varimax Rotation of Single Factor Solution for Non-imaging Conditions 
 Factor 1 
Dependent  
Variable 
Procedural Pain 
Experience 
Pain .88  
Fear Post .86  
Bother .79  
Feelings  .70  
Thoughts .69  
Parent Post .68  
Nurse Post .51  
Distress .46  
% of variance explained 50.31  
 
Table 10.9 
Varimax Rotation of Single Factor Solution for the Imaging Conditions 
 Factor 1 
Dependent  
Variable 
Impact of Painful 
Procedure 
Bother .88  
Pain .86  
Parent Post .79  
Nurse post  .70  
Fear Post .69  
Distress .68  
Thoughts .51  
Feelings .46  
% of variance explained 46.29  
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Principal components analysis on the variables in the non-imaging conditions 
revealed one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.  Varimax rotation produced the 
single factor solution presented in Table 10.8  The single factor solution accounted for 
50.31 per cent of the variance.  
 
As was the case in the whole sample factor analysis, this factor is best described 
as the Procedural Pain Experience.  The variable with the highest loading is pain, 
closely followed by the post procedural measure of fear during the procedure and then 
bother.  A cluster of feelings and thoughts with the parent’s rating of how uptight the 
child was during the procedure follows the top three.   
 
Principal components analysis of the dependent variables in the imaging 
conditions also revealed one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.  Varimax rotation 
produced the single factor solution presented in Table 10.9.  The single factor solution 
accounted for 46.29 per cent of the variance.  
 
The factor analysis in the imaging conditions produced a shift in the top-loading 
variable from pain to bother, and fear dropped to the fifth position.  At the same time, 
parent and nurse ratings of how uptight the child was during the procedure escalated 
into the cluster of top-loading variables.  This pattern represents a number of subtle 
changes in the relationships between the variables in the imaging conditions.  The 
emphasis on bother, coupled with inclusion of the parent and nurse uptight ratings 
suggests that this factor might relate to the impact of the painful procedure on the child.     
 
Post Hoc Analyses: Effects of High versus Low Involvement in Imagery 
on the Dependent Variables  
The Imagery Absorption Scale (IAS) outlined in Chapter 9 was developed to facilitate 
a post hoc analysis of the effect of high versus low involvement in imagery on the 
dependent variables.  The scale was applied to the videorecorded cases of children in 
the imagery conditions; the maximum possible score was 12.  The median (IAS = 9) 
split created two roughly equal groups who varied in their observed involvement in 
imagery.  High involvement in imagery was defined as an IAS score of 9 to 12 (n = 
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33).  The remainder (IAS score 1-8) constituted intermittent to low involvement in 
imagery (n = 27).   Using this classification as a quasi-experimental independent 
variable, the effects of high versus low involvement in imagery and the relaxation – 
non-relaxation manipulations on the dependent variables were analysed.  In these 
analyses, age, gender and previous experience of venepuncture were always entered as 
covariates.  Where the dependent variable had a pre-procedural measure (fear and 
uptight ratings), these were also entered in the analyses as covariates. The results of the 
analyses according to high-low involvement in imagery are presented in the same order 
as before: pain, fear, bother, valency of thoughts and feelings, distress, and parent and 
nurse ratings of how uptight the child was during the procedure  
 
The means and standard deviations of the dependent variables in Table 10.10 
relate to the imaging conditions only.  The imaging conditions are first divided into 
imagery without relaxation (non-relaxed) and imagery with relaxation (relaxed).  Each 
of these groupings is then divided into low and high involvement in imagery as 
measured by the Imagery Absorption Scale (IAS).  Again, the means and standard 
deviations are based on the same transformations listed earlier in Table 10.1. 
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Table 10.10 
Descriptive Statistics on Transformed Measures according to Low and High 
Involvement in Imagery in non-relaxed and relaxed imaging conditions. 
 Non-Relaxed Relaxed 
 Low IAS High IAS Low IAS High IAS 
 Mean 
(n = 14) 
(SD) Mean 
(n = 16) 
(SD) Mean 
(n = 13) 
(SD) Mean 
(n = 17) 
(SD) 
Pain  4.09 b (1.85) 2.84 (1.28) 4.21 (1.58) 2.19c (1.68) 
Fear Post 1.10 (.97) .91 (.76) 1.04 (.54) .35 (.49) 
Bother 3.45b (2.32) 1.55 (1.57) 4.28 (2.12) 1.21 (1.46) 
Thoughts 1.44 (.37) 1.31 (.38) 1.65 (.37) 1.26 (.32) 
Feelings 1.57 (.28) 1.46 (.35) 1.61 (.33) 1.40 (.37) 
Uptight 
Parent Post 
3.77 (2.00) 1.69 (1.41) 4.08 (1.52) 1.46 (1.31) 
Uptight 
Nurse Post 
4.16 (1.59) 1.80 (1.31) 4.01 (1.34) 1.93 (1.48) 
Distress 
 
.85a (.52) .32 (.49) .91 (.41) .06c (.26) 
Notes: 
an = 12 
bn = 13 
cn = 16 
 
High involvement in imagery had a significant effect on pain, F(1,51) = 10.53,  
p = .002, η2 = .17, but not relaxation, F(1,51) = 1.40, ns.  There was no interaction 
between imagery and relaxation, F(1,51) = .31, ns.  Self-reported procedural fear was 
not influenced by high – low involvement in imagery, F(1,52) = .83, ns.  Relaxation 
produced a reduction in procedural fear, F(1,52) = 8.46, p = .005, η2 = .14.  In the 
analysis there was no interaction between imagery and relaxation, F(1,52) = .96, ns.  
High involvement in imagery had an effect on self-report of bother, F(1,52) = 20.10, p 
< .001, η2 = ..29.  Relaxation showed no effect on bother, F(1,52) = .03, ns, and there 
was no interaction between high-low involvement in imagery and relaxation, F(1,52) = 
1.01, ns. 
 
The effect of high involvement in imagery on valency of thoughts was 
significant, F(1,53) = 9.01, p = .004, η2 = .15, and there was a trend towards an effect 
of imagery on valency of feelings, F(1,53) = 2.71, p = .11, η2 = .05.  There was no 
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effect of relaxation on valency of thoughts, F(1,53) = .91, nor valency of feelings, 
F(1,53) = .08, ns.  There was trend towards an interaction between high-low 
involvement in imagery and relaxation for thoughts, F(1,53) = 2.54,  p = .12, η2 = .05; 
but not for feelings, F(1,53) = .24, ns. 
 
High involvement in imagery had an effect on distress, F(1,50) =  30.86, p < 
.001, η2 = .38, but there was no effect of relaxation, F(1,50) =  .61, ns,.  There was no 
interaction between high – low involvement in imagery and relaxation: F(1,50) =  1.45, 
ns. 
 
There was an effect of high involvement in imagery on both parent, and nurse 
ratings of how uptight the child was during the procedure: parent ratings, F(1,52) = 
29.38,  p < .001, η2 = .36; nurse ratings, F(1,52) =  15.00, p < .001, η2 = .22.  No 
significant effect of relaxation on parent or nurse ratings was found: parent, F(1,52) = 
.50, ns; nurse, F(1,52) = .44, ns, nor any interaction between imagery and relaxation; 
parent ratings, F(1,52) = .06, ns; nurse ratings F(1,52) = .82, ns. 
 
In summary, within the two imaging conditions, the children who had high 
involvement in their imagery reported significantly lower pain and scored lower on all 
related dependent variables except fear.  High involvement in imagery also had a 
positive effect on thoughts and a tendency towards positive feelings.    
 
Summary 
The results of the inferential analyses were presented in this chapter.  Prior to the 
analyses, three general issues were considered.  These were checks for randomisation, 
departures from normality, and consideration of covariates.  Randomisation was 
effective, although, children in the control conditions were slightly, but not 
significantly, older than the children in the other conditions.  Consideration of 
covariates was undertaken in two stages.  The first set, gender, previous venepuncture 
and age showed some effects and were subsequently employed as covariates in all 
analyses.  The second set of covariates emerged from the factor analysis on the 
relationships between the dependent variables.  The two factor solution clearly 
delineated the Pre-procedural Emotional State as a factor distinct from the Procedural 
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Pain Experience.  The imaging conditions reduced the composite ‘Procedural Pain 
Experience Score’ but oddly, the ‘Pre-procedural Emotional State Score’ was higher in 
the imaging compared to non-imaging conditions, which is why the pre-procedural 
variables were then entered together with age, gender and previous venepuncture in the 
follow-up analyses.  The subsequent analyses of the effects of the imaging and 
relaxation conditions on the dependent variables showed a slight effect of the imaging 
conditions on pain and significant effects on most of the related variables including 
bother, fear, valency of thoughts and feelings and uptight ratings.  Relaxation reduced 
procedural fear and tended to show a positive effect on the valency of feelings. 
 
The trend observed in the correlations was for weaker relationships in the 
imaging compared to non-imaging conditions.  Factor analysis on the non-imaging 
conditions produced only the Procedural Pain Experience factor while factor analysis 
on the imaging conditions produced a shift to, ‘Impact of the Painful Procedure on the 
Child’.  The effects on the dependent variables within the imaging conditions were 
further explored in a post hoc analysis of the effect of high versus low involvement in 
imagery.  In this analysis, pain and all of the dependent variables except fear were 
significantly lower in the children who engaged in imagery as depicted by the high IAS 
score.  The significance and implications of the results presented in Chapter 8 from the 
cartoon study together with the results in this chapter will now be discussed in detail in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the second study are discussed in this chapter in relation 
to the findings of the first study, the literature reviewed, and the 
theoretical framework that emerged in the preliminary chapters.  The 
aim of this chapter is to propose an empirically and theoretically based 
model that will account for the effects of distraction, relaxation and 
imagery on procedural pain and fear in children.   
 
Two studies of moderate sample sizes were undertaken in this thesis to 
investigate the effects of distraction, relaxation and imagery on procedural pain and 
fear in children undergoing a standard medical procedure.  A number of environmental 
parameters were controlled and the participants, although necessarily a convenience 
sample, were randomly allocated to the experimental conditions.  The first study 
investigated the effects of a single distraction intervention in the form of a cartoon 
video rather than a range of distractors.  In this way, the manipulation was easily 
standardised.  The second study was more complex in that the manipulations under 
investigation were relaxation and imagery as combined and independent interventions.  
The manipulation checks confirmed that the interventions, relaxation and imagery, 
were successful and this facilitated a deep level of investigation into their effects on a 
broad range of self-report and observational measures that involved the parents, the 
nurses who performed the procedures, an independent observer, and lastly, the 
researcher.  In each study, the painful procedure was venepuncture, and both studies 
were undertaken in the same acute clinical setting.  This meant that the study 
populations, technical aspects of the procedure, and environmental conditions were 
similar in both studies, which in terms of this discussion, is important because the 
findings can be compared with confidence. 
 
The first part of this chapter is divided into two sections.  The first section 
focuses on the overall effects of distraction, imagery and relaxation and the post hoc 
analyses of the effects of high versus low involvement in imagery on the dependent 
variables.  The second section reverses the perspective and focuses on the dependent 
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variables and how their interrelationships were affected by the interventions.  The 
remainder of the chapter is devoted to the development of a model that accounts for the 
effects of distraction, relaxation and imagery, on procedural fear and pain.  
 
Overview of the Success and Failure of the Distraction, Imaging, and 
Relaxation Conditions 
The three interventions under investigation, distraction, relaxation and imagery, 
showed similarities and some differences in terms of their effects on procedural pain 
and fear.  This overview will compare and contrast the effects of the interventions on 
fear and pain, and will be followed by a close examination of the effects of distraction 
relaxation and imagery on the range of dependent variables in the second study. 
 
Effects of Distraction, Relaxation and Imagery on Fear and Pain 
The distraction intervention in the first study had a clear and obvious effect of reducing 
procedural fear in children aged 5 to 16 years.  In the second study, both relaxation and 
imagery reduced procedural fear, and when the two interventions were combined, the 
effect was even greater.  Pain however proved to be more resistant to the effects of the 
interventions.  In the first study, distraction had an effect on pain that approached 
significance.  In the second study, relaxation did not reduce pain, and imagery only had 
an effect when children who had a high level of involvement were compared to those 
who had a low level of involvement.  There was, however, a significant effect of the 
imaging conditions on the composite Procedural Pain Experience factor score. This 
score was generated from a factor analysis of the dependent variables. 
 
Immediately it appears that of the two main constructs under investigation, fear 
and pain, pain is more resistant to the effects of relaxation, distraction and imagery.  At 
first glance, each of these interventions is different to the others, however, there are 
points of similarity and contrast in terms of their social and psychological 
characteristics, capacity to involve, and impact on the child in the procedural setting.  
These characteristics are worth exploring in the light of the differential effects of these 
interventions on fear and pain. 
 
  
 
236  
The distraction intervention in this study was a cartoon playing on television.  
This presented the child with two options, to focus attention on the cartoon, or to focus 
attention on the elements of the procedure.  The degree of social involvement and 
interaction with the child was low compared to say blowing bubbles, or engaging the 
child in a story that unfolds in a pop-up book.  In this sense, the child is more of a 
recipient than a participant, in relation to the intervention.  As a recipient, the child may 
feel a sense of isolation in an environment that is unfamiliar and threatening.  However, 
a cartoon is something that is likely to be familiar and in a way, ‘a bit out of place’, 
given the typical clinical reality of a procedure room.  The sight and sound of a cartoon 
in this setting could be unexpected and even surprising.  The efficacy of a distraction is 
dependent upon how it is construed.  If the child passively construes the cartoon 
playing: it is there, I know it is on the television; and actively construes the procedure: 
right now, what they are doing to my arm is more important than that stupid cartoon 
playing, then as a distraction, the cartoon will fail.  The nurse might try to direct the 
child’s attention to the cartoon, and for some children, that might help, but for others, 
the cartoon is a story that cannot compete with what is unfolding in the procedure 
room.  The results show however that the cartoon condition reduced fear and produced 
a trend towards lower self-report of pain.  This would suggest that many children chose 
to actively construe the cartoon and in so doing, passively construed the procedural 
reality, and let it fade. 
 
The relaxation intervention has some similarities with distraction but differs 
particularly at the level of social interaction.  In common with distraction, the 
relaxation exercise presented the child with two options: to focus on relaxing, or to 
focus on the elements of the procedure.  However, unlike the cartoon distractor, where 
the child’s attention is directed to something ‘out there’, the relaxation exercise 
directed the child’s attention within.  There is an element of distraction in this because 
the child’s attention is directed away from the physical aspects of the procedure to a 
focussed sense of self in a relaxing manner.  The striking differences between 
relaxation and distraction as interventions include the participatory nature of the child’s 
involvement, and the communication between the person conducting the relaxation, 
and the child.  When a child engages in a relaxation exercise, she is an active 
participant, rather than being an observer, for example, when watching a cartoon on a 
television.  As a participant, the child engages with the person who is directing the 
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relaxation exercise.  The flow of communication tends to be one way, that is, from the 
clinician to the child, but it is not as unidirectional as watching a cartoon.  Furthermore, 
in using relaxation with a child, the person interacting with the child is supportive and 
calm, and could be construed as a ‘good guy’, while the nurse or the doctor performing 
the procedure is the ‘bad guy’.  In this study, the relaxation intervention had a 
significant effect on fear but not pain, which suggests that although the sensation of 
pain was not affected, having something to do, to focus on, perhaps the feeling of being 
relaxed, and being with a supportive person, made the experience less frightening. 
 
The guided imagery intervention combines the attention shift in distraction with 
the supportive and communicative elements of the relaxation intervention.  When 
engaging in imagery, the child’s attention is directed firstly inward, similar to 
relaxation, but then the child constructs her own story, and furthermore, communicates 
her story to a guide who, demonstrably, is very interested in what is unfolding.  The 
level of interaction with the guide is much greater in imagery than relaxation.  In fact, 
the flow of communication is more from the child to the guide.  In this way, the child is 
not only a participant; the child is in control and is the centre of her constructed reality.  
The child, in a distraction or relaxation intervention, is, at a most basic level, a listener, 
in imagery, the child is a speaker, and everyone present, is the audience.  This is a 
complete turn around in the typical communication dynamics in a procedure room, 
where the child is usually told what to, and what not to do, by everyone present.  Even 
in distraction and relaxation techniques, people tell the child what to, and what not, to 
do.  In imagery, there is an element of instruction from the guide but a ‘guide and be 
guided approach’ ensures that the locus of control is with the child.  An important 
difference between imagery and distraction and relaxation is the extent to which the 
child can construct her own story, a reality that is inconsistent with the procedural 
reality.  Certainly, children will actively construct some distraction techniques in a 
personal and meaningful manner rather simply being a passive observer, but in 
imagery, there is full opportunity for the child to actively construct her own reality, and 
in so doing, to let the procedural reality slip away. 
 
In the second study, the whole sample factor analysis of dependent measures 
produced two distinct factors, which represented the Procedural Pain Experience and 
Pre-procedural Emotional State.  Imagery significantly reduced the Procedural Pain 
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Experience Score.  It is worth pausing for a moment to reflect on what the first factor, 
the child’s Procedural Pain Experience, actually means: it represents a holistic view of 
the pain experience for the child.  The three top loading variables (all self-report), 
which could be thought of, as ‘the big three’ of procedural pain, were pain, procedural 
fear and bother, in that order.  The ‘big three’ were closely followed by valency of 
thoughts and feelings (also self-report).  This cluster of variables aptly represents the 
experience of procedural pain for a child, ‘It hurts, I’m afraid, and I am bothered, my 
thoughts are negative, as are my feelings’.  In terms of procedural pain, as suggested 
earlier, the word ‘unpleasant’ in the IASP definition of pain is inadequate.  The ‘big 
three’, pain, fear and bother, together with negative thoughts and feelings, are 
consistent with the affective descriptors that children use to describe severe pain – 
terrifying, torturing, killing, deadly, as identified by Tesler et al. (1989).   
 
It is interesting to note that this ‘children’s pain experience measure’ is not only 
a composite of distinct variables, the variables were measured using a variety of tools, 
and yet, they converge on a single factor. It is not as if the children just repeatedly 
reported much the same thing on one measure.  Separate visual analogue scales were 
used to measure pain and bother; fear was measured with a completely different tool; 
the Poker Chip Tool, and valency of thoughts and feelings was obtained with a verbal 
rating scale.   This ‘Procedural Pain Experience’ factor emerged as a factor quite 
distinct from the second factor, the child’s Pre-procedural Emotional State. 
 
The post hoc analysis concentrated on the effects of on high versus low 
involvement in imagery.  Comparison of high and low involvement in imagery groups 
reproduced the whole sample imaging versus non-imaging findings but in this analysis, 
pain was significantly lower in the children who scored high on the IAS, but fear was 
not affected.  It is possible that during the procedure it was the pain that the children 
experienced that determined their level of imagery absorption rather than the reverse.  
Such is the nature of post hoc analyses.  While it is argued that the reason that children 
who had high involvement in imagery would score low on pain and the related 
variables was their involvement in imagery, the assumptive nature of the argument is 
acknowledged. 
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Overall, the imaging conditions had a significant of fear, and pain was 
significantly lower in the children who had high involvement in imagery.  It appears 
safe to conclude, therefore, that imagery as opposed to relaxation and probably 
distraction, will lead to a reduction in the pain experienced by children when that pain 
is defined in terms of both its sensory and emotional components. 
 
Relationships between Pain, Fear, Bother, Thoughts, Feelings, Parent and 
Nurse Uptight Ratings and Observed Distress and the Effects of 
Relaxation and Imagery. 
As discussed in the previous section, the factor analysis of the dependent variables 
across the whole sample revealed two factors: the Procedural Pain Experience, and the 
child’s Pre-procedural Emotional State.  However, separate factor analyses of the non-
imaging and imaging conditions revealed slightly different single factor solutions.  In 
the case of the non-imaging conditions, the single factor was similar to the first factor 
revealed in the analysis of the whole sample.  The most important variable was self 
reported pain.  The factor analysis measures in the imaging conditions also produced a 
single factor solution, but in this analysis, the top-loading variable was bother.  
Concern about the possible effect of sample size on the stability of these analyses is 
acknowledged but the shift from pain to bother in the imaging conditions is interesting.  
The single factor solution in the imaging conditions is more related to the ‘Impact of 
the Procedure on the Child’ with ‘bother’ and parent and nurse ratings of how ‘uptight’ 
the child was during the procedure featuring amongst the top-loading variables.  Pain is 
there of course because pain, or lack of it, is part of the impact on the child.  Clearly, 
the parents and nurses could relate to whether the procedure bothered, or did not bother 
the child in the imaging conditions but less so in the non-imaging conditions.  Parent 
and nurse uptight ratings, and the observational measure of distress all correlated 
strongly with bother in the imaging conditions but intriguingly, the same correlations 
were weaker in the non-imaging conditions.  Apart from the shift from pain (non-
imaging factor analysis), to bother (imaging factor analysis), fear featured amongst the 
top-loading variables in the non-imaging conditions but dropped considerably in the 
imaging factor analysis.  There is no simple explanation for these findings.  The child’s 
overt reaction to the procedure could be a component of the degree to which the pain 
bothered the child.  Certainly, the distress score is simply based on the number of times 
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particular behaviours are observed, and nothing else, whereas pain and fear are more 
subjective and less easily identified by an observer.  The emphasis on ‘bother’ coupled 
with pain, as components of the ‘Impact on the Child’ factor also suggests that in the 
imaging conditions, the two variables change together rather than the dissociative 
notion that the child can still feel the pain but is not bothered by it.  The suggestion 
here is that in imagery, the child is less bothered, and appears less uptight but what the 
child feels, is not the same as the usual ‘pain experience’ (the factor identified in the 
non-imaging and whole sample analyses).  The ultimate goal of this discussion is to 
propose how this can happen in imagery and in certain types of distraction. 
 
Turning from the factor analyses to the individual dependent variables, the 
strongest correlation across the entire sample was between pain and bother.  Pain also 
correlated strongly, as one would expect, with procedural fear, procedural uptight 
ratings, distress, negative feelings and thoughts.  In this study, the emphasis in the pain 
measure was on the ‘hurty bit’ – how much it hurt in the child’s arm during the blood 
test.  This was an attempt to focus the measure on the sensory aspect of the pain, using 
simple language.  The other measures related to emotion (fear and feelings), affect 
(uptight), cognition (thoughts) and behaviour (Observational Scale of Behavioral 
Distress - OSBD).  The significant positive correlation between pain and the other 
measures reflect the complexity of procedural pain, the strong association between 
sensation and emotion, and highlights these as possible targets for psychological 
interventions.  However, it remains that out of the ‘ouch’ and the fear, the ouch is the 
more difficult to modulate. 
 
Fear is an enormously important aspect of procedural pain, for the child, and the 
health professional.  Interestingly, the highest correlation with pre-procedural fear 
across all participants was procedural fear.  While some children may not be 
particularly frightened before the procedure, then frightened during the procedure, 
generally, those children who are frightened before will be frightened during the 
procedure, and if not frightened before, they tend not be frightened during the 
procedure – these represent the strong correlation between pre-procedural and 
procedural fear.  Other significant correlations with pre-fear were pain, distress and the 
uptight ratings of the nurses and parents.  All of these relationships reflect the link 
between pre-procedural fear and the intensity of the pain experience.  Likewise, 
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procedural fear correlated strongly with pain, bother, nurse and parent procedural 
uptight ratings and the valency of the child’s thoughts and feelings.   
 
Fear was measured before randomly allocating a child to a condition, and again 
immediately following the procedure.  The post-procedural fear score related to how 
scary or frightening it was for the child during the procedure.  Although the timing of 
the measure was after the procedure, the score relates to fear during the procedure. 
 
Both relaxation and imagery had a significant effect on fear, as did distraction 
in the first study.  Fear is certainly a factor that impacts heavily on the child’s 
procedural pain experience.  Fear, or its biomedical approximation, anxiety, has long 
been considered an important factor in procedural pain (Jay et al., 1987, 1991; Kuttner, 
1989; Pederson, 1995; Zeltzer & LeBaron, 1982).  As was outlined in Chapter 5, fear is 
preferred over anxiety for a range of reasons, not the least of which was that identifying 
fear in a child demands attention, whereas ‘anxiety’ tends to project the ‘problem’ onto 
the child.  Fear is not only an obvious target of psychological intervention, in both 
studies, as reported elsewhere (Broome et al., 1988; Carlson, Broome & Vessy, 2000; 
Kuttner, 1986, 1998), it is a target that is susceptible to psychological intervention. 
 
Despite the relative ease with which fear can be reduced, within the biomedical 
paradigm the focus is still on anxiety, and as a medical diagnosis, anxiety is ‘treated’ 
pharmacologically.  For example, Ljungman, Kreuger, Andréasson, Gordh, and 
Sörensen (2000) reported reduced anxiety but not pain, with intranasal midazolam (a 
short acting central nervous system depressant) prior to subcutaneous central venous 
port access in children.  They also reported nasal discomfort (elsewhere described as 
‘burning’, Anderson, Zeltzer, & Fanurik, 1993) as the most common side effect, 
occurring in 45 per cent of the sample and that 19 percent of the sample dropped out of 
the study because of this side effect. Midazolam causes discomfort, has a disgusting 
taste, and can cause outright agitation or delirium in children (Anderson, Zeltzer, & 
Fanurik, 1993; Massanari & Novitsky, 1997; Young & Kendall, 2001).  Within the 
‘emotion’ context of this discussion, even if the child does not become agitated, the 
construction of ‘disgust’ in relation to taste is worth commenting on.  Disgust is 
commonly included among the five principal emotions  (fear, anger, sadness, joy, and 
disgust) as a negative emotion.  Introducing something that the fearful child may very 
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well construe as disgusting is likely to add to the child’s negative construction of the 
experience.  The co-construction of fear and disgust, coupled with a sense of 
helplessness, and hopelessness is akin to the trauma experience that survivors of 
disaster or combat zones face.  For many children, the trauma is exacerbated because it 
is repeated with every procedure.  Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter 2, it is quite 
feasible that the stress of repeated procedures could impact negatively on a child’s 
immune status.   Administering midazolam, up the nose of a child to reduce ‘anxiety’ 
associated with a medical procedure, seems a problematic and complex way of 
achieving an effect that can be achieved by engaging the child in a simple relaxation 
exercise or by using distraction.   
 
The important issues to consider in combining pharmacological and 
psychological interventions are the aims of each intervention and the possible 
interactions.  For example, the use of benzodiazepines (diazepam) to reduce anxiety in 
conjunction with psychological approaches has been found to be unnecessary (Bullock 
& Shaddy, 1993) and undesirable (Jay et al., 1991) because of impacting negatively on 
the child’s ability to learn a cognitive behavioural intervention.  Regarding midazolam, 
if the aim was to induce a state of anterograde amnesia of the pain, fear and terror of 
procedural pain, then this drug is an excellent choice.  If, however, the aims were to 
reduce the experience of pain and fear, to give some control to the child, to facilitate 
coping and a sense of achievement, and to involve the child and family in treatment, 
then a psychological approach, with or without an analgesic or local anaesthetic would 
be appropriate.   
 
One of the less expected findings to emerge from an examination of the 
relationships between the dependent variables was the emergence of the second factor 
in the factor analysis of the whole sample.  This factor was described as the child’s Pre-
procedural Emotional State and the five top loading variables were the nurse pre-
procedural and procedural uptight ratings, the child’s pre-procedural fear, and the 
parent procedural and pre-procedural uptight ratings.  Furthermore, these factor scores 
derived from this factor were higher in the imaging conditions than the non-imaging 
conditions. 
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Given that the pre-procedural ratings were actually taken after the procedure, it 
is possible that for some reason the parents and the nurses rated the children in the 
imaging conditions as more uptight before the procedure and the children in the non-
imaging conditions as less uptight.  It is of course possible that by chance the children 
in the imaging conditions were more uptight before the procedure.  A point worth 
stressing here is that the child’s self report of fear was also higher in the imaging 
conditions.  This measure was taken before the procedure, and perhaps even more 
telling, before random allocation to a condition.  It tends to suggest that the timing of 
the parent and nurse pre-procedural measures was not ideal.  Had the parent’s pre-
procedural rating been taken before the procedure, it was felt that this should be done in 
isolation from the child.  Removing the parent from the child before the procedure for 
the sake of a measure was deemed unethical.  It was also felt that secretly conversing 
with the parent in front of the child might compromise the child’s level of trust.  With 
hindsight, the parent’s pre-procedural measure could have been attached to the bottom 
of the consent form as a visual analogue scale, read and completed by the parent after 
signing consent. 
 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to demonstrate that psychological 
interventions may have distinct effects on different aspects of the pain experience and 
thus alter the manner in which these aspects are related to one another.  It has also 
shown the care that is required in measuring these various aspects.  While the 
discussion has often been speculative, it is important to remember the unquestionable 
findings of the two studies.  Both studies suggest that procedural fear is susceptible to 
distraction, relaxation, and imagery.  The distraction and relaxation effects suggest that 
a shift in attention is sufficient to reduce fear.  However, shifting attention, the bottom-
up, sensory – appraisal model, does not appear to be sufficient to significantly reduce 
the sensation of pain but being involved in imagery, or actively construing the 
distractor does.  The ability to demonstrate similar effects of distraction and imagery on 
fear (a complex body-mind experience) and pain, – also a complex body-mind 
experience, suggests that the modulation of each is subject to similar mechanisms.  A 
more detailed psychological and neurophysiological model of the relationships between 
distraction, imagery, fear and pain, will be developed. 
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A Model to Explain the Effects of Imagery and Distraction on Procedural 
Fear and Pain in Children. 
The proposed mechanisms underlying the effects of imagery and distraction on pain 
and fear in this study are based on the following premises: that the brain constructs our 
sense of self in the world; and that consciousness is experiencing qualia.  These qualia 
are the qualities of our thoughts, feelings and sensations, associated with neural activity 
that emerges from working memory involving both bottom-up and top-down processes. 
 
In discussing the effects of imagery on fear and pain, the phenomena of imagery 
fear and pain are construed as qualia (Cairns-Smith, 1999).  The quale of fear carries 
the added complexities of the emotions.  The bodily perturbations are what stand out 
immediately in feeling fearful but the cognitive and social factors are equally 
significant.  The quale that is the raw sensation, the ‘ouch’ of pain as the needle pierces 
the skin is arguably simpler; it hurts.  “Where does it hurt?”  “In my arm”.  The 
suggestion here is not that pain can simply be reduced to a sensation but in an attempt 
to explain the effects of distraction, relaxation and imagery, the discussion accepts that 
among the qualia, the ‘ouch’ is a ‘simpler’ experience involving a largely sensory 
component and fewer cognitive and social elements. 
 
 The reason that the quale of fear is easier to modulate than the quale of pain 
(the ouch component) might lie in how each is constructed.  As an emotion, fear is 
comprised of bodily feelings and cognitions within a social and cultural context.  Pain 
(again, the emphasis here is on the sensation), on the other hand, is considerably more 
primitive, involving, initially, fewer cognitive and social components.  In terms of 
modulation, in the case of fear, there are more avenues open to intervention.  The 
avenues of intervention are the various components of the emotions such as, the bodily 
perturbations, emphasised in the early physiological theories of James and Lange, the 
cognitive aspects of Lazarus, and the social aspects raised by Kemper, and Oatley and 
Johnson-Laird.  To expand this argument, let us consider the impact of relaxation. 
 
For the children in this study, relaxation tended to be associated with positive 
feelings, which would compete with the usual fear quale.  While children in the 
relaxation conditions did not report ‘positive thoughts’, a shift towards positive feelings 
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and actively engaging in, rather than ‘having to comply with’, treatment marks a 
significant reconstruction of self in the procedural environment.  For the child, such a 
shift also accompanies a social relationship that is participatory, carries a certain 
amount of status, and negates (to a degree) the typical power differential that exists 
when a child is the passive recipient of a medical procedure.  Usually when the child 
challenges that role, she is denigrated to the point of being labelled ‘difficult’ and may 
be forcibly restrained.  A similar participatory relationship exists in imagery, which 
might also partly explain the significant reduction in fear between the imaging, and the 
non-imaging conditions.  The children in the imaging conditions showed a positive 
shift in valency of thoughts and feelings, which is likely to impart an enhanced sense of 
control, and in so doing, also have a positive effect on fear.   
 
In terms of pain quale, best approximated as the ‘ouch’, apart from 
pharmacologic intervention, the principal avenue open to intervention appears to be 
cognition, which might explain why pain is harder to modulate than fear.  For the 
purpose of this discussion, pain is temporarily reduced to the ‘ouch’ component for two 
reasons: firstly, to consider why this aspect is harder to modulate; and secondly, to 
consider the extreme cases where the modulation is remarkably successful.  In a 
practical sense, however, the qualia of the procedural pain experience are so 
intertwined that an attempt to reduce the whole to the component parts is nothing more 
than a fragmentalist folly.  In this study, the closest approximation to the whole 
experience was the composite Self-reported Pain Experience Factor Score, which was 
significantly reduced in the imaging conditions.  The model, presented later describes 
the detail of the relationships between fear and pain, and distraction, relaxation and 
imagery.  Although pain and fear are discussed as separate entities, procedural pain is a 
composite of many qualia that are constructed, and as such, can be reconstrued, as the 
case may be. 
  
The proposed model for the effects of distraction, relaxation and imagery has 
features that are not dissimilar to those proposed by Chapman and Nakamura (1998).  
Chapman and Nakamura took a constructivist view of the role of suggestion in 
hypnoanalgesia.  They conceptualised consciousness as an area in the brain for 
competing schema; schema related to pain, and schema related to the hypnotic 
suggestion.  However, the model presented in Figures 3 and 4 differs from Chapman 
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and Nakamura’s view in a number of ways.  Firstly, consciousness in the proposed 
model is viewed as a phenomenon that emerges from working memory activity rather 
than an area that can ‘hold’ a finite number of schemata.  Secondly, the proposed 
model moves beyond the cognitive schemas that underpin Chapman and Nakamura’s 
view of consciousness to consider the social psychological elements of the 
interventions that apply even in the absence of direct suggestions – as in imagery and 
distraction.  Finally, the model attempts to embrace the way these interventions may 
alter both the sensory and emotional qualia of fear and pain. 
 
The proposed model in terms of the psychological mechanisms and 
neurophysiological correlates as they relate to procedural pain and fear in children is 
presented in Figures 3 and 4.  Reality 1 (R1) relates to the construed reality of self in 
the procedure room, and Reality 2 (R2) relates to the construed reality of self in 
imagery.  Each of these can be construed actively or passively, in a reciprocal manner.  
That is, if the child actively construes the procedural reality (R1), and passively 
construes the distractor or imagery then the procedural reality (R1) will take precedence 
over the alternate reality (R2).  Conversely, if the child actively and in particular, 
‘imaginatively’, construes the distractor, for example a pop-up book, or actively 
construes the imagery, then the reality consistent with what is actively constructed (R2) 
will take precedence over the procedural reality (R1).  The success or failure of 
distraction or imagery is a function of the mode of construing the procedural reality 
versus the alternate reality of the distractor or the imagery.  It is important to emphasise 
that while the terms success, and failure are meaningful in terms of statistical 
significance, the boundaries in the clinical domain are less clear-cut.  In some cases, 
children will actively construct and engage in imagery or a distraction technique and 
shift to a reality that has little in common with the procedural reality, where pain and 
fear simply do not feature.  Statistically, and clinically, this would constitute a success.  
However, during a painful procedure, a child might have periods where he or she is 
absorbed in, and actively construing the alternate reality, then swings back to the 
procedural reality, and then is able to reset, or reconstrue the active – passive 
construing balance back to the alternate reality.  In terms of clinical significance, this 
would not constitute a failure; there are many levels of success.  Depending on the 
balance of active vs. passive construction, the qualia of fear and pain will vary with 
regard to the alternate reality in their intensity, personal and social significance. 
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Figure 3.  ‘Limbic forebrain – Consciousness – Reality’ relationships in a Procedural Pain Reality.  (Adapted 
from LeDoux, 1987, 1998, 2002)  The broad arrow rising in the shaded area represents the emerging 
Evanescent Self.  Activity below the Evanescent Self is in the domain of the Greater Self (Cairns-Smith, 
1999). 
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Figure 3 outlines the proposed interactions between limbic forebrain regions, 
consciousness, and the related effects in the procedural pain reality – Reality 1.  In 
terms of the passive construing – active construing construct, the child actively 
construes the painful and frightening aspects of the procedural reality and passively 
construes the distractor or does not engage in imagery.   Awareness of what emerges 
around working memory (Baars, 1996; Baddeley, 1993; LeDoux, 1998; Phaf & 
Wolters, 1997; Schachter, 1991), or the qualia of Cairns-Smith’s ‘Evanescent Self’, is 
what is central to the child’s sense of consciousness.  The key structures are likely to 
include the lateral prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, the orbital cortex and 
the association areas (LeDoux 1998).  The cognitions and aspects of consciousness that 
emerge from working memory are negative and centre on powerlessness, lack of status, 
danger, no control, and extreme threat.  The association areas abound with the alarming 
sensory input of the procedure room and the people present.  Somatosensory, visual, 
and auditory associations are representations of self in an environment that is harmful, 
threatening and dangerous.  Some of this activity, particularly in the association areas 
and the anterior cingulate (LeDoux 1998; Roth 2000), emerges as conscious awareness, 
with the Evanescent Self (shaded area), however, much is beyond consciousness, in 
Cairn-Smith’s terms, the ‘Greater Self’.  The Greater Self encompasses all brain 
activity, of which one is not consciously aware.   The projections from working 
memory and the association areas to the amygdala are well defined (LeDoux 1987), 
and even stronger are the reciprocal projections back to these and other cortical areas, 
which focuses attention on the alarming incoming sensory information.  Working 
memory draws upon experiences and knowledge in long-term memory.  New memories 
are laid down (LeDoux, 1987) via the hippocampus (factual) and the amygdala (fear 
related).  Activation of the amygdala mediates the fear response via output connections; 
these set the hormonal, autonomic, and fear behaviours into action (LeDoux, 1987).  At 
the same time, the activated amygdala innervates the nucleus basalis, which heightens 
acetylcholine arousal of the cortex (Amaral et al., cited in LeDoux, 1998).  The flurry 
of bodily responses from amygdala mediated hormonal, autonomic and fear behaviours 
feeds back (LeDoux, 1998) to the constructed reality and sense of self that emerges 
from working memory.  The qualia of the child’s Evanescent Self, the fearfulness of 
fear, the painfulness of pain and the terror of being terrified emerge as consciousness, 
within the child.  Some might hope to ‘save face’ to try to bare it, others will scream in 
pain and fear. 
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Figure 4 outlines the proposed interactions between limbic forebrain regions, 
consciousness, and the related effects in the imagery reality – Reality 2 – the 
Evanescent Self constructed in imagery, or in relation to actively construing and being 
involved in, a distraction.  As a child engages in imagery or the distraction, his or her 
mode of construing of the procedural reality (R1) becomes passive and the imagery or 
distraction shifts from the passive to the active pole.  As the child becomes increasingly 
engaged in the imagery or the distraction, his or her construed consciousness and 
reality shifts from R1 to R2, that is, Figure 3 to Figure 4.  Visual imaging is constructed 
in the visual associations areas in the temporal lobe (D’Esposito et al., 1997; Logothetis 
1999; Mellet et al., 2000; Mesulam, 1998), which feed into working memory.  It is 
likely that other sensory aspects of imagery are also constructed in the appropriate 
association areas.  For example, the child who was in the swimming pool in imagery 
during a lumbar puncture when asked what she could feel during the procedure said, “I 
could feel the water, lifting me and drifting me.” – the quality of the feelings and 
sensations are qualia and in Cairn-Smith’s terms, the ‘Me’ is the fleeting ‘Evanescent 
Self’ constructed in imagery.  Children frequently report bodily sensations that are 
congruent with their imagery.  In imagery, the somatosensory reality is consistent with 
the constructed reality in imagery, not the reality of the procedure room.  Even if there 
is bottom-up somatosensory input, the view is we are conscious of activity in the 
association areas not the primary sensory areas (Crick & Koch, 1995; Mesulam, 1998; 
Roth, 2000).  Coghill et al. (1999) concluded that pain intensity, affect, feature 
extraction (cognitive evaluation of a painful stimulus), motor control and attention are 
all subject to significant modulation by top-down factors.  It is possible that the bottom-
up afferent nociceptive input is modulated by top-down neural activity associated with 
the process of imaging.  Mesulam (1998, p. 1034) said, “Mental imagery provides one 
of at least three settings where the activation of sensory areas can transcend the 
constraints imposed by external reality”.  Top-down modulation would explain the 
apparent decrease in pain sensitivity, ‘the decreased ouch’, seen in children who are 
highly involved in distraction, imagery, hypnosis and indeed any psychological state 
that has an effect on pain.  Furthermore, this is consistent with the failure of opioid 
antagonists to reverse the analgesia in hypnosis (Spiegel & Albert, 1983) because the 
top-down modulation represents an alternate mechanism to the opioid-based 
downstream inhibitory pathways to the dorsal horn as outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
  
 
251  
If the child’s construed reality is somewhere on a continuum between R1 and 
R2, then as the child shifts from one reality to the other, the features of the prevailing 
reality take precedence.  In practice, children in imagery are aware of some aspects of 
R1 (they engage in conversation with the person guiding their imagery) but it is in the 
background and the sensations are not the same.  One 15 year-old in this study, on 
opening her eyes as she came out of her imagery and looking at the Bandaid® on her 
arm exclaimed in a puzzled manner, “Oh!  It’s done, is it?”  She appeared not to have 
realized that the venepuncture was over and the blood collected.  When asked what she 
could feel in her arm during the procedure she said, “I felt something, I don’t know, I 
thought it was her [the nurse’s] hair or something.”  It is important to note that the R1 to 
R2 shift is a dynamic continuum and a child in imagery may at any stage, move one 
way or the other, which explains the variability in effect. 
 
The cognitive and emotive aspects of the imagery in R2 reflect a safe place.  
The children in the imaging conditions reported positive thoughts and feelings, not 
necessarily relaxing, but engaging.  For example, a child could be playing a game of 
basketball, or running a race.  At a conscious level, good thoughts and feelings are 
consistent with R2 but what is also important is the brain activity that is not accessible, 
or in Cairn-Smith’s terms, is within the Greater Self.  In R2, what emerges from 
working memory is a consciousness, an Evanescent Self that is constructed in the 
process of imaging.  The Evanescent Self draws upon long-term memories and 
experiences associated with the imagery.  While this is happening, the amygdala, 
through its vast connections (Aggleton, 1992; LeDoux, 1987) monitors activity within 
the Evanescent Self and the Greater Self.  Activation of the amygdala is central to the 
experience of fear.  The amygdala is not activated because the imagery-related activity 
is not threatening or alarming.  This is not to say that it is not possible to experience a 
fear response while consciously imaging a non-threatening reality.  Neuronal activity in 
the Greater Self could certainly activate the amygdala and in so doing initiate a fear 
response.  If, however, the focus on the imagery is dominant, that is, the top-down 
construction of imagery qualia predominates, then amygdala activation via bottom-up 
processes is less likely to occur.  LeDoux, (1998) said, “It now seems undeniable that 
the emotional meaning of stimuli can be processed unconsciously” (p.64), which is 
consistent with the bottom-up, sensory – appraisal view.  The argument here is that in 
imagery, the brain constructs, and responds to, the experience rather than, as Greenfield 
(2000) said, merely being a sponge to the senses. 
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Implications of the Model for the Effects of Imagery versus Distraction on 
Fear and Pain 
The results from these studies suggest that both distraction and relaxation significantly 
reduce the fear experienced by a child during venepuncture.  In the cartoon study, 
distraction had a significant effect on fear and a definite trend towards a reduction in 
pain.  In the imagery study, relaxation reduced fear and high involvement in imagery 
effected a significant reduction in pain and related dependent variables.  Two related 
concepts are important here, firstly, the notion of the active construing – passive 
construing construct and, secondly, the notion of an R1 – R2 construct.  Regarding the 
mode of construing, the suggestion is that distraction and relaxation tend to be 
construed passively, but the mode of construing in distraction can shift towards the 
active pole.  High involvement in imagery is consistent with a shift to the active mode 
of construing, and importantly for both distraction and imagery, what is actively 
construed is not the procedural reality, but the reality and involvement in either the 
distraction or the imagery.  In terms of an R1 – R2 shift, distraction, relaxation and 
imagery begin in R1 but meaningful, engaging, and ideally, imaginative distraction and 
involvement in imagery shift the child’s reality construct to R2. 
 
In terms of Personal Construct Theory, the R1 – R2 construct is a useful way of 
considering the practical application of the model.  If the child were tightly construed 
around R1, the aim would be to loosen the child’s construing to entertain the notion that 
there is an alternative, which is R2.  This is, in essence, Kelly’s philosophy of 
constructive alternativism; the pain and fear of the procedural reality are not ‘givens’, 
because the child’s procedural reality is constructed, and as such, it can be reconstrued. 
 
The proposed relationship between fear and pain in reconstruing from R1 to R2 
is depicted in Figure 5 where the x-axis represents the R1 – R2 construct.  The process 
underpinning the loosening and transition from R1 to R2 is a shift to the active pole in 
construing the distraction or the imagery, and a concomitant shift from actively, to 
passively construing the procedure.  The y-axis represents the intensity of fear and 
pain. 
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Figure 5  Reality 1 (R1) – Reality 2 (R2) relationship between pain and fear in distraction, 
relaxation, imagery and hypnosis.  R1PF, Reality 1 – Procedure Focused, R1DF, Reality 1 
– Distractor Focused, while R2, represents a shift to an actively constructed alternate 
reality. 
 
At Reality 1 – Procedure Focussed (R1PF), fear and pain are actively construed 
and their intensity is high.  As the child loosens his or her construing around the R1PF 
pole, towards Reality 1 – Distractor Focussed (R1DF), the intensity of fear and pain 
start to decrease.  Note the pain curve is above the fear curve.  The two measures are 
strongly correlated so the shapes are similar.  A simple distractor, relaxation or low 
R1DF R2 
Pain 
Fear 
Intensity 
R1PF 
Distractor 
Relaxation 
Imagery Hypnosis 
Pain 
Fear 
Pain & Fear 
Actively construing 
procedure – Passively 
construing distractor 
Actively construing 
distractor, imagery, and/or 
suggestions.  Passively 
construing procedure. 
Distraction 
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involvement in imagery, moves the child along the R1 – R2 construct to a point at R1DF 
where fear is significantly reduced but pain is perceived.  The reason the child feels 
pain is that he or she is still actively constructing the sensorial reality of R1 but the 
emotional reality has many more avenues for change – power relationships, status, 
control – which are being reconstrued.  The association areas participate in what 
emerges as consciousness.  The activity in the association areas in R1 is based on input 
from the primary sensory areas.  In less effective distraction techniques or low 
involvement in imagery, unlike effective distraction, high involvement in imagery, or 
hypnosis, the child’s sensorial consciousness is constructed around R1.  When a child 
begins to actively construe the distractor and it becomes a ‘distraction’, or the child 
actively constructs his or her imagery, as measured in this study by the high IAS, he or 
she constructs a sensorial consciousness that is not consistent with the procedural 
reality, R1.  Imagery is not just distraction from one reality, and effective distraction is 
arguably something more than paying attention to a distractor.  The ‘something more’ 
is the shift from passive to active construing, the laying over of personal meaning, and 
identifying with, rather than being a passive observer. 
 
In imagery, or when something (a distractor) other than the immediate 
procedural reality is actively construed, the child’s Evanescent Self takes a qualitative 
shift, complete with unique qualia.  When this happens, conscious awareness, the 
Evanescent Self, shifts from R1 to R2.  R2 could then shift to R3, R4, and so on. When 
this happens, awareness of the pain in R1 is reduced.  Top-down displacement of 
bottom-up nociceptive input is an accepted phenomenon in brain neurophysiology 
(Coghill et al., 1999; Mesulam, 1998) but even this is suggestive of a competitive 
paradigm.  The preferred model here is a shift to a completely different sensorial 
experience, constructed in a top-down manner, rather than a fixed ‘reality 
consciousness’ admitting some-but-not-other aspects of experience. 
 
Links with Emotion Theories and Personal Construct Psychology 
The theory represented in Figures 3, 4 and 5 discussed above draws upon top-down 
processes rather than the bottom-up, sensory – appraisal view.  This approach is 
consistent with the constructivist view that the brain is actively involved in creating our 
sense of the world.  As expressed by Greenfield (2000), the brain is more than a mere 
sponge to the senses.  This does not render the emotion theories redundant.  The 
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relevance of the emotion theories discussed in Chapter 3 resides in the cognitive 
aspects of the proposed model.  However, within the constructivist view, construing is 
not the same as appraising.  Appraisal implies the attachment of meaning to bottom-up 
sensory input, whereas the act of construing is a synthesis of cognition including top-
down processing into the constructed view of self in the world.  
 
Power, status and control from Kemper (1993) are obvious factors in construing 
procedural fear.  In R1 the child construes no power: ‘there is nothing I can do, they are 
going to make me have this procedure’; no status ‘you don’t care what I think, you 
don’t listen to me, you don’t respect my view’; or control: ‘everything is happening to 
me and there is nothing I can do to stop it’.  The negative power differential and lack of 
control in Kemper’s view predispose a child to fear.  If the child perceives no status, 
and the agents are the health professionals and perhaps the mother then the resultant 
emotion would be anger (Kemper, 1993; 2000).  The social realm also includes issues 
related to solidarity.  If the child construes loss of solidarity with the mother, stemming 
from the mother’s powerlessness, this will exacerbate a sense of abandonment and fear. 
If the child construes that the erosion in solidarity stems from betrayal by the mother 
then the emotion might be anger.  The social interactions and emotions in a procedure 
room are complex and dynamic.  Through the course of a procedure, a child can 
experience fear anger and sadness in a multitude of sequences and combinations 
depending on how the child construes his or her reality.  Within the constructivist view, 
these emotions are not givens but they are possible constructs if the child is not given a 
tangible opportunity to reconstrue coupled with nothing to focus on other than the 
procedure. 
 
In contrast is the child who actively constructs an alternate reality (R2) in 
imagery.  The health professional is listening to, and engaging with, the child in 
imagery, not telling the child what to do and how to behave.  Everyone present is 
listening to the child.  It is common to build one’s own image of the child’s reality as 
the child speaks.  The child is an active participant rather than a resistant recipient of 
treatment.  The child’s constructs are manifestations of his or her perceived status, 
empowerment and control, which, according to Kemper, are not consistent with anger 
and fear.  These factors are important with regard to establishing trust and rapport with 
the child and therefore the likelihood of the child participating in the imagery, 
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particularly when the child is already afraid – as evident in this study by the high pre-
procedural fear scores.  
 
Plutchik viewed fear as an emotion that primes the individual for escape to 
ensure protection.  Fear in Plutchik’s terms will diminish if the individual can escape 
and escalate in the face of danger if there is no escape.  This is very much a stimulus – 
response view located firmly in the sensory – appraisal paradigm.  Danger, within the 
PCP view, is only danger because it is, in this case, actively construed that way.  If 
‘danger’ was taken as the negative pole on a danger – safe construct, and the child was 
able to reconstrue towards the safe pole, then the fear would subside.  Using imagery to 
reconstrue to the safe pole is not what Plutchik considered as escaping from a ‘given’ 
threat but from the child’s perspective, it works.  Furthermore, the Plutchik model does 
not readily handle the social factors that facilitate, or inhibit the likelihood of the child 
being able to reconstrue to the safe pole.  The sociology of procedural pain must be 
considered.  For example, ignoring, deceiving, forcibly restraining, and exercising 
power-over a child during a procedure, are factors that are unlikely to loosen the child’s 
tight construing around the ‘danger’ pole.  Distraction, relaxation techniques and 
entering an imagined world are ways of imparting positive attention and giving the 
child something to focus on other than the procedure.  These factors could help the 
child to loosen and reconstrue to the positive ‘safe’ pole.   Relaxation, simple 
distraction and low involvement in imagery reduced fear but not pain, which suggests 
that even though the participants could feel the pain, their fear was reduced by having 
something other than the procedure to focus on.  ‘Having something other than the 
procedure to focus on’ could be a way of imparting some sense of control and 
loosening around the danger pole. 
 
If the child’s consciousness, that is, awareness of what emerges from working 
memory is focussed on the distraction then the emergence of a fear response would be 
less likely to occur provided the focus of the distraction is not negatively construed.  
Clinically, the challenge is to present distractors that will not only catch the attention of 
the child, but distractors that the child will actively construe and become involved in.  
Kuttner (1986) has championed a number of distraction techniques ranging from 
simply blowing bubbles, to engaging the child in a ‘pop-up’ storey book. Other 
approaches reviewed in Chapter 5 include a kaleidoscope (Carlson et al., 2000; Vessey 
et al., 1994) cartoons (Cohen et al., 1997), audio taped lullabies (Meagel et al., 1998) 
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and medical play techniques (Fassler, 1985).  The key to catching the child’s attention 
may lie in what Plutchik referred to as intensity of surprise on a distraction – 
amazement construct.  However, the social and cultural dimensions must also be 
considered to ensure that the surprise is construed in a positive manner.  Intuitively, 
anyone who has used distraction techniques with children would welcome a positive 
shift in the child’s attention to the amazement pole.  Within the model, the amygdala is 
unlikely to precipitate a fear response if what emerges from working memory is 
positively construed as amazing.   
 
Throughout this thesis, the constructivist view that the brain takes an active role 
in constructing our sense of self in the world is derived from Kelly’s Psychology of 
Personal Constructs.  Before closing this discussion, it is worth relating Kelly’s views 
on fear to the procedural pain context, which of course includes the health professional.  
As a starting point, the following analysis is offered bearing in mind that one’s 
constructs are individually construed within the PCP framework but the suggested 
constructs could be used as a point of embarkation on a PCP investigation of the 
model.   
 
Fear, in Kelly’s terms, results when a new incidental construct seems about to 
take over the core structure.  An incidental construct is focussed, it could be as 
straightforward as earlier suggested, danger, on a danger – safe core construct, when 
the nurse calls the child’s name or, I don’t know how to get through this, on a core 
construct, I don’t know how to get through this – I know how to get through this.   
 
In the case of fear, specific knowledge may be low.  In Kelly’s words, “We are 
threatened by hauntingly familiar things and frightened by unexpectedly strange things 
(Kelly, 1955, p. 494).  It is possible in some cases that the unknown exacerbates the 
child's fear.  For the child who has never had the procedure, the unknown is frightening 
because the more that is unknown, the less confident the child is about being able to get 
through the procedure – hence, the possibility of gravitation to the: I don’t know how to 
get through this, pole.  Emergency departments are full of people who are frightened 
because of the unknown – What is wrong with me?  What will they find?  What are 
they going to do to me?  Moreover, How am I going to get through what they are going 
to do?  For the child who has previous experience of painful procedures and who is 
terrified, the unknown does not relate to the technical aspects of the procedure.  In this 
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case, the child’s incidental construal could be more related to not knowing how she or 
he is going to cope, bear, get through what they are going to do to him or her especially 
given what happened last time.  On face value, to a ‘grown-up’ this could be construed 
as having little significance, particularly if the procedure is considered ’minor’.  
However, the complexity of a given procedure, or for that matter, the diagnosis, may 
have little to do with how the child construes the procedural reality.  As one young 
adult said when reflecting on what it was like to be a young child, experiencing 
repeated procedures, “I wasn’t afraid of sickness, I was afraid of pain; I was afraid of 
strange people coming in to give me this pain” (Kuttner, 1998).  We, the health 
professionals are the strangers.  If we are to understand procedural pain and fear in 
children, we must, at least consider the child’s reality.  Granted, not all ‘grown-up’ 
health professionals are interested in the child’s reality, or find this easy but for those 
who are concerned, a starting point, as discussed earlier, is to construe as the child 
construes.  It is not always easy to shelve one’s ‘grown up’ view of the world and think 
as the child thinks.  A starting point could be to consider the language (Tesler et al., 
1989) children use to describe the affective component of severe pain – killing, dying, 
deadly, suffocating, terrifying and torturing, and then consider the opposite poles.  In 
the spirit of Kelly’s constructive alternativism, an approach with a health professional 
who says, ‘I am an adult, I just can’t relate to children’ might be ‘If you were a child, 
how might you and your best friend relate to each other? On the other hand, more 
pertinently, ‘If you were a child, how might you relate to your worst enemy?  Issues of 
trust, being heard, fairness, hate and hurt, spring to the ‘child mind’.  Each of these are 
possible core constructs with likeness pole, and a contrast pole, and each construct 
could have a place in the model in Figures 3 and 4 next to the examples given: power, 
status, danger, threat. 
 
Generalizability 
It was stated at the outset that this thesis is about the psychology of fear and pain in 
children undergoing medical procedures.  However, the constructive tenor of the model 
represented in Figures 3 and 4 allows for generalization to any situation where the 
qualia of pain and fear are altered by psychological means; for example, altered pain 
and fear associated with religious ceremonies, and in hypnosis.  It is well known that in 
some cultures people undergo initiation ceremonies that involve extensive tissue 
damage while at the same time they seem oblivious to pain.  Not all so-called cultural 
examples are pain free – some subjects writhe and scream in pain during ceremonial 
  
 
259  
procedures.  Anderson and Anderson (1994) provide a balanced critical review of 
pertinent examples from Brazil, Sri Lanka and East Africa and state, “Nevertheless, it 
is abundantly clear that religious ecstasy alone is capable of masking enormous pain” 
(p. 125). 
 
Beecher’s (1946) patients in the forward army hospital with extensive tissue 
damage but not requesting pain relief could also be included here.  Beecher concluded 
that what was important regarding the refusal of analgesia was the context and meaning 
of the pain for the soldier.  Both the soldier and the religious participant are probably 
somewhere between R1DF and R2 but the cognitive factors, which could be thought of 
as ‘self-suggestions’ in a self-hypnotic sense, are overwhelming.  With regard to ‘fear 
or religious ecstasy inhibiting pain’, the argument here is not one of endogenous opioid 
modulation of bottom-up input.  The explanation is the same as for imagery and 
hypnosis, that is, the experience of pain, as every other conscious experience is 
constructed by the brain and emerges at what at this stage, is best approximated as a 
‘working memory’ view of consciousness.  If an individual’s consciousness has shifted, 
for whatever reason, from the actively constructed physical here and now to an actively 
constructed alternate reality then what is ‘real’, including the presence or absence of 
pain is a function of what exists in that reality.  For the child in a swimming pool in 
imagery, the Evanescent Self is in the pool and experiencing all the associated qualia.  
For Beecher’s soldiers, their construed reality, their Evanescent Self, may have centred 
on a sense of tremendous relief experienced in the realization “I am not going to die, I 
am going to get through this”. For the participant in the religious ceremony “I am at 
one with the Greater Being”. Under these circumstances, pain is simply not part of the 
artist’s picture – the individual’s sense of self in the world.  However, for the soldier, a 
fumbling medic, probing a needle around, trying to find a vein would be a focussed 
psychological trigger on the here and now of procedural pain, which presumably could 
have been avoided if the soldier was given an opportunity to develop an image of being 
at home.  Similarly, the religious participant who loses focus or, worse still, is 
subjected to, rather than participates in, the ceremony, may feel the full terror and pain 
of the experience.   
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The findings of the two studies have been discussed in some detail.  It remains 
to consider briefly the implications of the findings and the model for clinical practice 
and for further research.  These are addressed in the final chapter, Conclusions to the 
thesis after first providing a summary of the key issues identified in this discussion 
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CHAPTER 12 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Anecdotally, when using imagery with children during a painful procedure 
something appears to be happening to the normal experience of pain because some 
children seem to get through the procedure with no complaint of pain and on coming 
out of their imagery they are surprised that the procedure is over.  Distraction and 
relaxation techniques also seem to help children to cope with procedural pain and fear.  
Anecdotal reports based on clinical experience are, however, unlikely to advance our 
knowledge and understanding of the relationships between these interventions and fear 
and pain in children.  The aim of this thesis, therefore, was to investigate the effects of 
relaxation, distraction and imagery on procedural pain and fear in children and to 
propose a model that could account for the success and failure of these psychological 
interventions. 
 
This thesis has provided clear support for the view that psychological 
interventions such as distraction, relaxation and imagery are effective in reducing fear 
during medical procedures.  Furthermore, these interventions have been shown to work 
rapidly, with no preliminary training and to be successful where the fear is associated 
with acute pain. 
 
The research has also provided evidence that the total pain experience, when 
assessed primarily in terms of pain, fear, distress and related self-report measures, can 
also be reduced during imagery, may be reduced during distraction, but is not affected 
by relaxation alone.  The failure of relaxation to affect pain does not exclude it as a 
viable adjuvant because it had an effect on fear. 
 
The research has offered suggestive evidence that during imagery those children 
who were absorbed in their imagery were significantly lower in their reports of pain 
and all other aspects of pain except fear than those children who were less absorbed in 
imagery. 
 
In comparing the three interventions of distraction, relaxation and imagery, a 
model was proposed that recognised the complex interplay between cognitive, social 
and emotional factors that determine the extent to which each intervention would alter 
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different aspects of the pain experience.  It was suggested that changes in the pain 
experience were not only a matter of altered cognitions but were subject to the child’s 
perceived status within the medical procedure.  The role of the other in sustaining an 
alternative reality was thus recognised as a key practical feature in psychological 
interventions as was Kelly’s personal construct theory at an abstract level. 
 
Finally, the proposed model attempted to demonstrate that a top-down process 
of pain modulation that would be entailed by the success of psychological 
interventions, such as imagery, is in keeping with recent findings in neurophysiology.  
It was argued consistently that the ‘experience of pain’ cannot be explained in terms of 
a bottom-up, sensory – appraisal process in which the higher cortical centres simply 
weigh up incoming information form the various senses.  Rather the ‘consciousness’ of 
the higher cortical senses, the working memory areas in particular, reflects a ‘mindful’ 
search for relevant sensory information that is in keeping with the prevailing 
constructions.  Among the qualia that emerge from this mindful search, quale such as 
pain cannot ‘mean’ as much to the child who is in some imagined place, as they will to 
the child who is engaged in the medical procedure. 
 
Implications for Further Research 
The empirical findings can be extended in a variety of ways.  The need to 
deploy a range of measures when investigating the pain experience was clearly 
suggested.  Both self-report and observational methods were used, and the research 
revealed some inconsistencies between the two types of measures.  Within the self-
report measures, the research suggested that we should be quite sensitive to the aspects 
of the pain experience that are granted prominence.  Clearly different forms of 
intervention may have different effects on the various aspects and are worthy of closer 
examination.  Furthermore, the implications of stressing, ignoring or reclassifying the 
various aspects of the pain experience can be profound as was indicated in the 
discussion of labelling fear as anxiety.  Among the observational measures, differences 
between parent and nurse ratings of the child, and the extent to which observational 
measures actually assessed pain, as opposed to distress or fear, deserve further scrutiny. 
 
During the research, a scale to measure involvement in imagery was devised.  
This scale needs further assessment of its reliability and validity.  In particular, the 
scale’s capacity to predict which child engages in imagery should be examined.  As it 
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was used in the current research, there was a danger that imagery absorption was a 
reflection of how painful the procedure was rather than the reverse.  It would be 
comparatively straightforward to investigate children who had shown a capacity to be 
absorbed, or not, and discover whether these children do respond maximally to an 
imagery intervention.  Complications that should be carefully considered in such a 
study would be the circumstances under which imagery absorption was tested initially, 
and how the intervention was subsequently carried out.  The model proposed to explain 
imagery stressed that engagement in imagery is a complex function of how the child 
construes the medical procedure and the social setting in which imagery occurs.  The 
imagery scale could also be assessed in relation to the neurophysiological mechanisms 
that underpin the imagery process to be considered below. 
 
The precise nature of the psychological interventions needs to be examined 
further.  Much evidence was presented that showed the manner in which interventions 
have been described and tested, has often been the source of confusion.  While the 
current research was careful in the manner in which it presented the interventions, 
either in isolation or in combination, it still did not disentangle all the factors that are 
inherent in the interventions.  In particular, the proposed model suggests more attention 
must be paid to the social dynamics within the intervention.  The relative status and 
power of the child during the intervention is important in its own right, especially with 
regard to fear, but it may also be critical in determining whether the child engages in 
imagery.  Further research might usefully compare relaxation, cartoon distraction and 
even imagery presented in an accommodating or didactic fashion, thus trying to tease 
out the engagement process from the social position of the child during the particular 
intervention.  In addition, the relative importance of being flexible, being able to 
modify and adjust the intervention during interaction has been raised (Kuttner, 1988).  
In its extreme, this aspect of the process could be investigated by contrasting the 
flexibility of interactional interventions, such as imagery or hypnosis, with the imposed 
pace of a video or audiotape. 
 
This social psychological perspective could be useful in comparing the relative 
effectiveness of hypnosis and imagery.  The two approaches have much in common but 
the former attaches considerably more importance on suggestion.  On the one hand, this 
has been acknowledged to offer greater scope for direction of the child but for some 
children it may do so at the expense of the child’s social position.  It would be 
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interesting to see if research could establish the relative advantage of each approach, 
though the child’s previous experience and personality will be critical mediating 
factors. 
 
The importance of the social factors was inherent in the proposed model.  This 
was not just an added feature of the model, and an attempt to reflect the undoubted 
complexity of the process, it was a key aspect.  The critical nature of the social factors 
was recognised at various times in the thesis as it was suggested to explain the current, 
though weakening, ascendency of the bottom-up process.  As much debate in 
psychology has recognised, neural mechanisms may well largely reflect the social 
processes in which the person is engaged.  Thus, a child who is placed in a subservient 
position will largely act in a passive manner, which, in turn will be reflected in their 
neural mechanisms.  These mechanisms will appear to be a ‘sponge to the sensations’.  
If the child is accorded an active role then it is probable that the initiative and capacity 
for intended action will be obvious in the child’s manner and will ultimately be 
reflected in neural processes.  Unquestionably, our capacity to test out these models is 
currently constrained by our limited understanding of the so-called ‘neural correlates of 
consciousness’ but this will undoubtedly unfold in the future.  As the technology for 
investigating the phenomenon of consciousness develops, we might see that the extent 
to which afferent stimuli determine the neural mechanism is much less than the 
capacity of the brain to construct what are meaningful stimuli. 
 
Finally, the developing field of psychoneuroimmunology is becoming 
increasingly relevant to psychology and medicine.  The potential for 
immunosuppressive effects associated with the fear and stress of repeated procedures 
warrants investigation, particularly in light of the positive effects of psychological 
interventions of pain and fear.  It would not be difficult to investigate immune function 
in children in relation to procedural pain and fear, with and without interventions such 
as distraction, imagery or hypnosis. 
 
Implications for Practice 
Imagery is a therapeutic technique that allows a child to transcend a painful and 
frightening existence to a place that feels normal and sometimes is even fun.  The 
researcher said to one child after playing a game of cricket in imagery during the 
procedure, “You have had blood tests before, haven’t you.”  He replied, “Yeah but 
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never this exciting!”  It is likely that every person can construct images.  Whether or 
not a child can engage in guided imagery, or a distraction technique, probably has more 
to do with how the child construes the reality of the procedure room, including the 
health professional, than the child’s intrinsic ‘imaging’ or ‘distracting’ ability.  This is 
where the emotion theories are perhaps most relevant, in drawing attention to a 
therapeutic relationship that must be based on trust and rapport rather than power-over, 
control and compliance.  With this in mind, the successful implementation of a 
psychological approach to managing fear and pain with a child is likely to be advanced 
if we have a deeper understanding of how a particular child constructs his or her 
immediate reality, especially the relationships the child has with the health 
professionals.  It is easy to label a frightened child as anxious, difficult and 
manipulative.  As one nurse said, “Perhaps we have been hiding behind the needle for 
too long” (personal communication: Jennie Cross).  The health professional is an 
integral part of the child’s reality, particularly in a procedure room.  As the child’s 
emotional state before the procedure is such a strong predictor of how the child will 
construe the total pain experience, it makes sense pay particular attention to how the 
child construes the notion of a medical procedure well before he or she enters the 
physical reality.  Moreover, the onus is on us to consider how we might impact on how 
the child construes us, and what we leave behind when we walk away.  The notion of 
transcending our obvious ‘grown up’ assumptions about what is important, and what is 
peripheral and construing as a child construes, is a skill that, in the heat of the moment, 
might provide valuable insight into the child’s experience. 
 
For many clinicians and researchers who work with children, managing pain is 
not a problem; it is a challenge that is immensely rewarding.  For many, meeting this 
challenge is what is quintessential in their practice.  However, the word ‘quintessential’ 
could, fall short of the mark for some.  The Swedish translation of 'quintessential' is 
Kärnan (pronounced Shār-Nun, ‘Shār’ as cār).  More than ‘quintessential’, kärnan 
embraces ‘the core’, ‘the seed’, and ‘the heart’ of the matter.  Indeed, meeting the 
challenge of helping children to control their fear and pain could be construed as the 
“kärnan of practice” in paediatric pain.  








  
 
274  
APPENDIX B 
Checks on Randomisation of Participants in the Cartoon Study   
 
Table B-1 
Age by Condition 
 
  Group N Mean SD Std. Error Mean 
Age Cartoon 48 7.85 a 3.97 .57 
  Control 52 7.50 a 3.97 .55 
 
Note 
a t (98) = .446, p =. 657 
 
 
Table B-2 
Gender by Condition 
 
  Group Total 
  Cartoon Control  
Gender Boy 25 a 32 a 57 
 Girl 23 a 20 a 43 
Total  48 52 100 
 
Note 
a χ2 (1, N = 100) = 0.91, p =. 340.   
   
 
Table B-3 
Previous Venepuncture by Condition 
 
  Group Total 
   Cartoon Control  
History of 
Venepuncture 
No previous 
venepuncture 
31 a 40 a 71 
  Venepuncture more 
than 2 years ago. 
17 a 12 a 29 
Total  48 52 100 
 
Note 
a χ2 (1, N = 100) = 1.85, p =. 174.   
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Table B-4 
Nurse taking Blood by Condition 
   Group Total 
   Cartoon Control  
Nurse 1 6 4 10 
  2 18 14 32 
  3 9 9 18 
  4 5 4 9 
  5 7 10 17 
  6 2 11 13 
  7 1 0 1 
Total  48 52 100 
 
 Χ2 (6, N = 100) = 8.63, p =. 196.   
 
 
Table B-5 
Time of Day by Condition 
   Group Total 
   Cartoon Control  
Time of day Morning 14 18 32 
  Afternoon 34 34 68 
Total  48 52 100 
 
Note 
a χ2 (1, N = 100) = 0.34, p =. 560.   
 
 
Table B-6 
Parents Present by Condition 
 Group Total 
 Cartoon Control  
Mother 33 35 68 
Father 8 6 14 
Both Parents 6 10 16 
No Parentsa 0 1 1 
Otherb 1 0 1 
Total 48 52 100 
Note:  
aOne 16 year-old independent boy wanted to participate in the study and was included. 
b One child was accompanied by a grandparent. 
cχ2  (4, N = 100) = 3.19, p =. 527 
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APPENDIX C 
Dependent Variable Untransformed Means and Standard Deviations by Condition in 
the Cartoon Study   
Table C-1 
Untransformed measures by condition in the Cartoon Study 
 CONTROL  CARTOON 
 n Mean  SD  n Mean  SD 
Pain – CHEOPS 29 10.66 2.00  25 8.44 2.04 
Pain – VAS 36 35.97 24.10  33 27.39 23.25 
Fear – Poker Chip 36 1.67 1.14  33 .73 .76 
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APPENDIX D 
Imagery Absorption Scale (IAS): Internal Consistency 
 
Table D-1 
IAS Corrected Item-Total Correlations 
Scored Item Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if Item Deleted 
Eyes .60 .84 
Place .38 .87 
Relaxed .66 .84 
Speech .79 .82 
Flow .69 .84 
Affect .66 .84 
Duration .74 .83 
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APPENDIX E 
Checks on Randomisation of Participants in the Relaxation and Imagery Study.   
 
Table E-1 
Age by Condition 
 n Age Mean 
   6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16  
Control 30 2 1 1 4 2 2 4 2 8 2 2 11.7a 
RT/GI 30 3 4 2 3 2 3 5 5 2 1  10.33 a 
Relaxation 30 2 5 2 2 2 6 2 3 4 2  10.53 a 
Imagery 30 1 6 3 2 3 3 6 2 1 2 1 10.37 a 
 120 8 16 8 11 9 14 17 12 15 7 3  
Note 
 aF (3, 116) = 1.77, ns. 
 
 
Table E-2 
Gender by Condition 
 Boy Girl Total 
Control 13 17 30 
RT/GI 12 18 30 
Relaxation 14 16 30 
Imagery 13 17 30 
 52 68 120 
 
χ2  (3, N = 120) = 0.27, ns. 
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Table E-3 
Nurse Performing the Venepuncture by Condition 
  Nurse 1 Nurse 2 Nurse 3 Nurse 4 Nurse 5 Nurse 6 Nurse 7 Total 
Control 3 3 4 8 4 3 5 30 
RT/GI 5 5 1 8 5 2 4 30 
Relaxation  4 3 12 2 4 5 30 
Imagery 8 3 5 8 2 3 1 30 
 16 15 13 36 13 12 15 120 
 
χ2  (18, N = 120) = 18.87 
 
 
Table E-4 
Caregiver Present by Condition 
  Mother Father Both Other Total 
Control 21 4 3 2 30 
RT/GI 22 3 2 3 30 
Relaxation 21 5 3 1 30 
Imagery 19 3 1 7 30 
 83 15 9 13 120 
 
χ2   (9, N = 120) = 8.57, ns. 
 
 
Table E-5 
Previous Venepuncture by Condition 
 Previous 
venepuncture 
Total 
 Yes No  
Control 21 9 30 
RT/GI 22 8 30 
Relaxation 22 8 30 
Imagery 27 3 30 
 92 28 120 
 
χ2   (3, N = 120) = 4.01, ns. 
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APPENDIX F 
Untransformed and Transformed Descriptive Statistics in the Relaxation and 
Imagery Study 
   
Table F-1 
Untransformed Descriptive Statistics – Whole Sample 
  N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Pain 118 28.41 28.08 1.31 .79 
Fear pre-test 120 1.88 1.26 .43 -.89 
Fear Post-test 120 1.16 1.20 .95 .05 
Bother 119 24.75 31.48 1.38 .69 
Uptight - Parent rating 
Pre-test 
120 4.81 3.54 .02 -1.39 
Uptight - Parent rating 
Post-test 
120 3.71 2.95 .56 -.65 
Uptight - Nurse rating 
Pre-test 
120 4.39 2.54 .08 -.60 
Uptight - Nurse rating 
Post-test 
120 3.87 2.72 .48 -.71 
Distress – OSBD 117 1.41 3.03 4.39 26.72 
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Table F-2  
Untransformed Descriptive Statistics – Control Condition 
 n Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Pain 30 26.87 20.24 .96 -.15 
Fear Pre-test 30 1.63 1.03 .62 .26 
Fear Post-test 30 1.47 1.20 .28 -1.01 
Bothered 30 26.50 28.97 1.27 .84 
Uptight - Parent rating 
Pre-test 
30 4.07 3.50 .21 -1.45 
Uptight - Parent rating 
Post-test 
30 4.10 2.99 .12 -1.01 
Uptight - Nurse rating 
Pre-test 
30 3.70 2.48 -.07 -.99 
Uptight - Nurse rating 
Post-test 
30 3.90 2.76 .122 -.99 
Distress – OSBD  30 1.11 1.60 1.35 .78 
 
 
 
Table F-3 
Untransformed Descriptive Statistics – Relaxation Condition 
 n Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Pain 30 28.37 31.93 1.47 .77 
Fear Pre-test 30 1.87 1.48 .31 -1.32 
Fear Post-test 30 1.23 1.45 1.08 -.20 
Bothered 30 23.83 30.56 1.75 2.02 
Uptight - Parent rating 
Pre-test 
30 4.60 3.56 .19 -1.33 
Uptight - Parent rating 
Post-test 
30 3.43 2.75 .72 -.31 
Uptight - Nurse rating 
Pre-test 
30 4.33 2.43 -.06 -.30 
Uptight - Nurse rating 
Post-test 
30 3.63 2.36 .83 .43 
Distress – OSBD 30 1.5143 4.60 4.38 20.70 
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Table F-4  
Untransformed Descriptive Statistics – Imagery Condition 
 n Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Pain 29 30.34 30.32 1.32 .81 
Fear Pre-test 30 2.03 1.38 .19 -1.16 
Fear Post-test 30 1.23 1.22 .85 -.09 
Bothered 29 22.17 30.90 1.46 1.09 
Uptight - Parent rating 
Pre-test 
30 4.87 3.79 .00 -1.52 
Uptight - Parent rating 
Post-test 
30 3.70 3.19 .77 -.50 
Uptight - Nurse rating 
Pre-test 
30 4.67 2.59 .18 -.45 
Uptight - Nurse rating 
Post-test 
30 4.03 3.05 .63 -.82 
Distress – OSBD 28 2.00 3.16 1.75 2.54 
 
 
 
Table F-5  
Untransformed Descriptive Statistics – Relaxation/Imagery Condition 
  n Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Pain 29 28.10 29.80 1.15 .53 
Fear Pre-test 30 2.00 1.14 .74 -.92 
Fear Post-test 30 .70 .70 .50 -.78 
Bothered 30 26.40 36.39 1.26 .09 
Uptight - Parent rating 
Pre-test 
30 5.70 3.27 -.28 -1.15 
Uptight - Parent rating 
Post-test 
30 3.60 2.99 .67 -.27 
Uptight - Nurse rating 
Pre-test 
30 4.87 2.64 .18 -.88 
Uptight - Nurse rating 
Post-test 
30 3.90 2.78 .36 -.96 
OSBD Observer 1. 29 1.05 1.82 2.34 5.86 
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Table F-6 
Transformed Descriptive Statistics – Control Condition 
  Transformation 
X = Score 
n Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Pain  X.4 30 3.45 1.21 -.33 .90 
Fear Pre  X.7 30 1.33 .67 -.15 .25 
Fear Post X.7 30 1.17 .84 -.18 -1.19 
Bother X.4 30 3.04 1.83 -.01 -.70 
Uptight – Parent rating 
Pre-test 
X.8 30 2.81 2.25 .01 -1.52 
Uptight – Parent rating 
Post-test 
X.8 30 2.90 1.93 -.18 -1.02 
Uptight – Nurse rating 
Pre-test 
X.8 30 2.70 1.65 -.36 -.90 
Uptight – Nurse rating 
Post-test 
X.8 30 2.81 1.78 -.16 -1.04 
Distress – OBSD X.1 30 .49 .54 .18 -2.07 
Relaxed Reflected X.5 30 2.39 .59 -.63 -.20 
 
 
Table F-7 
Transformed Descriptive Statistics – Relaxation Condition 
 Transformation 
X = Score 
n Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Pain  X.4 30 3.33 1.53 .87 -.38 
Fear Pre  X.7 30 1.40 .95 -.11 -1.17 
Fear Post X.7 30 .95 .97 .64 -.85 
Bother X.4 30 2.77 1.91 .19 -.43 
Uptight – Parent rating 
Pre-test 
X.8 30 3.17 2.21 -.04 -1.33 
Uptight – Parent rating 
Post-test 
X.8 30 2.53 1.74 .42 -.68 
Uptight – Nurse rating 
Pre-test 
X.8 30 3.12 1.54 -.41 -.26 
Uptight – Nurse rating 
Post-test 
X.8 30 2.71 1.45 .50 -.03 
Distress – OBSD X.1 30 .36 .52 .82 -1.29 
Relaxed Reflected X.5 29 1.77 .62 .45 -.76 
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Table F-8 
Transformed Descriptive Statistics – Imagery Condition 
 Transformation 
X = Score 
n Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Pain  X.4 29 3.40 1.66 -.01 -.10 
Fear Pre  X.7 30 1.53 .86 -.31 -.74 
Fear Post X.7 30 1.00 .86 .29 -.94 
Bother X.4 29 2.40 2.14 .41 -1.09 
Uptight – Parent rating 
Pre-test 
X.8 30 3.29 2.38 -.20 -1.46 
Uptight – Parent rating 
Post-test 
X.8 30 2.66 1.98 .48 -.77 
Uptight – Nurse rating 
Pre-test 
X.8 30 3.32 1.59 -.19 -.22 
Uptight – Nurse rating 
Post-test 
X.8 30 2.90 1.86 .39 -.93 
Distress – OBSD X.1 28 .55 .57 .07 -2.06 
Relaxed Reflected X.5 29 2.13 .74 -.34 -1.04 
Imagery – IAS  Log Reflected X 30 .60 .30 -.61 -.32 
 
 
 
Table F-9  
Transformed Descriptive Statistics – Relaxation and Imagery Condition 
 Transformation 
X = Score 
n Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Pain  X.4 29 3.10 1.90 -.10 -.88 
Fear Pre  X.7 30 1.57 .63 .61 -1.13 
Fear Post X.7 30 .65 .61 .11 -1.49 
Bother X.4 30 2.54 2.33 .40 -1.22 
Uptight – Parent rating 
Pre-test 
X.8 30 3.88 1.98 -.51 -.85 
Uptight – Parent rating 
Post-test 
X.8 30 2.59 1.91 .30 -.64 
Uptight – Nurse rating 
Pre-test 
X.8 30 3.46 1.57 .00 -.99 
Uptight – Nurse rating 
Post-test 
X.8 30 2.83 1.74 .12 -1.08 
Distress – OBSD X.1 29 .44 .54 .40 -1.94 
Relaxed Reflected X.5 30 1.87 .72 .34 -1.14 
Imagery – IAS  Log Reflected X 30 .51 .41 -.07 -1.70 
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APPENDIX G 
Untransformed Descriptive Statistics: Relaxation Scores, Whole Sample and by 
Condition. 
Table G-1 
Untransformed Relaxation Scores.  
 
 N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
      
Whole Sample 118 6.34 2.89 -.38 -.89 
 Control 30 4.97 2.63 .11 -.67 
 RT/GI 30 7.00 2.89 -.76 -.49 
 Relaxation 29 7.48 2.4 -.97 .34 
 Imagery 29 5.93 3.03 -.19 -.80 
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APPENDIX H 
Untransformed Descriptive Statistics: IAS Scores, Whole Sample and by Condition. 
 
Table H-1  
Untransformed IAS Scores.  
 
 N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
      
Whole Sample 60 8.22 3.26 -.48 -1.01 
 RT/GI 30 8.27 3.73 -.48 -1.33 
 Imagery 30 8.17 2.78 -.51 -.61 
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APPENDIX I 
Correlations between the Post-Procedural Measures in the Non-Imaging and 
Imaging Conditions 
  
Table I-1 
Correlations: Non-Imaging Conditions – Post-procedural measures (N = 60) 
 Pain Fear Post Bother 
Valency of 
Thoughts 
 
Valency of 
Feelings 
 
Parent Post Nurse Post Distress 
Pain 1.000 .808** .732** .532** .624** .536** .420** .468** 
Fear Post  1.000 .664** .602** .592** .587** .416** .355** 
Bother   1.000 .569** .537** .497** .395** .380** 
Thoughts    1.000 .553** .582** .255* .288 
Feelings     1.000 .434** .343** .413** 
Parent Post      1.000 .533** .197 
Nurse Post       1.000 .255* 
Distress        1.000 
Note:  
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table I-2 
Correlations: Imaging Conditions – Post-procedural measures 
  Pain Fear Post Bother 
Valency of 
Thoughts 
 
Valency of 
Feelings 
 
Parent 
Post Nurse Post Distress 
Pain r  1.000 .543** .765** .397** .406** .493** .560** .440** 
 N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 55 
Fear Post r   1.000 .417** .438** .357** .520** .494** .348** 
 N  60 59 60 60 60 60 57 
Bother r    1.000 .419** .471** .544** .587** .534** 
 N   59 59 59 59 59 56 
Thoughts r     1.000 .337** .387** .273* .257 
 N    60 60 60 60 57 
Feelings r      1.000 .337** .184 .214 
 N     60 60 60 57 
Parent Post r       1.000 .688** .529** 
 N      60 60 57 
Nurse Post r        1.000 .545** 
 N       60 57 
Distress r         1.000 
 N        57 
Note:  
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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